20 APR 2024 · Hegel critiques Gustav Hugo's approach to the history of Roman law for its attempt to rationalize laws and regulations that are fundamentally unjust and inhumane, such as the right to execute creditors, slavery, and the treatment of women and children as property. Hugo justifies these on historical grounds, seeking explanations in the context of the times rather than assessing them against the standards of reason. In stark contrast, Hegel seeks to engage with Roman civil law in a way that acknowledges its influence on contemporary legal systems and addresses the foundations of legal rights in a society undergoing political and social transformation. He argues that the upheaval of historical events has infused Roman legal concepts with new intellectual substance, relevant to the modern world. This reformation has redefined the concept of a "person" in law, expanding the rights and freedoms to all human beings, making freedom a core principle of legal rights. Thus, Hegel's perspective moves beyond historical justification to a critical engagement with law in the context of human rights and societal progress.

17 APR 2024 · The transition from property to contract is a philosophical or logical transition that doesn't add new elements to property but reveals its inherent relational nature. In Hegel's perspective property is considered to be an embodiment of the will, which becomes concrete through recognition by others, on the basis of a common will. This common will is foundational to the concept of property and is explicitly expressed in contracts. Contracts, therefore, are not just legal agreements but the manifestation of a collective will that acknowledges individual freedoms and ownership. They represent a higher realization of freedom, transcending the mere possession of things to embody the collective will and recognition of personhood. However, contracts are also a limited expression of freedom, as they can be contested and do not fully encapsulate the idea of freedom where understanding and existence align. This nuanced view of contracts highlights their role in the broader dynamic of realizing freedom, beyond economic or psychological processes, and points to the need for further analysis to understand their place in political reality.

16 APR 2024 · Though Hegel's 1820 Philosophy of Right faced undue criticism during and after his life, being labeled an apology for Prussian absolutism, it was in fact an effort by Hegel to express the rational form of a reformed, modern European state and society. This vision was shared by individuals such as Baron von Stein and Prince von Hardenburg in Prussia, and was well-understood by Hegel's friends and students. At the heart of Hegel's work is the notion that what constitutes right is essential for the realization of freedom. In this aspect, he stayed true to his Kantian roots while simultaneously breaking away from Kant. A key difference between the two philosophers lies in Hegel's rejection of Kant's assertion that freedom necessitates exercising a non-natural causality upon ourselves, one that exists outside the natural order and can initiate events without being affected by prior causal chains. Hegel, on the other hand, saw freedom not as a form of causality, but rather as our ability to adopt a negative stance towards our inclinations, desires, and impulses. While both philosophers agreed that the will is fundamentally a form of practical reason guided by norms, Hegel disputed the notion that a special form of causality was required for such a will to be free. According to Hegel, our freedom lies in our approach to our actions; we are truly free when we act based on reasons we can consider our own – those with which we identify ourselves. An individual's preferences, desires, and impulses hold normative status only if they align with their overall life plan and contribute to their sense of identity. Hegel believed that while there may be an empirical explanation for how our decisions ultimately move us, this would not be crucial for understanding why an action is considered one's own or expresses one's acknowledgment of their reasons for acting. The need for a special doctrine of transcendental causality would only arise if reasons were viewed as separate entities. In the realm of human nature, the ability to possess a will signifies, foremost, the capacity for one's actions to embody one's practical commitments - emerging from and integrating within the grand design of one's existence. Such actions are executed not due to extraneous reasons, but precisely because of these commitments. Secondly, it entails the aptitude for introspection regarding these practical engagements, evaluating their relevance in relation to other objectives and principles an individual may contemplate. Lastly, it requires the comprehension that these obligations are self-imposed and not dictated by external forces. To possess a will is to exhibit intentionality in our actions and adhere to established norms. As Hegel discerned, the will is a manifestation of thought. Conversely, the absence of such liberty would entail acting based on factors one cannot rationally support or validate - ultimately succumbing to external influences such as unbridled desires or arbitrary societal customs.

15 APR 2024 · Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/hegels-dialectic-philosophy--4573240/support. As we delve into the latter portion of our discourse on alienation and the shift toward contract, allow me to first remark that within Hegel's philosophy, the notion of property extends beyond a mere ideological endorsement of the ruling class – those who amass the lion's share of possessions or dominate land ownership within a nation. Hegel's interest lies not in championing the cause of the so-called Junkers or landowners; rather, his concept of property law serves a critical function. Consider this fundamental truth: every individual possesses the right to own something. Property law encompasses all, excluding none. Consequently, no person may be deemed an object, a slave, or a mere vessel for another's will or control. This principle emerges clearly in our examination of property alienation. Returning to the idea of alienation, it signifies the withdrawal of one's will from a specific object or possession. In both acquisition and relinquishment – or alienation – of property, the will reflects upon itself. Even as it surrenders its property to others, it remains connected to itself. Through alienation, it becomes evident that objects possess no rights; only persons bear such rights. Given that things lack volition, we hold dominion over their fate. Yet this authority to alienate property applies solely to items appropriately classified as property – those inherently external in nature. Property concerns only that which exists outside of an individual's being. Aspects not entirely external but intrinsic to one's essence are exempt from property law and thus cannot undergo alienation. One's personality and the core of one's existence remain inviolable; they cannot be demoted to mere objects subject to another's ownership rights. The rationale behind this limitation is readily apparent: the very purpose of rights is to manifest freedom. No right exists for negating that freedom; otherwise, rights would become fundamentally ambiguous – simultaneously representing freedom and obliterating it. There can be no right to nullify one's own personhood, for such an act would constitute a contradiction in terms. In considering the matter of personhood, one must inevitably confront the absolute injustice of slavery. Within the confines of slavery, a person ceases to exist, replaced by an alienated being who no longer belongs to himself but to another. The slave's will resides not within himself, but in the hands of his master, who degrades the individual to the status of property or mere thing.  Whether slavery is voluntary or forced becomes an inconsequential distinction. According to Hegel, voluntary slavery represents a contradiction, an act in opposition to one's very nature. The free will cannot exist in attempting not to be free will; such a notion is inherently contradictory. One may not suspend their own rationality, conscience, or religious faith – these are not external factors but rather constitutive elements of one's essence and personality. When others dictate our beliefs or actions on our behalf, we surrender our own personalities. The matter becomes more complex when considering physical and spiritual aptitudes - while they are part of our being as individuals, they are not synonymous with our identities. In a limited capacity, one may renounce the right of property regarding labor and production. Our activities do not wholly define us; we cannot be reduced solely to the tasks we perform. However, this does not extend to the totality of our time for labor and production. To alienate all available time for labor equates to enslavement, for the totality of expression is power itself. A person is not merely the owner of his own life; life is not an external aspect of one's personality. Rather, life encompasses the totality of all external activities and is an intrinsic part of being oneself. As such, Hegel contends that a person has no right to take his own life – doing so would imply standing above oneself in contradiction. In conclusion, personhood stands as a bastion against the injustice of slavery and serves as a reminder that we are more than the sum of our actions, beliefs, and abilities. To preserve the sanctity of personhood, we must resist any form of enslavement that seeks to strip us of our inherent rights and freedoms. Essential characteristics of alienation, a concept critical in comprehending the forthcoming discussion on the transition to contractual agreements.

15 APR 2024

15 APR 2024 · A. Abstract Right  (a) property   Immediate freedom expresses itself in objects Par. 488 - The mind, as an individual with self-determined freedom, understands its abstract liberty through the possession of external objects, which lack their own will and thus are subject to the mind's intelligence and volition.  The mind, an entity of self-determined freedom, perceives its liberty in an abstract form. This abstract liberty is understood through the possession of external objects, which inherently lack their own will. These objects become subject to the mind's intelligence and volition, serving as a canvas upon which the mind projects its freedom. This projection is not a mere assertion of control but a fundamental expression of the mind's immediate freedom. Property, not possession expresses my personhood Par. 489 - Through the act of possession, an object becomes 'mine', reflecting not just a practical claim but the infusion of my personal will into it, transforming possession into property that serves as a means for expressing my personality as an end.  Possession, in its initial form, is a practical claim over an object, signifying that it is 'mine.' However, this practical aspect transcends into a deeper infusion of personal will into the object. Through this process, possession evolves into property, which is not merely a means to an end but the end itself. Property becomes a tangible expression of one's personality, embodying the will and essence of the individual.   Personhood is still only abstract unity with itself Par. 490 - Ownership unites a person with their abstract self through external objects, and this self-relationship is realized and affirmed through mutual recognition with others.  Ownership is more than a legal or economic construct; it is a unifying force that connects a person with their abstract self. Through the ownership of external objects, a person engages in a self-relationship that is both realized and affirmed through the mutual recognition with others. This recognition is not a passive acknowledgment but an active engagement that solidifies the person's existence within a community of individuals.   Independent persons recognize others in property Par. 491 - Objects serve as the medium through which individuals, aware of their freedom and independence, express and recognize their will by taking possession or marking ownership.  Objects, thus, become the medium through which individuals express and recognize their will. Aware of their freedom and independence, persons use objects to manifest their will in the physical world. The act of taking possession or marking ownership is not a mere formality but a declaration of one's identity and autonomy.   Properties are bought and sold: cooperation between freedoms Par. 492 - Property involves the discretionary act of imbuing an object with one's will, which can be freely placed or withdrawn, and it is through this personal will that ownership can be transferred to another by mutual agreement, forming a contract.  Property, as a concept, encompasses the discretionary act of placing one's will into an object. This act is arbitrary, allowing for the will to be freely placed or withdrawn. It is through this personal will that the essence of contract emerges. Ownership can be transferred to another by mutual agreement, forming a contract that represents a cooperation between freedoms. TEST YOURSELVES What does the mind use as a 'canvas' to project its freedom? A) Its own will B) External objects C) Abstract concepts D) Intelligence and volition How does possession transform into property according to the text? A) By becoming a practical claim B) Through legal or economic constructs C) By infusing personal will into the object D) Through mutual recognition with others What does ownership primarily serve as in expressing personality? A) A means to an end B) An end in itself C) A legal right D) A social construct How is the self-relationship of a person realized and affirmed? A) Through the possession of external objects B) By engaging in economic activities C) Through passive acknowledgment D) By mutual recognition with others What role do objects play in the expression and recognition of will? A) They are a mere formality B) They serve as a medium for expression and recognition C) They are arbitrary possessions D) They are used for economic transactions What is the essence of contract in the context of property? A) The arbitrary act of placing one's will into an object B) The legal transfer of ownership C) The cooperation between freedoms through mutual agreement D) The economic value of the property The correct answers are: B) External objects C) By infusing personal will into the object B) An end in itself D) By mutual recognition with others B) They serve as a medium for expression and recognition C) The cooperation between freedoms through mutual agreement

13 APR 2024 · Hegel's analysis of property and contract is rooted in natural law rather than economic or positive legal frameworks. He sees property as a manifestation of personal freedom, where property is not just a historical happenstance but a necessary form for realizing individual selfhood. The person, in Hegel's view, is an abstract entity in opposition to nature, seeking to overcome the contradiction between subjective will and objective reality. By taking possession of objects, a person affirms his selfhood in a tangible way, moving from pure subjectivity to objective existence. Property is the initial objectification of freedom, characterized by immediacy and distinct from the person. Cultural goods, unlike natural objects, are products of human will and labor, becoming property through the mind's activity. Property is the first expression of selfhood, negating the selfhood of things and demonstrating their relativity to the will. property is not an expression of human needs and not just about utility but about giving oneself an objective existence. The transition from property to contract involves this mediation of the will with objects, both natural and cultural.

10 APR 2024 · The next category after "property", is the concept of contract. In this episode of Hegelcourses we are presenting an overview.

10 APR 2024 · The free will is: (A) Itself at first immediate, and hence as a single being - the person: the existence which the person gives to its liberty is property. The Right as Right (law) is formal, abstract right. (B) When the will is reflected into self, so as to have its existence inside it, and to be thus at the same time characterized as a particular, it is the right of the subjective will, morality of the individual conscience. (C) When the free will is the substantial will, made actual in the subject and conformable to its concept and rendered a totality of necessity - it is the ethics of actual life in family, civil society, and State. 

22 MAR 2024 · So, what exactly is objective spirit in Hegel's philosophy?  Objective spirit refers to the external manifestations of human consciousness and freedom in institutions, customs, and laws.  It is the realm where human beings come together in society to create a world of shared values, norms, and practices.  Objective spirit is the embodiment of human subjectivity in the external world, shaping the fabric of society and culture. In order to grasp the concept of objective spirit, it is important to understand the key ideas that Hegel presents in his philosophy.  One central notion is the idea of the "universal will," which is the collective will of a society that is expressed through its institutions and laws.  Hegel believed that individuals are interconnected within a larger social organism, with each person contributing to the development of objective spirit. Another important concept in objective spirit is the notion of "ethical life," which encompasses the ethical norms and values that govern human behavior in society.  Hegel argued that ethical life arises out of the interactions between individuals and institutions, forming a network of relationships that constitute the fabric of social life.  Ethics, for Hegel, is not simply a matter of individual choice but is deeply embedded in the structures of society. Objective spirit plays a crucial role in Hegel's philosophy as it represents the externalization of human freedom and self-awareness.  Through the creation of institutions, customs, and laws, human beings shape their reality and establish a framework for social interaction.  Objective spirit is the medium through which individuals express their subjective identities and participate in the larger community. Moreover, objective spirit serves as the bridge between the subjective and objective dimensions of reality, connecting the inner world of consciousness with the external world of social relations.  It is through the institutions of objective spirit that individuals develop a sense of belonging and identity within a larger community.  Objective spirit, therefore, forms the foundation for the ethical and political life of society. Despite being developed over two centuries ago, Hegel's concept of objective spirit remains relevant in today's world.  In an age of increasing globalization and interconnectedness, the notion of a shared ethical and political framework is more important than ever.  Objective spirit provides a lens through which we can understand the dynamics of contemporary society and navigate the complexities of modern life. Furthermore, objective spirit offers a critical perspective on the role of institutions in shaping human behavior and values.  In a world marked by political turmoil and social unrest, the need for a collective vision of ethical life is paramount.  By examining the ways in which objective spirit influences our lives, we can gain insight into the underlying structures that govern our society and work towards a more just and equitable future. In conclusion, objective spirit in the philosophy of Hegel represents the external manifestations of human consciousness and freedom in society. It is through the creation of institutions, customs, and laws that individuals express their subjective identities and participate in the larger community.  Objective spirit serves as the bridge between the subjective and objective dimensions of reality, shaping the ethical and political life of society.

17 MAR 2024 · Philosophy lacks the advantage other sciences have of basing their objects' existence on commonly accepted consciousness.  Unlike religion, which shares its pursuit of ultimate Truth with philosophy, philosophy cannot presume its cognitive methods are accepted.  Philosophy must engage with preconceived notions of its objects, as the mind forms general images before specific concepts.  However, philosophy seeks to demonstrate the necessity and nature of its objects, revealing that initial understandings are insufficient.  It cannot make dogmatic assertions or accept others' without question. And yet we must make a beginning: and a beginning, as primary and underived, makes an assumption, or rather is an assumption.  It seems as if it were impossible to make a beginning at all.

29 OCT 2020 · A brief explanation of #517 of the Encyclopedia. The general structure of the concept of Social Morality or Sittlichkeit follows the main structure of the concept: the universality of the family, the particularity of the civil society, and then the singularity of the State. These forms of social morality are relatively independent of each other, but at the same time, they presuppose each other and are intertwined. They should not be confused! (In Italian fascism, the civil society was organized as an organism, that is, construed as a "family".

16 SEP 2020 · The second of two review lectures and the beginning of our analysis of Hegel's social philosophy, the new series. This lecture we'll discuss the concept of social morality. Introduction: We are not going to repeat all the previous steps we have taken to arrive at the concept of social morality. A quick reminder must be sufficient. I just want to remind you that the sphere of abstract justice shows us a person who expresses his freedom in a property. That implies a negative relationship to other persons who are excluded from that property. Then we found a positive relationship in the concept of the contract. However, a person can try to express his freedom by breaking the contract, which introduces the concept of injustice. We started with abstract justice and ended up with injustice. Why? Because property and contract do not fully express the nature of freedom. Property and contract do not fully realize, i.e. do not make personal freedom become fully objectified. The result is a contradiction between my freedom and the contract I have made but can always break as well. Therefore it seems that we need to talk about subjectivity, which is the concept of a free individual being responsible for his actions and recognizing himself in the world of his actions. Our actions show intentionality, we aim at realizing the good. That at least is the purpose of our exercise of freedom. We do not control however all the circumstances of our actions, nor do we control the effect of our actions. We started with a subject trying to intentionally realize the good, but we end up, yet again, with a contradiction. Our purpose is the good, but evil can result. The good is merely an obligation and not a reality. Let us now turn to paragraph 513 and discuss the nature of Hegel's concept of social morality. Summary: Let us now summarize what we have found in this lecture. The concept of social morality is the result of all the deductions in abstract justice and morality. Social morality is a concept that refers to a shared life of a community, organizing a certain manner. A basic principle of this organized community is the unity of universality and particularity. That is not an ideal, but a reality. The concept of freedom has now reached the stage of its objective existence. It is no longer abstract, nor does it show the supremacy of my particular freedom which is the principle of morality. There is a new unity of subjective and objective spirit. What we have called the good in the sphere of morality, was still merely a formal concept and implied an obligation. But now in social morality, this good has become a living reality. We now have an organization of our social life that is universal and rational in itself. It goes beyond and above our individual freedom. However, only when individuals in their self-awareness and in the exercise of their freedom recognize this and think and act in conformity with it, is the universal and rational will a reality. Individuals make the universal a reality. And at the same time, that reality as universal is more than just the sum of these individuals. All social morality can be viewed therefore from an objective and a subjective viewpoint. It is very easy to illustrate this. let's consider the institution of marriage. Two individuals enter into a marriage by their own individual free will. And yet the concept of marriage goes beyond their individuality both in the legal ramifications and in the conceptual meaning of marriage. Marriage is only a reality within the self-consciousness and actions of married persons. And at the same time, the concept of marriage is more than just the self-consciousness and the actions of individuals. So now we have a beginning for our analysis of Hegel's social philosophy. Thank you for listening. See you next time. And be wise and be nice!

16 SEP 2020 · We're making a new start in our Hegel-studies. This is the first of two reviews before we go into Hegel's "social Morality" section.