https://www.spreaker.com/show/federalist-society-scotuscasthttp://www.federalistsociety.org/SCOTUScast]]>enPoliticsCopyright The Federalist Societyhttps://d3wo5wojvuv7l.cloudfront.net/t_rss_itunes_square_1400/images.spreaker.com/original/a745a28a0a5152590ef20326dc7b4a0e.jpghttps://www.spreaker.com/show/federalist-society-scotuscastFri, 16 Dec 2022 18:55:52 +0000The Federalist SocietyThe Federalist Societyinfo@fedsoc.orgSCOTUScast is a project of the Federalist Society for Law & Public Policy Studies. This audio broadcast series provides expert commentary on U.S. Supreme Court cases as they are argued and issued. The Federalist Society takes no position on particular...http://www.federalistsociety.org/SCOTUScast]]>cleanepisodichttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/wilkins-v-united-states-post-argument-sc
Tune in to hear Prof. Ilya Somin, a scholar of constitutional law, federalism, and property law from the Antonin Scalia Law School at George Mason University, break down the oral argument and offer his takeaways, opinions, and predictions about the case.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/52207036Fri, 16 Dec 2022 19:00:02 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn November 30, 2022, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Wilkins v. United States. The issue at hand is the Quiet Title Act's statute of limitations. Tune in to hear Prof. Ilya Somin, a scholar of constitutional law, federalism, and property...
Tune in to hear Prof. Ilya Somin, a scholar of constitutional law, federalism, and property law from the Antonin Scalia Law School at George Mason University, break down the oral argument and offer his takeaways, opinions, and predictions about the case.]]>727cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/united-states-v-texas-post-argument-scot_1
Tune in to hear Prof. Ilya Somin, a scholar of constitutional law, federalism, and immigration from the Antonin Scalia Law School at George Mason University, break down the oral argument and offer his takeaways, opinions, and predictions about the case.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/52196388Thu, 15 Dec 2022 17:00:02 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn November 29, 2022, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in United States v. Texas. The issues at hand include whether states have standing to challenge the Department of Homeland Security's immigration guidelines and whether this DHS guidance...
Tune in to hear Prof. Ilya Somin, a scholar of constitutional law, federalism, and immigration from the Antonin Scalia Law School at George Mason University, break down the oral argument and offer his takeaways, opinions, and predictions about the case.]]>1867cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/mallory-v-norfolk-southern-railway-co-po
Tune in to hear from Prof. Christopher R. Green, a leading scholar on the 14th Amendment and constitutional law from the University of Mississippi School of Law.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/52186411Wed, 14 Dec 2022 17:00:03 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn November 8, 2022, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. At issue is whether a state can require corporations to consent to personal jurisdiction in order to do business in the state, or whether such a...
Tune in to hear from Prof. Christopher R. Green, a leading scholar on the 14th Amendment and constitutional law from the University of Mississippi School of Law.]]>1361cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/axon-v-federal-trade-commission-post-arg
Featuring:
Ashley Baker, Director of Public Policy, Committee for Justice
Ronald Cass, President, Cass & Associates, PC
Henry Su, Partner, Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP
[Moderator] Svetlana Gans, Partner, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/52175392Tue, 13 Dec 2022 17:00:03 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn November 7, the U.S. Supreme Court heard Axon Enterprise, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, to decide whether Congress stripped federal district courts of jurisdiction over constitutional challenges to the FTC by granting the courts of appeals...
Featuring:
Ashley Baker, Director of Public Policy, Committee for Justice
Ronald Cass, President, Cass & Associates, PC
Henry Su, Partner, Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP
[Moderator] Svetlana Gans, Partner, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP]]>3079cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/sec-v-cochran-post-argument-scotuscast
Before the SEC could rule on Cochran’s objection, the Supreme Court decided Lucia v. SEC, in which it held that SEC ALJs are officers of the United States under the Appointments Clause, who must be appointed by the President, a court of law, or a department head. In response to the Lucia ruling, the SEC remanded all pending administrative cases for new proceedings before constitutionally appointed ALJs, including Cochran’s.

Cochran filed a federal lawsuit arguing that while Lucia may have addressed one constitutional issue with ALJs, it left uncorrected another problem: because SEC ALJs enjoy multiple layers of "for-cause" removal protection, they are unconstitutionally insulated from the President's Article II removal power. The district court dismissed her case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on five circuit courts of appeal ruling that the Exchange Act implicitly stripped district courts of the jurisdiction to hear challenges to ongoing SEC enforcement proceedings. Arguing that in 2010, the Supreme Court had unanimously ruled in Free Enterprise Fund that nothing in the Exchange Act stripped federal court jurisdiction either explicitly, or implicitly, Cochran appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. A three judge panel affirmed the dismissal 2-1, but later, the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc, reversed 9-7, holding that Cochran had district court jurisdiction to bring her challenge to the SEC ALJ’s removal protections.

Tune in to hear a breakdown of the oral argument.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/52122468Wed, 07 Dec 2022 18:00:02 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn November 7, 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral argument in Michelle Cochran v. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. In April 2016, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) brought an enforcement action against Michelle Cochran, a...
Before the SEC could rule on Cochran’s objection, the Supreme Court decided Lucia v. SEC, in which it held that SEC ALJs are officers of the United States under the Appointments Clause, who must be appointed by the President, a court of law, or a department head. In response to the Lucia ruling, the SEC remanded all pending administrative cases for new proceedings before constitutionally appointed ALJs, including Cochran’s.

Cochran filed a federal lawsuit arguing that while Lucia may have addressed one constitutional issue with ALJs, it left uncorrected another problem: because SEC ALJs enjoy multiple layers of "for-cause" removal protection, they are unconstitutionally insulated from the President's Article II removal power. The district court dismissed her case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on five circuit courts of appeal ruling that the Exchange Act implicitly stripped district courts of the jurisdiction to hear challenges to ongoing SEC enforcement proceedings. Arguing that in 2010, the Supreme Court had unanimously ruled in Free Enterprise Fund that nothing in the Exchange Act stripped federal court jurisdiction either explicitly, or implicitly, Cochran appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. A three judge panel affirmed the dismissal 2-1, but later, the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc, reversed 9-7, holding that Cochran had district court jurisdiction to bring her challenge to the SEC ALJ’s removal protections.

Tune in to hear a breakdown of the oral argument.]]>1720cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/sffa-v-harvard-post-argument-scotuscast
In perhaps the most anticipated case of this term, the court considers a challenge to the use of racially preferential undergraduate student admissions practices at Harvard University and the University of North Carolina.

Tune in to hear our experts break down the oral argument.

Featuring:
Prof. Amanda Shanor, Assistant Professor of Legal Studies & Business Ethics, The Wharton School
Devon Westhill, President and General Counsel, Center for Equal Opportunity
Moderator: Curt Levey, President, Committee for Justice]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/52058475Wed, 30 Nov 2022 18:30:02 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn October 31, 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court heard Students for Fair Admissions Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College (and Students for Fair Admissions Inc. v. University of North Carolina). In perhaps the most anticipated case of this...
In perhaps the most anticipated case of this term, the court considers a challenge to the use of racially preferential undergraduate student admissions practices at Harvard University and the University of North Carolina.

Tune in to hear our experts break down the oral argument.

Featuring:
Prof. Amanda Shanor, Assistant Professor of Legal Studies & Business Ethics, The Wharton School
Devon Westhill, President and General Counsel, Center for Equal Opportunity
Moderator: Curt Levey, President, Committee for Justice]]>3608cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/andy-warhol-foundation-for-the-visual-ar
Following oral arguments on October 12, Zvi Rosen, who filed an amicus brief in the case in support of the respondent (Goldsmith), joined us to break down the case.

Featuring:
Zvi Rosen, Assistant Professor, Southern Illinois University School of Law]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/51981124Tue, 22 Nov 2022 16:30:02 +0000The Federalist SocietyThe Supreme Court is considering a lawsuit between rock and roll photographer Lynn Goldsmith and the Andy Warhol Foundation regarding Warhol’s works based on Goldsmith’s photo of the musician Prince. The fair use doctrine excuses from liability...
Following oral arguments on October 12, Zvi Rosen, who filed an amicus brief in the case in support of the respondent (Goldsmith), joined us to break down the case.

Featuring:
Zvi Rosen, Assistant Professor, Southern Illinois University School of Law]]>1313cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/national-pork-producers-council-v-ross-p_1
Oral arguments took place on October 11. The Manhattan Institute's Ilya Shapiro joined us to analyze the arguments and examine the issues underlying the case.

Featuring:
Ilya Shapiro, Senior Fellow and Director of Constitutional Studies, Manhattan Institute]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/51944441Fri, 18 Nov 2022 17:55:01 +0000The Federalist SocietyIn National Pork Producers Council v. Ross, the Supreme Court will address the dormant commerce clause in the context of a California law regarding the housing of farm animals. Specifically, the Court will decide "whether allegations that a state law...
Oral arguments took place on October 11. The Manhattan Institute's Ilya Shapiro joined us to analyze the arguments and examine the issues underlying the case.

Featuring:
Ilya Shapiro, Senior Fellow and Director of Constitutional Studies, Manhattan Institute]]>1192cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/merrill-v-milligan-post-argument-scotusc
Following the 2020 Census, the Alabama Legislature redrew its congressional district lines to account for shifts in the state’s population. With these new lines, only one of the state’s seven congressional districts was majority-minority. Several plaintiffs sued, asserting the districts violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and sought the creation of an additional majority-minority district to account for the growing African American population in Alabama.

The District Court enjoined the districts, holding that they violated the VRA. Alabama appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted Certiorari and stayed the district court's injunctions.

Featuring:
David Warrington, Partner, Dhillon Law Group Inc.
Moderator: Michael Dimino, Professor of Law, Widener University Commonwealth Law School]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/51914398Wed, 16 Nov 2022 18:00:02 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn October 4, 2022 the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral argument in Merrill v. Milligan. Following the 2020 Census, the Alabama Legislature redrew its congressional district lines to account for shifts in the state’s population. With these new lines,...
Following the 2020 Census, the Alabama Legislature redrew its congressional district lines to account for shifts in the state’s population. With these new lines, only one of the state’s seven congressional districts was majority-minority. Several plaintiffs sued, asserting the districts violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and sought the creation of an additional majority-minority district to account for the growing African American population in Alabama.

The District Court enjoined the districts, holding that they violated the VRA. Alabama appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted Certiorari and stayed the district court's injunctions.

Featuring:
David Warrington, Partner, Dhillon Law Group Inc.
Moderator: Michael Dimino, Professor of Law, Widener University Commonwealth Law School]]>3359cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/delaware-v-pennsylvania-and-wisconsin-po
Join us for a discussion with Prof. Donald J. Kochan on the background of the case, takeaways from the oral argument, and the potential impacts the statutory interpretation involved.

Featuring:
Donald J. Kochan, Professor of Law and Deputy Executive Director, Law and Economics Center, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/51779339Fri, 04 Nov 2022 16:00:01 +0000The Federalist SocietyMillions of dollars are at stake in a dispute over whether uncashed MoneyGrams qualify as “a money order, traveler’s check, or other similar written instrument (other than a third party bank check) on which a banking or financial organization or a...
Join us for a discussion with Prof. Donald J. Kochan on the background of the case, takeaways from the oral argument, and the potential impacts the statutory interpretation involved.

Featuring:
Donald J. Kochan, Professor of Law and Deputy Executive Director, Law and Economics Center, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University]]>2118cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/sackett-v-environmental-protection-agenc
Join us for a discussion on this important case with Damien Schiff (arguing for petitioners), Tony Francois (represented petitioners in the Ninth Circuit), and William Snape (Director of the American University Washington College of Law’s Program on Environment and Energy Law). The panel will be moderated by Hunton Andrews Kurth partner Matt Leopold, who served previously as EPA general counsel and assisted in drafting the 2020 Navigable Waters Protection Rule defining WOTUS.

Featuring:
Tony Francois, Senior Attorney, Pacific Legal Foundation
Damien Schiff, Senior Attorney, Pacific Legal Foundation
Prof. William Snape, Director of Program on Environmental and Energy Law, Assistant Dean of Adjunct Faculty Affairs, and Fellow in Environmental Law, American University Washington College of Law
Moderator: Matt Leopold, Partner, Hunton Andrews Kurth]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/51777605Thu, 03 Nov 2022 17:00:02 +0000The Federalist SocietyOne of the longest-standing environmental law challenges is how to define the scope of waters regulated under the Clean Water Act known as “waters of the United States” (WOTUS). After decades of regulatory uncertainty, the Supreme Court has again...
Join us for a discussion on this important case with Damien Schiff (arguing for petitioners), Tony Francois (represented petitioners in the Ninth Circuit), and William Snape (Director of the American University Washington College of Law’s Program on Environment and Energy Law). The panel will be moderated by Hunton Andrews Kurth partner Matt Leopold, who served previously as EPA general counsel and assisted in drafting the 2020 Navigable Waters Protection Rule defining WOTUS.

Featuring:
Tony Francois, Senior Attorney, Pacific Legal Foundation
Damien Schiff, Senior Attorney, Pacific Legal Foundation
Prof. William Snape, Director of Program on Environmental and Energy Law, Assistant Dean of Adjunct Faculty Affairs, and Fellow in Environmental Law, American University Washington College of Law
Moderator: Matt Leopold, Partner, Hunton Andrews Kurth]]>3929cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/dobbs-v-jackson-womens-health-organizati_1
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court. Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh filed concurring opinions. Chief Justice Roberts filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan filed a dissenting opinion.

Please join our team of legal experts to discuss the significance of this case.

Featuring:
Prof. Daniel Farber, Sho Shato Professor of Law, University of California - Berkeley; former law clerk, Justice John Paul Stevens
Carrie Severino, President, Judicial Crisis Network; former law clerk, Justice Clarence Thomas
Moderator: Hon. Thomas B. Griffith, former Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/50739287Fri, 29 Jul 2022 12:30:01 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 24, 2022, the US Supreme Court decided Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization. In a 6-3 decision, the Court reversed and remanded the decision of the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, holding that the Constitution does not...
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court. Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh filed concurring opinions. Chief Justice Roberts filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan filed a dissenting opinion.

Please join our team of legal experts to discuss the significance of this case.

Featuring:
Prof. Daniel Farber, Sho Shato Professor of Law, University of California - Berkeley; former law clerk, Justice John Paul Stevens
Carrie Severino, President, Judicial Crisis Network; former law clerk, Justice Clarence Thomas
Moderator: Hon. Thomas B. Griffith, former Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit]]>3342cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/west-virginia-v-epa-post-decision-scotus_1
This case is a major development in administrative law. For the first time, a majority opinion of the Supreme Court used the phrase “major questions doctrine” to describe its methodology. The Court determined that the Clean Power Plan dealt with issues of such “economic and political significance” that it required a clear statement of Congressional intent to authorize this specific type of action. Because the CAA contains no such clear statement, the Clean Power Plan was unlawful.

Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Alito, wrote a concurring opinion expanding on the “major questions doctrine” and its relationship to the constitutional principle of non-delegation. Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Breyer and Sotomayor, wrote a dissenting opinion arguing the Court improperly placed “major questions” at the beginning of its statutory analysis—instead of conducting a traditional Chevron-style textual inquiry and concluding with “major questions.” Further, the dissent states that Congress provided EPA with the authority to require “generation shifting” in the CAA’s use of broad language authorizing the Agency to identify a “system of emission reduction” to address air pollution.

Featuring:
David Fotouhi, Partner, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, former Acting General Counsel, EPA
Justin Schwab, Founder, CGCN Law; former Deputy General Counsel, EPA.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/50738998Thu, 28 Jul 2022 16:49:21 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 30, 2022, the Supreme Court decided West Virginia v. EPA. In a 6-3 decision, the Court held that EPA exceeded its authority under Clean Air Act Section 111 when it issued the 2015 Clean Power Plan, which sought to control carbon dioxide...
This case is a major development in administrative law. For the first time, a majority opinion of the Supreme Court used the phrase “major questions doctrine” to describe its methodology. The Court determined that the Clean Power Plan dealt with issues of such “economic and political significance” that it required a clear statement of Congressional intent to authorize this specific type of action. Because the CAA contains no such clear statement, the Clean Power Plan was unlawful.

Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Alito, wrote a concurring opinion expanding on the “major questions doctrine” and its relationship to the constitutional principle of non-delegation. Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Breyer and Sotomayor, wrote a dissenting opinion arguing the Court improperly placed “major questions” at the beginning of its statutory analysis—instead of conducting a traditional Chevron-style textual inquiry and concluding with “major questions.” Further, the dissent states that Congress provided EPA with the authority to require “generation shifting” in the CAA’s use of broad language authorizing the Agency to identify a “system of emission reduction” to address air pollution.

Featuring:
David Fotouhi, Partner, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, former Acting General Counsel, EPA
Justin Schwab, Founder, CGCN Law; former Deputy General Counsel, EPA.]]>2727cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/denezpi-v-united-states-ysleta-del-sur-p
Featuring:
Anthony J. Ferate, Of Counsel, Spencer Fane LLP
Jennifer Weddle, Shareholder, Greenberg Traurig]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/50729643Thu, 28 Jul 2022 13:30:03 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 13 and 15, 2022, the Supreme Court decided Denezpi v. United States and Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas respectively. Both cases dealt with issues of Native American law. In Denezpi, a 6-3 Court ruled that the double jeopardy clause does not...
Featuring:
Anthony J. Ferate, Of Counsel, Spencer Fane LLP
Jennifer Weddle, Shareholder, Greenberg Traurig]]>2012cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/cameron-v-emw-womens-surgical-center-pos_1Featuring:
Philip D. Williamson, Partner, Taft, Stettinius & Hollister LLP]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/50729384Wed, 27 Jul 2022 18:30:31 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 3, 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Cameron v. EMW Women's Surgical Center. Writing for the 8-1 majority, Justice Samuel Alito explained how the the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit erred in denying the Kentucky attorney...Featuring:
Philip D. Williamson, Partner, Taft, Stettinius & Hollister LLP]]>1321cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/united-states-v-tsarnaev-post-decision-s
The Court held that the judge's conduct of voir dire conformed to its precedents and reversed the First Circuit's holding that the judge had violated a rule established by that circuit under its supervisor power. The Court held that courts of appeals have no power to circumvent or supplement legal standards established in Supreme Court precedents.

The Court also held that the judge was within his authority to exclude from the penalty trial hearsay evidence of Tsarnaev's brother's involvement in an unrelated murder. The Court rejected the argument that the Eighth Amendment requires admission of all mitigating evidence no matter how dubious or how weakly mitigating.

Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Barrett filed a concurring opinion, in which Gorsuch joined. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined.

Featuring:
Kent Scheidegger, Legal Director, Criminal Justice Legal Foundation]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/50729278Wed, 27 Jul 2022 18:30:24 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 4, 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court decided United States v. Tsarnaev. In a 6-3 decision, the Court reversed the judgment of the U.S. Court of the Appeals for the First Circuit, holding that the court improperly vacated Dzhokhar Tsarnaev's...
The Court held that the judge's conduct of voir dire conformed to its precedents and reversed the First Circuit's holding that the judge had violated a rule established by that circuit under its supervisor power. The Court held that courts of appeals have no power to circumvent or supplement legal standards established in Supreme Court precedents.

The Court also held that the judge was within his authority to exclude from the penalty trial hearsay evidence of Tsarnaev's brother's involvement in an unrelated murder. The Court rejected the argument that the Eighth Amendment requires admission of all mitigating evidence no matter how dubious or how weakly mitigating.

Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Barrett filed a concurring opinion, in which Gorsuch joined. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined.

Featuring:
Kent Scheidegger, Legal Director, Criminal Justice Legal Foundation]]>605cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/carson-v-makin-post-decision-scotuscast
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Kagan joined, and in which Justice Sotomayor joined as to all but Part I-B. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion. Please join our legal expert to discuss the case, the legal issues involved, and the implications going forward.

Featuring:

Arif Panju, Managing Attorney, Institute for Justice]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/50720614Tue, 26 Jul 2022 22:20:59 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 21, 2022, the Supreme Court decided Carson v. Makin. In a 6-3 opinion, the Court reversed and remanded the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The Court held that Maine's "nonsectarian" requirement for otherwise...
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Kagan joined, and in which Justice Sotomayor joined as to all but Part I-B. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion. Please join our legal expert to discuss the case, the legal issues involved, and the implications going forward.

Featuring:

Arif Panju, Managing Attorney, Institute for Justice]]>2404cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/new-york-state-rifle-pistol-association-_3
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in the first major case on firearms regulation that the Court has considered in over a decade. Please join our legal expert to discuss the case, the legal issues involved, and the implications for the future of firearm regulation in America.

Featuring:

Prof. Mark W. Smith, Visiting Fellow in Pharmaceutical Public Policy and Law in the Department of Pharmacology, University of Oxford; Presidential Scholar and Senior Fellow in Law and Public Policy, The King’s College; Distinguished Scholar and Senior Fellow of Law and Public Policy, Ave Maria School of Law]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/50720626Tue, 26 Jul 2022 22:20:53 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 23, 2022, the Supreme Court decided New York State Rifle & Pistol Association Inc. v. Bruen. In a 6-3 decision, the Court struck down New York’s handgun licensing law that required New Yorkers to demonstrate a “proper cause” in order to be...
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in the first major case on firearms regulation that the Court has considered in over a decade. Please join our legal expert to discuss the case, the legal issues involved, and the implications for the future of firearm regulation in America.

Featuring:

Prof. Mark W. Smith, Visiting Fellow in Pharmaceutical Public Policy and Law in the Department of Pharmacology, University of Oxford; Presidential Scholar and Senior Fellow in Law and Public Policy, The King’s College; Distinguished Scholar and Senior Fellow of Law and Public Policy, Ave Maria School of Law]]>1532cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/patel-v-garland-post-decision-scotuscasthttps://api.spreaker.com/episode/50510125Fri, 08 Jul 2022 21:30:02 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn May 16, 2022 the Court decided Patel v. Garland, holding that Federal courts lack jurisdiction to review facts found as part of any judgment relating to the granting of discretionary relief in immigration proceedings enumerated under 8 U.S.C. §...797cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/golan-v-saada-post-decision-scotuscasthttps://api.spreaker.com/episode/50510122Fri, 08 Jul 2022 18:45:02 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 15, 2022 the Court decided Golan v. Saada, holding that a court is not categorically required to examine all possible ameliorative measures before denying a Hague Convention petition for return of a child to a foreign country once the court...675cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/vega-v-tekoh-post-decision-scotuscasthttps://api.spreaker.com/episode/50510117Fri, 08 Jul 2022 15:45:02 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 23rd, the Court decided Vega vs. Tekoh, a case which concerned whether an un-mirandized statement against a defendant in a criminal proceeding violates the fifth amendment and might support a section 1983 claim against the officer who obtained...584cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/viking-river-cruises-v-moriana-post-arguhttps://api.spreaker.com/episode/50129418Wed, 08 Jun 2022 19:21:22 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 30th, the Court heard oral argument in Viking River Cruises, Inc. vs. Moriana, a case which concerned whether the Federal Arbitration Act requires enforcement of a bilateral arbitration agreement providing that an employee cannot raise...839cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/siegel-v-fitzgerald-post-argument-scotus
Stay tuned for the post-decision episode of this case!]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/50128546Wed, 08 Jun 2022 19:02:12 +0000The Federalist SocietyIn April, 2022, the Court heard arguments in Siegel v. Fitzgerald, a bankruptcy case concerning fee increase exemptions in two states. Joining today to discuss the argument is Allyson Ho, partner in the Dallas Office of Gibson, Dunn, & Crutcher and...
Stay tuned for the post-decision episode of this case!]]>501cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/morgan-v-sundance-post-decision-scotuscahttps://api.spreaker.com/episode/49960474Thu, 26 May 2022 20:41:21 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn May 23, 2022 the Court decided Morgan vs. Sundance. Joining today to discuss the 9-0 decision is Stephen J. Ware, the Frank Edwards Tyler Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of Kansas Law School.820cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/shurtleff-v-city-of-boston-post-decisionhttps://api.spreaker.com/episode/49960471Thu, 26 May 2022 20:41:14 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn May 2nd, 2022 the Court decided Shurtleff vs. City of Boston. Joining SCOTUScast once more, this time for post-decision analysis, is Professor Scott Gaylord of Elon University School of Law.1200cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/fec-v-ted-cruz-post-decision-scotuscast
Holding: Section 304 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 — which limits the amount of post-election contributions that may be used to repay a candidate who lends money to his own campaign — unconstitutionally burdens core political speech.
Judgment: Affirmed, 6-3, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts on May 16, 2022. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Breyer and Sotomayor joined.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/49850567Wed, 18 May 2022 20:57:28 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn May 16, 2022 the Court decided Federal Election Commission vs. Ted Cruz for Senate. Listeners may remember our guest today, Professor Bradley A. Smith, the Josiah H. Blackmore II/Shirley M. Nault Professor of Law at Capital University Law School,...
Holding: Section 304 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 — which limits the amount of post-election contributions that may be used to repay a candidate who lends money to his own campaign — unconstitutionally burdens core political speech.
Judgment: Affirmed, 6-3, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts on May 16, 2022. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Breyer and Sotomayor joined.]]>942cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/badgerow-v-walters-post-decision-scotusc
Holding: Federal jurisdiction in a petition to compel arbitration under Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act is determined by “looking through” the petition to the jurisdictional basis of the “underlying substantive controversy,” Vaden v. Discover Bank, but that approach does not apply to petitions to confirm or vacate arbitral awards under Sections 9 and 10 of the FAA.
Judgment: Reversed and remanded, 8-1, in an opinion by Justice Kagan on March 31, 2022. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/49850565Wed, 18 May 2022 20:57:20 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 31, the Court decided Badgerow v. Walters, a case which concerned judicial supervision of arbitration. Joining today to discuss the decision and its implications is Jennifer Dickey, Associate Chief Counsel at the U.S. Chamber Litigation...
Holding: Federal jurisdiction in a petition to compel arbitration under Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act is determined by “looking through” the petition to the jurisdictional basis of the “underlying substantive controversy,” Vaden v. Discover Bank, but that approach does not apply to petitions to confirm or vacate arbitral awards under Sections 9 and 10 of the FAA.
Judgment: Reversed and remanded, 8-1, in an opinion by Justice Kagan on March 31, 2022. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion.]]>782cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/west-virginia-v-environmental-protection
Featuring:
Speaker: Justin Schwab, Founder, CGCN Law; former Deputy General Counsel, EPA.
Moderator: Garrett Kral, Associate Member of the Environmental Law & Property Rights Practice Group’s Executive Committee; former Special Advisor for Oversight, EPA.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/49850563Wed, 18 May 2022 20:56:56 +0000The Federalist SocietyThe issue before the Court in West Virginia v. EPA is whether, when designing rules under Section 111, EPA is limited to identifying “systems of emission reduction” that can be applied to and at the level of an individually regulated facility, or...
Featuring:
Speaker: Justin Schwab, Founder, CGCN Law; former Deputy General Counsel, EPA.
Moderator: Garrett Kral, Associate Member of the Environmental Law & Property Rights Practice Group’s Executive Committee; former Special Advisor for Oversight, EPA.]]>2786cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/arizona-v-city-and-county-of-san-francishttps://api.spreaker.com/episode/49505873Thu, 21 Apr 2022 16:41:57 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn February 23rd, the Court heard arguments in Arizona vs. City and County of San Francisco, California, a case which concerned whether states with interests should be permitted to intervene to defend a rule when the United States ceases to defend....628cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/city-of-austin-v-reagan-natl-advertisinghttps://api.spreaker.com/episode/49505863Thu, 21 Apr 2022 16:41:45 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn November 10th, the Court heard arguments in City of Austin, Texas v. Reagan National Advertising, a case which concerned whether the Austin city code’s distinction between on-premise signs, which may be digitized, and off-premise signs, which may...803cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/united-states-v-zubaydah-post-decision-s
Joining us today to discuss decision this is Kate Comerford Todd, managing partner at Ellis George Cipollone in Washington, DC. Ms. Todd formerly served as Deputy Counsel to the Office of the President, Chief Counsel for the U.S. Chamber Litigation Center, and has held teaching positions at both George Washington University Law School and Cornell. Ms. Todd has also clerked for Justice Clarence Thomas and Judge J. Michael Luttig of the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and is a graduate of Harvard Law School.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/49505861Thu, 21 Apr 2022 16:41:40 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn Mar 3, 2022, the Court decided United States v. Zubaydah, a case which concerned whether the 9th circuit erred when it rejected the United States’ assertion of the state secrets privilege based on the court’s own assessment of potential harms to...
Joining us today to discuss decision this is Kate Comerford Todd, managing partner at Ellis George Cipollone in Washington, DC. Ms. Todd formerly served as Deputy Counsel to the Office of the President, Chief Counsel for the U.S. Chamber Litigation Center, and has held teaching positions at both George Washington University Law School and Cornell. Ms. Todd has also clerked for Justice Clarence Thomas and Judge J. Michael Luttig of the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and is a graduate of Harvard Law School.]]>520cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/wooden-v-united-states-post-decision-sco
Joining today to discuss this decision is Vikrant P. Reddy, Senior Research Fellow at the Charles Koch Institute.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/49245597Tue, 29 Mar 2022 22:33:53 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 7, 2022 the Supreme Court decided Wooden v. United States, holding that William Dale Wooden’s ten burglary offenses arising from a single criminal episode did not occur on different “occasions” and thus count as only one prior conviction...
Joining today to discuss this decision is Vikrant P. Reddy, Senior Research Fellow at the Charles Koch Institute.]]>1006cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/unicolors-inc-v-h-m-hennes-mauritz-lp-pohttps://api.spreaker.com/episode/49245426Tue, 29 Mar 2022 22:33:44 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn February 24, 2022 the Supreme Court decided Unicolors, Inc v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, LP. Joining today to discuss this decision is Zvi Rosen, Assistant Professor at SIU Law, former Visiting Scholar and Professorial Lecturer in Law at George...1198cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/yslet-del-sur-pueblo-v-texas-post-argumehttps://api.spreaker.com/episode/49245420Tue, 29 Mar 2022 22:32:21 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn Feb. 22, 2022 the Court heard arguments in Ysleta del Sur Pueblo vs. Texas, a case which concerned sovereign authority to regulate non-prohibited gaming activities. Joining to discuss this case is Anthony J. Ferate, of Counsel at Spencer Fane LLP.898cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/shurtleff-v-city-of-boston-post-argumenthttps://api.spreaker.com/episode/49021966Thu, 10 Mar 2022 21:30:08 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn January 18, 2022 the Court heard oral argument in Shurtleff v. City of Boston, a case which concerned the flag-flying at Boston city hall. Joining today to discuss this case is Professor Scott Gaylord of Elon University School of Law.1006cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/houston-community-college-sys-v-wilson-phttps://api.spreaker.com/episode/48939344Thu, 03 Mar 2022 20:22:14 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn November 2nd, 2021 the Court heard argument in Houston Community College Sys. v. Wilson, a case which concerned whether the First Amendment restricts the authority of an elected body to issue a censure resolution in response to a member’s speech....1223cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/johnson-v-arteaga-martinez-garland-attny
This episode will begin with coverage of the question and background, and proceed in the second part to focused analysis of oral argument.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/48938301Thu, 03 Mar 2022 20:22:07 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn January 11th, 2022 the Court heard arguments in two immigration cases, Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez and Garland, Attny Gen. V. Gonzalez. Joining today to discuss these arguments in two parts is Ilya Somin, Professor of Law at George Mason’s Antonin...
This episode will begin with coverage of the question and background, and proceed in the second part to focused analysis of oral argument.]]>1417cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/cassirer-v-thyssen-bornsemiza-collectionhttps://api.spreaker.com/episode/48678722Thu, 10 Feb 2022 21:01:31 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn Jan. 18, 2022 the Court heard argument in Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation. Joining today to discuss this decision in two parts is Professor Suzanna Sherry, the Herman O. Loewenstein Chair in Law Emerita at Vanderbilt Law School.1193cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/fec-v-ted-cruz-post-argument-scotuscasthttps://api.spreaker.com/episode/48539953Tue, 01 Feb 2022 16:05:57 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn January 19th, the Court heard arguments in Federal Election Commission v. Ted Cruz for Senate. At issue were: (1) Whether appellees have standing to challenge the statutory loan-repayment limit of 52 U.S.C. 30116(j); and (2) whether the...1011cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/biden-v-missouri-nfib-v-dol-osha-post-de
The OSHA rule mandated large employers to require vaccination or regular testing of their employees. CMS required vaccination of staff at health care facilities participating in Medicare or Medicaid programs. The Court granted a stay of the OSHA rule pending merits review in the Sixth Circuit, but stayed an injunction of the CMS rule allowing it to go into effect.

Joining today to discuss these decisions are, in order of appearance:
1) David Dewhirst, Solicitor General, Montana
2) Professor Dorit Reiss, James Edgar Hervey '50 Chair of Litigation, UC Hastings Law
3) Professor Ilya Somin, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/48457847Tue, 01 Feb 2022 16:03:50 +0000The Federalist SocietyThe Supreme Court recently issued its decisions in two federal vaccine mandate cases, Biden v Missouri and National Federation of Independent Business v. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Several states and interest...
The OSHA rule mandated large employers to require vaccination or regular testing of their employees. CMS required vaccination of staff at health care facilities participating in Medicare or Medicaid programs. The Court granted a stay of the OSHA rule pending merits review in the Sixth Circuit, but stayed an injunction of the CMS rule allowing it to go into effect.

Joining today to discuss these decisions are, in order of appearance:
1) David Dewhirst, Solicitor General, Montana
2) Professor Dorit Reiss, James Edgar Hervey '50 Chair of Litigation, UC Hastings Law
3) Professor Ilya Somin, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University]]>2759cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/whole-womans-health-u-s-v-texas-post-dec
A pair of distinguished federal-courts scholars join to discuss the cases, the legal issues involved, and the implications going forward.

Featuring:
Prof. Stephen Sachs, Antonin Scalia Professor of Law, Harvard Law School
Prof. Howard Wasserman, Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/48257487Thu, 13 Jan 2022 15:36:02 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn December 10, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson and dismissed the federal government's suit against Texas in United States v. Texas. The Court held 8-1 in Jackson that plaintiff abortion providers can pursue claims...
A pair of distinguished federal-courts scholars join to discuss the cases, the legal issues involved, and the implications going forward.

Featuring:
Prof. Stephen Sachs, Antonin Scalia Professor of Law, Harvard Law School
Prof. Howard Wasserman, Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law]]>1688cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/fbi-v-fazaga-post-argument-scotuscast
Joining today to discuss this case in great detail is Dr. Riddhi Sohan Dasgupta, Counsel at Schaerr | Jaffe LLP. Dr. Dasgupta has served as the Deputy General Counsel of the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Special Counsel of the United States Department of Education (ED), and adjunct faculty at George Mason’s Antonin Scalia Law School.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/48257482Tue, 11 Jan 2022 22:51:56 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn November 8th, 2021 the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Federal Bureau of Investigation v. Fazaga, a case which concerned whether Section 1806(f) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 displaces the state-secrets privilege and...
Joining today to discuss this case in great detail is Dr. Riddhi Sohan Dasgupta, Counsel at Schaerr | Jaffe LLP. Dr. Dasgupta has served as the Deputy General Counsel of the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Special Counsel of the United States Department of Education (ED), and adjunct faculty at George Mason’s Antonin Scalia Law School.]]>2659cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/carson-v-makin-post-argument-scotuscasthttps://api.spreaker.com/episode/48257481Tue, 11 Jan 2022 22:51:39 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn December 8th, the Court heard arguments in Carson v. Makin, a case which concerned whether a state violates the religion clauses or equal protection clause by prohibiting students participating in an otherwise generally available student aid...1251cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/ramirez-v-collier-post-argument-scotuscahttps://api.spreaker.com/episode/48197014Fri, 07 Jan 2022 14:05:02 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn November 9th, the Court heard argument in Ramirez v. Collier, a case which concerned Texas’ decision to allow Ramirez’s pastor to enter the execution chamber, but forbid the pastor from laying his hands on his parishioner. Joining today to discuss...1382cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/dobbs-v-jackson-womens-health-organizati
Featuring:
- Prof. Daniel Farber, Sho Sato Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley
- Prof. Richard W. Garnett, Paul J. Schierl/Fort Howard Corporation Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame Law School
- Prof. Julia Mahoney, John S. Battle Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law
- Prof. Richard Re, Joel B. Piassick Research Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law
- Prof. Mary Ziegler, Stearns Weaver Miller Professor, Florida State University College of Law]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/47998002Mon, 20 Dec 2021 15:52:57 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn December 1, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court heard Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, on the question of whether all pre-viability prohibitions on elective abortions are unconstitutional. This distinguished panel will review the oral...
Featuring:
- Prof. Daniel Farber, Sho Sato Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley
- Prof. Richard W. Garnett, Paul J. Schierl/Fort Howard Corporation Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame Law School
- Prof. Julia Mahoney, John S. Battle Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law
- Prof. Richard Re, Joel B. Piassick Research Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law
- Prof. Mary Ziegler, Stearns Weaver Miller Professor, Florida State University College of Law]]>2867cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/new-york-state-rifle-pistol-association-_1https://api.spreaker.com/episode/47934919Mon, 20 Dec 2021 14:46:44 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn November 3rd, the Court heard argument in New York State Rifle and Pistol Association v Bruen, a case which concerned whether New York's law requiring that applicants for unrestricted concealed-carry licenses demonstrate a special need for...1528cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/whole-womans-health-u-s-v-texas-post-arg
A distinguished pair of scholars joined us to discuss the cases, their history, the legal issues involved, and the implications going forward.

Featuring:
Prof. Stephen Sachs, Antonin Scalia Professor of Law, Harvard Law School
Prof. Howard Wasserman, Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/47855214Thu, 09 Dec 2021 17:20:37 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn November 1, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson on whether a state can insulate from federal-court review a law that may prohibit the exercise of a constitutional right by delegating to the public the...
A distinguished pair of scholars joined us to discuss the cases, their history, the legal issues involved, and the implications going forward.

Featuring:
Prof. Stephen Sachs, Antonin Scalia Professor of Law, Harvard Law School
Prof. Howard Wasserman, Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law]]>1635cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/zsr-unicolors-v-h-m-post-argument-scotus_1https://api.spreaker.com/episode/47853802Thu, 09 Dec 2021 15:39:46 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn November 8th, the Court heard argument in Unicolors, Inc. V. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L.P. Joining today to discuss this case is Professor Zvi Rosen of Southern Illinois University School of Law.617cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/aha-v-becerra-post-argument-scotuscast_1https://api.spreaker.com/episode/47821460Wed, 08 Dec 2021 17:11:07 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn November 30, the Court heard argument in American Hospital Association v. Becerra, a case which asked: "Whether deference under Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council permits the Department of Health and Human Services to set...645cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/united-states-v-zubaydah-post-argument-shttps://api.spreaker.com/episode/47821457Wed, 08 Dec 2021 17:10:45 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn October 6th, the Court heard oral argument in United States v. Zubaydah, a case which concerned "whether the 9th circuit erred when it rejected the United States’ assertion of the state secrets privilege based on the court’s own assessment of...942cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/cameron-v-emw-womens-surgical-center-poshttps://api.spreaker.com/episode/47573209Sat, 20 Nov 2021 16:20:11 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn October 12, 2021 the Court heard oral argument in Cameron v. EMW Women’s Surgical Center, a case which concerned whether a state attorney general vested with the power to defend state law should be permitted to intervene after a federal court...1200federalism,healthcare,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/wooden-v-united-stateshttps://api.spreaker.com/episode/47276780Wed, 03 Nov 2021 13:15:08 +0000The Federalist SocietyWe begin this October term with Wooden v. United States, argued October 4, 2021, a case which concerned the Armed Career Criminal Act. Nine justices convened, in person, to examine the issue of whether offenses that were committed as part of a single...526cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/united-states-v-tsarnaev-post-argument-shttps://api.spreaker.com/episode/47573266Wed, 13 Oct 2021 15:16:13 +0000The Federalist SocietyWe conclude the October sitting with United States v. Tsarnaev, argued on October 13th, 2021, a case which concerned procedural elements of Dzhokar Tsarnaev's capital sentences pertaining to the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing. Joining today is Richard...759criminal law & procedure,jurisprudence,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/yellen-v-confederated-tribes-of-the-cheh
With me today to discuss this case are Anthony Ferate, Of Counsel at Spencer Fan LLP, and Jennifer Weddle, Co-Chair of Greenberg Traurig’s American Indian Law practice.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/46868162Mon, 28 Jun 2021 20:40:00 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 25th, 2021 the Supreme Court decided Yellen v. Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Reservation, a case which concerned whether Alaska native regional and village corporations established pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act “Indian...
With me today to discuss this case are Anthony Ferate, Of Counsel at Spencer Fan LLP, and Jennifer Weddle, Co-Chair of Greenberg Traurig’s American Indian Law practice.]]>1997cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/mahanoy-area-school-district-v-b-l-post-_1https://api.spreaker.com/episode/46868088Fri, 25 Jun 2021 21:57:00 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 23rd, 2021 the Supreme Court decided Mahanoy Area School Dist. v. B. L., a case which concerned whether the First Amendment prohibits public school officials from regulating off-campus student speech. Justice Breyer authored the majority...1987cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/cedar-point-nursery-v-hassid-post-decisihttps://api.spreaker.com/episode/46867859Fri, 25 Jun 2021 18:57:00 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 23rd, 2021 the Supreme Court decided Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, a case which concerned whether a California regulation granting labor organizations a “right to take access” to an agricultural employer’s property to solicit support for...1080cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/collins-v-yellen-post-decision-scotuscashttps://api.spreaker.com/episode/46867985Thu, 24 Jun 2021 19:57:00 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 23rd, 2021 the Supreme Court decided Collins v. Yellen, a case which concerned the constitutionality of the structure of the Federal Housing Finance Agency. Joining me today to discuss this decision is Jason Levine, Partner at Alston & Bird,...1958cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/lange-v-california-post-decision-scotusc
I am joined today by Clark Neily, Vice President for Criminal Justice at the Cato Institute, Larry H. James, Managing Partner at Crabbe Brown and James, and Vikrant P. Reddy, Senior Research Fellow at the Charles Koch Institute.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/46868136Wed, 23 Jun 2021 16:57:00 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 23rd, 2021 the Supreme Court decided Lange v. California, a case which concerned whether the exigent circumstances exception to the 4th Amendment’s warrant requirement apply when police are pursuing a suspect whom they believe committed a...
I am joined today by Clark Neily, Vice President for Criminal Justice at the Cato Institute, Larry H. James, Managing Partner at Crabbe Brown and James, and Vikrant P. Reddy, Senior Research Fellow at the Charles Koch Institute.]]>1914cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/ncaa-v-alston-post-decision-scotuscasthttps://api.spreaker.com/episode/46867771Tue, 22 Jun 2021 22:56:00 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 21st, 2021 the Supreme Court decided National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Alston, a case which concerned whether the NCAA’s prohibition on compensation for college athletes violated federal antitrust law. Writing for a unanimous Court,...2083cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/united-states-v-arthrex-post-decision-sc
Three experts join us today to discuss the ruling. They are Professor Kristen Osenga, Austen E. Owen Research Scholar & Professor of Law at the University of Richmond School of Law, Professor Dmitry Karshtedt, Associate Professor of Law at the George Washington Law School, and Professor Gregory Dolin, Associate Professor of Law and Co-Director at the Center for medicine and Law at the University of Baltimore School of Law.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/46867648Mon, 21 Jun 2021 14:35:00 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 21st, 2021 the Supreme Court decided United States v. Arthrex, Inc, a case which concerned the constitutionality of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s authority to appoint Administrative Patent Judges. Writing for the 5-4 majority, Chief...
Three experts join us today to discuss the ruling. They are Professor Kristen Osenga, Austen E. Owen Research Scholar & Professor of Law at the University of Richmond School of Law, Professor Dmitry Karshtedt, Associate Professor of Law at the George Washington Law School, and Professor Gregory Dolin, Associate Professor of Law and Co-Director at the Center for medicine and Law at the University of Baltimore School of Law.]]>3030cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/california-v-texas-post-decision-scotuschttps://api.spreaker.com/episode/46867555Thu, 17 Jun 2021 18:55:00 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 17th, 2021 the Supreme Court decided California v. Texas, a case which concerned whether Texas (along with over a dozen States and two individuals) had standing to challenge the individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act (ACA). Writing for...3700cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/fulton-v-city-of-philadelphia-post-decishttps://api.spreaker.com/episode/46867252Thu, 17 Jun 2021 16:54:00 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 17th, 2021 the Supreme Court unanimously decided Fulton v. City of Philadelphia for petitioners. The issue before the court was whether the government violates the First Amendment by conditioning a religious agency’s ability to participate in...1502cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/nestle-inc-v-doe-et-al-post-decision-sco
Discussing this decision today are Julian Ku, Senior Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Faculty Director of International Programs, and Maurice A. Deane Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law, Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University, Professor William S. Dodge, the John D. Ayer Chair in Business Law and MLK Jr. Professor of Law at the UC Davis School of Law and Ilya Shapiro, Vice President and Director at the Robert A. Levy Center for Constitutional Studies at the Cato Institute.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/46867313Thu, 17 Jun 2021 12:55:00 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 17, 2021 the Supreme Court issued its 8-1 decision in Nestle USA, Inc. V. Doe et al and the consolidated case of Cargill, Inc. v. Doe I. In this case, the Court considered the question of whether an aiding and abetting claim against a domestic...
Discussing this decision today are Julian Ku, Senior Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Faculty Director of International Programs, and Maurice A. Deane Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law, Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University, Professor William S. Dodge, the John D. Ayer Chair in Business Law and MLK Jr. Professor of Law at the UC Davis School of Law and Ilya Shapiro, Vice President and Director at the Robert A. Levy Center for Constitutional Studies at the Cato Institute.]]>3465cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/van-buren-v-united-states-post-decision-In a 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Barrett, the Court reversed the ruling of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and remanded the case. The Supreme Court held, “An individual ‘exceeds authorized access’ under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2), when he accesses a computer with authorization but then obtains information located in particular areas of the computer — such as files, folders or databases — that are off-limits to him..”
Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito joined.
Orin Kerr, Professor of Law at UC Berkeley Law, joins us today to discuss this decision and its implications.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/45312959Mon, 14 Jun 2021 17:00:21 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 3, 2021 the Supreme Court decided Van Buren v. United States. The issue was whether a person who is authorized to access information on a computer for certain purposes violates Section 1030(a)(2) of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act if he...In a 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Barrett, the Court reversed the ruling of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and remanded the case. The Supreme Court held, “An individual ‘exceeds authorized access’ under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2), when he accesses a computer with authorization but then obtains information located in particular areas of the computer — such as files, folders or databases — that are off-limits to him..”
Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito joined.
Orin Kerr, Professor of Law at UC Berkeley Law, joins us today to discuss this decision and its implications.]]>1025supreme court,telecommunications & electronicleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/terry-v-united-states-post-decision-scothttps://api.spreaker.com/episode/46867235Mon, 14 Jun 2021 16:54:00 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 14th, 2021, the Supreme Court decided Terry v. U.S. The issue before the Court was whether pre-August 3rd, 2010, crack offenders sentenced under 21 U.S.C 841(b)(1)(c) have a “covered offense” under Section 404 of the First Step Act. Justice...1122cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/united-states-v-palomar-santiago-post-deIn a 9-0 opinion authored by Justice Sotomayor, the Court reversed the ruling of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case. The Supreme Court held, “Each of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)’s statutory requirements for bringing a collateral attack on a prior deportation order is mandatory.”
Brian Fish, Special Assistant to the United States Attorney in Baltimore, MD, joins us today to discuss this decision and its implications.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/45262640Fri, 11 Jun 2021 15:48:54 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn May 24, 2021 the Supreme Court decided United States v. Palomar-Santiago. The issue was whether a defendant who was removed from the United States is automatically entitled to a defense of invalid removal where the crime underlying his removal is...In a 9-0 opinion authored by Justice Sotomayor, the Court reversed the ruling of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case. The Supreme Court held, “Each of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)’s statutory requirements for bringing a collateral attack on a prior deportation order is mandatory.”
Brian Fish, Special Assistant to the United States Attorney in Baltimore, MD, joins us today to discuss this decision and its implications.]]>1376criminal law & procedure,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/borden-v-united-states-post-decision-sco_1https://api.spreaker.com/episode/46868431Thu, 10 Jun 2021 16:54:00 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 10th, 2021, the Supreme Court decided Borden v. United States. The issue before the Court was whether the “use of force” clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act encompasses crimes with an intent requirement of mere recklessness. Justice Elena...692cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/united-states-v-cooley-post-decision-scoIn a 9-0 opinion authored by Justice Breyer, the Court vacated the ruling of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and remanded. The Supreme Court held, “A tribal police officer has authority to detain temporarily and to search a non-Native American traveling on a public right-of-way running through a reservation for potential violations of state or federal law.”
Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion.
Anthony Ferate, Of Counsel at Spencer Fane LLP, joins us today to discuss the Court’s decision and its implications.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/45206061Mon, 07 Jun 2021 20:40:00 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 1, 2021 the Supreme Court decided United States v. Cooley. The issue was whether the lower courts erred in suppressing evidence on the theory that a police officer of an Indian tribe lacked authority to temporarily detain and search the...In a 9-0 opinion authored by Justice Breyer, the Court vacated the ruling of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and remanded. The Supreme Court held, “A tribal police officer has authority to detain temporarily and to search a non-Native American traveling on a public right-of-way running through a reservation for potential violations of state or federal law.”
Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion.
Anthony Ferate, Of Counsel at Spencer Fane LLP, joins us today to discuss the Court’s decision and its implications.]]>637supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/sanchez-v-mayorkas-post-decision-scotuschttps://api.spreaker.com/episode/46868488Mon, 07 Jun 2021 16:53:00 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 7, 2021, the Supreme Court decided Sanchez v. Mayorkas. The issue before the Court was whether the conferral of Temporary Protected Status under 8 U.S.C. § 1254a constitutes an “admission” into the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1255,...971cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/city-of-san-antonio-v-hotels-com-post-deIn a 9-0 opinion authored by Justice Alito, the Court affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The Supreme Court held, “Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 39 does not permit a district court to alter a court of appeals’ allocation of the costs listed in subdivision (e) of that rule.”
Charles Campbell, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Associate Professor of Law at Faulkner University’s Jones School of Law, joins us today to discuss this decision and its implications.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/45206125Thu, 03 Jun 2021 20:45:00 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 1, 2021 the Supreme Court decided City of San Antonio, Texas v. Hotels.com L.P. The issue was whether, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit alone has held, district courts “lack[] discretion to deny or reduce” appellate...In a 9-0 opinion authored by Justice Alito, the Court affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The Supreme Court held, “Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 39 does not permit a district court to alter a court of appeals’ allocation of the costs listed in subdivision (e) of that rule.”
Charles Campbell, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Associate Professor of Law at Faulkner University’s Jones School of Law, joins us today to discuss this decision and its implications.]]>1483supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/bp-p-l-c-v-mayor-and-city-council-of-bal_1In a 7-1 opinion authored by Justice Gorsuch, the Court vacated the ruling of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, holding, “Where defendant energy companies premised 28 U. S. C. § 1447(d) removal in part on the federal officer removal statute, Section 1442, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit erred in holding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider all grounds for removal rejected by the district court.”
Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Karen Harned, Executive Director of the National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal Center, joins us to discuss this decision.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/45031782Tue, 25 May 2021 18:40:46 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn May 17, 2021 the Supreme Court decided BP P.L.C. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore.The issue was was whether 28 U.S.C. 1447(d) permits a court of appeals to review any issue encompassed in a district court’s order remanding a removed...In a 7-1 opinion authored by Justice Gorsuch, the Court vacated the ruling of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, holding, “Where defendant energy companies premised 28 U. S. C. § 1447(d) removal in part on the federal officer removal statute, Section 1442, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit erred in holding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider all grounds for removal rejected by the district court.”
Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Karen Harned, Executive Director of the National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal Center, joins us to discuss this decision.]]>603environmental & energy law,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/facebook-inc-v-duguid-post-decision-scotIn a 9-0 opinion authored by Justice Sotamayor, the Court reversed the ruling of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case. The Supreme Court held, “To qualify as an ‘automatic telephone dialing system’ under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, a device must have the capacity either to store, or to produce, a telephone number using a random or sequential number generator.” This decision narrows the federal robocoll ban.
Scott D. Delacourt, Partner at Wiley Rein LLP and Daniel Lyons, Professor of Law at Boston College School of Law, joins us today for a conversation moderated by Danielle Thumann, Attorney Advisor for FCC Commissioner Brendan Carr.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/45026624Tue, 25 May 2021 14:33:27 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn April 1, 2021 the Supreme Court decided Facebook Inc. v. Duguid. The issue was whether the definition of an "automatic telephone dialing system" in the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 encompasses any device that can “store”...In a 9-0 opinion authored by Justice Sotamayor, the Court reversed the ruling of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case. The Supreme Court held, “To qualify as an ‘automatic telephone dialing system’ under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, a device must have the capacity either to store, or to produce, a telephone number using a random or sequential number generator.” This decision narrows the federal robocoll ban.
Scott D. Delacourt, Partner at Wiley Rein LLP and Daniel Lyons, Professor of Law at Boston College School of Law, joins us today for a conversation moderated by Danielle Thumann, Attorney Advisor for FCC Commissioner Brendan Carr.]]>1327supreme court,telecommunications & electronicleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/edwards-v-vannoy-post-decision-scotuscasIn a 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Kavanaugh, the Court affirmed the ruling of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, holding, “The jury-unanimity rule announced in Ramos v. Louisiana does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review.”
Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Breyer and Sotomayor joined.
Kent Scheidegger, Legal Director & General Counsel at the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation, joins us to discuss this decision and its implications.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/45031096Mon, 24 May 2021 17:43:00 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn May 17, 2021 the Supreme Court decided Edwards v. Vannoy. The issue was whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Ramos v. Louisiana applies retroactively to cases on federal collateral review. In a 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Kavanaugh,...In a 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Kavanaugh, the Court affirmed the ruling of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, holding, “The jury-unanimity rule announced in Ramos v. Louisiana does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review.”
Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Breyer and Sotomayor joined.
Kent Scheidegger, Legal Director & General Counsel at the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation, joins us to discuss this decision and its implications.]]>735criminal law & procedure,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/city-of-san-antonio-v-hotels-com-post-arCharles Campbell, Associate Professor of Law and Interim Dean at Faulkner University's Jones School of Law, joins us today to discuss this case's oral argument.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/44913517Wed, 19 May 2021 17:38:47 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn April 21, 2021 the Supreme Court heard oral argument in City of San Antonio v. Hotels.com. The question before the Court was whether, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit alone has held, district courts “lack[] discretion to deny...Charles Campbell, Associate Professor of Law and Interim Dean at Faulkner University's Jones School of Law, joins us today to discuss this case's oral argument.]]>1775federalism,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/caniglia-v-strom-post-decision-scotuscasIn a 9-0 opinion authored by Justice Thomas, the Court vacated the ruling of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and remanded the case. The Supreme Court held, “Neither the holding nor logic of Cady v. Dombrowski justifies the removal of Edward Caniglia’s firearms from his home by police officers under a ‘community caretaking exception’ to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement."
Chief Justice Roberts filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Breyer joined. Justices Alito and Kavanaugh also filed concurring opinions.
Robert Frommer, Senior Attorney at the Institute for Justice, joins us to discuss this decision and its implications.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/45030468Wed, 19 May 2021 17:28:00 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn May 17, 2021 the Supreme Court decided Caniglia v. Strom. The issue was whether the “community caretaking” exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement extends to the home. In a 9-0 opinion authored by Justice Thomas,...In a 9-0 opinion authored by Justice Thomas, the Court vacated the ruling of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and remanded the case. The Supreme Court held, “Neither the holding nor logic of Cady v. Dombrowski justifies the removal of Edward Caniglia’s firearms from his home by police officers under a ‘community caretaking exception’ to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement."
Chief Justice Roberts filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Breyer joined. Justices Alito and Kavanaugh also filed concurring opinions.
Robert Frommer, Senior Attorney at the Institute for Justice, joins us to discuss this decision and its implications.]]>1179fourth amendment,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/minerva-surgical-inc-v-hologic-inc-post-Daniel Ortiz, Michael J. and Jane R. Horvitz Distinguished Professor of Law and Director of the Supreme Court Litigation Clinic at the University of Virginia School of Law, joins us today to discuss this case's oral argument.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/44898439Tue, 18 May 2021 20:43:50 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn April 21, 2021 the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Minerva Surgical Inc. v. Hologic Inc. The question before the Court was whether a defendant in a patent infringement action who assigned the patent, or is in privity with an assignor of the...Daniel Ortiz, Michael J. and Jane R. Horvitz Distinguished Professor of Law and Director of the Supreme Court Litigation Clinic at the University of Virginia School of Law, joins us today to discuss this case's oral argument.]]>1028intellectual property,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/united-states-v-gary-post-argument-scotuRobert Leider, Assistant Professor of law at Antonin Scalia Law School at George Mason University, joins us today to discuss this case's oral argument.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/44898188Tue, 18 May 2021 20:22:38 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn April 20, 2021 the Supreme Court heard oral argument in United States v. Gary. The question before the Court was whether a defendant who pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(a), is...Robert Leider, Assistant Professor of law at Antonin Scalia Law School at George Mason University, joins us today to discuss this case's oral argument.]]>1126due process,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/terry-v-united-states-post-argument-scotVikrant Reddy, Senior Reserch Fellow at the Charles Koch Institute, joins us today to discuss this case's oral argument.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/44897782Tue, 11 May 2021 19:47:28 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn May 4, 2021 the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Terry v. United States. The question before the court was whether pre-August 3, 2010, crack offenders sentenced under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) have a “covered offense” under...Vikrant Reddy, Senior Reserch Fellow at the Charles Koch Institute, joins us today to discuss this case's oral argument.]]>907criminal law & procedure,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/carr-v-saul-post-decision-scotuscastIn a 9-0 opinion authored by Justice Sotomayor, the Court reversed the ruling of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and remanded the case. The Supreme Court held, “Principles of issue exhaustion do not require Social Security disability claimants to argue at the agency level that the administrative law judges hearing their disability claims were unconstitutionally appointed.”
Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Gorsuch and Barrett joined. Justice Breyer filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
Thomas Berry, Research Fellow at the Robert A. Levy Center for Constitutional Studies of Cato Institute and Managing Editor of the Cato Supreme Court Review, joins us today to discuss this decision and its implications.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/45032659Fri, 30 Apr 2021 19:24:00 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn April 22, 2021 the Supreme Court decided Carr v. Saul. was whether a claimant seeking disability benefits under the Social Security Act forfeits an Appointments Clause challenge to the appointment of an administrative law judge by failing to...In a 9-0 opinion authored by Justice Sotomayor, the Court reversed the ruling of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and remanded the case. The Supreme Court held, “Principles of issue exhaustion do not require Social Security disability claimants to argue at the agency level that the administrative law judges hearing their disability claims were unconstitutionally appointed.”
Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Gorsuch and Barrett joined. Justice Breyer filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
Thomas Berry, Research Fellow at the Robert A. Levy Center for Constitutional Studies of Cato Institute and Managing Editor of the Cato Supreme Court Review, joins us today to discuss this decision and its implications.]]>1503supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/mahanoy-area-school-district-v-b-l-post-Michael Dimino, Professor of Law at Widener University Commonwealth Law School, joins us today to discuss this case's oral argument.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/44929397Fri, 30 Apr 2021 14:21:06 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn April 28, 2021 the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L. The question before the court was whether Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, which holds that public school officials may regulate...Michael Dimino, Professor of Law at Widener University Commonwealth Law School, joins us today to discuss this case's oral argument.]]>2012first amendment,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/sanchez-v-mayorkas-post-argument-scotuscHon. Grover Joseph Rees joins us today to dicsuss this case's oral argument.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/44557752Thu, 29 Apr 2021 15:34:10 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn April 19, 2021 the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Sanchez v. Mayorkas. The question before the court was under 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(f)(4), a grant of temporary protected status authorizes eligible noncitizens to obtain...Hon. Grover Joseph Rees joins us today to dicsuss this case's oral argument.]]>1480supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/jones-v-mississippi-post-decision-scotusIn a 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Kavanaugh, the Court affirmed the ruling of the Supreme Court of Mississippi, holding, “The Eighth Amendment does not require a finding that a juvenile is permanently incorrigible before imposing a sentence of life without parole.”
Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Breyer and Kagan joined.
Marc Levin, Chief Policy Counsel for the Council on Criminal Justice and Senior Advisor of Right on Crime, joins us today to discuss this case and its implications.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/45027081Wed, 28 Apr 2021 14:58:00 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn April 22, 2021 the Supreme Court decided Jones v. Mississippi. The issue was whether the Eighth Amendment requires the sentencing authority to make a finding that a juvenile is permanently incorrigible before imposing a sentence of life without...In a 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Kavanaugh, the Court affirmed the ruling of the Supreme Court of Mississippi, holding, “The Eighth Amendment does not require a finding that a juvenile is permanently incorrigible before imposing a sentence of life without parole.”
Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Breyer and Kagan joined.
Marc Levin, Chief Policy Counsel for the Council on Criminal Justice and Senior Advisor of Right on Crime, joins us today to discuss this case and its implications.]]>986criminal law & procedure,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/united-states-v-cooley-post-argument-scoAnthony J. Ferate, Of Counsel at Spencer Fane LLP, joins us today to discuss this case's oral argument.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/44166375Mon, 26 Apr 2021 13:57:05 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 23, 2021 the Supreme Court heard oral argument in United States v. Cooley. The question before the court was whether the lower courts erred in suppressing evidence on the theory that a police officer of an Indian tribe lacked authority to...Anthony J. Ferate, Of Counsel at Spencer Fane LLP, joins us today to discuss this case's oral argument.]]>1211federalismcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/florida-v-georgia-post-decision-scotuscaJustice Barrett, writing for the 9-0 majority, dismissed the case, holding that Florida failed to establish that Georgia’s overconsumption of interstate waters was either a substantial factor contributing to, or the sole cause of, Florida’s injuries.
Tony Francois, Senior Attorney at the Pacific Legal Foundation, joins us today to discuss the court’s decision in this case.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/44455262Tue, 13 Apr 2021 14:55:00 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn April 1, 2021, the Supreme Court decided Florida v. Georgia, an ongoing case of original jurisdiction involving Florida’s desire to limit the amount of water that Georgia uses in the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin. Justice...Justice Barrett, writing for the 9-0 majority, dismissed the case, holding that Florida failed to establish that Georgia’s overconsumption of interstate waters was either a substantial factor contributing to, or the sole cause of, Florida’s injuries.
Tony Francois, Senior Attorney at the Pacific Legal Foundation, joins us today to discuss the court’s decision in this case.]]>1126state governments,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/goldman-sachs-group-inc-v-arkansas-teachTed Frank, Director at the Hamilton Lincoln Law Institute and the Center for Class Action Fairness, joins us today to discuss this case's oral argument.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/44437476Fri, 02 Apr 2021 15:14:00 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 29, 2021 the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Goldman Sachs Group Inc. v. Arkansas Teacher Retirement System. The questions before the court were whether, first, a defendant in a securities class action may rebut the presumption of...Ted Frank, Director at the Hamilton Lincoln Law Institute and the Center for Class Action Fairness, joins us today to discuss this case's oral argument.]]>1121supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/national-collegiate-athletic-associationHon. Joshua D. Wright, professor and Executive Director of the Global Antitrust Institute at Antonin Scalia Law School, joins us today to discuss this case's oral argument.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/44454807Fri, 02 Apr 2021 14:27:18 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 31, 2021 the Supreme Court heard oral argument in NCAA v. Alston. The question before the court was Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit erroneously held, in conflict with decisions of other circuits and general antitrust...Hon. Joshua D. Wright, professor and Executive Director of the Global Antitrust Institute at Antonin Scalia Law School, joins us today to discuss this case's oral argument.]]>1147corporations,securities & antitrustcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/torres-v-madrid-post-decision-scotuscastIn October 2016, she filed a civil-rights complaint in federal court against the two officers, alleging claims including excessive force and conspiracy to engage in excessive force. Construing Torres’s complaint as asserting the excessive-force claims under the Fourth Amendment, the court concluded that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. In the court’s view, the officers had not seized Torres at the time of the shooting, and without a seizure, there could be no Fourth Amendment violation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
In a 5-3 vote the Supreme Court vacated and remanded. The Court held that the application of physical force to the body of a person with intent to restrain is a seizure even if the person does not submit and is not subdued. Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Alito joined. Justice Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Kent Scheidegger, Legal Director and General Counsel, Criminal Justice Legal Foundation, joins us today to discuss this opinion.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/44167072Thu, 01 Apr 2021 15:10:00 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 25, 2021, the Supreme Court decided Torres v. Madrid. This case arises out of an incident Roxanne Torres had with police officers in which she was operating a vehicle under the influence of methamphetamine and in the process of trying to get...In October 2016, she filed a civil-rights complaint in federal court against the two officers, alleging claims including excessive force and conspiracy to engage in excessive force. Construing Torres’s complaint as asserting the excessive-force claims under the Fourth Amendment, the court concluded that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. In the court’s view, the officers had not seized Torres at the time of the shooting, and without a seizure, there could be no Fourth Amendment violation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
In a 5-3 vote the Supreme Court vacated and remanded. The Court held that the application of physical force to the body of a person with intent to restrain is a seizure even if the person does not submit and is not subdued. Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Alito joined. Justice Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Kent Scheidegger, Legal Director and General Counsel, Criminal Justice Legal Foundation, joins us today to discuss this opinion.]]>803fourteenth amendmentcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/caniglia-v-strom-post-argument-scotuscasRobert Frommer, Senior Attorney at the Institute for Justice, joins us today to discuss this case's oral argument.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/44166672Mon, 29 Mar 2021 14:35:11 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 24, 2021 the Supreme Court heard oral arguement in Caniglia v. Strom. The question before the court was whether the “community caretaking” exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement extends to the home. Robert...Robert Frommer, Senior Attorney at the Institute for Justice, joins us today to discuss this case's oral argument.]]>1126fourth amendmentcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/united-states-v-cooley-post-argument-sco_1Anthony Ferate, Of Counsel at Spencer Fane LLP, joins us today to discuss this case's oral argument.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/44166434Fri, 26 Mar 2021 14:09:02 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 23, 2021 the Supreme Court heard oral argument in United States v. Cooley. The question before the court was the lower courts erred in suppressing evidence on the theory that a police officer of an Indian tribe lacked authority to...Anthony Ferate, Of Counsel at Spencer Fane LLP, joins us today to discuss this case's oral argument.]]>1211federalismcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/cedar-point-nursery-v-hassid-post-argumeWen Fa, attorney at the Pacific Legal Foundation, joins us today to discuss this case's oral argument.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/44151342Thu, 25 Mar 2021 19:14:09 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 22, 2021 the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid. The question before the Court was whether the uncompensated appropriation of an easement that is limited in time effects a per se physical taking under the Fifth...Wen Fa, attorney at the Pacific Legal Foundation, joins us today to discuss this case's oral argument.]]>1045due processcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/carr-v-saul-post-argument-scotuscastJennifer L. Mascott, Assistant Professor of Law, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University, and Richard Pierce, Lyle T. Alverson Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School, join us today to discuss this case's oral argument.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/44150547Wed, 10 Mar 2021 19:55:13 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 3, 2021, the Supreme Court will hear oral arguments in Carr v. Saul. The question before the Court was whether a claimant seeking disability benefits under the Social Security Act forfeits an Appointments Clause challenge to the appointment...Jennifer L. Mascott, Assistant Professor of Law, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University, and Richard Pierce, Lyle T. Alverson Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School, join us today to discuss this case's oral argument.]]>1292administrative law & regulatiocleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/brnovich-v-democratic-national-committeeDerek Muller, Professor of Law at University of Iowa's College of Law, joins us today to discuss this case's oral argument.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/44147099Tue, 09 Mar 2021 16:35:00 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 2, 2021 the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee. The questions before the court were: first, whether Arizona’s out-of-precinct policy, which does not count provisional ballots cast in person on...Derek Muller, Professor of Law at University of Iowa's College of Law, joins us today to discuss this case's oral argument.]]>1169election lawcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/federal-republic-of-germany-v-philipp-poGermany v. Phillip arises out of lawsuit brought by the heirs of several Jewish art dealers who are seeking compensation for what they describe as the forced sale of medieval Christian relics under the Nazi regime. The respondents filed a lawsuit in federal court in the District of Columbia, invoking the expropriation exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which abrogates foreign sovereign immunity when “rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue,” as the jurisdictional basis for their claims. Germany moved to dismiss, and the district court largely denied the motion, holding the claims fell within the scope of the expropriation exception. Germany appealed, and the U.S. Appeals Court for D.C. affirmed as to jurisdiction, reiterating its holding in a prior case that a genocidal taking is a violation of international law and rejecting Germany’s argument based on principles of international comity.
In a unanimous ruling the Supreme Court vacated the lower-court ruling that allowed the lawsuit to go forward, agreeing with Germany that the lawsuit does not fall within an exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which generally bars lawsuits against foreign governments in U.S. courts.
Alberto Coll, Vincent de Paul Professor of Law at DePaul University College of Law, joins us today to discuss this ruling and its implications.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/43843377Mon, 08 Mar 2021 16:06:31 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn February 3, 2021, the Supreme Court decided Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp. The court also issued a one-sentence opinion vacating a lower-court ruling in Republic of Hungary v. Simon, a similar lawsuit brought by Holocaust survivors seeking...Germany v. Phillip arises out of lawsuit brought by the heirs of several Jewish art dealers who are seeking compensation for what they describe as the forced sale of medieval Christian relics under the Nazi regime. The respondents filed a lawsuit in federal court in the District of Columbia, invoking the expropriation exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which abrogates foreign sovereign immunity when “rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue,” as the jurisdictional basis for their claims. Germany moved to dismiss, and the district court largely denied the motion, holding the claims fell within the scope of the expropriation exception. Germany appealed, and the U.S. Appeals Court for D.C. affirmed as to jurisdiction, reiterating its holding in a prior case that a genocidal taking is a violation of international law and rejecting Germany’s argument based on principles of international comity.
In a unanimous ruling the Supreme Court vacated the lower-court ruling that allowed the lawsuit to go forward, agreeing with Germany that the lawsuit does not fall within an exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which generally bars lawsuits against foreign governments in U.S. courts.
Alberto Coll, Vincent de Paul Professor of Law at DePaul University College of Law, joins us today to discuss this ruling and its implications.]]>915international law & trade,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/lange-v-california-post-argument-scotuscThe trial court concluded that the officer had probable cause, denied the motion to suppress, and issued a conviction for Lange. Later, a civil court ruled that Lange's arrest was unlawful and an appellate court ruled that the arrest was lawful. On appeal to the California First District Court of Appeal, the court affirmed the conviction.
Vikrant Reddy, Senior Research Fellow at the Charles Koch Institute and Clark Neily, Vice President for Criminal Justice at the Cato Institute, join us today to discuss this argument and its implications.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/43791103Mon, 08 Mar 2021 15:55:18 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn February 24, 2021 the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Lange v. California. The question before the court was whether the pursuit of a person whom a police officer has probable cause to believe has committed a misdemeanor categorically...The trial court concluded that the officer had probable cause, denied the motion to suppress, and issued a conviction for Lange. Later, a civil court ruled that Lange's arrest was unlawful and an appellate court ruled that the arrest was lawful. On appeal to the California First District Court of Appeal, the court affirmed the conviction.
Vikrant Reddy, Senior Research Fellow at the Charles Koch Institute and Clark Neily, Vice President for Criminal Justice at the Cato Institute, join us today to discuss this argument and its implications.]]>83criminal law & procedure,fourth amendment,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/republican-party-of-pennsylvania-v-degraDerek Muller, Professor of Law at University of Iowa’s College of Law, joins us today to discuss this cert denial and the three justices’ dissents.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/43735256Thu, 04 Mar 2021 14:14:55 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn February 22, 2021, by a 6-3 vote, the Supreme Court denied cert in Repubulican Party of Pennsylvania v. Degraffenreid. There were two questions presented, which the Court decided not to entertain. The first was whether the Pennsylvania Supreme...Derek Muller, Professor of Law at University of Iowa’s College of Law, joins us today to discuss this cert denial and the three justices’ dissents.]]>636election law,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/united-states-v-briggs-post-decision-scoJustice Alito wrote for a 8-0 majority, finding that there was no statute of limitations for military rape. Justice Amy Coney Barrett took no part in the decision.
Arthur Rizer, Resident Senior Fellow at the R Street Institute, and Prof. Richard Sala, Assistant Professor of Law at the Vermont Law School, join us today to discuss this decision and its implications.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/43608135Tue, 23 Feb 2021 23:47:25 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn December 10, 2020 the Supreme Court decided United States v. Briggs. The question presented was whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces erred in concluding–contrary to its own longstanding precedent–that the Uniform Code...Justice Alito wrote for a 8-0 majority, finding that there was no statute of limitations for military rape. Justice Amy Coney Barrett took no part in the decision.
Arthur Rizer, Resident Senior Fellow at the R Street Institute, and Prof. Richard Sala, Assistant Professor of Law at the Vermont Law School, join us today to discuss this decision and its implications.]]>1170supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/facebook-inc-v-duguid-post-argument-scotMegan Brown, Partner at Wiley Rein LLP, and Daniel Lyons, Professor of Law at Boston College Law School, join us today to discuss this case's oral argument.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/43605759Tue, 23 Feb 2021 20:44:48 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn December 8, 2020, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Facebook Inc. v. Duguid. The issue presented was whether the definition of an "automatic telephone dialing system" in the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 encompasses any device...Megan Brown, Partner at Wiley Rein LLP, and Daniel Lyons, Professor of Law at Boston College Law School, join us today to discuss this case's oral argument.]]>1083supreme court,telecommunications & electronicleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/ford-motor-company-v-montana-eight-judicKaren Harned, Executive Director at National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal Center and Jaime A. Santos, Partner at Goodwin Procter LLP, join us today to discuss this case's oral argument.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/43605150Tue, 23 Feb 2021 19:50:08 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn October 7, 2020, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Ford Motor Company v. Montana Eight Judicial Circuit Court. The issue presented was whether the “arise out of or relate to” requirement for a state court to exercise specific...Karen Harned, Executive Director at National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal Center and Jaime A. Santos, Partner at Goodwin Procter LLP, join us today to discuss this case's oral argument.]]>1415federal courts,state courts,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/henry-schein-inc-v-archer-and-white-sale_2Erika Birg, Partner at Nelson Mullins, and Richard Faulkner, Of Counsel at Bennett Injury Law, join us today to discuss this ruling and its implications.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/43586261Mon, 22 Feb 2021 18:46:18 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn January 25, 2021 the Supreme Court decided Henry Schein Inc. v. Archer and White Sales Inc.. The question presented was whether a provision in an arbitration agreement that exempts certain claims from arbitration negates an otherwise clear and...Erika Birg, Partner at Nelson Mullins, and Richard Faulkner, Of Counsel at Bennett Injury Law, join us today to discuss this ruling and its implications.]]>2099supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/city-of-chicago-illinois-v-fultonJustice Alito’s opinion was joined by all other members of the Court except Justice Barrett, who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion.
Ralph Brubaker, Carl L. Vacketta Professor of Law at University of Illinois’s College of Law, joins us today to discuss this ruling.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/43274395Mon, 01 Feb 2021 22:29:29 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn January 14, 2021 the Supreme Court decided City of Chicago, Illinois v. Fulton. The question presented was whether an entity that is passively retaining possession of property in which a bankruptcy estate has an interest has an affirmative...Justice Alito’s opinion was joined by all other members of the Court except Justice Barrett, who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion.
Ralph Brubaker, Carl L. Vacketta Professor of Law at University of Illinois’s College of Law, joins us today to discuss this ruling.]]>1002financial servicescleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/federal-communications-commission-v-promMs. Jane E. Mago, Consultant in Media Policy and Law and former General Counsel of the FCC, Hon. Michael O'Rielly, Visiting Fellow at the Hudson Institute and former Commissioner of the FCC, Mr. Christopher J. Wright, Partner at Harris, Wiltshire & Grannis and former General Counsel of the FCC, and Mr. Lawrence J. Spiwak, President, Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal and Economic Public Policy Studies, join us today to discuss this case's oral argument.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/43606882Fri, 22 Jan 2021 22:21:00 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn On January 19, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Federal Communications Commission v. Prometheus Radio Project. The question before the Court was whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit erred in vacating as...Ms. Jane E. Mago, Consultant in Media Policy and Law and former General Counsel of the FCC, Hon. Michael O'Rielly, Visiting Fellow at the Hudson Institute and former Commissioner of the FCC, Mr. Christopher J. Wright, Partner at Harris, Wiltshire & Grannis and former General Counsel of the FCC, and Mr. Lawrence J. Spiwak, President, Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal and Economic Public Policy Studies, join us today to discuss this case's oral argument.]]>3626supreme court,telecommunications & electronicleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/bp-p-l-c-v-mayor-and-city-council-of-balPhilip Goldberg, Special Counsel for the Manufacturers’ Accountability Project, and Washington D.C. Office Managing Partner, Shook, Hardy & Bacon, LLP, joins us today to discuss this case's oral argument.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/43606190Fri, 22 Jan 2021 21:22:02 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn January 19, 2021, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in BP P.L.C. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore. The question presented was whether 28 U.S.C. 1447(d) permits a court of appeals to review any issue encompassed in a district court’s...Philip Goldberg, Special Counsel for the Manufacturers’ Accountability Project, and Washington D.C. Office Managing Partner, Shook, Hardy & Bacon, LLP, joins us today to discuss this case's oral argument.]]>711environmental law & property r,federal courts,state courts,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/henry-schein-inc-v-archer-and-white-sale_1Erika Birg, Partner at Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP, joins us today to discuss this ruling.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/42887106Mon, 11 Jan 2021 19:17:16 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn December 18, 2020 the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Henry Schein Inc. v. Archer and White Sales Inc. The question presented was whether a provision in an arbitration agreement that exempts certain claims from arbitration negates an otherwise...Erika Birg, Partner at Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP, joins us today to discuss this ruling.]]>1357supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/rutledge-v-pharmaceutical-care-managemen_1Justice Sotomayor’s opinion was joined by all other members of the Court except Justice Barrett, who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion.
Max Schulman, an Associate at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, joins us today to discuss this ruling.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/42694627Mon, 21 Dec 2020 18:51:28 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn December 10, 2020 the Supreme Court decided Rutledge v. Pharmaceutical Care Management Association. The question presented was whether the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) pre-empts the State of Arkansas’ Act 900, which...Justice Sotomayor’s opinion was joined by all other members of the Court except Justice Barrett, who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion.
Max Schulman, an Associate at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, joins us today to discuss this ruling.]]>579federalism,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/cargill-v-doe-i-post-argument-scotuscastDavid Rybicki is Partner at K&L Gates LLP. He joins us today to discuss this case’s oral argument.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/42562363Fri, 18 Dec 2020 22:54:15 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn December 1 2020, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Cargill v. Doe I. There were two legal questions before the Court. The first was whether the presumption against extraterritorial application of the Alien Tort Statute is displaced by...David Rybicki is Partner at K&L Gates LLP. He joins us today to discuss this case’s oral argument.]]>1419federalism,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/tanzin-v-tanvir-post-decision-scotuscastStephanie Taub, Senior Counsel at First Liberty, joins us to discuss the ruling and its implications.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/43479094Wed, 16 Dec 2020 19:12:36 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn December 10, 2020 the Supreme Court decided the case of Tanzin v. Tanvir. In an 8-0 ruling, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgement of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, holding that "appropriate relief" under the Religious Freedom Restoration...Stephanie Taub, Senior Counsel at First Liberty, joins us to discuss the ruling and its implications.]]>936religious libertycleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/edwards-v-vannoy-post-argument-scotuscasWilliam S. McClintock is an Associate at King & Spalding LLP. He joins us today to discuss this case’s oral argument.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/42558593Tue, 15 Dec 2020 18:57:57 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn December 2, 2020, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Edwards v. Vannoy. The question before the court was whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Ramos v. Louisiana applies retroactively to cases on federal collateral review. William...William S. McClintock is an Associate at King & Spalding LLP. He joins us today to discuss this case’s oral argument.]]>1099criminal law & procedure,due process,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/van-buren-v-united-states-post-argument-Orin Kerr is a Professor of Law at UC Berkeley School of Law and he joins us to discuss this case’s oral argument.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/42539919Mon, 14 Dec 2020 18:05:49 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn November 30, 2020 the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Van Buren v. United States. The question before the court was whether a person who is authorized to access information on a computer for certain purposes violates Section 1030(a)(2) of the...Orin Kerr is a Professor of Law at UC Berkeley School of Law and he joins us to discuss this case’s oral argument.]]>1286supreme court,telecommunications & electronicleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/trump-v-new-york-post-argument-scotuscasProfessor John S. Baker joins us today to discuss this case’s oral argument. Professor Baker is Professor Emeritus at Lousiana State University's Paul M. Hebert Law Center.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/42538809Mon, 14 Dec 2020 12:21:42 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn November 30, 2020 the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Trump v. New York. The first legal question before the Court was whether a group of states and local governments have standing under Article III of the Constitution to challenge a July 21,...Professor John S. Baker joins us today to discuss this case’s oral argument. Professor Baker is Professor Emeritus at Lousiana State University's Paul M. Hebert Law Center.]]>1470federalism,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/taylor-v-riojas-post-decision-scotuscastTaylor alleged that the officers knowingly confined him for six days in cells so grossly unsanitary as to violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. He contends that the cells were covered in human waste, that he was forced to sleep naked in raw sewage, and that the high risk of contamination prevented him from eating or drinking for nearly four days. The Fifth Circuit rejected Taylor’s challenge, reasoning that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity from suit because it was not “clearly established” by court doctrine that the specific conditions of Taylor’s confinement would have violated the Eighth Amendment.
The Supreme Court vacated the Fifth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case. “No reasonable correctional officer,” the Court indicated, “could have concluded that, under the extreme circumstances of this case, it was constitutionally permissible to house Taylor in such deplorably unsanitary conditions for such an extended period of time.”
Although the Court’s opinion was issued per curiam, it was noted that Justice Thomas dissented and Justice Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Justice Alito issued an opinion concurring in the judgment.
Katherine Mims Crocker, Assistant Professor of Law at William and Mary Law School, joins us to discuss this decision and its implications.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/42397890Mon, 07 Dec 2020 10:10:14 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn November 2, 2020 the Supreme Court decided Taylor v. Riojas, holding that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit erred in granting qualified immunity to correctional officers sued by inmate Trent Taylor regarding the conditions of his...Taylor alleged that the officers knowingly confined him for six days in cells so grossly unsanitary as to violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. He contends that the cells were covered in human waste, that he was forced to sleep naked in raw sewage, and that the high risk of contamination prevented him from eating or drinking for nearly four days. The Fifth Circuit rejected Taylor’s challenge, reasoning that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity from suit because it was not “clearly established” by court doctrine that the specific conditions of Taylor’s confinement would have violated the Eighth Amendment.
The Supreme Court vacated the Fifth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case. “No reasonable correctional officer,” the Court indicated, “could have concluded that, under the extreme circumstances of this case, it was constitutionally permissible to house Taylor in such deplorably unsanitary conditions for such an extended period of time.”
Although the Court’s opinion was issued per curiam, it was noted that Justice Thomas dissented and Justice Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Justice Alito issued an opinion concurring in the judgment.
Katherine Mims Crocker, Assistant Professor of Law at William and Mary Law School, joins us to discuss this decision and its implications.]]>558criminal law & procedure,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/texas-v-california-post-argument-scotusc
Iyla Somin joins us for this special, extended edition episode of SCOTUScast. Mr. Somin is a Professor of Law at the Antonin Scalia Law School of George Mason University.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/42241341Fri, 20 Nov 2020 11:03:02 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn November 10, 2020, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Texas v. California. The issues before the court were whether the unconstitutional individual mandate to purchase minimum essential coverage is severable from the remainder of the Patient...
Iyla Somin joins us for this special, extended edition episode of SCOTUScast. Mr. Somin is a Professor of Law at the Antonin Scalia Law School of George Mason University.]]>1550healthcare,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/fulton-v-city-of-philadelphia-pennsylvanMark Rienzi joins us today to discuss this case’s oral argument. Mr. Rienzi is President of The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty and Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Center for Religious Liberty at The Catholic University of America Columbus School of Law]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/42025190Mon, 16 Nov 2020 19:57:13 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn November 4, 2020, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia. There were three questions before the court. The first was whether free exercise plaintiffs can only succeed by proving a particular type of discrimination...Mark Rienzi joins us today to discuss this case’s oral argument. Mr. Rienzi is President of The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty and Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Center for Religious Liberty at The Catholic University of America Columbus School of Law]]>1262religious liberty,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/borden-v-united-states-post-argument-scoJoining us to discuss this case’s oral argument is Kent Scheidegger. Mr. Scheidegger is the Legal Director & General Counsel at Criminal Justice Legal Foundation]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/42025122Mon, 16 Nov 2020 19:49:15 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn November 3, 2020, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Borden v. United States. The question before the court was whether the “use of force” clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act encompasses crimes with a mens rea of mere...Joining us to discuss this case’s oral argument is Kent Scheidegger. Mr. Scheidegger is the Legal Director & General Counsel at Criminal Justice Legal Foundation]]>655criminal law & procedure,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/jones-v-mississippi-post-argument-scotusJoining us to discuss this case’s oral argument is Marc Levin. Mr. Levin is the Chief of Policy and Innovation for the Right on Crime initiative at the Texas Public Policy Foundation.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/42024955Mon, 16 Nov 2020 19:34:54 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn November 3, 2020, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Jones v. Mississippi. The question before the court was whether the Eighth Amendment requires the sentencing authority to make a finding that a juvenile is permanently incorrigible before...Joining us to discuss this case’s oral argument is Marc Levin. Mr. Levin is the Chief of Policy and Innovation for the Right on Crime initiative at the Texas Public Policy Foundation.]]>830criminal law & procedure,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/rutledge-v-pharm-care-management-associaMax Schulman joins us to discuss this case’s oral arguments. Schulman is an associate in the Washington, D.C. office of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/41884417Fri, 06 Nov 2020 18:39:00 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn October 6, 2020, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments for Rutledge v. Pharmaceutical Care Management Association. The issue in this case is whether states have the right to regulate pharmacy benefit managers, or PBM’s. Leslie Rutledge,...Max Schulman joins us to discuss this case’s oral arguments. Schulman is an associate in the Washington, D.C. office of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher.]]>772federalism & separation of pow,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/u-s-fish-and-wildlife-service-v-sierra-cJoining us today to discuss this case’s oral argument are Nancie Marzulla and Damien Schiff. Ms. Marzulla is Partner at Marzulla Law, and Mr. Schiff is a Senior Attorney at the Pacific Legal Foundation.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/41886781Fri, 06 Nov 2020 16:43:00 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn November 2, 2020, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service v. Sierra Club. This case addresses the scope of transparency under the Freedom of Information Act’s key “deliberative process” privilege....Joining us today to discuss this case’s oral argument are Nancie Marzulla and Damien Schiff. Ms. Marzulla is Partner at Marzulla Law, and Mr. Schiff is a Senior Attorney at the Pacific Legal Foundation.]]>1171administrative law & regulatio,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/torres-v-madrid-post-argument-scotuscastKent Scheidegger joins us to discuss this case’s oral arguments. Scheidegger is Legal Director and General Counsel at the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/41647705Fri, 23 Oct 2020 17:09:56 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn October 14, 2020, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments regarding Torres v. Madrid. The question before the court was whether an unsuccessful attempt to detain a suspect by use of physical force is a “seizure” within the meaning of the...Kent Scheidegger joins us to discuss this case’s oral arguments. Scheidegger is Legal Director and General Counsel at the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation]]>569criminal law & procedure,fourth amendment,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/pereida-v-barr-post-argument-scotuscastBrian Fish joins us today to discuss this case’s oral arguments. Mr. Fish is Special Assistant to the United States Attorney of Baltimore, Maryland.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/41644831Fri, 23 Oct 2020 10:07:38 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn October 14, 2020, the Supreme Court heard Pereida v. Barr, an immigration case. The question before the court was whether a criminal conviction bars a noncitizen from applying for relief from removal when the record of conviction is merely...Brian Fish joins us today to discuss this case’s oral arguments. Mr. Fish is Special Assistant to the United States Attorney of Baltimore, Maryland.]]>1221criminal law & procedure,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/united-states-v-collins-post-argument-scArthur Rizer and Richard Sala join us to discuss this case’s oral arguments. Rizer is the Director of the Criminal Justice & Civil Liberties program and Resident Senior Fellow at the R Street Institute. Sala is an Assistant Professor of Law at the Vermont Law School.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/41570308Tue, 20 Oct 2020 14:43:07 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn October 13, 2020, The Supreme Court heard oral arguments regarding United States v. Collins (consolidated with United States v. Briggs). The question before the court was whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces erred in concluding...Arthur Rizer and Richard Sala join us to discuss this case’s oral arguments. Rizer is the Director of the Criminal Justice & Civil Liberties program and Resident Senior Fellow at the R Street Institute. Sala is an Assistant Professor of Law at the Vermont Law School.]]>1191criminal law & procedure,federal courts,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/google-llc-v-oracle-america-incMichael Risch joins us to discuss this case’s oral arguments. Risch is Vice Dean and Professor of Law at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law and author of an amicus brief in support of Google.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/41554492Mon, 19 Oct 2020 16:46:21 +0000The Federalist SocietyThe Supreme Court heard oral arguments for Google LLC v. Oracle America Inc. on October 7, 2020. Two questions were before the court: the first was whether copyright protection extends to a software interface; the second was whether, as a jury found,...Michael Risch joins us to discuss this case’s oral arguments. Risch is Vice Dean and Professor of Law at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law and author of an amicus brief in support of Google.]]>760intellectual property,supreme court,telecommunications & electronicleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/tanzin-v-tanvir-post-argument-scotuscastStephanie Taub joins us to discuss this case’s oral arguments.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/41497069Fri, 16 Oct 2020 18:00:00 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn October 6, 2020, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments regarding Tanzin v. Tanvir, a case involving the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, commonly referred to as RFRA. The issue in this case is whether RFRA permits suits seeking money...Stephanie Taub joins us to discuss this case’s oral arguments.]]>1534religious libertycleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/carney-v-adams-post-argument-scotuscastMichael Dimino joins us to discuss this case's oral arguments.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/41496858Fri, 16 Oct 2020 13:48:35 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn October 5, 2020, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments regarding Carney v. Adams, a First Amendment case involving a longstanding Delaware state constitutional provision that limits judges affiliated with any one political party to no more than a...Michael Dimino joins us to discuss this case's oral arguments.]]>1319election law,first amendment,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/united-states-patent-and-trademark-officJoining us today to discuss this case and its implications is Zvi Rosen, Visiting Scholar and Professorial Lecturer in Law at George Washington University’s School of Law]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/40006143Fri, 24 Jul 2020 20:46:10 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 30, 2020 the Supreme Court released its decision in United States Patent and Trademark Office v. Booking.com B.V.. In an 8-1 decision, the Court upheld the ruling of the lower court, which found that “Booking.com” is not a generic...Joining us today to discuss this case and its implications is Zvi Rosen, Visiting Scholar and Professorial Lecturer in Law at George Washington University’s School of Law]]>1211intellectual property,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/courthouse-steps-decision-co-dept-of-sta_2

Joining us today to discuss this decision and its implications is Derek Muller, Professor of Law at University of Iowa College of Law.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/39923320Thu, 23 Jul 2020 17:30:05 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn July 6, 2020, the Supreme Court affirmed the power of the states to regulate the decisions of presidential electors in Chiafalo v. Washington and its companion case Colorado Department of State v. Baca. The Court held that States may fine--or even...

Joining us today to discuss this decision and its implications is Derek Muller, Professor of Law at University of Iowa College of Law.]]>1147federalism,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/co-dept-of-state-v-baca-and-chiafalo-v-w_1 Joining us today to discuss this decision and its implications is Derek Muller, Professor of Law at University of Iowa College of Law.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/39924537Tue, 21 Jul 2020 19:07:00 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn July 6, 2020, the Supreme Court affirmed the power of the states to regulate the decisions of presidential electors in Chiafalo v. Washington and its companion case Colorado Department of State v. Baca. The Court held that States may fine--or even... Joining us today to discuss this decision and its implications is Derek Muller, Professor of Law at University of Iowa College of Law.]]>1147federalism,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/department-of-homeland-security-v-thuraiThe court reversed and remanded the case to the courts below, holding that, As applied in this case, U. S. C. § 1252(e)(2)—which limits the habeas review obtainable by a noncitizen detained for expedited removal—does not violate the suspension or due process clauses.
Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Breyer filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Ginsburg Joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Kagan joined.
To discuss the case, we have O.H. Skinner, Arizona Solicitor General.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/39884808Tue, 21 Jul 2020 17:34:45 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 25, in a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court issued the opinion, penned by Justice Alito, in the case Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam. The court reversed and remanded the case to the courts below, holding that, As applied in this...The court reversed and remanded the case to the courts below, holding that, As applied in this case, U. S. C. § 1252(e)(2)—which limits the habeas review obtainable by a noncitizen detained for expedited removal—does not violate the suspension or due process clauses.
Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Breyer filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Ginsburg Joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Kagan joined.
To discuss the case, we have O.H. Skinner, Arizona Solicitor General.]]>1026supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/united-states-forest-service-v-cowpasturPer Justice Thomas's opinion for the Court: "We granted certiorari in these consolidated cases to decide whether the United States Forest Service has authority under the Mineral Leasing Act, 30 U. S. C. §181 et seq., to grant rights-of-way through lands within national forests traversed by the Appalachian Trail. 588 U. S. ___ (2019). We hold that the Mineral Leasing Act does grant the Forest Service that authority and therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit."
Justice Thomas's majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Breyer, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh in full, and by Justice Ginsburg as to all but Part III-B-2. Justice Sotomayor dissented, joined by Justice Kagan.
To discuss the case, we have Hon. Paul D. Clement, Partner at Kirkland & Ellis LLP and Stephen A. Vaden, General Counsel at the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/39869722Mon, 20 Jul 2020 20:04:42 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 15, 2020, the Supreme Court released its decision in the case of United States Forest Service v. Cowpasture River Preservation Association. By a vote of 7-2, the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was reversed, and...Per Justice Thomas's opinion for the Court: "We granted certiorari in these consolidated cases to decide whether the United States Forest Service has authority under the Mineral Leasing Act, 30 U. S. C. §181 et seq., to grant rights-of-way through lands within national forests traversed by the Appalachian Trail. 588 U. S. ___ (2019). We hold that the Mineral Leasing Act does grant the Forest Service that authority and therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit."
Justice Thomas's majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Breyer, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh in full, and by Justice Ginsburg as to all but Part III-B-2. Justice Sotomayor dissented, joined by Justice Kagan.
To discuss the case, we have Hon. Paul D. Clement, Partner at Kirkland & Ellis LLP and Stephen A. Vaden, General Counsel at the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>2699supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/mcgirt-v-oklahoma-post-decision-scotuscaThe Supreme Court ruled in favor of McGirt, holding that land in northeastern Oklahoma--reserved for the Creek Nation since the 19th century-- remains a reservation in accordance with a federal statute that gives the federal government jurisdiction to try certain major crimes committed by Indians in Indian country. Therefore, Oklahoma state courts did not have jurisdiction to convict Mr. McGirt.
To discuss this case and its implications, we have Andy Lester, partner at Spencer Fane LLP.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/39899411Mon, 20 Jul 2020 13:29:40 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn July 9, the Supreme Court handed down its opinion in McGirt v. Oklahoma. Jimcy McGirt sought post-conviction relief of three major sexual assault convictions, arguing his crimes occurred in Indian Country and thus were subject to the Indian Major...The Supreme Court ruled in favor of McGirt, holding that land in northeastern Oklahoma--reserved for the Creek Nation since the 19th century-- remains a reservation in accordance with a federal statute that gives the federal government jurisdiction to try certain major crimes committed by Indians in Indian country. Therefore, Oklahoma state courts did not have jurisdiction to convict Mr. McGirt.
To discuss this case and its implications, we have Andy Lester, partner at Spencer Fane LLP.]]>829federalism,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/our-lady-of-guadalupe-school-v-morrissey
Joining us to discuss this case and its implications is Daniel Blomberg, Senior Counsel at the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/39815047Thu, 16 Jul 2020 14:51:53 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn July 8, 2020 the Supreme Court decided Our Lady of Guadalupe v. Morrissey Berru. In a 7-2 ruling, the court held that that a “ministerial exemption” derived from the First Amendment prevents civil courts from adjudicating schoolteacher...
Joining us to discuss this case and its implications is Daniel Blomberg, Senior Counsel at the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty.]]>1127first amendment,religious libertiescleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/little-sisters-of-the-poor-saints-peter-https://api.spreaker.com/episode/39814666Thu, 16 Jul 2020 10:28:02 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn July 8, 2020 the Supreme Court decided Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, upholding in a 7-2 ruling a federal rule exempting employers with religious or moral objections from providing contraceptive coverage to...996healthcare,religious libertycleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/barr-v-american-association-of-political_1By a vote of 6-3, in an opinion by Justice Kavanaugh, the Court affirmed the case, holding that The exception for calls to collect government debt from a federal ban on robocalls to cellphones violates the First Amendment, but the exception is severable from the rest of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991.
Justice Thomas joined the court’s opinion as to parts I and II. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Breyer filed an opinion concurring in the judgment with respect to severability and dissenting in part, in which Justices Ginsburg and Kagan joined. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which Justice Thomas joined as to part II.
To discuss the case, we have Michael R. Dimino, Professor of Law at Widener University School of Law.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/39869640Tue, 14 Jul 2020 14:30:09 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn July 6, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court released its decision in Barr v. American Association of Political Consultants Inc., a case involving a dispute over whether the government-debt exception to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991’s...By a vote of 6-3, in an opinion by Justice Kavanaugh, the Court affirmed the case, holding that The exception for calls to collect government debt from a federal ban on robocalls to cellphones violates the First Amendment, but the exception is severable from the rest of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991.
Justice Thomas joined the court’s opinion as to parts I and II. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Breyer filed an opinion concurring in the judgment with respect to severability and dissenting in part, in which Justices Ginsburg and Kagan joined. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which Justice Thomas joined as to part II.
To discuss the case, we have Michael R. Dimino, Professor of Law at Widener University School of Law.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>1176supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/usaid-v-alliance-for-society-internationTo discuss the case, we have both Casey Mattox, a Senior Fellow focusing on toleration and free speech at the Charles Koch Institute, and Krystal B. Swendsboe, Associate at Wiley Rein LLP.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/39777874Tue, 14 Jul 2020 13:50:09 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 29, 2020 the Supreme Court released its decision in United States Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International. By a vote of 5-3, the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is reversed....To discuss the case, we have both Casey Mattox, a Senior Fellow focusing on toleration and free speech at the Charles Koch Institute, and Krystal B. Swendsboe, Associate at Wiley Rein LLP.]]>1220free speech & election law,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/june-medical-llc-v-russoTo discuss the case, we have Stephen H. Aden, Chief Legal Officer & General Counsel at Americans United for Life.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/39523822Mon, 13 Jul 2020 18:42:08 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 29, 2020, the Supreme Court issued its first major abortion decision on the merits since Justice Anthony Kennedy's retirement. The consolidated cases, June Medical Services v. Russo and Russo v. June Medical Services, involved the...To discuss the case, we have Stephen H. Aden, Chief Legal Officer & General Counsel at Americans United for Life.]]>1203constitution,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/espinoza-v-montana-department-of-revenue_1Chief Justice Roberts' majority opinion was joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion joined by Justice Gorsuch. Justices Alito and Gorsuch also filed concurring opinions. Justice Ginsburg dissented, joined by Justice Kagan. Justice Breyer dissented, joined by Justice Kagan as to Part I. Justice Sotomayor also filed a dissenting opinion.
To discuss the case, we have Michael Bindas, Senior Attorney at the Institute for Justice.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/38188913Thu, 09 Jul 2020 21:44:08 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 30, the Supreme Court released its decision in the case of Espinoza v. Montana Dep't of Revenue. By a vote of 5-4, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Montana was reversed and the case remanded. Chief Justice Roberts' majority opinion was...Chief Justice Roberts' majority opinion was joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion joined by Justice Gorsuch. Justices Alito and Gorsuch also filed concurring opinions. Justice Ginsburg dissented, joined by Justice Kagan. Justice Breyer dissented, joined by Justice Kagan as to Part I. Justice Sotomayor also filed a dissenting opinion.
To discuss the case, we have Michael Bindas, Senior Attorney at the Institute for Justice.]]>1067religious liberty,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/seila-law-llc-v-consumer-financial-prote_1Seila Law, a law firm based in CA specializing in debt relief services, was being investigated by CFPB after being alleged of violating telemarketing sales rules. Seila Law challenged the CFPB’s authority to investigate their firm, maintaining the CFPB’s structure, namely its director’s immunity from “at will” removal by the President, was unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court ruled 5-4 in favor of Seila Law, finding Congress’s insulation of the Bureau’s director from at will removal did indeed violate the separation of powers.
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the majority’s opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Kagan filed an opinion concurring in the judgement with regard to severability and dissenting in part in which Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor joined.
Joining us to discuss this case and its implications are John Eastman, Henry Salvatori Profesor of Law and Community Service and Director of the Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence at Chapman University’s school of Law, and Brian Johnson, partner at Alston & Bird.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/39783524Thu, 09 Jul 2020 15:31:54 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 29, 2020, the Supreme Court decided Seila Law, LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, a case that raises separation of power questions regarding the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). Specifically the Court ruled on whether...Seila Law, a law firm based in CA specializing in debt relief services, was being investigated by CFPB after being alleged of violating telemarketing sales rules. Seila Law challenged the CFPB’s authority to investigate their firm, maintaining the CFPB’s structure, namely its director’s immunity from “at will” removal by the President, was unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court ruled 5-4 in favor of Seila Law, finding Congress’s insulation of the Bureau’s director from at will removal did indeed violate the separation of powers.
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the majority’s opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Kagan filed an opinion concurring in the judgement with regard to severability and dissenting in part in which Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor joined.
Joining us to discuss this case and its implications are John Eastman, Henry Salvatori Profesor of Law and Community Service and Director of the Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence at Chapman University’s school of Law, and Brian Johnson, partner at Alston & Bird.]]>1332administrative law & regulatio,federalism,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/department-of-homeland-security-v-regentThe Chief Justice's opinion for the Court was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan in full, and by Justice Sotomayor as to all but Part IV. Justice Sotomayor concurred in part, concurred in the judgment in part, and dissented in part. Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part, joined by Justices Alito and Gorsuch. Justices Alito and Kavanaugh also filed opinions concurring on the judgment in part and dissenting in part. Our expert selection of speakers will discuss the decision and implications for the future.
To discuss the case, on this special panel episode, we have:
Dr. John C. Eastman, Henry Salvatori Professor of Law and Community Service and Director, Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence, Chapman University Fowler School of Law
Christopher Hajec, Director of Litigation at the Immigration Reform Law Institute
Mario Loyola, Senior Fellow at the Competitive Enterprise Institute
William A. Stock, Partner at Klasko Immigration Law Partners, LLP]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/39869954Tue, 30 Jun 2020 20:19:59 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 18, 2020, the Supreme Court released its decision in the case of Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California. By a vote of 5-4, the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (DHS v. Regents) was...The Chief Justice's opinion for the Court was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan in full, and by Justice Sotomayor as to all but Part IV. Justice Sotomayor concurred in part, concurred in the judgment in part, and dissented in part. Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part, joined by Justices Alito and Gorsuch. Justices Alito and Kavanaugh also filed opinions concurring on the judgment in part and dissenting in part. Our expert selection of speakers will discuss the decision and implications for the future.
To discuss the case, on this special panel episode, we have:
Dr. John C. Eastman, Henry Salvatori Professor of Law and Community Service and Director, Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence, Chapman University Fowler School of Law
Christopher Hajec, Director of Litigation at the Immigration Reform Law Institute
Mario Loyola, Senior Fellow at the Competitive Enterprise Institute
William A. Stock, Partner at Klasko Immigration Law Partners, LLP]]>2093supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/bostock-and-title-vii-post-decision-scotJustice Gorsuch's majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Alito dissented, joined by Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh.
To discuss the case, we have Curt Levey, President of the Committee for Justice.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/39869855Fri, 26 Jun 2020 20:17:13 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 15, by a vote of 6-3 the Supreme Court released its decision in Bostock v. Clayton County (combined with Altitude Inc. v. Zarda and R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc.), the Supreme Court affirmed that the judgment of the U.S. Court of...Justice Gorsuch's majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Alito dissented, joined by Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh.
To discuss the case, we have Curt Levey, President of the Committee for Justice.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>811constitutioncleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/lucky-brand-dungarees-v-marcel-fashions-Because the trademark action at issue challenged different conduct—and raised different claims—from an earlier action between the parties, Marcel cannot preclude Lucky Brand from raising new defenses, including a defense that Lucky Brand failed to press fully in the earlier suit.
To discuss the case, we have Paul Stancil, Professor of Law at Bingham Young University.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/38090639Mon, 15 Jun 2020 10:30:13 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn May 14, 2020, in an opinion by Justice Sotomayor the Supreme Court, in a vote of 9-0, reversed and remanded the case Lucky Brand Dungarees v. Marcel Fashions Group holding: Because the trademark action at issue challenged different...Because the trademark action at issue challenged different conduct—and raised different claims—from an earlier action between the parties, Marcel cannot preclude Lucky Brand from raising new defenses, including a defense that Lucky Brand failed to press fully in the earlier suit.
To discuss the case, we have Paul Stancil, Professor of Law at Bingham Young University.]]>1074supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/ge-energy-power-conversion-france-v-outoBy a vote of 9-0, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the judgment of the 11th Circuit. Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, held that “The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards does not conflict with domestic equitable estoppel doctrines that permit the enforcement of arbitration agreements by nonsignatories to those agreements.” Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion.
To discuss the case, we have Sadie Blanchard, Associate Professor of Law at the University of Notre Dame.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/31225368Thu, 11 Jun 2020 15:16:00 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 1, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision, in GE Energy Power Conversion France SAS v. Outokumpu Stainless USA LLC. By a vote of 9-0, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the judgment of the 11th Circuit. Justice Thomas, writing...By a vote of 9-0, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the judgment of the 11th Circuit. Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, held that “The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards does not conflict with domestic equitable estoppel doctrines that permit the enforcement of arbitration agreements by nonsignatories to those agreements.” Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion.
To discuss the case, we have Sadie Blanchard, Associate Professor of Law at the University of Notre Dame.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>638supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/co-dept-of-state-v-baca-and-chiafalo-v-wIn Colorado Department of State v. Baca, the Court will consider the claim of a presidential elector in Colorado who attempted to vote for someone other than Hillary Clinton, despite the fact that Hillary Clinton won Colorado's popular vote, and was replaced by another elector.
In Chiafalo v. Washington, the Court will hear the claims of three presidential electors who were each fined $1000 after they voted for a candidate other than Hillary Clinton in 2016, who also won Washington's popular vote. The cases will examine state power to regulate the actions of presidential electors and could affect how electors behave in the 2020 election.
To discuss the cases, we have Michael Morley, Assistant Professor at Florida State University College of Law.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/30040825Tue, 09 Jun 2020 18:04:44 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn May 13, 2020, the Supreme Court heard arguments in a pair of cases concerning the Electoral College. In Colorado Department of State v. Baca, the Court will consider the claim of a presidential elector in Colorado who attempted to vote for someone...In Colorado Department of State v. Baca, the Court will consider the claim of a presidential elector in Colorado who attempted to vote for someone other than Hillary Clinton, despite the fact that Hillary Clinton won Colorado's popular vote, and was replaced by another elector.
In Chiafalo v. Washington, the Court will hear the claims of three presidential electors who were each fined $1000 after they voted for a candidate other than Hillary Clinton in 2016, who also won Washington's popular vote. The cases will examine state power to regulate the actions of presidential electors and could affect how electors behave in the 2020 election.
To discuss the cases, we have Michael Morley, Assistant Professor at Florida State University College of Law.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>846supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/holguin-hernandez-v-united-states-post-aIn 2016, Petitioner Gonzalo Holguin-Hernandez pled guilty in federal district court to possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, and was sentenced to 24 months of imprisonment followed by two years of supervised release. As a citizen of Mexico, he also admitted to being unlawfully present in the United States. In October 2017, after completing his term of incarceration and starting his supervised release, Holguin-Hernandez was removed from the United States. In addition to the condition that he not commit another federal, state, or local crime, the terms of supervised release required that Holguin-Hernandez not illegally reenter the United States. In November 2017, was arrested by Border Patrol agents, admitted having carried marijuana into the U.S. from Mexico, and again pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute. He was sentenced to 60 months of imprisonment and 5 more years of supervised release. The U.S. Probation office then alleged that Holguin-Hernandez had violated the terms of supervised release relating to his initial conviction and sought revocation. In a subsequent hearing he admitted the violations and was sentenced to 12 months of imprisonment, to run consecutively to the 60-month term of imprisonment for the second drug trafficking offense. Although Holguin-Hernandez’s counsel argued against a consecutive sentence during the hearing as unnecessary in light of the considerably longer drug trafficking one, she did not formally object or seek reconsideration after the judge imposed the revocation sentence.
On appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the sentence. Although Holguin-Hernandez argued that his sentence was longer than necessary to effectuate the statutory factors to be considered when imposing a sentence, the Court reasoned that he had not actually raised that objection in district court and therefore the sentence would be reviewed for plain error only. The Court found no plain error, indicating that the sentence fell within the Guidelines range and noting the Guidelines recommendation that a term of imprisonment for violation of supervised release be imposed consecutively to any other term the defendant might be serving. Other federal circuit courts of appeals had taken a different approach, however, and the Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to address whether a formal objection after pronouncement of sentence is necessary to invoke appellate reasonableness review of the length of a defendant’s sentence.
To discuss the case, we have Daniel Guarnera, Associate at Kellogg, Hansen, Todd, Figel & Frederick.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/29956531Tue, 09 Jun 2020 04:09:57 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn Dec. 10, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument in Holguin-Hernandez v. United States, a case involving a dispute over whether making a formal objection after pronouncement of the defendant’s sentence is necessary to invoke appellate...In 2016, Petitioner Gonzalo Holguin-Hernandez pled guilty in federal district court to possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, and was sentenced to 24 months of imprisonment followed by two years of supervised release. As a citizen of Mexico, he also admitted to being unlawfully present in the United States. In October 2017, after completing his term of incarceration and starting his supervised release, Holguin-Hernandez was removed from the United States. In addition to the condition that he not commit another federal, state, or local crime, the terms of supervised release required that Holguin-Hernandez not illegally reenter the United States. In November 2017, was arrested by Border Patrol agents, admitted having carried marijuana into the U.S. from Mexico, and again pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute. He was sentenced to 60 months of imprisonment and 5 more years of supervised release. The U.S. Probation office then alleged that Holguin-Hernandez had violated the terms of supervised release relating to his initial conviction and sought revocation. In a subsequent hearing he admitted the violations and was sentenced to 12 months of imprisonment, to run consecutively to the 60-month term of imprisonment for the second drug trafficking offense. Although Holguin-Hernandez’s counsel argued against a consecutive sentence during the hearing as unnecessary in light of the considerably longer drug trafficking one, she did not formally object or seek reconsideration after the judge imposed the revocation sentence.
On appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the sentence. Although Holguin-Hernandez argued that his sentence was longer than necessary to effectuate the statutory factors to be considered when imposing a sentence, the Court reasoned that he had not actually raised that objection in district court and therefore the sentence would be reviewed for plain error only. The Court found no plain error, indicating that the sentence fell within the Guidelines range and noting the Guidelines recommendation that a term of imprisonment for violation of supervised release be imposed consecutively to any other term the defendant might be serving. Other federal circuit courts of appeals had taken a different approach, however, and the Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to address whether a formal objection after pronouncement of sentence is necessary to invoke appellate reasonableness review of the length of a defendant’s sentence.
To discuss the case, we have Daniel Guarnera, Associate at Kellogg, Hansen, Todd, Figel & Frederick.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>1559supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/mcgirt-v-oklahoma-post-argument-scotuscaPetitioner Jimcy McGirt was found guilty of one count of first degree rape by instrumentation, one count of lewd molestation, and one count of forcible sodomy. McGirt was sentenced to 500 years in prison without parole. On appeal, the Oklahoma Court declined to review McGirt’s petition. He then filed an appeal with the U.S. Supreme Court, arguing that Oklahoma courts lacked jurisdiction because the crimes occurred in Indian Country where McGirt was a member of the Creek Nations of Oklahoma.
To discuss the case, we have Troy Eid, Shareholder, Greenberg Traurig LLP.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/29951200Tue, 09 Jun 2020 02:30:00 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn May 11, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument in McGirt v. Oklahoma, which involves a dispute over whether the prosecution of an enrolled member of the Creek Tribe for crimes committed within the historical Creek boundaries is subject to...Petitioner Jimcy McGirt was found guilty of one count of first degree rape by instrumentation, one count of lewd molestation, and one count of forcible sodomy. McGirt was sentenced to 500 years in prison without parole. On appeal, the Oklahoma Court declined to review McGirt’s petition. He then filed an appeal with the U.S. Supreme Court, arguing that Oklahoma courts lacked jurisdiction because the crimes occurred in Indian Country where McGirt was a member of the Creek Nations of Oklahoma.
To discuss the case, we have Troy Eid, Shareholder, Greenberg Traurig LLP.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>1881supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/little-sisters-of-the-poor-v-pennsylvaniTo discuss the case, we have Erin Hawley, Senior Fellow at the Kinder Institute for Constitutional Democracy at the University of Missouri and former professor of law at the University of Missouri School of Law.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/30055055Wed, 03 Jun 2020 10:30:00 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn May 6, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument in the consolidated cases of Trump v. Pennsylvania and Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, which involve a dispute over:(1) Whether the Departments of Health and...To discuss the case, we have Erin Hawley, Senior Fellow at the Kinder Institute for Constitutional Democracy at the University of Missouri and former professor of law at the University of Missouri School of Law.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>598healthcare,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/espinoza-v-montana-department-of-revenue
To discuss the case, we have Erica Smith, Senior Attorney at the Institute for Justice.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/28719401Sat, 30 May 2020 20:55:14 +0000The Federalist SocietyThis SCOTUScast addresses the January 22 Supreme Court argument in Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue. The question, in this case, is whether it violates the Free Exercise Clause for a state supreme court to invalidate a school choice program,...
To discuss the case, we have Erica Smith, Senior Attorney at the Institute for Justice.]]>815religious liberties,religious liberty,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/atlantic-richfield-co-v-christian-post-dTo discuss the case, we have Jonathan Wood, Senior Attorney at the Pacific Legal Foundation.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/38456469Thu, 28 May 2020 14:30:42 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn April 20, 2020, the Supreme Court, by a vote of 7-2, held that owners of polluted land within designated Superfund sites are “potentially responsible parties” under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability...To discuss the case, we have Jonathan Wood, Senior Attorney at the Pacific Legal Foundation.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>1178supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/opati-v-republic-of-sudan-post-decision-Following the 1998 al Qaeda bombing of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, victims and their families brought suit against the Republic of Sudan, alleging that it had assisted al Qaeda in carrying out the attacks. In doing so, plaintiffs invoked a terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)--but there was uncertainty as to whether, even in the absence of an immunity bar, Congress had provided a federal cause of action for claimants such as plaintiffs. In 2008, however, Congress amended FSIA to provide an express cause of action and directed that claims such as plaintiffs’ be treated “as if ” they had been originally filed under the new cause of action. Congress also made punitive damages available under the new cause of action and authorized the filing of new claims that arose out of the same incident as earlier claims. Plaintiffs amended their complaint accordingly and, following a bench trial, obtained a multi-billion dollar damages award, including more than $4 billion in punitive damages.
Sudan challenged the punitive damages award on appeal, arguing that Congress had not expressly authorized punitive damages based on conduct that predated its 2008 legislation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed, but the Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to consider whether, consistent with its decision in Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004), FSIA applies retroactively, thereby permitting recovery of punitive damages under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c) against foreign states for terrorist activities occurring prior to the passage of the current version of the statute.
By a vote of 8-0, the case was vacated and remanded, in an opinion by Justice Gorsuch on May 18, 2020. Justice Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
To discuss the case, we have Roger Alford, Professor of Law at the University of Notre Dame

As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/28144730Sat, 23 May 2020 18:51:01 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn May 18, 2020, the Supreme Court held by a vote of 8-0 that Plaintiffs in a suit against a foreign state for personal injury or death caused by acts of terrorism under 28 U. S. C. § 1605A(c) may seek punitive damages for pre-enactment conduct....Following the 1998 al Qaeda bombing of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, victims and their families brought suit against the Republic of Sudan, alleging that it had assisted al Qaeda in carrying out the attacks. In doing so, plaintiffs invoked a terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)--but there was uncertainty as to whether, even in the absence of an immunity bar, Congress had provided a federal cause of action for claimants such as plaintiffs. In 2008, however, Congress amended FSIA to provide an express cause of action and directed that claims such as plaintiffs’ be treated “as if ” they had been originally filed under the new cause of action. Congress also made punitive damages available under the new cause of action and authorized the filing of new claims that arose out of the same incident as earlier claims. Plaintiffs amended their complaint accordingly and, following a bench trial, obtained a multi-billion dollar damages award, including more than $4 billion in punitive damages.
Sudan challenged the punitive damages award on appeal, arguing that Congress had not expressly authorized punitive damages based on conduct that predated its 2008 legislation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed, but the Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to consider whether, consistent with its decision in Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004), FSIA applies retroactively, thereby permitting recovery of punitive damages under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c) against foreign states for terrorist activities occurring prior to the passage of the current version of the statute.
By a vote of 8-0, the case was vacated and remanded, in an opinion by Justice Gorsuch on May 18, 2020. Justice Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
To discuss the case, we have Roger Alford, Professor of Law at the University of Notre Dame

As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>582supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/barr-v-american-association-of-politicalTo discuss the case, we have Kevin Walsh, Professor of Law at the University of Richmond School of Law.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/28000450Thu, 21 May 2020 22:03:30 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn May 6, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument in Barr v. American Association of Political Consultants Inc., a case involving a dispute over whether the government-debt exception to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991’s...To discuss the case, we have Kevin Walsh, Professor of Law at the University of Richmond School of Law.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>812supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/trump-v-mazars-usa-and-trump-v-vance-posThe Supreme Court has also asked the parties to brief whether these congressional subpoenas are the kind of dispute between the branches that the court should avoid.
To discuss the case, we have Devin Watkins, Attorney at the Competitive Enterprise Institute.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/39763890Thu, 21 May 2020 18:46:32 +0000The Federalist SocietyThree cases before the Supreme Court consider the ability of grand juries and congressional committees to subpoena the personal tax records of the President. In Trump v. Mazars USA and Trump v. Deutsche Bank, three House committees subpoenaed the...The Supreme Court has also asked the parties to brief whether these congressional subpoenas are the kind of dispute between the branches that the court should avoid.
To discuss the case, we have Devin Watkins, Attorney at the Competitive Enterprise Institute.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>1145federalism & separation of pow,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/maine-community-health-options-v-united-The judgment reversed and remanded the case to the courts below. The opinion was written by Justice Sotomayor on April 27, 2020. Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined the court's opinion except for Part III-C. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion.
To discuss the case, we have Julia Mahoney, Professor of Law at the University of Virginia School of Law.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/27972014Thu, 21 May 2020 15:22:07 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn April 27, 2020, the Supreme Court held by a vote of 8-1, in the case Maine Community Health Options v. United States, that The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s now-expired “Risk Corridors” statute—which set a...The judgment reversed and remanded the case to the courts below. The opinion was written by Justice Sotomayor on April 27, 2020. Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined the court's opinion except for Part III-C. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion.
To discuss the case, we have Julia Mahoney, Professor of Law at the University of Virginia School of Law.]]>1074supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/our-lady-guadalupe-school-v-morrissey-beIn 2012, the case Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, the Supreme Court, unanimously held that, under the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses, “it is impermissible for the government to contradict a church’s determination of who can act as its ministers.” Accordingly, the Court recognized that there is a “ministerial exception” that precludes the application of employment-discrimination laws to claims concerning the relationship between a religious institution and its ministers. But who qualifies as a minister? The Hosanna-Tabor Court refused “to adopt a rigid formula,” but found that the employee at issue, in that case, was a minister in light of several “considerations”—the formal title given to the employee by the church, the substance reflected in that title, the employee’s own use of that title, and the important religious functions the employee performed.
Eight years later, the question of “who’s a minister?” is back before the Court in Our Lady of Guadalupe v. Morrissey-Berru, and St. James School v. Biel. In each case, teachers at Catholic schools brought discrimination claims, and the Ninth Circuit concluded the ministerial exception did not apply. Now before the Supreme Court, the schools contend that the Ninth Circuit has adopted the “rigid formula” that the Hosanna-Tabor Court eschewed, and they argue that in most cases a “religious functions” test is sufficient.
To discuss the case, we have Nathan Chapman, Associate Professor of Law at the University of Georgia School of Law.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/27910424Wed, 20 May 2020 21:54:02 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn May 11, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument in the consolidated cases Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru and St. James School v. Biel, which involves a dispute over whether the First Amendment's religion clauses prevent civil...In 2012, the case Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, the Supreme Court, unanimously held that, under the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses, “it is impermissible for the government to contradict a church’s determination of who can act as its ministers.” Accordingly, the Court recognized that there is a “ministerial exception” that precludes the application of employment-discrimination laws to claims concerning the relationship between a religious institution and its ministers. But who qualifies as a minister? The Hosanna-Tabor Court refused “to adopt a rigid formula,” but found that the employee at issue, in that case, was a minister in light of several “considerations”—the formal title given to the employee by the church, the substance reflected in that title, the employee’s own use of that title, and the important religious functions the employee performed.
Eight years later, the question of “who’s a minister?” is back before the Court in Our Lady of Guadalupe v. Morrissey-Berru, and St. James School v. Biel. In each case, teachers at Catholic schools brought discrimination claims, and the Ninth Circuit concluded the ministerial exception did not apply. Now before the Supreme Court, the schools contend that the Ninth Circuit has adopted the “rigid formula” that the Hosanna-Tabor Court eschewed, and they argue that in most cases a “religious functions” test is sufficient.
To discuss the case, we have Nathan Chapman, Associate Professor of Law at the University of Georgia School of Law.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>782religious liberty,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/opati-v-republic-of-sudan-post-argument-Following the 1998 al Qaeda bombing of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, victims and their families brought suit against the Republic of Sudan, alleging that it had assisted al Qaeda in carrying out the attacks. In doing so, plaintiffs invoked a terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)--but there was uncertainty as to whether, even in the absence of an immunity bar, Congress had provided a federal cause of action for claimants such as plaintiffs. In 2008, however, Congress amended FSIA to provide an express cause of action and directed that claims such as plaintiffs’ be treated “as if ” they had been originally filed under the new cause of action. Congress also made punitive damages available under the new cause of action and authorized the filing of new claims that arose out of the same incident as earlier claims. Plaintiffs amended their complaint accordingly and, following a bench trial, obtained a multi-billion dollar damages award, including more than $4 billion in punitive damages.
Sudan challenged the punitive damages award on appeal, arguing that Congress had not expressly authorized punitive damages based on conduct that predated its 2008 legislation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed, but the Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to consider whether, consistent with its decision in Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004), FSIA applies retroactively, thereby permitting recovery of punitive damages under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c) against foreign states for terrorist activities occurring prior to the passage of the current version of the statute.
To discuss the case, we have Roger Alford, Professor of Law at the University of Notre Dame
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/27814610Tue, 19 May 2020 22:59:06 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn Feb. 24, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument in Opati v. Republic of Sudan, a case involving a dispute over whether the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act authorizes punitive damages for terrorist activities that took place before Congress...Following the 1998 al Qaeda bombing of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, victims and their families brought suit against the Republic of Sudan, alleging that it had assisted al Qaeda in carrying out the attacks. In doing so, plaintiffs invoked a terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)--but there was uncertainty as to whether, even in the absence of an immunity bar, Congress had provided a federal cause of action for claimants such as plaintiffs. In 2008, however, Congress amended FSIA to provide an express cause of action and directed that claims such as plaintiffs’ be treated “as if ” they had been originally filed under the new cause of action. Congress also made punitive damages available under the new cause of action and authorized the filing of new claims that arose out of the same incident as earlier claims. Plaintiffs amended their complaint accordingly and, following a bench trial, obtained a multi-billion dollar damages award, including more than $4 billion in punitive damages.
Sudan challenged the punitive damages award on appeal, arguing that Congress had not expressly authorized punitive damages based on conduct that predated its 2008 legislation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed, but the Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to consider whether, consistent with its decision in Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004), FSIA applies retroactively, thereby permitting recovery of punitive damages under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c) against foreign states for terrorist activities occurring prior to the passage of the current version of the statute.
To discuss the case, we have Roger Alford, Professor of Law at the University of Notre Dame
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>764foreign policy,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/ny-state-rifle-pistol-association-inc-v-Under New York state law, possessing a firearm without a license is prohibited. New York City issues “premises” licenses that permit possession of a pistol or revolver at a particular address, and under city “Rule 5-23” such firearms may not be lawfully removed from that address except for transport directly to or from authorized shooting ranges within New York City limits (as well as certain state-designated hunting areas). Plaintiffs, who hold New York City premises licenses, wished to transport their firearms to shooting ranges, competitions, and/or homes outside of New York City. They sued for injunctive relief in federal district court, alleging that Rule 5-23’s restrictions violated the Second Amendment and were otherwise invalid under the dormant Commerce Clause, the First Amendment right of expressive association, and the fundamental right to travel. The district court rejected all these claims and dismissed the case. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, applying intermediate scrutiny to the Second Amendment claims, affirmed. The Supreme Court, however, subsequently granted certiorari to address whether the City’s ban on transporting a licensed, locked, and unloaded handgun to a home or shooting range outside city limits is consistent with the Second Amendment, the Commerce Clause, and the constitutional right to travel.
The case was vacated and remanded with a 6-3 vote in a per curiam opinion on April 27, 2020. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined in full and Justice Thomas joined except for Part IV-B.
To discuss the case, we have David Thompson, of Cooper & Kirk and Amy Swearer, Legal Fellow at the Meese Center for Legal and Judicial Studies
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/28963528Mon, 18 May 2020 14:30:55 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn April 27, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court released its opinion in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association Inc. v. City of New York, a case involving a dispute over whether New York City rules limiting transportation of licensed firearms to...Under New York state law, possessing a firearm without a license is prohibited. New York City issues “premises” licenses that permit possession of a pistol or revolver at a particular address, and under city “Rule 5-23” such firearms may not be lawfully removed from that address except for transport directly to or from authorized shooting ranges within New York City limits (as well as certain state-designated hunting areas). Plaintiffs, who hold New York City premises licenses, wished to transport their firearms to shooting ranges, competitions, and/or homes outside of New York City. They sued for injunctive relief in federal district court, alleging that Rule 5-23’s restrictions violated the Second Amendment and were otherwise invalid under the dormant Commerce Clause, the First Amendment right of expressive association, and the fundamental right to travel. The district court rejected all these claims and dismissed the case. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, applying intermediate scrutiny to the Second Amendment claims, affirmed. The Supreme Court, however, subsequently granted certiorari to address whether the City’s ban on transporting a licensed, locked, and unloaded handgun to a home or shooting range outside city limits is consistent with the Second Amendment, the Commerce Clause, and the constitutional right to travel.
The case was vacated and remanded with a 6-3 vote in a per curiam opinion on April 27, 2020. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined in full and Justice Thomas joined except for Part IV-B.
To discuss the case, we have David Thompson, of Cooper & Kirk and Amy Swearer, Legal Fellow at the Meese Center for Legal and Judicial Studies
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>1626second amendment,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/united-states-v-sineneng-smith-post-deciTo discuss the cases, we have Brian M. Fish, Special Assistant, United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/29913567Wed, 13 May 2020 14:30:00 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn May 7, 2020, the Supreme Court released the decision in United States v. Sineneng-Smith. By a vote of 9-0, the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was vacated and the case remanded. Although every member of the Court joined...To discuss the cases, we have Brian M. Fish, Special Assistant, United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>1342supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/united-states-agency-for-international-dThe United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 authorized the appropriation of billions of dollars to fund efforts by nongovernmental organizations to combat HIV/AIDS around the world. The Act provides, however, that none of these funds may be used by an organization “that does not have a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking.” 22 U.S.C. §7631(f). In its 2013 decision in Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., the Supreme Court held that this “Policy Requirement” violated the First Amendment, by compelling as a condition of federal funding the affirmation of a belief that by its nature cannot be confined within the scope of the Government program.
Respondents are domestic organizations that carry out HIV/AIDS-related aid work, including activities undertaken through legally distinct foreign affiliates. As the Supreme Court’s decision in Agency for Int’l Development did not address foreign affiliates specifically, the federal government has continued to apply the Policy Requirement to them. The affiliates object that, while they do not condone prostitution, neither can they satisfy the Policy Requirement because their HIV/AIDS work necessarily involves them with the activities of sex-worker communities abroad. The affiliates, therefore, challenged the Policy Requirement as applied to them and the district court entered a permanent injunction in their favor. A divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that the logic of the Supreme Court’s Agency for Int’l Development decision extended to foreign affiliates and not just domestic non-governmental organizations. The federal government thereafter sought certiorari and the Supreme Court agreed to consider whether the First Amendment bars enforcement of the Policy Requirement with respect to legally distinct foreign entities operating overseas that are affiliated with respondents.
To discuss the case, we have Casey Mattox, Senior Fellow of Free Speech and Toleration at the Charles Koch Institute and Krystal B. Swendsboe, Associate at Wiley Rein LLP.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/28958845Tue, 12 May 2020 14:30:24 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn May 5, 2020, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in United States Agency for Int’l Development v. Alliance for Open Society Int’l, Inc., a case which considers whether the First Amendment bars enforcement of a funding-related federal...The United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 authorized the appropriation of billions of dollars to fund efforts by nongovernmental organizations to combat HIV/AIDS around the world. The Act provides, however, that none of these funds may be used by an organization “that does not have a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking.” 22 U.S.C. §7631(f). In its 2013 decision in Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., the Supreme Court held that this “Policy Requirement” violated the First Amendment, by compelling as a condition of federal funding the affirmation of a belief that by its nature cannot be confined within the scope of the Government program.
Respondents are domestic organizations that carry out HIV/AIDS-related aid work, including activities undertaken through legally distinct foreign affiliates. As the Supreme Court’s decision in Agency for Int’l Development did not address foreign affiliates specifically, the federal government has continued to apply the Policy Requirement to them. The affiliates object that, while they do not condone prostitution, neither can they satisfy the Policy Requirement because their HIV/AIDS work necessarily involves them with the activities of sex-worker communities abroad. The affiliates, therefore, challenged the Policy Requirement as applied to them and the district court entered a permanent injunction in their favor. A divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that the logic of the Supreme Court’s Agency for Int’l Development decision extended to foreign affiliates and not just domestic non-governmental organizations. The federal government thereafter sought certiorari and the Supreme Court agreed to consider whether the First Amendment bars enforcement of the Policy Requirement with respect to legally distinct foreign entities operating overseas that are affiliated with respondents.
To discuss the case, we have Casey Mattox, Senior Fellow of Free Speech and Toleration at the Charles Koch Institute and Krystal B. Swendsboe, Associate at Wiley Rein LLP.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>2091supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/us-patent-and-trademark-office-v-bookingIn 2011 and 2012, Booking.com sought trademark protection for its web address name, “Booking.com”--but the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) rejected the application. “Booking” was either generic and not protectable, the PTO stated, or else a descriptive mark to which the addition of “.com” was insufficient to demonstrate the “secondary meaning” necessary for federal protection of a descriptive mark. Booking.com filed a civil action in federal district court to appeal the PTO rejection and prevailed: the district court held that “Booking.com” as a whole was a descriptive mark that had acquired secondary meaning; that is, it was sufficiently distinctive to establish a mental association in the mind of the relevant public between the proposed mark and the source of the product or service. The PTO in turn appealed, but a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. The U.S. Supreme Court thereafter granted the PTO’s cert petition to address whether--given that generic terms may not be federally registered as trademarks--the addition by an online business of a generic top-level domain (“.com”) to an otherwise generic term can create a protectable trademark.
To discuss the case, we have Art Gollwitzer, partner at Michael Best & Friedrich LLP and Zvi Rosen, Visiting Scholar and Professorial Lecturer in Law at George Washington University School of Law.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/28924151Mon, 11 May 2020 14:30:40 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn May 4, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument in United States Patent and Trademark Office v. Booking.com B.V., a case presenting the question whether the addition by an online business of a generic top-level domain (“.com”) to an...In 2011 and 2012, Booking.com sought trademark protection for its web address name, “Booking.com”--but the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) rejected the application. “Booking” was either generic and not protectable, the PTO stated, or else a descriptive mark to which the addition of “.com” was insufficient to demonstrate the “secondary meaning” necessary for federal protection of a descriptive mark. Booking.com filed a civil action in federal district court to appeal the PTO rejection and prevailed: the district court held that “Booking.com” as a whole was a descriptive mark that had acquired secondary meaning; that is, it was sufficiently distinctive to establish a mental association in the mind of the relevant public between the proposed mark and the source of the product or service. The PTO in turn appealed, but a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. The U.S. Supreme Court thereafter granted the PTO’s cert petition to address whether--given that generic terms may not be federally registered as trademarks--the addition by an online business of a generic top-level domain (“.com”) to an otherwise generic term can create a protectable trademark.
To discuss the case, we have Art Gollwitzer, partner at Michael Best & Friedrich LLP and Zvi Rosen, Visiting Scholar and Professorial Lecturer in Law at George Washington University School of Law.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>1983supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/shular-v-united-states-post-decision-scoThe Eleventh Circuit upheld his conviction and sentence, rejecting the application of the “categorical approach” to defining “serious drug offenses, and holding that the ACCA definition “requires only that the predicate offense involves certain activities related to controlled substances.”
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that “serious drug offense” requires only that the state offense involves the conduct specified in the statute, and does not require that the state offense in question match certain generic drug offenses under federal law.
The opinion was written by Justice Ginsburg. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion.
To discuss the case, we have Gregory A. Brower, Shareholder, Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/26889620Fri, 08 May 2020 02:19:45 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn Feb. 26, 2020, in a 9-0 decision, the Supreme Court decided Shular v. United States, rejecting the defense argument that Florida’s unique drug laws cannot be used to enhance a federal sentence. At issue was a federal statute known as the...The Eleventh Circuit upheld his conviction and sentence, rejecting the application of the “categorical approach” to defining “serious drug offenses, and holding that the ACCA definition “requires only that the predicate offense involves certain activities related to controlled substances.”
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that “serious drug offense” requires only that the state offense involves the conduct specified in the statute, and does not require that the state offense in question match certain generic drug offenses under federal law.
The opinion was written by Justice Ginsburg. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion.
To discuss the case, we have Gregory A. Brower, Shareholder, Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck.]]>906supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/romag-fasteners-inc-v-fossil-inc-post-deThe decision, which vacated and remanded the opinion below from the Federal Circuit, was written by Justice Gorsuch on April 23, 2020. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices Breyer and Kagan joined. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.
To discuss the case, we have Adam Mossoff, Professor of Law at Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/26874534Thu, 07 May 2020 16:37:39 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn April 23, 2020, in a 9-0 decision, the Supreme Court decided Romag Fasteners Inc. v. Fossil Inc., holding that a plaintiff in a trademark infringement suit is not required to show that a defendant willfully infringed the plaintiff’s trademark...The decision, which vacated and remanded the opinion below from the Federal Circuit, was written by Justice Gorsuch on April 23, 2020. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices Breyer and Kagan joined. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.
To discuss the case, we have Adam Mossoff, Professor of Law at Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>941supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/monasky-v-taglieri-post-decision-scotuscThe Hague Convention, and the federal law that implements it in the United States, indicate that a parent whose child has been removed to another country in violation of that parent’s custodial rights can petition in federal or state court for the return of the child to the child’s country of habitual residence. The courts of that country can then resolve any underlying custody disputes.
The opinion was given by Justice Ginsburg. Justice Thomas joined as to Parts I, III and IV, and filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
To discuss the case, we have Margaret Ryznar, Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/26872986Thu, 07 May 2020 16:23:42 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn Feb. 25, 2020, in a vote of 9-0 the U.S. Supreme Court decided Monasky v. Taglieri, holding that a child’s habitual residence under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction depends on the totality of the...The Hague Convention, and the federal law that implements it in the United States, indicate that a parent whose child has been removed to another country in violation of that parent’s custodial rights can petition in federal or state court for the return of the child to the child’s country of habitual residence. The courts of that country can then resolve any underlying custody disputes.
The opinion was given by Justice Ginsburg. Justice Thomas joined as to Parts I, III and IV, and filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
To discuss the case, we have Margaret Ryznar, Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>425supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/county-of-maui-hawai-i-v-hawai-i-wildlifUnder the federal Clean Water Act (CWA), someone seeking to discharge a pollutant from a “point source,” such as a pipe or well, into navigable water must first obtain a permit via the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System program (NPDES). The County of Maui, Hawai’i (the County), owns and operates four wells at a wastewater treatment plant that processes several million gallons of sewage per day. Treated wastewater from the plant is injected into groundwater via these wells, and some ultimately enter the Pacific Ocean via submarine seeps.
The 6-3 opinion was given by Justice Breyer on April 23, 2020. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion.
To discuss the case, we have Glenn Roper, attorney at the Pacific Legal Foundation.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/26775141Tue, 05 May 2020 15:59:09 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn April 23, 2020, in a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court decided County of Maui, Hawai’i v. Hawai’i Wildlife Fund and vacated and remanded the case. The Court held that the Clean Water Act, which forbids “any addition” of any...Under the federal Clean Water Act (CWA), someone seeking to discharge a pollutant from a “point source,” such as a pipe or well, into navigable water must first obtain a permit via the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System program (NPDES). The County of Maui, Hawai’i (the County), owns and operates four wells at a wastewater treatment plant that processes several million gallons of sewage per day. Treated wastewater from the plant is injected into groundwater via these wells, and some ultimately enter the Pacific Ocean via submarine seeps.
The 6-3 opinion was given by Justice Breyer on April 23, 2020. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion.
To discuss the case, we have Glenn Roper, attorney at the Pacific Legal Foundation.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>672environmental & energy law,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/barton-v-barr-post-decision-scotuscastThe stop-time rule affects the discretion afforded the U.S. Attorney General to cancel the removal from the United States of a lawful permanent resident who has resided in the U.S. continuously for 7 years. Under the stop-time rule, the requisite continuous residence terminates once the alien commits any of a certain number of offenses that render the alien inadmissible to (or removable from) the United States under federal law. Thus, committing a listed offense may cause an alien to fall short of the continuous 7-year residence requirement and thereby become ineligible for cancellation of removal.
Andre Martello Barton, after receiving lawful permanent resident status, was convicted in 1996 on three counts of aggravated assault, one count of criminal damage to property, and one count of firearm possession during commission of a felony, all in violation of state law. In 2007 and 2008, he was also convicted of several state law drug offenses. The federal government then initiated proceedings to remove Barton based on his various convictions. He conceded removability on the basis of his controlled substance and gun possession offenses but applied for cancellation of removal based on continuous residence. The government argued that Barton’s 1996 convictions triggered the stop-time rule, thereby disqualifying him for cancellation of removal. The Immigration Judge ruled in favor of the government and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. Barton then petitioned for relief from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which rejected his argument that the stop-time rule only applies to aliens seeking admission to the United States, and therefore denied his petition.
In a 5-4 vote, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that eligibility for cancellation of removal of a lawful permanent resident who commits a serious crime during the initial seven years of residence need not be one of the offenses of removal.
The opinion was written by Justice Kavanaugh on April 23, 2020. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan joined.
To discuss the case, we have Amy Moore, Professor of Law at Belmont University College of Law.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/26728103Mon, 04 May 2020 23:26:57 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn April 23, 2020, in a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court decided Barton v. Barr, a case involving a dispute over whether, for the purposes of the “stop-time rule,” a lawfully admitted permanent resident who is not seeking admission to the...The stop-time rule affects the discretion afforded the U.S. Attorney General to cancel the removal from the United States of a lawful permanent resident who has resided in the U.S. continuously for 7 years. Under the stop-time rule, the requisite continuous residence terminates once the alien commits any of a certain number of offenses that render the alien inadmissible to (or removable from) the United States under federal law. Thus, committing a listed offense may cause an alien to fall short of the continuous 7-year residence requirement and thereby become ineligible for cancellation of removal.
Andre Martello Barton, after receiving lawful permanent resident status, was convicted in 1996 on three counts of aggravated assault, one count of criminal damage to property, and one count of firearm possession during commission of a felony, all in violation of state law. In 2007 and 2008, he was also convicted of several state law drug offenses. The federal government then initiated proceedings to remove Barton based on his various convictions. He conceded removability on the basis of his controlled substance and gun possession offenses but applied for cancellation of removal based on continuous residence. The government argued that Barton’s 1996 convictions triggered the stop-time rule, thereby disqualifying him for cancellation of removal. The Immigration Judge ruled in favor of the government and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. Barton then petitioned for relief from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which rejected his argument that the stop-time rule only applies to aliens seeking admission to the United States, and therefore denied his petition.
In a 5-4 vote, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that eligibility for cancellation of removal of a lawful permanent resident who commits a serious crime during the initial seven years of residence need not be one of the offenses of removal.
The opinion was written by Justice Kavanaugh on April 23, 2020. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan joined.
To discuss the case, we have Amy Moore, Professor of Law at Belmont University College of Law.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>929supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/thryv-inc-v-click-to-call-technologies-l_1To discuss the case we have Daniel L. Geyser, Chair, Supreme Court and Appellate Practice, Geyser, P.C.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/39764041Thu, 30 Apr 2020 14:57:55 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn April 20, 2020, the Supreme Court released its decision in Thryv, Inc. v. Click-To-Call Technologies, LP holding that the Patent Office decision to hear an inter partes review (“IPR”) challenge is not subject to judicial review on...To discuss the case we have Daniel L. Geyser, Chair, Supreme Court and Appellate Practice, Geyser, P.C.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>2179cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/ramos-v-louisiana-post-decision-scotuscaIn Ramos, Evangelisto Ramos was convicted of second-degree murder by the vote of 10 of 12 jurors. Challenging his conviction, Ramos argued that Louisiana’s statutory scheme permitting non-unanimous jury verdicts in non-capital felony cases violated his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Relying on its precedent, the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected Ramos’ argument. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to consider whether the Fourteenth Amendment fully incorporates the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a unanimous jury verdict (in criminal cases) against the states.
In a vote of 6-3, the court reversed. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the court with respect to Parts I, II–A, III, and IV–B–1, in which Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kavanaugh joined; an opinion with respect to Parts II–B, 4–B–2, and 5, in which Justices Ginsburg, Breyer and Sotomayor joined; and an opinion with respect to Part 4–A, in which Justices Ginsburg and Breyer joined. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring as to all but Part 4–A. Justice Kavanaugh filed an opinion concurring in part. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts joined, and in which Justice Kagan joined as to all but Part III–D.
To discuss the case, we have John C. Richter, Partner, Special Matters and Government Investigations, King & Spalding LLP.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/27470933Thu, 30 Apr 2020 14:30:58 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn October 7, 2019, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Ramos v. Louisiana. In Ramos, Evangelisto Ramos was convicted of second-degree murder by the vote of 10 of 12 jurors. Challenging his conviction, Ramos argued that Louisiana’s...In Ramos, Evangelisto Ramos was convicted of second-degree murder by the vote of 10 of 12 jurors. Challenging his conviction, Ramos argued that Louisiana’s statutory scheme permitting non-unanimous jury verdicts in non-capital felony cases violated his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Relying on its precedent, the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected Ramos’ argument. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to consider whether the Fourteenth Amendment fully incorporates the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a unanimous jury verdict (in criminal cases) against the states.
In a vote of 6-3, the court reversed. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the court with respect to Parts I, II–A, III, and IV–B–1, in which Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kavanaugh joined; an opinion with respect to Parts II–B, 4–B–2, and 5, in which Justices Ginsburg, Breyer and Sotomayor joined; and an opinion with respect to Part 4–A, in which Justices Ginsburg and Breyer joined. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring as to all but Part 4–A. Justice Kavanaugh filed an opinion concurring in part. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts joined, and in which Justice Kagan joined as to all but Part III–D.
To discuss the case, we have John C. Richter, Partner, Special Matters and Government Investigations, King & Spalding LLP.]]>1942supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/liu-v-securities-and-exchange-commissionTo discuss the case, we have Todd F. Braunstein, General Counsel - International, Willis Towers Watson.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/26298934Tue, 28 Apr 2020 18:50:04 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 3, 2020, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments for the case of Liu v. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). At issue is "whether the Securities and Exchange Commission may seek and obtain disgorgement from a court as “equitable...To discuss the case, we have Todd F. Braunstein, General Counsel - International, Willis Towers Watson.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>889supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/kahler-v-kansas-post-decision-scotuscastJustice Kagan’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Breyer dissented, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor.
To discuss the case, we have GianCarlo Canaparo, Legal Fellow at the Heritage Foundation.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/27473748Wed, 22 Apr 2020 14:30:13 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 23, 2020, the Supreme Court held by a vote of 6-3 that the federal Due Process Clause does not require a state to adopt an insanity test that turns on a defendant’s ability to recognize that his or her crime was morally wrong. In an...Justice Kagan’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Breyer dissented, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor.
To discuss the case, we have GianCarlo Canaparo, Legal Fellow at the Heritage Foundation.]]>1125supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/thompson-v-hebdon-post-decision-scotusca_1Currently, Alaska’s law imposes (among other things) a $500 annual limit on individual contributions to a political candidate and to any group other than a political party.
The 9th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals upheld the limits, ruling that they were drawn narrowly to prevent quid pro quo corruption or the appearance of such corruption.
The Supreme Court, in an per curiam opinion, granted the petition of cert, vacated the decision below and remanded the case back for the 9th Circuit to revisit. Justice Ginsburg filed a statement.
To discuss the case, we have Derek Muller, Professor of Law at Pepperdine University Caruso School of Law.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/25575111Wed, 15 Apr 2020 20:24:04 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn Nov. 25, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a summary opinion in Thompson v. Hebdon, a case involving campaign-finance law. Specifically at issue was whether Alaska’s political contribution limits are consistent with this Court’s First...Currently, Alaska’s law imposes (among other things) a $500 annual limit on individual contributions to a political candidate and to any group other than a political party.
The 9th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals upheld the limits, ruling that they were drawn narrowly to prevent quid pro quo corruption or the appearance of such corruption.
The Supreme Court, in an per curiam opinion, granted the petition of cert, vacated the decision below and remanded the case back for the 9th Circuit to revisit. Justice Ginsburg filed a statement.
To discuss the case, we have Derek Muller, Professor of Law at Pepperdine University Caruso School of Law.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>484supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/georgia-v-public-resource-org-inc-post-aTo discuss the case, we have Zvi Rosen, Visiting Scholar and Professorial Lecturer in Law at George Washington University School of Law and Sy Damle, Partner, Latham & Watkins LLP.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/25530774Wed, 15 Apr 2020 15:06:02 +0000The Federalist SocietyIn its very first case on copyright, the Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Marshall was faced with the question of whether its own reports are protected by copyright, and decided in the negative. This term, the Supreme Court is called upon to...To discuss the case, we have Zvi Rosen, Visiting Scholar and Professorial Lecturer in Law at George Washington University School of Law and Sy Damle, Partner, Latham & Watkins LLP.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>2347supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/allen-v-cooper-post-decision-scotuscastTo discuss the case, in this special panel episode, we have:
Prof. Steven Tepp, Professorial Lecturer in Law, George Washington Law, and President and Founder of Sentinal Worldwide
Prof. John T. Cross, Grosscurth Professor of Intellectual Property Law and Technology Transfer, University of Louisville Brandeis School of Law
Prof. Ralph Oman, Pravel, Hewitt, Kimball and Kreiger Professorial Lecturer in Intellectual Property and Patent Law
Prof. Ernest A. Young, Alston & Bird Professor, Duke Law School

As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/27473498Wed, 15 Apr 2020 14:30:00 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 23, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court released a decision in Allen v. Cooper, which is the latest development in a decades-long series of Congressional enactments and Supreme Court rulings over whether and how Congress can abrogate the sovereign...To discuss the case, in this special panel episode, we have:
Prof. Steven Tepp, Professorial Lecturer in Law, George Washington Law, and President and Founder of Sentinal Worldwide
Prof. John T. Cross, Grosscurth Professor of Intellectual Property Law and Technology Transfer, University of Louisville Brandeis School of Law
Prof. Ralph Oman, Pravel, Hewitt, Kimball and Kreiger Professorial Lecturer in Intellectual Property and Patent Law
Prof. Ernest A. Young, Alston & Bird Professor, Duke Law School

As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>3672supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/kansas-v-glover-post-decision-scotuscastJustice Thomas’ majority opinion was joined by all other justices except Justice Sotomayor, who dissented. In addition, Justice Kagan filed a concurring opinion that was joined by Justice Breyer.
To discuss the case, we have Brian Fish, Special Assistant, United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/27465681Thu, 09 Apr 2020 14:30:38 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn April 6, 2020, the Supreme Court held by a vote of 8-1 that when a law enforcement officer lacks information negating an inference that a vehicle’s driver is the registered owner, an investigative traffic stop made after running the...Justice Thomas’ majority opinion was joined by all other justices except Justice Sotomayor, who dissented. In addition, Justice Kagan filed a concurring opinion that was joined by Justice Breyer.
To discuss the case, we have Brian Fish, Special Assistant, United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>1119supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/kelly-v-united-states-post-argument-scotIn 2013, in a New Jersey scandal known as “Bridgegate,” petitioners William E. Baroni, Jr. and Bridget Anne Kelly manufactured a grid-lock traffic jam in Fort Lee, New Jersey after the mayor refused to endorse then-Governor Chris Christie’s re-election campaign. Under the guise of a “traffic study” the two limited Fort Lee motorists’ access to the George Washington Bridge--the busiest bridge in the world--over the period of four days coinciding with the local school district’s first week of school.
Baroni and Kelly were indicted in 2015 for conspiracy to obtain by fraud, knowingly convert, or intentionally misapply property of an organization receiving federal benefits, the underlying offense itself (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A)), conspiracy to commit wire fraud, actual wire fraud, and conspiracy against civil rights. A jury convicted both defendants on all counts. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and vacated the civil rights convictions, but affirmed all other judgments of conviction. The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari, however, to consider whether a public official can “defraud” the government of its property by advancing a public policy reason for an official decision that was not actually the public official’s subjective reason for making the decision.
To discuss the case, we have Erin Sheley, associate professor of law at the University of Oklahoma College of Law.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/26725060Fri, 20 Mar 2020 10:30:00 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn Jan. 14, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument in Kelly v. United States, a case asking whether a public official “defraud[s]” the government of its property by advancing a “public policy reason” for an official...In 2013, in a New Jersey scandal known as “Bridgegate,” petitioners William E. Baroni, Jr. and Bridget Anne Kelly manufactured a grid-lock traffic jam in Fort Lee, New Jersey after the mayor refused to endorse then-Governor Chris Christie’s re-election campaign. Under the guise of a “traffic study” the two limited Fort Lee motorists’ access to the George Washington Bridge--the busiest bridge in the world--over the period of four days coinciding with the local school district’s first week of school.
Baroni and Kelly were indicted in 2015 for conspiracy to obtain by fraud, knowingly convert, or intentionally misapply property of an organization receiving federal benefits, the underlying offense itself (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A)), conspiracy to commit wire fraud, actual wire fraud, and conspiracy against civil rights. A jury convicted both defendants on all counts. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and vacated the civil rights convictions, but affirmed all other judgments of conviction. The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari, however, to consider whether a public official can “defraud” the government of its property by advancing a public policy reason for an official decision that was not actually the public official’s subjective reason for making the decision.
To discuss the case, we have Erin Sheley, associate professor of law at the University of Oklahoma College of Law.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>1198supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/thompson-v-hebdon-post-decision-scotuscaCurrently, Alaska’s law imposes (among other things) a $500 annual limit on individual contributions to a political candidate and to any group other than a political party.
The 9th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals upheld the limits, ruling that they were drawn narrowly to prevent quid pro quo corruption or the appearance of such corruption.
The Supreme Court, in an per curiam opinion, granted the petition of cert, vacated the decision below and remanded the case back for the 9th Circuit to revisit. Justice Ginsburg filed a statement.
To discuss the case, we have Derek Muller, Professor of Law at Pepperdine University Caruso School of Law.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/25533376Fri, 20 Mar 2020 10:30:00 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn Nov. 25, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a summary opinion in Thompson v. Hebdon, a case involving campaign-finance law. Specifically at issue was whether Alaska’s political contribution limits are consistent with this Court’s First...Currently, Alaska’s law imposes (among other things) a $500 annual limit on individual contributions to a political candidate and to any group other than a political party.
The 9th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals upheld the limits, ruling that they were drawn narrowly to prevent quid pro quo corruption or the appearance of such corruption.
The Supreme Court, in an per curiam opinion, granted the petition of cert, vacated the decision below and remanded the case back for the 9th Circuit to revisit. Justice Ginsburg filed a statement.
To discuss the case, we have Derek Muller, Professor of Law at Pepperdine University Caruso School of Law.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>484supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/mckinney-v-arizona-post-decision-scotuscWriting for the majority, Justice Kavanaugh clarified or confirmed several important criminal and death penalty procedure issues. First, the majority affirmed the ongoing validity of Clemons v. Mississippi and the availability of appellate reweighing of aggravation and mitigation. Second, the Court confirmed that a jury need only find the existence of an aggravating factor, and need not conduct the weighing of aggravation and mitigation or impose the particular sentence in a death penalty case. Third, the Court affirmed that a state court conclusion as to the collateral nature of a state appellate proceeding was not subject to dispute by the Court.
To discuss the case, we are joined by Oramel H. (O.H.) Skinner, Solicitor General for Arizona.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/25530934Mon, 16 Mar 2020 10:30:00 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn Tuesday, in a 5-4 decision in McKinney v. Arizona, the Supreme Court of the United States issued a landmark death penalty and criminal procedure opinion about the division between direct and collateral review and the jury requirements that the...Writing for the majority, Justice Kavanaugh clarified or confirmed several important criminal and death penalty procedure issues. First, the majority affirmed the ongoing validity of Clemons v. Mississippi and the availability of appellate reweighing of aggravation and mitigation. Second, the Court confirmed that a jury need only find the existence of an aggravating factor, and need not conduct the weighing of aggravation and mitigation or impose the particular sentence in a death penalty case. Third, the Court affirmed that a state court conclusion as to the collateral nature of a state appellate proceeding was not subject to dispute by the Court.
To discuss the case, we are joined by Oramel H. (O.H.) Skinner, Solicitor General for Arizona.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>693cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/hernandez-v-mesa-post-decision-scotuscas_1The central issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Hernandez family can recover damages in a Bivens action for the killing of their son in violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments when there is no other available remedy under federal law.
By a vote of 5-4, the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was affirmed. Per Justice Alito's opinion for the Court: "We are asked in this case to extend Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971), and create a damages remedy for a cross-border shooting. As we have made clear in many prior cases, however, the Constitution’s separation of powers requires us to exercise caution before extending Bivens to a new 'context,' and a claim based on a cross-border shooting arises in a context that is markedly new. Unlike any previously recognized Bivens claim, a cross-border shooting claim has foreign relations and national security implications.... Because of the distinctive characteristics of cross-border shooting claims, we refuse to extend Bivens into this new field.... In sum, this case features multiple factors that counsel hesitation about extending Bivens, but they can all be condensed to one concern––respect for the separation of powers." Justice Alito's majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Gorsuch. Justice Ginsburg dissented, joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan.
To discuss the case, we have Peter Thomson, Special Counsel, Stone Pigman Walther Wittmann LLC
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/24229929Thu, 12 Mar 2020 14:30:16 +0000The Federalist SocietyThe case of Hernandez v. Mesa arises from a 2010 confrontation on the U.S.-Mexican border in which U.S. Border Patrol agent Jesus Mesa shot and killed Sergio Hernandez, a teenage Mexican national. Although the FBI apparently cleared Mesa of...The central issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Hernandez family can recover damages in a Bivens action for the killing of their son in violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments when there is no other available remedy under federal law.
By a vote of 5-4, the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was affirmed. Per Justice Alito's opinion for the Court: "We are asked in this case to extend Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971), and create a damages remedy for a cross-border shooting. As we have made clear in many prior cases, however, the Constitution’s separation of powers requires us to exercise caution before extending Bivens to a new 'context,' and a claim based on a cross-border shooting arises in a context that is markedly new. Unlike any previously recognized Bivens claim, a cross-border shooting claim has foreign relations and national security implications.... Because of the distinctive characteristics of cross-border shooting claims, we refuse to extend Bivens into this new field.... In sum, this case features multiple factors that counsel hesitation about extending Bivens, but they can all be condensed to one concern––respect for the separation of powers." Justice Alito's majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Gorsuch. Justice Ginsburg dissented, joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan.
To discuss the case, we have Peter Thomson, Special Counsel, Stone Pigman Walther Wittmann LLC
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>1326supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/june-medical-services-v-russo-post-argumTo discuss the case, we have Steven Aden, Chief Legal Officer & General Counsel at Americans United for Life
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/24227074Mon, 09 Mar 2020 14:30:21 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 4, 2020, the Supreme Court oral argument in consolidated cases June Medical Services v. Russo and Russo v. June Medical Services (formerly June Medical Services v. Gee and Gee v. June Medical Services), which involve the constitutionality of...To discuss the case, we have Steven Aden, Chief Legal Officer & General Counsel at Americans United for Life
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>1312supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/seila-law-llc-v-consumer-financial-proteTo discuss the case, we have Ilya Shapiro, Director, Robert A. Levy Center for Constitutional Studies, Cato Institute
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/26298828Fri, 06 Mar 2020 14:35:00 +0000The Federalist SocietyIn Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), the Supreme Court will decide the constitutionality of the CFPB, an agency long criticized not just by the business community but also constitutional scholars who see major problems a...To discuss the case, we have Ilya Shapiro, Director, Robert A. Levy Center for Constitutional Studies, Cato Institute
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>1307supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/u-s-v-sineneng-smith-post-argument-scotuTo discuss the cases, we have Brian M. Fish, Special Assistant, United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/26518459Tue, 03 Mar 2020 15:30:00 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn February 25, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the case of United States v. Sineneng-Smith. At issue is "whether the federal criminal prohibition against encouraging or inducing illegal immigration for commercial advantage or private...To discuss the cases, we have Brian M. Fish, Special Assistant, United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>1990supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/thryv-inc-v-click-to-call-technologies-lIn 2013, Ingenio--a predecessor entity to petitioner Thryv, Inc.--initiated IPR proceedings to challenge the validity of a patent held by Click-to-Call Technologies, LP (CTC). CTC countered that the IPR was time-barred under the one-year limit of 35 U.S.C. § 315(b), because a complaint alleging infringement of that patent had been served on Ingenio back in 2001, well over one year before the IPR request. The Board rejected CTC’s argument, reasoning that the time bar did not apply because the complaint in question had been voluntarily dismissed, and was to be treated as if non-existent. Proceeding with IPR, the Board then ruled various claims of the disputed patent to be unpatentable.
After a complicated series of appellate proceedings that included a vacatur and remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued the en banc decision that formed the basis for Thryv’s certiorari petition in this case. Citing a recent determination it had made in a similar case, the court first decided that it had jurisdiction to review the IPR time-bar dispute. Title 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) provides that a decision whether to institute an IPR “shall be final and nonappealable,” but the court treated that bar as inapplicable to questions of timeliness as opposed to the merits. The Federal Circuit then held that the time bar of § 315(b) was triggered by service of any complaint, even one later dismissed without prejudice. Accordingly, the court vacated the Board’s decision and remanded with instructions to dismiss the IPR as time-barred: a victory for CTC. But the Supreme Court then granted Thryv’s certiorari petition to address anew the key jurisdictional issue: whether 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) permits appeal of the Board’s decision to institute an IPR upon finding that § 315(b)’s time bar did not apply.
To discuss the case, we have Robert J. Rando, Founder and Lead Counsel, the Rando Law Firm P.C.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/23800473Mon, 24 Feb 2020 15:30:45 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn Dec. 9, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument in Thryv, Inc. v. Click-to-Call Technologies, LP, a case involving a dispute over certain appeal and time restrictions applicable to “inter partes review” (IPR) proceedings before the...In 2013, Ingenio--a predecessor entity to petitioner Thryv, Inc.--initiated IPR proceedings to challenge the validity of a patent held by Click-to-Call Technologies, LP (CTC). CTC countered that the IPR was time-barred under the one-year limit of 35 U.S.C. § 315(b), because a complaint alleging infringement of that patent had been served on Ingenio back in 2001, well over one year before the IPR request. The Board rejected CTC’s argument, reasoning that the time bar did not apply because the complaint in question had been voluntarily dismissed, and was to be treated as if non-existent. Proceeding with IPR, the Board then ruled various claims of the disputed patent to be unpatentable.
After a complicated series of appellate proceedings that included a vacatur and remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued the en banc decision that formed the basis for Thryv’s certiorari petition in this case. Citing a recent determination it had made in a similar case, the court first decided that it had jurisdiction to review the IPR time-bar dispute. Title 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) provides that a decision whether to institute an IPR “shall be final and nonappealable,” but the court treated that bar as inapplicable to questions of timeliness as opposed to the merits. The Federal Circuit then held that the time bar of § 315(b) was triggered by service of any complaint, even one later dismissed without prejudice. Accordingly, the court vacated the Board’s decision and remanded with instructions to dismiss the IPR as time-barred: a victory for CTC. But the Supreme Court then granted Thryv’s certiorari petition to address anew the key jurisdictional issue: whether 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) permits appeal of the Board’s decision to institute an IPR upon finding that § 315(b)’s time bar did not apply.
To discuss the case, we have Robert J. Rando, Founder and Lead Counsel, the Rando Law Firm P.C.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>1190supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/peter-v-nantkwest-inc-post-decision-scotWhen a patent applicant is rejected by the PTO, and the PTAB affirms that decision on appeal, the aggrieved applicant may either pursue further (but relatively constrained) review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit--or the applicant may file a more expansive challenge in federal district court. The latter option is authorized by 35 U.S.C. § 145, but the statute also provides that “[a]ll the expenses of the proceedings shall be paid by the applicant.”
Here, NantKwest challenged an adverse PTAB decision in federal district court, but lost. After the judgment was affirmed by the Federal Circuit, the PTO sought reimbursement of its expenses from NantKwest, including nearly $80,000 in attorneys’ fees. The district court denied recovery based on the “American Rule” that parties in federal court typically bear their own fees unless otherwise directed by Congress. A divided en banc panel of the Federal Circuit ultimately affirmed the district court. This decision, however, was in tension with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit’s construction of similar language in the Lanham Act.
By a vote of 9-0, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Federal Circuit. Justice Sotomayor, writing for a unanimous Court, held that the plain text of §145 did not provide the requisite “specific and explicit” indication that Congress had intended to depart from “the American Rule’s presumption against fee shifting.” Accordingly, the PTO could not recover attorneys’ fees from NantKwest under §145.
To discuss the case, we have Robert J. Rando, Founder and Lead Counsel, The Rando Law Firm P.C.*
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.

*Please note that Mr. Rando is co-Counsel on an Amicus brief filed on behalf of the Association of Amicus Counsel in this case.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/22703791Wed, 12 Feb 2020 20:17:39 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn Dec 11, 2019 the Supreme Court decided Peter v. NantKwest Inc., a case considering whether a party opting to bring a challenge in federal district court to an adverse decision of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s (PTO) Patent Trial and...When a patent applicant is rejected by the PTO, and the PTAB affirms that decision on appeal, the aggrieved applicant may either pursue further (but relatively constrained) review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit--or the applicant may file a more expansive challenge in federal district court. The latter option is authorized by 35 U.S.C. § 145, but the statute also provides that “[a]ll the expenses of the proceedings shall be paid by the applicant.”
Here, NantKwest challenged an adverse PTAB decision in federal district court, but lost. After the judgment was affirmed by the Federal Circuit, the PTO sought reimbursement of its expenses from NantKwest, including nearly $80,000 in attorneys’ fees. The district court denied recovery based on the “American Rule” that parties in federal court typically bear their own fees unless otherwise directed by Congress. A divided en banc panel of the Federal Circuit ultimately affirmed the district court. This decision, however, was in tension with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit’s construction of similar language in the Lanham Act.
By a vote of 9-0, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Federal Circuit. Justice Sotomayor, writing for a unanimous Court, held that the plain text of §145 did not provide the requisite “specific and explicit” indication that Congress had intended to depart from “the American Rule’s presumption against fee shifting.” Accordingly, the PTO could not recover attorneys’ fees from NantKwest under §145.
To discuss the case, we have Robert J. Rando, Founder and Lead Counsel, The Rando Law Firm P.C.*
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.

*Please note that Mr. Rando is co-Counsel on an Amicus brief filed on behalf of the Association of Amicus Counsel in this case.]]>1012supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/monasky-v-taglieri-post-argument-scotuscThe Hague Convention, and the federal law that implements it in the United States, indicate that a parent whose child has been removed to another country in violation of that parent’s custodial rights can petition in federal or state court for the return of the child to the child’s country of habitual residence. The courts of that country can then resolve any underlying custody disputes.
Petitioner Michelle Monasky, an American, gave birth to her daughter A.M.T. in Italy. Monasky’s husband Domenico Taglieri, who is the father, is Italian. Alleging that Taglieri had become physically abusive, Monasky took the newborn A.M.T. to a domestic abuse shelter in Italy, and several weeks later both left for Ohio. Taglieri obtained an ex parte ruling from an Italian court terminating Monasky’s parental rights and then petitioned in federal district court in Ohio for A.M.T.’s return under the Hague Convention. The district court granted the petition, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court denied Monasky’s petition for a stay. She then returned A.M.T. to Italy. On appeal, a divided Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the district court’s ruling on the merits. In doing so, the Sixth Circuit treated the question of habitual residence as ultimately one of fact to be reviewed on appeal for clear error only.
Arguing that the Sixth Circuit’s approach was in tension with that of several other federal circuit courts of appeals, Monasky petitioned for certiorari. The Supreme Court granted the petition to consider whether (1) a district court’s determination of habitual residence under the Hague Convention should be reviewed de novo rather than for clear error; and (2) whether, when an infant is too young to acclimate to her surroundings, a subjective agreement between the infant‘s parents is necessary to establish her habitual residence under the Hague Convention.
To discuss the case, we have Margaret Ryznar, Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/22703662Wed, 12 Feb 2020 20:12:09 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn Dec. 11, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument in Monasky v. Taglieri, a case involving the standard of appellate review applicable to determinations of “habitual residence” under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of...The Hague Convention, and the federal law that implements it in the United States, indicate that a parent whose child has been removed to another country in violation of that parent’s custodial rights can petition in federal or state court for the return of the child to the child’s country of habitual residence. The courts of that country can then resolve any underlying custody disputes.
Petitioner Michelle Monasky, an American, gave birth to her daughter A.M.T. in Italy. Monasky’s husband Domenico Taglieri, who is the father, is Italian. Alleging that Taglieri had become physically abusive, Monasky took the newborn A.M.T. to a domestic abuse shelter in Italy, and several weeks later both left for Ohio. Taglieri obtained an ex parte ruling from an Italian court terminating Monasky’s parental rights and then petitioned in federal district court in Ohio for A.M.T.’s return under the Hague Convention. The district court granted the petition, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court denied Monasky’s petition for a stay. She then returned A.M.T. to Italy. On appeal, a divided Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the district court’s ruling on the merits. In doing so, the Sixth Circuit treated the question of habitual residence as ultimately one of fact to be reviewed on appeal for clear error only.
Arguing that the Sixth Circuit’s approach was in tension with that of several other federal circuit courts of appeals, Monasky petitioned for certiorari. The Supreme Court granted the petition to consider whether (1) a district court’s determination of habitual residence under the Hague Convention should be reviewed de novo rather than for clear error; and (2) whether, when an infant is too young to acclimate to her surroundings, a subjective agreement between the infant‘s parents is necessary to establish her habitual residence under the Hague Convention.
To discuss the case, we have Margaret Ryznar, Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>515supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/intel-corp-investment-policy-committee-vRespondent Christopher Sulyma worked for Intel Corporation from 2010-12, and during that time participated in retirement plans governed by ERISA. In 2015, Sulyma brought suit against Intel’s investment policy committee under various provisions of ERISA, alleging that the committee had invested imprudently and failed to make certain disclosures. Intel moved to dismiss the complaint based on ERISA’s statute of limitations, which provides that actions like Sulyma’s may not be commenced more than “three years after the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the breach or violation.” The district court found that Sulyma had actual knowledge of the alleged violations more than three years before bringing suit, and dismissed the case. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that Sulyma’s constructive knowledge of the alleged violations did not rise to the level of “actual knowledge” necessary to trigger the statute of limitations. It was not sufficient, the Court determined, that the relevant facts were available to the Sulyma; he had actually to be aware of those facts.
The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning on the meaning of “actual knowledge” conflicted with that of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, however, and the Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to consider whether the ERISA limitations provision bars suit when all the relevant information was disclosed to the plaintiff by the defendants more than three years before the plaintiff filed the complaint, but the plaintiff chose not to read or could not recall having read the information.
To discuss the cases, we have Matthew S. Rozen, Associate Attorney at Gibson Dunn
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/22738703Wed, 05 Feb 2020 10:30:05 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn Dec. 4, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument in Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee v. Sulyma, a case asking what degree of knowledge of a possible violation is necessary to trigger the three-year statute of limitations provided in the...Respondent Christopher Sulyma worked for Intel Corporation from 2010-12, and during that time participated in retirement plans governed by ERISA. In 2015, Sulyma brought suit against Intel’s investment policy committee under various provisions of ERISA, alleging that the committee had invested imprudently and failed to make certain disclosures. Intel moved to dismiss the complaint based on ERISA’s statute of limitations, which provides that actions like Sulyma’s may not be commenced more than “three years after the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the breach or violation.” The district court found that Sulyma had actual knowledge of the alleged violations more than three years before bringing suit, and dismissed the case. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that Sulyma’s constructive knowledge of the alleged violations did not rise to the level of “actual knowledge” necessary to trigger the statute of limitations. It was not sufficient, the Court determined, that the relevant facts were available to the Sulyma; he had actually to be aware of those facts.
The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning on the meaning of “actual knowledge” conflicted with that of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, however, and the Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to consider whether the ERISA limitations provision bars suit when all the relevant information was disclosed to the plaintiff by the defendants more than three years before the plaintiff filed the complaint, but the plaintiff chose not to read or could not recall having read the information.
To discuss the cases, we have Matthew S. Rozen, Associate Attorney at Gibson Dunn
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>994supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/barton-v-barr-post-argument-scotuscastThe stop-time rule affects the discretion afforded the U.S. Attorney General to cancel the removal from the United States of a lawful permanent resident who has resided in the U.S. continuously for 7 years. Under the stop-time rule, the requisite continuous residence terminates once the alien commits any of a certain number of offenses that render the alien inadmissible to (or removable from) the United States under federal law. Thus, committing a listed offense may cause an alien to fall short of the continuous 7-year residence requirement and thereby become ineligible for cancellation of removal.
Andre Martello Barton, after receiving lawful permanent resident status, was convicted in 1996 on three counts of aggravated assault, one count of criminal damage to property, and one count of firearm possession during the commission of a felony, all in violation of state law. In 2007 and 2008, he was also convicted of several state law drug offenses. The federal government then initiated proceedings to remove Barton based on his various convictions. He conceded removability on the basis of his controlled substance and gun possession offenses but applied for cancellation of removal based on continuous residence. The government argued that Barton’s 1996 convictions triggered the stop-time rule, thereby disqualifying him for cancellation of removal. The Immigration Judge ruled in favor of the government and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. Barton then petitioned for relief from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which rejected his argument that the stop-time rule only applies to aliens seeking admission to the United States, and therefore denied his petition.
The Eleventh Circuit recognized that the federal circuit courts of appeals have split on the issue, however, and the Supreme Court ultimately granted certiorari to address whether a lawfully admitted permanent resident who is not seeking admission to the United States can be “render[ed] ... inadmissible” for the purposes of the stop-time rule.
To discuss the case, we have Amy Moore, Associate Professor of Law at Belmont University College of Law.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/22669770Mon, 27 Jan 2020 10:30:02 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn Nov. 4, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument in Barton v. Barr, a case involving a dispute over whether, for the purposes of the “stop-time rule,” a lawfully admitted permanent resident who is not seeking admission to the United...The stop-time rule affects the discretion afforded the U.S. Attorney General to cancel the removal from the United States of a lawful permanent resident who has resided in the U.S. continuously for 7 years. Under the stop-time rule, the requisite continuous residence terminates once the alien commits any of a certain number of offenses that render the alien inadmissible to (or removable from) the United States under federal law. Thus, committing a listed offense may cause an alien to fall short of the continuous 7-year residence requirement and thereby become ineligible for cancellation of removal.
Andre Martello Barton, after receiving lawful permanent resident status, was convicted in 1996 on three counts of aggravated assault, one count of criminal damage to property, and one count of firearm possession during the commission of a felony, all in violation of state law. In 2007 and 2008, he was also convicted of several state law drug offenses. The federal government then initiated proceedings to remove Barton based on his various convictions. He conceded removability on the basis of his controlled substance and gun possession offenses but applied for cancellation of removal based on continuous residence. The government argued that Barton’s 1996 convictions triggered the stop-time rule, thereby disqualifying him for cancellation of removal. The Immigration Judge ruled in favor of the government and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. Barton then petitioned for relief from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which rejected his argument that the stop-time rule only applies to aliens seeking admission to the United States, and therefore denied his petition.
The Eleventh Circuit recognized that the federal circuit courts of appeals have split on the issue, however, and the Supreme Court ultimately granted certiorari to address whether a lawfully admitted permanent resident who is not seeking admission to the United States can be “render[ed] ... inadmissible” for the purposes of the stop-time rule.
To discuss the case, we have Amy Moore, Associate Professor of Law at Belmont University College of Law.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>765criminal law & procedure,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/atlantic-richfield-co-v-christian-post-aIn this special, extended analysis episode, we have two guests. The first voice you will hear is Corbin Barthold, Senior Litigation Counsel at Washington Legal Foundation followed by Jonathan Wood, Senior Attorney at the Pacific Legal Foundation.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/24227022Mon, 13 Jan 2020 15:30:00 +0000The Federalist SocietyIn Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Christian, the Supreme Court will determine whether the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act preempts state common law claims for restoration damages for pollution also addressed by an...In this special, extended analysis episode, we have two guests. The first voice you will hear is Corbin Barthold, Senior Litigation Counsel at Washington Legal Foundation followed by Jonathan Wood, Senior Attorney at the Pacific Legal Foundation.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>2160supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/kansas-v-garcia-post-argument-scotuscastRespondents Ramiro Garcia, Donaldo Morales, and Guadalupe Ochoa-Lara were convicted of identity theft (and/or making a false information) by the state of Kansas, for using social security numbers that were not theirs on federally required employment or housing-related paperwork. Respondents argued that their convictions were invalid on the grounds that IRCA preempts the use of such information in a state prosecution. The Kansas Supreme Court agreed and reversed the convictions, holding that IRCA expressly preempted state prosecutions that use information contained in a federal I-9 form. That decision conflicted with those of various other state supreme courts and federal circuit courts of appeals, however, and the U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted Kansas’s certiorari petition to address whether IRCA impliedly preempts Kansas’ prosecution of respondents.
To discuss the cases, we have Jonathan Urick senior counsel for litigation at the U.S. Chamber Litigation Center.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/21522853Thu, 09 Jan 2020 23:10:39 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn Oct. 16, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument in Kansas v. Garcia, a case involving a dispute over whether the federal Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) precludes states from using any information contained in a federal Form I-9,...Respondents Ramiro Garcia, Donaldo Morales, and Guadalupe Ochoa-Lara were convicted of identity theft (and/or making a false information) by the state of Kansas, for using social security numbers that were not theirs on federally required employment or housing-related paperwork. Respondents argued that their convictions were invalid on the grounds that IRCA preempts the use of such information in a state prosecution. The Kansas Supreme Court agreed and reversed the convictions, holding that IRCA expressly preempted state prosecutions that use information contained in a federal I-9 form. That decision conflicted with those of various other state supreme courts and federal circuit courts of appeals, however, and the U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted Kansas’s certiorari petition to address whether IRCA impliedly preempts Kansas’ prosecution of respondents.
To discuss the cases, we have Jonathan Urick senior counsel for litigation at the U.S. Chamber Litigation Center.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>1647criminal law & procedure,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/new-york-state-rifle-pistol-association-Under New York state law, possessing a firearm without a license is prohibited. New York City issues “premises” licenses that permit possession of a pistol or revolver at a particular address, and under city “Rule 5-23” such firearms may not be lawfully removed from that address except for transport directly to or from authorized shooting ranges within New York City limits (as well as certain state-designated hunting areas). Plaintiffs, who hold New York City premises licenses, wished to transport their firearms to shooting ranges, competitions, and/or homes outside of New York City. They sued for injunctive relief in federal district court, alleging that Rule 5-23’s restrictions violated the Second Amendment and were otherwise invalid under the dormant Commerce Clause, the First Amendment right of expressive association, and the fundamental right to travel. The district court rejected all these claims and dismissed the case. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, applying intermediate scrutiny to the Second Amendment claims, affirmed. The Supreme Court, however, subsequently granted certiorari to address whether the City’s ban on transporting a licensed, locked, and unloaded handgun to a home or shooting range outside city limits is consistent with the Second Amendment, the Commerce Clause, and the constitutional right to travel.
To discuss the cases, we have Robert Leider, professor at Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/23798184Fri, 20 Dec 2019 15:30:00 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn Dec. 2, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association Inc. v. City of New York, a case involving a dispute over whether New York City rules limiting transportation of licensed firearms to ranges within...Under New York state law, possessing a firearm without a license is prohibited. New York City issues “premises” licenses that permit possession of a pistol or revolver at a particular address, and under city “Rule 5-23” such firearms may not be lawfully removed from that address except for transport directly to or from authorized shooting ranges within New York City limits (as well as certain state-designated hunting areas). Plaintiffs, who hold New York City premises licenses, wished to transport their firearms to shooting ranges, competitions, and/or homes outside of New York City. They sued for injunctive relief in federal district court, alleging that Rule 5-23’s restrictions violated the Second Amendment and were otherwise invalid under the dormant Commerce Clause, the First Amendment right of expressive association, and the fundamental right to travel. The district court rejected all these claims and dismissed the case. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, applying intermediate scrutiny to the Second Amendment claims, affirmed. The Supreme Court, however, subsequently granted certiorari to address whether the City’s ban on transporting a licensed, locked, and unloaded handgun to a home or shooting range outside city limits is consistent with the Second Amendment, the Commerce Clause, and the constitutional right to travel.
To discuss the cases, we have Robert Leider, professor at Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>950first amendment,second amendment,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/allen-v-cooper-post-argument-scotuscastPetitioner Frederick Allen and his company, Nautilus Productions, contend that North Carolina violated their federal copyrights by publishing video and photographic footage that Allen had taken of the pirate Blackbeard’s sunken flagship, Queen Anne’s Revenge. Allen also challenges the validity of a recently passed North Carolina statute providing that photographs and video recordings of shipwrecks in the custody of North Carolina are public records. This law, he contends, was enacted in bad faith to undermine his copyright claim.
Allen and Nautilus sued North Carolina and various of its officials in federal district court. Although the district court rejected defendants’ invocation of sovereign immunity from suit, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed that judgment, concluding that the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act does not validly abrogate Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, which ultimately shields respondents from all of Allen’s and Nautilus’s claims.
The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to consider whether Congress validly abrogated state sovereign immunity via the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act in providing remedies for authors of original expression whose federal copyrights are infringed by states.
To discuss the case, in this special panel episode, we have Zvi Rosen, Visiting Scholar and Professorial Lecturer in Law, George Washington University School of Law, Prof. Josh Blackman, Associate Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law Houston, and our moderator, Kevin R. Amer, Deputy General Counsel at the U.S. Copyright Office.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/20197062Thu, 21 Nov 2019 15:45:11 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn Nov. 5, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument in Allen v. Cooper, which involves a dispute over the way state sovereign immunity and federal copyright law interact when an author alleges state infringement of that author’s federal...Petitioner Frederick Allen and his company, Nautilus Productions, contend that North Carolina violated their federal copyrights by publishing video and photographic footage that Allen had taken of the pirate Blackbeard’s sunken flagship, Queen Anne’s Revenge. Allen also challenges the validity of a recently passed North Carolina statute providing that photographs and video recordings of shipwrecks in the custody of North Carolina are public records. This law, he contends, was enacted in bad faith to undermine his copyright claim.
Allen and Nautilus sued North Carolina and various of its officials in federal district court. Although the district court rejected defendants’ invocation of sovereign immunity from suit, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed that judgment, concluding that the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act does not validly abrogate Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, which ultimately shields respondents from all of Allen’s and Nautilus’s claims.
The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to consider whether Congress validly abrogated state sovereign immunity via the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act in providing remedies for authors of original expression whose federal copyrights are infringed by states.
To discuss the case, in this special panel episode, we have Zvi Rosen, Visiting Scholar and Professorial Lecturer in Law, George Washington University School of Law, Prof. Josh Blackman, Associate Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law Houston, and our moderator, Kevin R. Amer, Deputy General Counsel at the U.S. Copyright Office.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>2474property law,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/hernandez-v-mesa-post-argument-scotuscas_1The central issue now before the Supreme Court is whether the Hernandez family can recover damages in a Bivens action for the killing of their son in violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments when there is no other available remedy under federal law.
To discuss the case, we have Peter Thomson, Special Counsel, Stone Pigman Walther Wittmann LLC.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/23798335Mon, 18 Nov 2019 15:30:06 +0000The Federalist SocietyThe case of Hernandez v. Mesa arises from a 2010 confrontation on the U.S.-Mexican border in which U.S. Border Patrol agent Jesus Mesa shot and killed Sergio Hernandez, a teenage Mexican national. Although the FBI apparently cleared Mesa of...The central issue now before the Supreme Court is whether the Hernandez family can recover damages in a Bivens action for the killing of their son in violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments when there is no other available remedy under federal law.
To discuss the case, we have Peter Thomson, Special Counsel, Stone Pigman Walther Wittmann LLC.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>2280supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/county-of-maui-hawaii-v-hawaii-wildlife-_1Under the federal Clean Water Act (CWA), someone seeking to discharge a pollutant from a “point source,” such as a pipe or well, into navigable water must first obtain a permit via the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System program (NPDES). The County of Maui, Hawai’i (the County), owns and operates four wells at a wastewater treatment plant that processes several million gallons of sewage per day. Treated wastewater from the plant is injected into groundwater via these wells, and some ultimately enter the Pacific Ocean via submarine seeps.
Hawai’i Wildlife Fund and various other organizations filed suit against the County, alleging that it was violating the CWA by discharging effluent through groundwater into the ocean without an NDPES permit. The district court agreed with the plaintiffs and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the County’s argument that no violation occurred because the pollutants did not issue directly from the point source (the wells) into navigable water (the ocean), but rather traveled indirectly to the ocean via groundwater. The Ninth Circuit’s reading sharpened a split among the federal circuit courts of appeals on the proper interpretation of the CWA, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether the CWA requires a permit “when pollutants originate from a point source but are conveyed to navigable waters by a nonpoint source, such as groundwater.”
To discuss the cases, we have Glenn Roper, attorney at the Pacific Legal Foundation.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/20015581Wed, 13 Nov 2019 21:00:40 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn Nov 6, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court heard County of Maui, Hawai’i v. Hawai’i Wildlife Fund, which involves a dispute over whether the Clean Water Act’s permit requirement applies when pollutants originate from a concrete point but...Under the federal Clean Water Act (CWA), someone seeking to discharge a pollutant from a “point source,” such as a pipe or well, into navigable water must first obtain a permit via the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System program (NPDES). The County of Maui, Hawai’i (the County), owns and operates four wells at a wastewater treatment plant that processes several million gallons of sewage per day. Treated wastewater from the plant is injected into groundwater via these wells, and some ultimately enter the Pacific Ocean via submarine seeps.
Hawai’i Wildlife Fund and various other organizations filed suit against the County, alleging that it was violating the CWA by discharging effluent through groundwater into the ocean without an NDPES permit. The district court agreed with the plaintiffs and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the County’s argument that no violation occurred because the pollutants did not issue directly from the point source (the wells) into navigable water (the ocean), but rather traveled indirectly to the ocean via groundwater. The Ninth Circuit’s reading sharpened a split among the federal circuit courts of appeals on the proper interpretation of the CWA, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether the CWA requires a permit “when pollutants originate from a point source but are conveyed to navigable waters by a nonpoint source, such as groundwater.”
To discuss the cases, we have Glenn Roper, attorney at the Pacific Legal Foundation.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>1600cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/kansas-v-glover-post-argument-scotuscastA county sheriff’s deputy pulled over Charles Glover, Jr. after running a registration check on the vehicle Glover was driving and finding that the registered owner had a revoked license. Although Glover was, in fact, the registered owner, the deputy did not attempt to confirm his identity before making the stop; nor did he witness any traffic violations. The deputy had simply assumed the registered owner was the person driving the vehicle. Glover moved to suppress evidence obtained during the traffic stop, arguing that the officer had lacked the requisite “reasonable suspicion” of illegal activity to authorize the stop. The Kansas Supreme Court ultimately agreed with Glover, holding that the officer “lacked an articulable and reasonable suspicion that the unidentified driver did not have a valid driver's license.”
This decision conflicted with those of various other state supreme courts and federal circuit courts of appeals on similar questions, and the U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted Kansas’s certiorari petition to consider whether, for purposes of an investigative stop under the Fourth Amendment, it is reasonable for an officer to suspect that the registered owner of a vehicle is the one driving the vehicle absent any information to the contrary.
To discuss the cases, we have Brian Fish, Special Assistant, United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/19998797Tue, 12 Nov 2019 17:00:54 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn Nov. 4, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument in Kansas v. Glover, a case involving a dispute over the “reasonable suspicion” necessary to justify a traffic stop when the registered owner of a vehicle has a revoked license but the...A county sheriff’s deputy pulled over Charles Glover, Jr. after running a registration check on the vehicle Glover was driving and finding that the registered owner had a revoked license. Although Glover was, in fact, the registered owner, the deputy did not attempt to confirm his identity before making the stop; nor did he witness any traffic violations. The deputy had simply assumed the registered owner was the person driving the vehicle. Glover moved to suppress evidence obtained during the traffic stop, arguing that the officer had lacked the requisite “reasonable suspicion” of illegal activity to authorize the stop. The Kansas Supreme Court ultimately agreed with Glover, holding that the officer “lacked an articulable and reasonable suspicion that the unidentified driver did not have a valid driver's license.”
This decision conflicted with those of various other state supreme courts and federal circuit courts of appeals on similar questions, and the U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted Kansas’s certiorari petition to consider whether, for purposes of an investigative stop under the Fourth Amendment, it is reasonable for an officer to suspect that the registered owner of a vehicle is the one driving the vehicle absent any information to the contrary.
To discuss the cases, we have Brian Fish, Special Assistant, United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>1206criminal law & procedure,fourth amendment,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/mathena-v-malvo-post-argument-scotuscastIn 2004, respondent Lee Boyd Malvo was convicted in Virginia on various counts of capital murder due to his participation in the “DC Sniper” attacks of 2002. As he was 17 years old at the time, he avoided the death penalty and was sentenced to four terms of life imprisonment without parole. In 2012, the Supreme Court held in Miller v. Alabama that sentencing a person younger than 18 to mandatory life imprisonment without parole violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. In 2016, the Court then held in Montgomery v. Louisiana that Miller had announced a new substantive rule applicable retroactively in cases on state collateral review.
When Malvo raised these issues on collateral review, the Fourth Circuit held that his sentences of life without parole must be vacated based on Miller, and the cases remanded for resentencing to determine whether his crimes reflected a “permanent incorrigibility” that would justify reimposition of the life-without-parole sentence. This judgment created a conflict with the Supreme Court of Virginia, which had concluded that Montgomery did not extend the applicability of Miller to discretionary sentencing schemes (including life without parole), but only applied Miller retroactively to cases on collateral review involving mandatory sentences of life without parole.
The Supreme Court thereafter granted certiorari to address whether the Fourth Circuit erred in concluding that Montgomery--when addressing whether the new constitutional rule announced in Miller applies retroactively on collateral review--may properly be interpreted as modifying and substantively expanding the very rule whose retroactivity was in question.
To discuss the case, we have Kent Scheidegger, Legal Director of the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/19811597Sat, 02 Nov 2019 10:31:15 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn October 16, 2019, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Mathena v. Malvo, a case which concerns the scope of a new constitutional rule when applied retroactively on collateral review. In 2004, respondent Lee Boyd Malvo was convicted in Virginia...In 2004, respondent Lee Boyd Malvo was convicted in Virginia on various counts of capital murder due to his participation in the “DC Sniper” attacks of 2002. As he was 17 years old at the time, he avoided the death penalty and was sentenced to four terms of life imprisonment without parole. In 2012, the Supreme Court held in Miller v. Alabama that sentencing a person younger than 18 to mandatory life imprisonment without parole violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. In 2016, the Court then held in Montgomery v. Louisiana that Miller had announced a new substantive rule applicable retroactively in cases on state collateral review.
When Malvo raised these issues on collateral review, the Fourth Circuit held that his sentences of life without parole must be vacated based on Miller, and the cases remanded for resentencing to determine whether his crimes reflected a “permanent incorrigibility” that would justify reimposition of the life-without-parole sentence. This judgment created a conflict with the Supreme Court of Virginia, which had concluded that Montgomery did not extend the applicability of Miller to discretionary sentencing schemes (including life without parole), but only applied Miller retroactively to cases on collateral review involving mandatory sentences of life without parole.
The Supreme Court thereafter granted certiorari to address whether the Fourth Circuit erred in concluding that Montgomery--when addressing whether the new constitutional rule announced in Miller applies retroactively on collateral review--may properly be interpreted as modifying and substantively expanding the very rule whose retroactivity was in question.
To discuss the case, we have Kent Scheidegger, Legal Director of the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>715constitution,criminal law & procedure,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/sexual-orientation-consolidated-post-argIn Altitude Express, Inc. v. Zarda, gay skydiving instructor Donald Zarda was fired after a female client with whom he was preparing a tandem jump alleged that he had touched her inappropriately, though he had disclosed his sexual orientation to protest that his intentions were not sexual. His lawsuit alleged that his employer discriminated against him because he was honest about his sexual orientation and did not conform to a “straight male macho stereotype.”
In Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, Gerald Bostock, a gay man who worked as a Child Welfare Services Coordinator for the Clayton County Juvenile Court System, was fired after Clayton County learned of his sexual orientation, his participation in a gay recreational softball league, and his promotion of volunteer opportunities with the County to league members. His lawsuit alleged that the County falsely accused him of mismanaging public funds as a pretext for discharging him, with the real reason being his sexual orientation.
The U.S. Courts of Appeals in these cases reached mutually exclusive interpretations of Title VII’s language prohibiting discrimination “because of … sex.” In Zarda, the Second Circuit, sitting en banc, overruled its prior caselaw to conclude that Title VII prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation. In Bostock, however, the Eleventh Circuit followed its longstanding precedent that Title VII does not support an action for sexual orientation discrimination. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari in both cases to clarify whether discrimination against an employee because of sexual orientation constitutes prohibited employment discrimination “because of . . . sex” within the meaning of Title VII.
To discuss the cases, we have John J. Bursch, Owner, Bursch Law PLLC.
*Please note that Mr. Bursch argued a related Title VII case before the Supreme Court this term, Harris Funeral Homes v. EEOC.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/19804144Fri, 01 Nov 2019 14:30:52 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn October 8, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument in two consolidated cases asking whether discrimination “because of … sex,” which is prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, includes discrimination based on...In Altitude Express, Inc. v. Zarda, gay skydiving instructor Donald Zarda was fired after a female client with whom he was preparing a tandem jump alleged that he had touched her inappropriately, though he had disclosed his sexual orientation to protest that his intentions were not sexual. His lawsuit alleged that his employer discriminated against him because he was honest about his sexual orientation and did not conform to a “straight male macho stereotype.”
In Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, Gerald Bostock, a gay man who worked as a Child Welfare Services Coordinator for the Clayton County Juvenile Court System, was fired after Clayton County learned of his sexual orientation, his participation in a gay recreational softball league, and his promotion of volunteer opportunities with the County to league members. His lawsuit alleged that the County falsely accused him of mismanaging public funds as a pretext for discharging him, with the real reason being his sexual orientation.
The U.S. Courts of Appeals in these cases reached mutually exclusive interpretations of Title VII’s language prohibiting discrimination “because of … sex.” In Zarda, the Second Circuit, sitting en banc, overruled its prior caselaw to conclude that Title VII prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation. In Bostock, however, the Eleventh Circuit followed its longstanding precedent that Title VII does not support an action for sexual orientation discrimination. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari in both cases to clarify whether discrimination against an employee because of sexual orientation constitutes prohibited employment discrimination “because of . . . sex” within the meaning of Title VII.
To discuss the cases, we have John J. Bursch, Owner, Bursch Law PLLC.
*Please note that Mr. Bursch argued a related Title VII case before the Supreme Court this term, Harris Funeral Homes v. EEOC.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>1525civil rights,constitution,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/kahler-v-kansas-ramos-v-louisiana-post-aIn Kahler, a jury convicted James Kahler of capital murder. Among other things, he objected at trial to a Kansas statute limiting any “mental disease or defect” defense to formation of the requisite mental state for the charged offense. The statute, Kahler argued, denied him due process by depriving him of the ability to present an insanity defense. The Supreme Court of Kansas, following its precedent, noted that state law had deliberately “abandon[ed] lack of ability to know right from wrong as a defense,” and rejected Kahler’s argument. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to consider whether the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution permit a state to abolish the insanity defense.
In Ramos, Evangelisto Ramos was convicted of second-degree murder by the vote of 10 of 12 jurors. Challenging his conviction, Ramos argued that Louisiana’s statutory scheme permitting non-unanimous jury verdicts in non-capital felony cases violated his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Relying on its precedent, the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected Ramos’ argument. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to consider whether the Fourteenth Amendment fully incorporates the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a unanimous jury verdict (in criminal cases) against the states.
To discuss the cases, we have GianCarlo Canaparo, Legal Fellow at the Heritage Foundation.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/19788066Fri, 25 Oct 2019 14:45:23 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn October 7, 2019, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Kahler v. Kansas and Ramos v. Louisiana, both of which raise questions of constitutional criminal law. In Kahler, a jury convicted James Kahler of capital murder. Among other things, he...In Kahler, a jury convicted James Kahler of capital murder. Among other things, he objected at trial to a Kansas statute limiting any “mental disease or defect” defense to formation of the requisite mental state for the charged offense. The statute, Kahler argued, denied him due process by depriving him of the ability to present an insanity defense. The Supreme Court of Kansas, following its precedent, noted that state law had deliberately “abandon[ed] lack of ability to know right from wrong as a defense,” and rejected Kahler’s argument. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to consider whether the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution permit a state to abolish the insanity defense.
In Ramos, Evangelisto Ramos was convicted of second-degree murder by the vote of 10 of 12 jurors. Challenging his conviction, Ramos argued that Louisiana’s statutory scheme permitting non-unanimous jury verdicts in non-capital felony cases violated his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Relying on its precedent, the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected Ramos’ argument. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to consider whether the Fourteenth Amendment fully incorporates the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a unanimous jury verdict (in criminal cases) against the states.
To discuss the cases, we have GianCarlo Canaparo, Legal Fellow at the Heritage Foundation.]]>1495constitution,criminal law & procedure,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/peter-v-nantkwest-post-argument-scotuscaWhen a patent application is rejected by the PTO, and the PTAB affirms that decision on appeal, the aggrieved applicant may either pursue further (but relatively constrained) review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit--or the applicant may file a more expansive challenge in federal district court. The latter option is authorized by 35 U.S.C. § 145, but the statute also provides that “[a]ll the expenses of the proceedings shall be paid by the applicant.”
Here, NantKwest challenged an adverse PTAB decision in federal district court, but lost. After the judgment was affirmed by the Federal Circuit, the PTO sought reimbursement of its expenses from NantKwest, including nearly $80,000 in attorneys’ fees. The district court denied recovery based on the “American Rule” that parties in federal court typically bear their own fees unless otherwise directed by Congress. A divided en banc panel of the Federal Circuit ultimately affirmed the district court. This decision, however, was in tension with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit’s construction of similar language in the Lanham Act.
Thereafter, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the phrase “[a]ll the expenses of the proceedings” in 35 U.S.C. § 145 encompasses the personnel expenses the PTO incurs when its employees, including attorneys, defend the agency in Section 145 litigation.
To discuss the case, we have Robert J. Rando, Founder and Lead Counsel, The Rando Law Firm P.C.*
*Please note that Mr. Rando is co-Counsel on an Amicus brief filed on behalf of the Association of Amicus Counsel in this case.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/19634537Tue, 22 Oct 2019 10:00:22 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn October 7, 2019, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Peter v. NantKwest Inc., a case which considers whether a party opting to bring a challenge in federal district court to an adverse decision of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s...When a patent application is rejected by the PTO, and the PTAB affirms that decision on appeal, the aggrieved applicant may either pursue further (but relatively constrained) review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit--or the applicant may file a more expansive challenge in federal district court. The latter option is authorized by 35 U.S.C. § 145, but the statute also provides that “[a]ll the expenses of the proceedings shall be paid by the applicant.”
Here, NantKwest challenged an adverse PTAB decision in federal district court, but lost. After the judgment was affirmed by the Federal Circuit, the PTO sought reimbursement of its expenses from NantKwest, including nearly $80,000 in attorneys’ fees. The district court denied recovery based on the “American Rule” that parties in federal court typically bear their own fees unless otherwise directed by Congress. A divided en banc panel of the Federal Circuit ultimately affirmed the district court. This decision, however, was in tension with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit’s construction of similar language in the Lanham Act.
Thereafter, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the phrase “[a]ll the expenses of the proceedings” in 35 U.S.C. § 145 encompasses the personnel expenses the PTO incurs when its employees, including attorneys, defend the agency in Section 145 litigation.
To discuss the case, we have Robert J. Rando, Founder and Lead Counsel, The Rando Law Firm P.C.*
*Please note that Mr. Rando is co-Counsel on an Amicus brief filed on behalf of the Association of Amicus Counsel in this case.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.]]>1282supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/nieves-v-bartlett-post-decision-scotuscaState troopers Luis Nieves and Bryce Weight arrested Russell Bartlett during the 2014 “Arctic Man” winter sports festival held in Alaska’s Hoodoo Mountains. According to the officers, an apparently intoxicated Bartlett started yelling at Sergeant Nieves when the latter asked partygoers to move a beer keg to make it less accessible to minors. Several minutes later, when Trooper Weight asked a minor whether the minor and underage friends had been drinking, Bartlett approached, inserted himself between Weight and the minor, and yelled that Weight should not speak with the minor. Weight contends Bartlett then approached him combatively and Weight pushed him back. Sergeant Nieves, seeing the altercation, hurried over and arrested Bartlett. When Bartlett was slow to comply, the officers forced him to the ground. Bartlett denies being aggressive, and contends that after he was handcuffed Nieves said: “[B]et you wish you would have talked to me now.”
Although Bartlett was charged with disorderly conduct and resisting arrest, the State ultimately dismissed the criminal charges against him. Bartlett then sued the officers in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that they had arrested him in retaliation for his speech, thereby violating his First Amendment rights. The court granted judgment in favor of the officers, concluding that they had probable cause to arrest Bartlett and that the existence of probable cause necessarily defeated Bartlett’s retaliation claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, however, arguing that even in the face of probable cause a claim of retaliatory arrest can prevail where the officers’ conduct would chill a person of ordinary firmness from First Amendment activity, and where the desire to chill speech was a “but for” cause of the arrest. The U.S. Supreme Court then granted certiorari to clarify the applicable legal standard.
By a vote of 6-3, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice Roberts, the court held that the existence of probable cause defeats a claim of retaliatory arrest as a matter of law--unless the plaintiff presents objective evidence that he was arrested when otherwise similarly situated individuals not engaged in the same sort of protected speech had not been. The Chief Justice’s majority opinion was joined by Justices Breyer, Alito, Kagan, and Kavanaugh in full, and by Justice Thomas except as to Part II-D. Justice Thomas also filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Ginsburg filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. Justice Sotomayor also dissented.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/19463602Fri, 11 Oct 2019 19:27:03 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn May 28, 2019, the Supreme Court decided Nieves v. Bartlett, a case that considers the conditions a plaintiff must meet to prevail on a claim of retaliatory arrest by law enforcement. State troopers Luis Nieves and Bryce Weight arrested Russell...State troopers Luis Nieves and Bryce Weight arrested Russell Bartlett during the 2014 “Arctic Man” winter sports festival held in Alaska’s Hoodoo Mountains. According to the officers, an apparently intoxicated Bartlett started yelling at Sergeant Nieves when the latter asked partygoers to move a beer keg to make it less accessible to minors. Several minutes later, when Trooper Weight asked a minor whether the minor and underage friends had been drinking, Bartlett approached, inserted himself between Weight and the minor, and yelled that Weight should not speak with the minor. Weight contends Bartlett then approached him combatively and Weight pushed him back. Sergeant Nieves, seeing the altercation, hurried over and arrested Bartlett. When Bartlett was slow to comply, the officers forced him to the ground. Bartlett denies being aggressive, and contends that after he was handcuffed Nieves said: “[B]et you wish you would have talked to me now.”
Although Bartlett was charged with disorderly conduct and resisting arrest, the State ultimately dismissed the criminal charges against him. Bartlett then sued the officers in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that they had arrested him in retaliation for his speech, thereby violating his First Amendment rights. The court granted judgment in favor of the officers, concluding that they had probable cause to arrest Bartlett and that the existence of probable cause necessarily defeated Bartlett’s retaliation claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, however, arguing that even in the face of probable cause a claim of retaliatory arrest can prevail where the officers’ conduct would chill a person of ordinary firmness from First Amendment activity, and where the desire to chill speech was a “but for” cause of the arrest. The U.S. Supreme Court then granted certiorari to clarify the applicable legal standard.
By a vote of 6-3, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice Roberts, the court held that the existence of probable cause defeats a claim of retaliatory arrest as a matter of law--unless the plaintiff presents objective evidence that he was arrested when otherwise similarly situated individuals not engaged in the same sort of protected speech had not been. The Chief Justice’s majority opinion was joined by Justices Breyer, Alito, Kagan, and Kavanaugh in full, and by Justice Thomas except as to Part II-D. Justice Thomas also filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Ginsburg filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. Justice Sotomayor also dissented.]]>855constitution,criminal law & procedure,first amendmentcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/nielsen-v-preap-post-decision-scotuscastAliens who are arrested in order to be removed from the United States typically can seek release or parole on bond while any dispute about their removability is being resolved. Title 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1), however, creates an exception: aliens who have committed certain crimes or have a connection to terrorism must be arrested when released from custody relating to their criminal charges, and almost always held without bond until the question of removal is settled.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit interpreted this mandatory detention provision to apply only when the alien is arrested immediately after release from prison. If a short period of time intervenes, the court concluded, the alien must be allowed the chance to apply for release on bond or parole.
By a vote of 5-4, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case. Respondent aliens who fall within the scope of § 1226(c)(1), the Court held, can be detained even if federal officials did not arrest them immediately upon release.
Justice Alito announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, III-A, III-B-1, and IV, and an opinion with respect to Parts II and III-B-2, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Gorsuch joined. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined.
To discuss the case, we have Greg Brower, Shareholder, Brownstein, Hyatt, Farber, Shreck.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/19155619Fri, 20 Sep 2019 14:00:05 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 19, 2019, the Supreme Court decided Nielsen v. Preap (and its companion case Wilcox v. Khoury), both of which consider the extent to which the mandatory detention provision of the Immigration and Naturalization Act applies to defendants who...Aliens who are arrested in order to be removed from the United States typically can seek release or parole on bond while any dispute about their removability is being resolved. Title 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1), however, creates an exception: aliens who have committed certain crimes or have a connection to terrorism must be arrested when released from custody relating to their criminal charges, and almost always held without bond until the question of removal is settled.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit interpreted this mandatory detention provision to apply only when the alien is arrested immediately after release from prison. If a short period of time intervenes, the court concluded, the alien must be allowed the chance to apply for release on bond or parole.
By a vote of 5-4, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case. Respondent aliens who fall within the scope of § 1226(c)(1), the Court held, can be detained even if federal officials did not arrest them immediately upon release.
Justice Alito announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, III-A, III-B-1, and IV, and an opinion with respect to Parts II and III-B-2, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Gorsuch joined. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined.
To discuss the case, we have Greg Brower, Shareholder, Brownstein, Hyatt, Farber, Shreck.]]>943criminal law & procedure,due process,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/frank-v-gaos-post-decision-podcastIn a class-action suit with three named plaintiffs, Google was accused of violating the Stored Communications Act by sharing user search terms and other information with the server hosting whatever webpage that user clicked to via Google Search results. A settlement was reached that would require Google to include certain disclosures on some of its webpages and would distribute more than $5 million to cy pres recipients, more than $2 million to class counsel, and no money to absent class members. The district court approved the settlement over the objections of several class members, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court then granted certiorari to address petitioners’ challenge that this cy pres settlement did not satisfy the Rule 23(e) requirement that class action settlements be “fair, reasonable, and adequate,” but did not ultimately reach the merits of that question.
In a per curiam opinion, the Court vacated the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether the class action plaintiffs even had standing to bring their class action in light of the Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in Spokeo v. Robins. That case held that “Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation.” Here, the Court indicated, the lower courts needed to resolve “whether any named plaintiff has alleged [Stored Communications Act] violations that are sufficiently concrete and particularized to support standing.” If not, the lack of standing would deprive the federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction in this case. Justice Thomas dissented.
To discuss the case, we have Theodore "Ted" Frank, Director of Litigation and Senior Attorney, Hamilton Lincoln Law Institute - and one of the named petitioners in this case.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/19144091Thu, 19 Sep 2019 12:25:42 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 20, 2019, the Supreme Court decided Frank v. Gaos, a case raising the question whether, or under what circumstances, a cy pres award that provides no direct relief to class members fulfills the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(e)...In a class-action suit with three named plaintiffs, Google was accused of violating the Stored Communications Act by sharing user search terms and other information with the server hosting whatever webpage that user clicked to via Google Search results. A settlement was reached that would require Google to include certain disclosures on some of its webpages and would distribute more than $5 million to cy pres recipients, more than $2 million to class counsel, and no money to absent class members. The district court approved the settlement over the objections of several class members, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court then granted certiorari to address petitioners’ challenge that this cy pres settlement did not satisfy the Rule 23(e) requirement that class action settlements be “fair, reasonable, and adequate,” but did not ultimately reach the merits of that question.
In a per curiam opinion, the Court vacated the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether the class action plaintiffs even had standing to bring their class action in light of the Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in Spokeo v. Robins. That case held that “Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation.” Here, the Court indicated, the lower courts needed to resolve “whether any named plaintiff has alleged [Stored Communications Act] violations that are sufficiently concrete and particularized to support standing.” If not, the lack of standing would deprive the federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction in this case. Justice Thomas dissented.
To discuss the case, we have Theodore "Ted" Frank, Director of Litigation and Senior Attorney, Hamilton Lincoln Law Institute - and one of the named petitioners in this case.]]>1005cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/air-liquid-systems-corp-v-devries-post-dThe Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (ALS) produced equipment for United States Navy ships. Parts of the equipment required asbestos insulation and asbestos parts in order to function but the manufacturers delivered the equipment without asbestos and the Navy added it later. Two Navy veterans, Kenneth McAfee and John DeVries developed cancer and died after being exposed to asbestos while stationed on the ships. Their families sued manufacturer ALS in federal district court, alleging that it had negligently failed to warn about the dangers of asbestos in the integrated products. ALS countered that it should not be held liable for asbestos that was added later by a third party, an argument known as the “bare metal” defense. The district court ruled in favor of ALS but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated that judgment and remanded the case, concluding that a “bare metal” manufacturer could still be held liable if it was foreseeable that the materials in question would have been used with later-added asbestos-containing materials. The Supreme Court then granted certiorari to resolve a split among the circuit courts of appeals on whether the “bare metal” defense is valid under maritime law.
By a vote of 6-3, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Third Circuit. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, holding that, in the maritime tort context, a product manufacturer has a duty to warn when its product requires incorporation of a part, the manufacturer knows or has reason to know that the integrated product is likely to be dangerous for its intended uses, and the manufacturer has no reason to believe that the product’s users will realize that danger. The majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Alito joined.
To discuss the case, we have Karen R. Harned, Executive Director, NFIB Small Business Legal Center.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/19094526Sat, 14 Sep 2019 10:30:12 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 19, 2019, the Supreme Court decided Air & Liquid Systems Corp. v. Devries, a case addressing the liability of a manufacturer under maritime law for injuries caused when asbestos was incorporated into their product by a third party after...The Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (ALS) produced equipment for United States Navy ships. Parts of the equipment required asbestos insulation and asbestos parts in order to function but the manufacturers delivered the equipment without asbestos and the Navy added it later. Two Navy veterans, Kenneth McAfee and John DeVries developed cancer and died after being exposed to asbestos while stationed on the ships. Their families sued manufacturer ALS in federal district court, alleging that it had negligently failed to warn about the dangers of asbestos in the integrated products. ALS countered that it should not be held liable for asbestos that was added later by a third party, an argument known as the “bare metal” defense. The district court ruled in favor of ALS but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated that judgment and remanded the case, concluding that a “bare metal” manufacturer could still be held liable if it was foreseeable that the materials in question would have been used with later-added asbestos-containing materials. The Supreme Court then granted certiorari to resolve a split among the circuit courts of appeals on whether the “bare metal” defense is valid under maritime law.
By a vote of 6-3, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Third Circuit. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, holding that, in the maritime tort context, a product manufacturer has a duty to warn when its product requires incorporation of a part, the manufacturer knows or has reason to know that the integrated product is likely to be dangerous for its intended uses, and the manufacturer has no reason to believe that the product’s users will realize that danger. The majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Alito joined.
To discuss the case, we have Karen R. Harned, Executive Director, NFIB Small Business Legal Center.]]>1010cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/sturgeon-v-frost-post-decision-scotuscas_1Congress, through ANILCA, created ten new national parks, monuments, and preserves with 104 million acres of federally owned land. When selecting the boundary lines, Congress chose to use the natural features of the land rather than strictly the federally owned land. The state, private, and Native lands within the boundary lines became in-holdings totaling 18 million acres. To protect the landowners, Congress included Section 103(c) which, in part, states that only federally owned lands within a conservation reserve unit were to be considered a part of the unit and that no state or private land is subject to regulations pertaining to federal land within the unit.
Petitioner John Sturgeon, a hunter, had been using a hovercraft to navigate up a portion of the Nation River that runs through the Yukon-Charley Preserve, a conservation unit in Alaska. The National Park Service (NPS) informed Sturgeon of a regulation prohibiting the operation of a hovercraft on navigable waters within the boundaries of any national park regardless of in-holdings.
Sturgeon sought an injunction against the National Park Service arguing that the land he was using was owned by the state of Alaska and NPS had no authority to enforce its hovercraft ban there. After an initial round of litigation resulting in remand by the Supreme Court for further consideration, the District Court again ruled against Sturgeon, interpreting Section 103(c) to limit NPS’ authority to impose Alaska-specific regulations on property inholdings--but not its authority to enforce nationwide regulations such as the hovercraft rule. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, but the Supreme Court again granted certiorari and rejected that interpretation as implausible, directing the Ninth Circuit on remand to consider whether the Nation River qualifies as “public land” (thereby subjecting it to NPS authority)--and if not, whether some other theory afforded NPS regulatory power over the river in question. The Ninth Circuit found that the Nation River did qualify as public land, ruling against Sturgeon yet again. For the third time, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review that court’s judgment.
By a vote of 9-0, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Kagan, the Court unanimously held that Nation River is not public land for purposes of ANILCA--and like all non-public lands and navigable waters within Alaska’s national parks, is exempt under Section 103(c) from NPS’ ordinary regulatory authority.
Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Ginsburg joined.
To discuss the case, we have Tony Francois, Senior Attorney, Pacific Legal Foundation.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/19072192Wed, 11 Sep 2019 20:00:23 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 26, 2019, the Supreme Court decided Sturgeon v. Frost, a case considering whether the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) prohibits the National Park Service from exercising regulatory control over state, native...Congress, through ANILCA, created ten new national parks, monuments, and preserves with 104 million acres of federally owned land. When selecting the boundary lines, Congress chose to use the natural features of the land rather than strictly the federally owned land. The state, private, and Native lands within the boundary lines became in-holdings totaling 18 million acres. To protect the landowners, Congress included Section 103(c) which, in part, states that only federally owned lands within a conservation reserve unit were to be considered a part of the unit and that no state or private land is subject to regulations pertaining to federal land within the unit.
Petitioner John Sturgeon, a hunter, had been using a hovercraft to navigate up a portion of the Nation River that runs through the Yukon-Charley Preserve, a conservation unit in Alaska. The National Park Service (NPS) informed Sturgeon of a regulation prohibiting the operation of a hovercraft on navigable waters within the boundaries of any national park regardless of in-holdings.
Sturgeon sought an injunction against the National Park Service arguing that the land he was using was owned by the state of Alaska and NPS had no authority to enforce its hovercraft ban there. After an initial round of litigation resulting in remand by the Supreme Court for further consideration, the District Court again ruled against Sturgeon, interpreting Section 103(c) to limit NPS’ authority to impose Alaska-specific regulations on property inholdings--but not its authority to enforce nationwide regulations such as the hovercraft rule. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, but the Supreme Court again granted certiorari and rejected that interpretation as implausible, directing the Ninth Circuit on remand to consider whether the Nation River qualifies as “public land” (thereby subjecting it to NPS authority)--and if not, whether some other theory afforded NPS regulatory power over the river in question. The Ninth Circuit found that the Nation River did qualify as public land, ruling against Sturgeon yet again. For the third time, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review that court’s judgment.
By a vote of 9-0, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Kagan, the Court unanimously held that Nation River is not public land for purposes of ANILCA--and like all non-public lands and navigable waters within Alaska’s national parks, is exempt under Section 103(c) from NPS’ ordinary regulatory authority.
Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Ginsburg joined.
To discuss the case, we have Tony Francois, Senior Attorney, Pacific Legal Foundation.]]>969environmental law & property rcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/bucklew-v-precythe-post-decision-scotuscPetitioner Russell Bucklew was convicted of murder and sentenced to death by lethal injection of a single drug, pentobarbital, by the State of Missouri. Bucklew challenged the State’s injection protocol under the Eighth Amendment, alleging that regardless of whether it would cause excruciating pain for all prisoners, it would cause him severe pain because of a particular medical condition he had.
The District Court dismissed his challenge. The U.S. Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit, applying Supreme Court precedent in Baze v. Rees and Glossip v. Gross, remanded the case to allow Bucklew to identify a feasible, readily implemented alternative procedure that would significantly reduce his alleged risk of pain. Bucklew eventually suggested nitrogen hypoxia, but the District Court rejected his argument for lack of evidence. A divided Eighth Circuit panel affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
By a vote of 5-4, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Eighth Circuit. In an opinion delivered by Justice Gorsuch, the court held that Baze and Glossip govern all Eighth Amendment challenges alleging that a method of execution inflicts unconstitutionally cruel pain, and Bucklew’s as-applied challenge fails the Baze-Glossip test. He failed to raise a triable issue of fact regarding the viability of nitrogen hypoxia as an alternative method, and even if he had there was no showing that it would significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain.
Justice Gorsuch’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas, Alito, and Kavanaugh. Justice Thomas and Justice Kavanaugh filed concurring opinions. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined as to all but Part III. Justice Sotomayor also filed a dissenting opinion.
To discuss the case, we have Kent Scheidegger, Legal Director & General Counsel, Criminal Justice Legal Foundation.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/18901621Fri, 23 Aug 2019 21:34:21 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn April 1, 2019, the Supreme Court decided Bucklew v. Precythe, a case considering the standard applicable when an offender sentenced to death raises an Eighth Amendment challenge to the state’s lethal injection procedure. Petitioner Russell...Petitioner Russell Bucklew was convicted of murder and sentenced to death by lethal injection of a single drug, pentobarbital, by the State of Missouri. Bucklew challenged the State’s injection protocol under the Eighth Amendment, alleging that regardless of whether it would cause excruciating pain for all prisoners, it would cause him severe pain because of a particular medical condition he had.
The District Court dismissed his challenge. The U.S. Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit, applying Supreme Court precedent in Baze v. Rees and Glossip v. Gross, remanded the case to allow Bucklew to identify a feasible, readily implemented alternative procedure that would significantly reduce his alleged risk of pain. Bucklew eventually suggested nitrogen hypoxia, but the District Court rejected his argument for lack of evidence. A divided Eighth Circuit panel affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
By a vote of 5-4, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Eighth Circuit. In an opinion delivered by Justice Gorsuch, the court held that Baze and Glossip govern all Eighth Amendment challenges alleging that a method of execution inflicts unconstitutionally cruel pain, and Bucklew’s as-applied challenge fails the Baze-Glossip test. He failed to raise a triable issue of fact regarding the viability of nitrogen hypoxia as an alternative method, and even if he had there was no showing that it would significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain.
Justice Gorsuch’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas, Alito, and Kavanaugh. Justice Thomas and Justice Kavanaugh filed concurring opinions. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined as to all but Part III. Justice Sotomayor also filed a dissenting opinion.
To discuss the case, we have Kent Scheidegger, Legal Director & General Counsel, Criminal Justice Legal Foundation.]]>626criminal law & procedure,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/gamble-v-united-states-post-decisionIn 2015 Terance Gamble, who had previously been convicted of second-degree robbery in Alabama state court, pleaded guilty in state court to possessing a firearm in violation of Alabama’s law against firearm possession by anyone convicted of a “crime of violence.” Federal prosecutors thereafter relied on the same facts to charge Gamble with violating the federal statute that forbids convicted felons to possess a firearm. Gamble moved to dismiss the federal charge, arguing that the Double Jeopardy Clause precluded a second conviction for essentially the same offense. The district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected Gamble’s argument due to the “dual sovereignty” or “separate sovereigns” doctrine, which holds that two offenses are not the same for Double Jeopardy purposes when pursued by separate (here, state and federal) sovereigns. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the separate sovereigns doctrine should be overturned.
By a vote of 7-2, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, declining to overturn the dual sovereignty doctrine. His majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Dissenting opinions were filed by Justice Gorsuch and Justice Ginsburg.
To discuss the case, we have Clark Neily, Vice President for Criminal Justice at the Cato Institute.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/18837845Fri, 16 Aug 2019 19:00:15 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 17, 2019, the Supreme Court decided Gamble v. United States, a case challenging the validity of the "separate sovereigns" exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause of the U.S. Constitution’s Fifth Amendment. In 2015 Terance Gamble, who...In 2015 Terance Gamble, who had previously been convicted of second-degree robbery in Alabama state court, pleaded guilty in state court to possessing a firearm in violation of Alabama’s law against firearm possession by anyone convicted of a “crime of violence.” Federal prosecutors thereafter relied on the same facts to charge Gamble with violating the federal statute that forbids convicted felons to possess a firearm. Gamble moved to dismiss the federal charge, arguing that the Double Jeopardy Clause precluded a second conviction for essentially the same offense. The district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected Gamble’s argument due to the “dual sovereignty” or “separate sovereigns” doctrine, which holds that two offenses are not the same for Double Jeopardy purposes when pursued by separate (here, state and federal) sovereigns. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the separate sovereigns doctrine should be overturned.
By a vote of 7-2, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, declining to overturn the dual sovereignty doctrine. His majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Dissenting opinions were filed by Justice Gorsuch and Justice Ginsburg.
To discuss the case, we have Clark Neily, Vice President for Criminal Justice at the Cato Institute.]]>552constitution,criminal law & procedure,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/dutra-group-v-batterton-post-decisionChristopher Batterton was injured while working on a vessel owned and operated by the Dutra Group. Batterton claimed the vessel was unseaworthy due to a missing safety feature and sued Dutra in federal district court for, among other things, punitive damages. Dutra argued that punitive damages are not available on claims for unseaworthiness, but the district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected Dutra’s argument. Because that ruling underscored a division among the circuit courts of appeals on the issue, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the split.
By a vote of 6-3, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, holding that a plaintiff may not recover punitive damages on a claim of unseaworthiness. Justice Alito’s majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Ginsburg dissented, joined by Justices Breyer and Sotomayor.
To discuss the case, we have Don Haycraft, Counsel at Liskow & Lewis.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/18829618Fri, 16 Aug 2019 10:01:09 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 24, 2019, the Supreme Court decided Dutra Group v. Batterton, a case addressing whether a plaintiff may recover punitive damages on a claim of unseaworthiness. Christopher Batterton was injured while working on a vessel owned and operated by...Christopher Batterton was injured while working on a vessel owned and operated by the Dutra Group. Batterton claimed the vessel was unseaworthy due to a missing safety feature and sued Dutra in federal district court for, among other things, punitive damages. Dutra argued that punitive damages are not available on claims for unseaworthiness, but the district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected Dutra’s argument. Because that ruling underscored a division among the circuit courts of appeals on the issue, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the split.
By a vote of 6-3, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, holding that a plaintiff may not recover punitive damages on a claim of unseaworthiness. Justice Alito’s majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Ginsburg dissented, joined by Justices Breyer and Sotomayor.
To discuss the case, we have Don Haycraft, Counsel at Liskow & Lewis.]]>794labor & employment law,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/tennessee-wine-and-spirits-retailers-assIn 2016, companies Total Wine and Affluere Investments, Inc. applied for licenses to own and operate liquor stores in Tennessee. Although state law imposed a two-year durational residency requirement that the entities did not meet, the Tennessee Alcoholic Beverage Commission (TABC) had obtained an opinion from the state attorney general that the requirement operated as a discriminatory trade restraint in violation of the U.S. Constitution’s Commerce Clause. TABC, therefore, recommended approval of the licenses, but trade association Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers Association (Association)--composed of in-state liquor retailers--threatened to sue TABC if the licenses were granted. TABC, therefore, sought declaratory relief on the validity of the durational residency requirement, and the case was removed to federal district court.
The district court held the requirement unconstitutional, the state declined to appeal, and the licenses issued. The Association, however, pursued its objections before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which ultimately affirmed the district court--though a dissenting judge argued that the Constitution’s Twenty-first Amendment granted states broad authority to regulate the in-state distribution of alcohol, and would have upheld the residency requirement. The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to reconcile its Twenty-first Amendment and dormant Commerce Clause precedents.
By a vote of 7-2, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Sixth Circuit. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, holding that Tennessee’s two-year durational-residency requirement applicable to retail liquor store license applicants violates the Commerce Clause and is not saved by the Twenty-first Amendment. Justice Alito’s majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Kavanaugh. Justice Gorsuch dissented, joined by Justice Thomas.
To discuss the case, we have Michael Bindas, Senior Attorney at the Institute for Justice.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/18826637Thu, 15 Aug 2019 15:15:25 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 26, 2019, the Supreme Court decided Tennessee Wine & Spirits Retailers Association v. Thomas, a case considering whether Tennessee’s two-year durational residency requirement for obtaining a retail liquor license is constitutional....In 2016, companies Total Wine and Affluere Investments, Inc. applied for licenses to own and operate liquor stores in Tennessee. Although state law imposed a two-year durational residency requirement that the entities did not meet, the Tennessee Alcoholic Beverage Commission (TABC) had obtained an opinion from the state attorney general that the requirement operated as a discriminatory trade restraint in violation of the U.S. Constitution’s Commerce Clause. TABC, therefore, recommended approval of the licenses, but trade association Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers Association (Association)--composed of in-state liquor retailers--threatened to sue TABC if the licenses were granted. TABC, therefore, sought declaratory relief on the validity of the durational residency requirement, and the case was removed to federal district court.
The district court held the requirement unconstitutional, the state declined to appeal, and the licenses issued. The Association, however, pursued its objections before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which ultimately affirmed the district court--though a dissenting judge argued that the Constitution’s Twenty-first Amendment granted states broad authority to regulate the in-state distribution of alcohol, and would have upheld the residency requirement. The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to reconcile its Twenty-first Amendment and dormant Commerce Clause precedents.
By a vote of 7-2, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Sixth Circuit. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, holding that Tennessee’s two-year durational-residency requirement applicable to retail liquor store license applicants violates the Commerce Clause and is not saved by the Twenty-first Amendment. Justice Alito’s majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Kavanaugh. Justice Gorsuch dissented, joined by Justice Thomas.
To discuss the case, we have Michael Bindas, Senior Attorney at the Institute for Justice.]]>1514administrative law & regulatio,constitution,federal courts,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/iancu-v-brunetti-post-decision-podcastBusiness owner Erik Brunetti applied to register his clothing brand’s trademark, “FUCT,” (pronounced as the individual letters F-U-C-T) but was refused by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) because the Lanham Act prohibits registration of marks that consist of or comprise “immoral or scandalous” matter. The PTO Trademark Trial and Appeal Board deemed the mark vulgar and indicated that it carried “negative sexual connotations,” and in association with Brunetti’s website imagery and products conveyed misogyny, depravity, and violence. Brunetti then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which held that the Lanham Act’s prohibition violated the First Amendment. The Supreme Court then granted certiorari to address the lower court’s invalidation of the federal statute.
By a vote of 6-3, the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the Federal Circuit. In an opinion delivered by Justice Kagan, the Court held that the Lanham Act prohibition on the registration of “immoral” or “scandalous” trademarks constitutes viewpoint discrimination that infringes the First Amendment.
Justice Kagan’s majority opinion was joined by which Justices Thomas, Ginsburg, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion. Justice Breyer and Chief Justice Roberts filed opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Justice Breyer joined.
To discuss the case, we have Thomas Berry, Attorney at the Pacific Legal Foundation.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/18678208Tue, 30 Jul 2019 18:55:34 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 24, 2019, the Supreme Court decided Iancu v. Brunetti, a case considering whether a provision of the Lanham Act prohibiting the registration of “immoral or scandalous” trademarks infringes the First Amendment. Business owner Erik...Business owner Erik Brunetti applied to register his clothing brand’s trademark, “FUCT,” (pronounced as the individual letters F-U-C-T) but was refused by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) because the Lanham Act prohibits registration of marks that consist of or comprise “immoral or scandalous” matter. The PTO Trademark Trial and Appeal Board deemed the mark vulgar and indicated that it carried “negative sexual connotations,” and in association with Brunetti’s website imagery and products conveyed misogyny, depravity, and violence. Brunetti then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which held that the Lanham Act’s prohibition violated the First Amendment. The Supreme Court then granted certiorari to address the lower court’s invalidation of the federal statute.
By a vote of 6-3, the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the Federal Circuit. In an opinion delivered by Justice Kagan, the Court held that the Lanham Act prohibition on the registration of “immoral” or “scandalous” trademarks constitutes viewpoint discrimination that infringes the First Amendment.
Justice Kagan’s majority opinion was joined by which Justices Thomas, Ginsburg, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion. Justice Breyer and Chief Justice Roberts filed opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Justice Breyer joined.
To discuss the case, we have Thomas Berry, Attorney at the Pacific Legal Foundation.]]>1244constitution,federal courts,first amendment,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/the-american-legion-v-american-humanist-In 1925, the American Legion erected a memorial cross (Peace Cross) in Bladensburg, MD, to honor 49 soldiers who died fighting in World War I. In 1961, the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission (Commission) acquired the land and has maintained the memorial using public funding. In 2014, the American Humanist Association (AHA) and other civil associations filed suit in District Court, alleging that the presence and publicly-funded maintenance of the Peace Cross violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. AHA sought relocation, demolition, or removal of the cross’s arms. The district court ruled in favor of the American Legion, applying the Supreme Court precedents Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) and Van Orden v. Perry (2005), concluding that the Peace Cross did not violate the Establishment Clause.
A divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed that judgment, applying the same precedents as the district court--but concluding that the Peace Cross conveyed to a reasonable observer the impression of state endorsement of Christianity, and excessively entangled the Commission with religion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the Establishment Clause issue.
By a vote of 7-2, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Fourth Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Alito, the Court held that “[t]he Bladensburg Cross does not violate the Establishment Clause.” Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II–B, II–C, III, and IV, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Kagan, and Kavanaugh. Justice Alito’s opinion with respect to Parts II–A and II–D was also joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer and Kavanaugh, but not Justice Kagan. A concurring opinion was filed by Justice Breyer in which Justice Kagan joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion and Justice Kagan filed an opinion concurring in part. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined.
To discuss the case, we have Christopher DiPompeo, Partner at Jones Day.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/18621761Tue, 23 Jul 2019 15:19:05 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 20, 2019, the Supreme Court decided The American Legion v. American Humanist Association, a case considering whether state funding of a war memorial in the form of a religious symbol is in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First...In 1925, the American Legion erected a memorial cross (Peace Cross) in Bladensburg, MD, to honor 49 soldiers who died fighting in World War I. In 1961, the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission (Commission) acquired the land and has maintained the memorial using public funding. In 2014, the American Humanist Association (AHA) and other civil associations filed suit in District Court, alleging that the presence and publicly-funded maintenance of the Peace Cross violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. AHA sought relocation, demolition, or removal of the cross’s arms. The district court ruled in favor of the American Legion, applying the Supreme Court precedents Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) and Van Orden v. Perry (2005), concluding that the Peace Cross did not violate the Establishment Clause.
A divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed that judgment, applying the same precedents as the district court--but concluding that the Peace Cross conveyed to a reasonable observer the impression of state endorsement of Christianity, and excessively entangled the Commission with religion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the Establishment Clause issue.
By a vote of 7-2, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Fourth Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Alito, the Court held that “[t]he Bladensburg Cross does not violate the Establishment Clause.” Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II–B, II–C, III, and IV, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Kagan, and Kavanaugh. Justice Alito’s opinion with respect to Parts II–A and II–D was also joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer and Kavanaugh, but not Justice Kagan. A concurring opinion was filed by Justice Breyer in which Justice Kagan joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion and Justice Kagan filed an opinion concurring in part. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined.
To discuss the case, we have Christopher DiPompeo, Partner at Jones Day.]]>1042constitution,first amendment,religious liberty,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/franchise-tax-board-of-california-v-hyat_1In the 1990s, Gilbert Hyatt moved from California to Nevada. Following an investigation and audit, however, the Franchise Tax Board of California (FTB) claimed that he had misstated the date of his move and therefore owed California millions in unpaid taxes, penalties and interest. Hyatt then brought a tort suit against FTB, which is a California state agency, in Nevada state court--and won a jury verdict of nearly $500 million. Although the Nevada Supreme Court set aside much of the award on appeal, it nevertheless affirmed an award of $1 million for fraud--even though a Nevada statute would have capped such damages in a similar suit against Nevada officials at $50,000. Nevada’s interest in providing adequate redress to its own citizens, the court concluded, superseded the application of any statutory cap for California’s benefit.
In 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed that judgment, concluding that the Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause required Nevada courts to grant the FTB the same level of immunity that Nevada agencies enjoy. The Court divided equally, however, on whether to overrule its 1979 precedent Nevada v. Hall, which holds that the Constitution does not bar private suits against a State in the courts of another State. By statute, the Court was therefore required to affirm the jurisdiction of the Nevada Supreme Court. On remand, that court instructed the trial court to enter damages against FTB in accord with the statutory cap for Nevada agencies. Thereafter the U.S. Supreme Court again granted certiorari to reconsider Nevada v. Hall.
By a vote of 5-4, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Nevada Supreme Court and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Thomas, the Court overruled Nevada v. Hall, holding that states retain their sovereign immunity from private suits brought in courts of other states. Justice Thomas’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined.
To discuss the case, we have Stephen Sachs, Professor of Law at Duke University.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/18593927Fri, 19 Jul 2019 20:47:21 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn May 13, 2019, the Supreme Court decided Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt, a case considering whether states maintain sovereign immunity from private suits in the courts of other states. In the 1990s, Gilbert Hyatt moved from California...In the 1990s, Gilbert Hyatt moved from California to Nevada. Following an investigation and audit, however, the Franchise Tax Board of California (FTB) claimed that he had misstated the date of his move and therefore owed California millions in unpaid taxes, penalties and interest. Hyatt then brought a tort suit against FTB, which is a California state agency, in Nevada state court--and won a jury verdict of nearly $500 million. Although the Nevada Supreme Court set aside much of the award on appeal, it nevertheless affirmed an award of $1 million for fraud--even though a Nevada statute would have capped such damages in a similar suit against Nevada officials at $50,000. Nevada’s interest in providing adequate redress to its own citizens, the court concluded, superseded the application of any statutory cap for California’s benefit.
In 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed that judgment, concluding that the Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause required Nevada courts to grant the FTB the same level of immunity that Nevada agencies enjoy. The Court divided equally, however, on whether to overrule its 1979 precedent Nevada v. Hall, which holds that the Constitution does not bar private suits against a State in the courts of another State. By statute, the Court was therefore required to affirm the jurisdiction of the Nevada Supreme Court. On remand, that court instructed the trial court to enter damages against FTB in accord with the statutory cap for Nevada agencies. Thereafter the U.S. Supreme Court again granted certiorari to reconsider Nevada v. Hall.
By a vote of 5-4, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Nevada Supreme Court and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Thomas, the Court overruled Nevada v. Hall, holding that states retain their sovereign immunity from private suits brought in courts of other states. Justice Thomas’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined.
To discuss the case, we have Stephen Sachs, Professor of Law at Duke University.]]>1027constitution,state courts,state governments,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/stokeling-v-united-states-post-decision-ACCA imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum prison sentence on any federal firearms offender who has three or more convictions for a “violent” felony or serious drug offense. In determining whether any given predicate felony conviction qualifies as “violent,” federal courts typically apply a “categorical” approach that looks only to the elements of the predicate offense and not the underlying facts. If the elements include “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another,” the conviction qualifies as a violent felony. The issue here was whether Stokeling’s Florida conviction for robbery categorically qualified as a violent felony for ACCA purposes. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that it did.
By a vote of 5-4, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit. In an opinion delivered by Justice Thomas, the Supreme Court held that ACCA’s elements clause encompasses a robbery offense that, like Florida’s law, requires the criminal physically to overcome the victim’s resistance. Justice Thomas’s majority opinion was joined by Justices Breyer, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which the Chief Justice and Justices Ginsburg and Kagan joined.
To discuss the case, we have Luke Milligan, Professor of Law at the University of Louisville Brandeis School of Law.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/18565802Tue, 16 Jul 2019 20:31:37 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn January 15, 2019, the Supreme Court decided Stokeling v. United States, a case considering whether Florida’s robbery law, which requires victim resistance that is then overcome by the physical force of the offender, qualifies as a...ACCA imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum prison sentence on any federal firearms offender who has three or more convictions for a “violent” felony or serious drug offense. In determining whether any given predicate felony conviction qualifies as “violent,” federal courts typically apply a “categorical” approach that looks only to the elements of the predicate offense and not the underlying facts. If the elements include “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another,” the conviction qualifies as a violent felony. The issue here was whether Stokeling’s Florida conviction for robbery categorically qualified as a violent felony for ACCA purposes. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that it did.
By a vote of 5-4, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit. In an opinion delivered by Justice Thomas, the Supreme Court held that ACCA’s elements clause encompasses a robbery offense that, like Florida’s law, requires the criminal physically to overcome the victim’s resistance. Justice Thomas’s majority opinion was joined by Justices Breyer, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which the Chief Justice and Justices Ginsburg and Kagan joined.
To discuss the case, we have Luke Milligan, Professor of Law at the University of Louisville Brandeis School of Law.]]>807criminal law & procedure,federal courts,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/north-carolina-department-of-revenue-v-tAbout thirty years ago, Joseph Lee Rice II formed a trust for the benefit of his children and their families. The trust was formed in New York State and governed by New York law, as well as administered by a trustee who is a New York resident. Kimberley Rice Kaestner moved to North Carolina in 1997 and claimed residency from 2005-2008. After the move, the trustee opted to divide Rice’s initial trust into three separate subtrusts while still maintaining control of all three trusts. The trust at issue in this case is the Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust (“Kaestner Trust”), which North Carolina sought to tax on the grounds that it “is for the benefit of” North Carolina residents. North Carolina taxed the trust for tax years 2005-2008, levying a bill of more than $1.3 million. The trustee paid the tax under protest and sued North Carolina in state court, arguing that the tax as applied to the Kaestner Trust violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Kaestner had received no income from the trust during the years in question, the trust was governed by New York law, and the trustee did not live in North Carolina. The state courts ruled in favor of Kaestner, and the State of North Carolina obtained a grant of certiorari.
In a unanimous decision, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court of North Carolina. In an opinion delivered by Justice Sotomayor, the Court held that “the presence of in-state beneficiaries alone does not empower a state to tax trust income that has not been distributed to the beneficiaries where the beneficiaries have no right to demand that income and are uncertain to receive it.” Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Gorsuch.
To discuss the case, we have Jon Urick, Senior Counsel for Litigation at the US Chamber Litigation Center.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/18556007Mon, 15 Jul 2019 19:14:46 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 21, 2019, the Supreme Court decided North Carolina Department of Revenue v. The Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust, a case considering the ability of states to tax trust income for in-state beneficiaries even when these beneficiaries do...About thirty years ago, Joseph Lee Rice II formed a trust for the benefit of his children and their families. The trust was formed in New York State and governed by New York law, as well as administered by a trustee who is a New York resident. Kimberley Rice Kaestner moved to North Carolina in 1997 and claimed residency from 2005-2008. After the move, the trustee opted to divide Rice’s initial trust into three separate subtrusts while still maintaining control of all three trusts. The trust at issue in this case is the Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust (“Kaestner Trust”), which North Carolina sought to tax on the grounds that it “is for the benefit of” North Carolina residents. North Carolina taxed the trust for tax years 2005-2008, levying a bill of more than $1.3 million. The trustee paid the tax under protest and sued North Carolina in state court, arguing that the tax as applied to the Kaestner Trust violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Kaestner had received no income from the trust during the years in question, the trust was governed by New York law, and the trustee did not live in North Carolina. The state courts ruled in favor of Kaestner, and the State of North Carolina obtained a grant of certiorari.
In a unanimous decision, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court of North Carolina. In an opinion delivered by Justice Sotomayor, the Court held that “the presence of in-state beneficiaries alone does not empower a state to tax trust income that has not been distributed to the beneficiaries where the beneficiaries have no right to demand that income and are uncertain to receive it.” Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Gorsuch.
To discuss the case, we have Jon Urick, Senior Counsel for Litigation at the US Chamber Litigation Center.]]>1670federalism,state courts,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/thacker-v-tennessee-valley-authority-pos_1In 2013, Anthony Szozda and Gary and Venida Thacker were participating in a fishing tournament on the Tennessee River. The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) had a crew near the river, trying to raise a downed power line that had partially fallen into the river instead of crossing over it. The crew attempted to lift the conductor out of the water concurrent with Szozda and the Thackers passing through the river at a high rate of speed. The conductor struck both Thacker and Szozda, causing serious injury to Gary Thacker and killing Szozda. The Thackers sued TVA for negligence. The district court dismissed their complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
On appeal, the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that judgment. Although the act creating the TVA waives sovereign immunity from tort suits, the Court held that the waiver does not apply where the TVA was engaged in governmental functions that were discretionary in nature. Applying a test derived from the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Court determined that the TVA’s challenged conduct fell within this “discretionary-function exception,” and immunity therefore applied.
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the judgement of the Eleventh Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings. In an opinion delivered by Justice Kagan, the Court held that the TVA’s sue-and-be-sued clause, which waives sovereign immunity, is not subject to a discretionary-function exception. Rather, on remand the court below should consider whether the conduct alleged to be negligent is governmental or commercial in nature. If it is commercial, immunity does not apply. If it is governmental, immunity may apply--but only if prohibiting the kind of suit in question is necessary to avoid grave interference with the governmental function at issue.
To discuss the case, we have Richard Peltz-Steele, Professor at the University of Massachusetts School of Law.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/18331185Thu, 20 Jun 2019 19:57:58 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn April 29, 2019, the Supreme Court decided Thacker v. Tennessee Valley Authority, a case involving a dispute over the “discretionary-function exception” to waivers of federal sovereign immunity. In 2013, Anthony Szozda and Gary and...In 2013, Anthony Szozda and Gary and Venida Thacker were participating in a fishing tournament on the Tennessee River. The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) had a crew near the river, trying to raise a downed power line that had partially fallen into the river instead of crossing over it. The crew attempted to lift the conductor out of the water concurrent with Szozda and the Thackers passing through the river at a high rate of speed. The conductor struck both Thacker and Szozda, causing serious injury to Gary Thacker and killing Szozda. The Thackers sued TVA for negligence. The district court dismissed their complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
On appeal, the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that judgment. Although the act creating the TVA waives sovereign immunity from tort suits, the Court held that the waiver does not apply where the TVA was engaged in governmental functions that were discretionary in nature. Applying a test derived from the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Court determined that the TVA’s challenged conduct fell within this “discretionary-function exception,” and immunity therefore applied.
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the judgement of the Eleventh Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings. In an opinion delivered by Justice Kagan, the Court held that the TVA’s sue-and-be-sued clause, which waives sovereign immunity, is not subject to a discretionary-function exception. Rather, on remand the court below should consider whether the conduct alleged to be negligent is governmental or commercial in nature. If it is commercial, immunity does not apply. If it is governmental, immunity may apply--but only if prohibiting the kind of suit in question is necessary to avoid grave interference with the governmental function at issue.
To discuss the case, we have Richard Peltz-Steele, Professor at the University of Massachusetts School of Law.]]>765administrative law & regulatio,federal courtscleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/rucho-v-common-cause-and-lamone-v-beniseRucho v. Common Cause involves whether North Carolina’s 2016 congressional map involves unconstitutional gerrymandering in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the First Amendment, and Article I. In March 2017, a three-judge district court ruled that North Carolina’s 2016 Congressional Redistricting Plan constituted unconstitutional gerrymandering because the state General Assembly improperly relied on “political data” to draw districts to increase the number of Republicans in North Carolina’s congressional delegation. The court ordered new maps to be drawn for use in future elections. Following the court’s instructions, the General Assembly drew a new congressional district plan according to criteria identified by the Joint Select Committee on Redistricting. One such criterion was “partisan advantage,” which, relying on population data and political data, would “make reasonable efforts to construct districts in the 2016 plan to maintain current partisan makeup of North Carolina’s congressional delegation.” The plan was approved by the committee, the North Carolina Senate and North Carolina House of Representatives, all along party lines. Others filed objections to the plan and asked that the court reject it as partisan gerrymandering. The court held that the plan constituted unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering, enjoined North Carolina from using the plan in any election after November 6, 2018, and directed the parties to submit briefs relating to whether the court should allow the plan to be used in the 2018 election and allow the General Assembly a third opportunity to draw a plan. Although the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the district court judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its 2018 decision in Gil v. Whitford on standing, the district court subsequently concluded that the plaintiffs had standing and reasserted its earlier determination on the merits. In August 2018, the district court concluded that there was not enough time to review a new plan before the seating of the new Congress in 2019 as well as determined that a new schedule for elections would interfere with North Carolina’s electoral machinery. Thus, the court declined to enjoin use of the plan in the November 2018 election.
The Supreme Court thereafter granted certiorari to consider (1) whether plaintiffs have standing to press their partisan gerrymandering claims; (2) whether plaintiffs’ partisan gerrymandering claims are justiciable; and (3) whether North Carolina’s 2016 congressional map is, in fact, an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander.

Lamone v. Benisek involves Maryland’s 2011 redistricting plan, particularly whether the State redrew the boundary of one district to burden Republicans. Following the 2010 census, Maryland redrew the lines of its congressional districts and state legislative districts. The Sixth Congressional District had grown by approximately 10,000 residents, which required adjustment of the district boundaries. If only a slight adjustment for population had been applied, the district would have been unquestionably Republican. Instead of this slight adjustment, the plan swapped half the population of the former Sixth District with about 24,000 voters. The change created in effect a difference in 90,000 Democratic votes. Plaintiffs argued that in enacting 2011 law, the State deliberately diluted Republican votes in violation of the First Amendment. A three-judge district court agreed with plaintiffs, enjoining the State from using the 2011 congressional redistricting plan after the 2018 congressional election and requiring it promptly to adopt a new plan for use in the 2020 congressional elections.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider (1) whether the various legal claims articulated by the three-judge district court are unmanageable; (2) whether the three-judge district court erred when, in granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, it resolved disputes of material fact as to multiple elements of plaintiffs’ claims, failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and treated as “undisputed” evidence that is the subject of still-unresolved hearsay and other evidentiary objections; and (3) whether the three-judge district court abused its discretion in entering an injunction despite the plaintiffs’ years-long delay in seeking injunctive relief, rendering the remedy applicable to at most one election before the next decennial census necessitates another redistricting.
To discuss the cases, we have Derek Muller, Associate Professor at Pepperdine University School of Law.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/18327303Wed, 19 Jun 2019 12:47:12 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 26, 2019, the Supreme Court heard argument in Rucho v. Common Cause and Benisek v. Lamone, two cases involving gerrymandering. Rucho v. Common Cause involves whether North Carolina’s 2016 congressional map involves unconstitutional...Rucho v. Common Cause involves whether North Carolina’s 2016 congressional map involves unconstitutional gerrymandering in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the First Amendment, and Article I. In March 2017, a three-judge district court ruled that North Carolina’s 2016 Congressional Redistricting Plan constituted unconstitutional gerrymandering because the state General Assembly improperly relied on “political data” to draw districts to increase the number of Republicans in North Carolina’s congressional delegation. The court ordered new maps to be drawn for use in future elections. Following the court’s instructions, the General Assembly drew a new congressional district plan according to criteria identified by the Joint Select Committee on Redistricting. One such criterion was “partisan advantage,” which, relying on population data and political data, would “make reasonable efforts to construct districts in the 2016 plan to maintain current partisan makeup of North Carolina’s congressional delegation.” The plan was approved by the committee, the North Carolina Senate and North Carolina House of Representatives, all along party lines. Others filed objections to the plan and asked that the court reject it as partisan gerrymandering. The court held that the plan constituted unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering, enjoined North Carolina from using the plan in any election after November 6, 2018, and directed the parties to submit briefs relating to whether the court should allow the plan to be used in the 2018 election and allow the General Assembly a third opportunity to draw a plan. Although the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the district court judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its 2018 decision in Gil v. Whitford on standing, the district court subsequently concluded that the plaintiffs had standing and reasserted its earlier determination on the merits. In August 2018, the district court concluded that there was not enough time to review a new plan before the seating of the new Congress in 2019 as well as determined that a new schedule for elections would interfere with North Carolina’s electoral machinery. Thus, the court declined to enjoin use of the plan in the November 2018 election.
The Supreme Court thereafter granted certiorari to consider (1) whether plaintiffs have standing to press their partisan gerrymandering claims; (2) whether plaintiffs’ partisan gerrymandering claims are justiciable; and (3) whether North Carolina’s 2016 congressional map is, in fact, an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander.

Lamone v. Benisek involves Maryland’s 2011 redistricting plan, particularly whether the State redrew the boundary of one district to burden Republicans. Following the 2010 census, Maryland redrew the lines of its congressional districts and state legislative districts. The Sixth Congressional District had grown by approximately 10,000 residents, which required adjustment of the district boundaries. If only a slight adjustment for population had been applied, the district would have been unquestionably Republican. Instead of this slight adjustment, the plan swapped half the population of the former Sixth District with about 24,000 voters. The change created in effect a difference in 90,000 Democratic votes. Plaintiffs argued that in enacting 2011 law, the State deliberately diluted Republican votes in violation of the First Amendment. A three-judge district court agreed with plaintiffs, enjoining the State from using the 2011 congressional redistricting plan after the 2018 congressional election and requiring it promptly to adopt a new plan for use in the 2020 congressional elections.
The Supreme...]]>930election law,federalism & separation of pow,first amendment,fourteenth amendment,state governmentscleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/emulex-corp-v-varjabedian-post-decision-Emulex Corp. is a computer component seller that entered into a merger agreement with Avago Technologies Wireless Manufacturing. In the merger agreement, Avago offered to pay $8 per share, which reflected a premium of 26.4% on the price of Emulex stock the day before the merger was announced. Emulex filed with the Commission a public recommendation statement supporting the tender offer, recommending that Emulex shareholders tender their shares and noting that that Emulex shareholders would receive a premium on their stock. The statement also included a summary of a “fairness opinion” generated by Goldman Sachs, indicating its view that the tender offer was fair to shareholders. Omitted from the recommendation statement, however, was a one-page premium analysis by Goldman indicating that the takeover premium offered by Avago was actually below average, though within the normal range for mergers involving similar companies. The merger went forward, but thereafter Gary Varjabedian and other Emulex shareholders collectively brought suit against Emulex under Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act, alleging that omission of the premium analysis page rendered the recommendation statement materially misleading. Emulex moved to dismiss, arguing that the facts alleged by plaintiffs did not sufficiently support the scienter required under Section 14(e). The district court agreed and ruled for Emulex but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. Although five other federal circuit courts of appeals had interpreted Section 14(e) to require scienter, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the better reading of the provision in light of its legislative history required merely a showing negligence and not scienter.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 supports an inferred private right of action based on the negligent misstatement or omission made in connection with a tender offer. During oral argument, however, the Justices questioned whether certiorari had properly been granted, as the courts below had not thoroughly considered whether Section 14(e) authorizes a private right of action at all. Indeed, just over one week after oral argument, the Supreme Court issued a per curiam opinion dismissing the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.
To discuss the case, we have Cory Andrews, Senior Litigation Counsel at the Washington Legal Foundation.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/18126866Thu, 30 May 2019 20:26:03 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn April 23, 2019, just one week after argument, the Supreme Court decided Emulex Corp. v. Varjabedian, a case involving a circuit split regarding Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and whether it supports an inferred private right...Emulex Corp. is a computer component seller that entered into a merger agreement with Avago Technologies Wireless Manufacturing. In the merger agreement, Avago offered to pay $8 per share, which reflected a premium of 26.4% on the price of Emulex stock the day before the merger was announced. Emulex filed with the Commission a public recommendation statement supporting the tender offer, recommending that Emulex shareholders tender their shares and noting that that Emulex shareholders would receive a premium on their stock. The statement also included a summary of a “fairness opinion” generated by Goldman Sachs, indicating its view that the tender offer was fair to shareholders. Omitted from the recommendation statement, however, was a one-page premium analysis by Goldman indicating that the takeover premium offered by Avago was actually below average, though within the normal range for mergers involving similar companies. The merger went forward, but thereafter Gary Varjabedian and other Emulex shareholders collectively brought suit against Emulex under Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act, alleging that omission of the premium analysis page rendered the recommendation statement materially misleading. Emulex moved to dismiss, arguing that the facts alleged by plaintiffs did not sufficiently support the scienter required under Section 14(e). The district court agreed and ruled for Emulex but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. Although five other federal circuit courts of appeals had interpreted Section 14(e) to require scienter, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the better reading of the provision in light of its legislative history required merely a showing negligence and not scienter.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 supports an inferred private right of action based on the negligent misstatement or omission made in connection with a tender offer. During oral argument, however, the Justices questioned whether certiorari had properly been granted, as the courts below had not thoroughly considered whether Section 14(e) authorizes a private right of action at all. Indeed, just over one week after oral argument, the Supreme Court issued a per curiam opinion dismissing the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.
To discuss the case, we have Cory Andrews, Senior Litigation Counsel at the Washington Legal Foundation.]]>632corporations,federal courts,litigation,securities & antitrust,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/henry-schein-inc-v-archer-and-white-saleThe Supreme Court granted certiorari, unanimously vacating the judgment of the Fifth Circuit and remanding the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Kavanaugh, the Supreme Court rejected the “wholly groundless” exception to the general rule that courts must enforce arbitration contracts according to their terms. Such an exception, the Court held, is inconsistent with the Federal Arbitration Act and the Court’s own precedent.

On April 24, 2019, the Supreme Court decided Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, a case considering whether an ambiguous agreement, in this case an employment contract, can provide the necessary contractual basis for concluding that the parties agreed to submit to class arbitration. In 2016, a hacking scheme revealed the tax information of about 1,300 employees of Lamps Plus, Inc. Frank Varela, one of the employees affected by this hack, brought a class action suit in federal district court against the company. Lamps Plus responded by seeking to compel individual arbitration, relying on the terms of Varela’s employment contract. The district court rejected Lamps Plus’ request, instead authorizing arbitration on a classwide basis and dismissing Varela’s claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed that judgment, determining that the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp--that a court may not compel classwide arbitration when an agreement is silent on the availability of such arbitration--did not control here because Varela’s employment agreement was ambiguous rather than silent regarding arbitration.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and by a vote of 5-4 reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice Roberts, the Supreme Court held that under the Federal Arbitration Act, an ambiguous agreement cannot provide the necessary contractual basis for concluding that the parties agreed to submit to class arbitration. The Chief Justice’s majority opinion was joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Breyer and Sotomayor. Both Justices Breyer and Sotomayor filed dissenting opinions. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which joined Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, and in which Justice Sotomayor joined as to Part II.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/18115628Wed, 29 May 2019 19:25:53 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn January 8, 2019, the Supreme Court decided Henry Schein Inc. v. Archer and White Sales Inc., a case involving the “wholly groundless” exception to the general rule that courts must enforce contracts that delegate threshold arbitrability...The Supreme Court granted certiorari, unanimously vacating the judgment of the Fifth Circuit and remanding the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Kavanaugh, the Supreme Court rejected the “wholly groundless” exception to the general rule that courts must enforce arbitration contracts according to their terms. Such an exception, the Court held, is inconsistent with the Federal Arbitration Act and the Court’s own precedent.

On April 24, 2019, the Supreme Court decided Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, a case considering whether an ambiguous agreement, in this case an employment contract, can provide the necessary contractual basis for concluding that the parties agreed to submit to class arbitration. In 2016, a hacking scheme revealed the tax information of about 1,300 employees of Lamps Plus, Inc. Frank Varela, one of the employees affected by this hack, brought a class action suit in federal district court against the company. Lamps Plus responded by seeking to compel individual arbitration, relying on the terms of Varela’s employment contract. The district court rejected Lamps Plus’ request, instead authorizing arbitration on a classwide basis and dismissing Varela’s claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed that judgment, determining that the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp--that a court may not compel classwide arbitration when an agreement is silent on the availability of such arbitration--did not control here because Varela’s employment agreement was ambiguous rather than silent regarding arbitration.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and by a vote of 5-4 reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice Roberts, the Supreme Court held that under the Federal Arbitration Act, an ambiguous agreement cannot provide the necessary contractual basis for concluding that the parties agreed to submit to class arbitration. The Chief Justice’s majority opinion was joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Breyer and Sotomayor. Both Justices Breyer and Sotomayor filed dissenting opinions. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which joined Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, and in which Justice Sotomayor joined as to Part II.]]>1014federal courts,litigation,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/nutraceutical-corp-v-lambert-post-decisiTroy Lambert filed a class action lawsuit against Nutraceutical Corp., a drug manufacturer, alleging violations of U.S. Food and Drug Administration requirements and various California consumer protection statutes. The district court initially certified the class action, but following reassignment of the case to a new judge and discovery raising concerns about Lambert’s classwide damages model, Nutraceutical moved to decertify the class and the district court granted the motion on February 20, 2015. Under Rule 23(f), Lambert had fourteen days from the date the motion was granted to seek permission in the Court of Appeals to appeal the order.
Lambert indicated on March 2 that he intended to file a motion for reconsideration, but did not do so until March 12, 2015, which fell within a deadline set by the district court but beyond 14-day window specified in Rule 23(f). The district court denied Lambert’s motion, and only then did he seek permission in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to appeal the class decertification. Nutraceutical objected that Lambert’s petition was untimely under Rule 23(f). The Court disagreed, reasoning that Rule 23(f) was non-jurisdictional and the deadline could therefore be equitably tolled given Lambert’s general diligence in following the district court’s instructions. Reaching the merits, the Ninth Circuit then reversed the decertification order on the grounds that the district court had abused its discretion. Nutraceutical successfully petitioned for certiorari.
In an opinion written by Justice Sotomayor, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case, holding the Rule 23(f) is not subject to equitable tolling.
To the discuss the case, we have Michael Morley, Assistant Professor of Law at Florida State University College of Law.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/17918766Mon, 13 May 2019 19:30:35 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn February 26, 2019, the Supreme Court decided Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert, a case considering whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), which imposes a 14-day deadline for appealing from a grant or denial of class-action certification, is...Troy Lambert filed a class action lawsuit against Nutraceutical Corp., a drug manufacturer, alleging violations of U.S. Food and Drug Administration requirements and various California consumer protection statutes. The district court initially certified the class action, but following reassignment of the case to a new judge and discovery raising concerns about Lambert’s classwide damages model, Nutraceutical moved to decertify the class and the district court granted the motion on February 20, 2015. Under Rule 23(f), Lambert had fourteen days from the date the motion was granted to seek permission in the Court of Appeals to appeal the order.
Lambert indicated on March 2 that he intended to file a motion for reconsideration, but did not do so until March 12, 2015, which fell within a deadline set by the district court but beyond 14-day window specified in Rule 23(f). The district court denied Lambert’s motion, and only then did he seek permission in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to appeal the class decertification. Nutraceutical objected that Lambert’s petition was untimely under Rule 23(f). The Court disagreed, reasoning that Rule 23(f) was non-jurisdictional and the deadline could therefore be equitably tolled given Lambert’s general diligence in following the district court’s instructions. Reaching the merits, the Ninth Circuit then reversed the decertification order on the grounds that the district court had abused its discretion. Nutraceutical successfully petitioned for certiorari.
In an opinion written by Justice Sotomayor, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case, holding the Rule 23(f) is not subject to equitable tolling.
To the discuss the case, we have Michael Morley, Assistant Professor of Law at Florida State University College of Law.]]>702federal courts,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/virginia-house-of-delegates-v-bethune-hiIn 2011, the Virginia House of Delegates redrew the 100 Virginia House of Delegates districts. Under the plan, each district was required to have 80,000 residents. Under the 2001 plan, there were twelve districts with a majority black voting age population (BVAP). These districts did not meet the 80,000 resident requirement for the 2011 plan, which meant that “any new plan required moving significant numbers of new voters into these districts in order to comply with the principle one person, one vote.” Title 52 U.S.C. § 10304--section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA)--required that any new plan not “diminish the number of districts in which minority groups can ‘elect their preferred candidates of choice.’” To ensure that at least twelve districts remained, the House of Delegates proposed that the twelve majority-minority districts were required to have a minimum 55% BVAP in the 2011 plan. The bill was passed and signed into law.
In 2014, registered voters in the twelve majority-minority districts filed suit against the Virginia State Board of Elections, claiming racial gerrymandering in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. In 2015 the three-judge district court ruled that race was not a predominant factor in the construction of 11 of the 12 challenged districts, but did predominate in one district, (District 75), though in that situation strict scrutiny was satisfied. In 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment with respect to District 75 but vacated the judgment as to the other 11 districts and remanded the case, concluding that the district court had relied on a flawed standard when assessing whether race predominated.
On remand, the three-judge district court concluded that race predominated in the drawing of all 11 districts and that none satisfied strict scrutiny. The Virginia House of Delegates appealed to the Supreme Court for further review, raising various concerns regarding the district court’s predominance and strict scrutiny analyses, as well evidentiary issues. For their part the appellees sought dismissal of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and the Court directed the parties to address whether the House of Delegates lacked standing to bring this appeal.
To the discuss the case, we have Scott Keller, Partner at Baker Botts.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/17818764Thu, 02 May 2019 20:33:52 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 18, 2019, the Supreme Court heard argument in Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, a case considering racial gerrymandering claims in the the redistricting of Virginia House of Delegates districts. In 2011, the Virginia House of...In 2011, the Virginia House of Delegates redrew the 100 Virginia House of Delegates districts. Under the plan, each district was required to have 80,000 residents. Under the 2001 plan, there were twelve districts with a majority black voting age population (BVAP). These districts did not meet the 80,000 resident requirement for the 2011 plan, which meant that “any new plan required moving significant numbers of new voters into these districts in order to comply with the principle one person, one vote.” Title 52 U.S.C. § 10304--section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA)--required that any new plan not “diminish the number of districts in which minority groups can ‘elect their preferred candidates of choice.’” To ensure that at least twelve districts remained, the House of Delegates proposed that the twelve majority-minority districts were required to have a minimum 55% BVAP in the 2011 plan. The bill was passed and signed into law.
In 2014, registered voters in the twelve majority-minority districts filed suit against the Virginia State Board of Elections, claiming racial gerrymandering in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. In 2015 the three-judge district court ruled that race was not a predominant factor in the construction of 11 of the 12 challenged districts, but did predominate in one district, (District 75), though in that situation strict scrutiny was satisfied. In 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment with respect to District 75 but vacated the judgment as to the other 11 districts and remanded the case, concluding that the district court had relied on a flawed standard when assessing whether race predominated.
On remand, the three-judge district court concluded that race predominated in the drawing of all 11 districts and that none satisfied strict scrutiny. The Virginia House of Delegates appealed to the Supreme Court for further review, raising various concerns regarding the district court’s predominance and strict scrutiny analyses, as well evidentiary issues. For their part the appellees sought dismissal of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and the Court directed the parties to address whether the House of Delegates lacked standing to bring this appeal.
To the discuss the case, we have Scott Keller, Partner at Baker Botts.]]>764free speech & election law,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/the-dutra-group-v-batterton-post-argumenChristopher Batterton was a deckhand on a ship owned by the Dutra Group. In the course of Batterton's work, a hatch cover that covered a compartment storing pressurized air blew open and crushed Batterton’s left hand. The hatch cover allegedly blew because of the ship's lack of a mechanism for exhausting over-pressurized air. Batterton was permanently disabled because of the injury. He brought suit against Dutra Group in federal district court in California, seeking (among other things) punitive damages for unseaworthiness.
Dutra Group moved to dismiss the claim for punitive damages, arguing that although the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had allowed such damages in its 1987 decision Evich v. Morris, that precedent had been implicitly overruled by the Supreme Court's 1990 decision in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp, which held that the parent of a deceased seaman could not recover loss of society damages in a general maritime action. The district court denied the motion and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding that punitive damages differed materially from loss of society damages, and that, under the Jones Act, Evich remained good law: punitive damages are awardable to seamen for their own injuries in general maritime unseaworthiness actions.
That ruling, however, put the Ninth Circuit in direct conflict with a contrary ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on the same issue, and the Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to address whether punitive damages may be awarded to a Jones Act seaman in a personal-injury suit alleging a breach of the general maritime duty to provide a seaworthy vessel.
To the discuss the case, we have Daryl Joseffer, Senior Vice President and Chief Counsel for Appellate Litigation at the U.S. Chamber Litigation Center.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/17807681Wed, 01 May 2019 20:04:52 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 25, 2019, the Supreme Court heard argument in The Dutra Group v. Batterton, a case considering whether punitive damages may be awarded in a general maritime action for unseaworthiness. Christopher Batterton was a deckhand on a ship owned...Christopher Batterton was a deckhand on a ship owned by the Dutra Group. In the course of Batterton's work, a hatch cover that covered a compartment storing pressurized air blew open and crushed Batterton’s left hand. The hatch cover allegedly blew because of the ship's lack of a mechanism for exhausting over-pressurized air. Batterton was permanently disabled because of the injury. He brought suit against Dutra Group in federal district court in California, seeking (among other things) punitive damages for unseaworthiness.
Dutra Group moved to dismiss the claim for punitive damages, arguing that although the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had allowed such damages in its 1987 decision Evich v. Morris, that precedent had been implicitly overruled by the Supreme Court's 1990 decision in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp, which held that the parent of a deceased seaman could not recover loss of society damages in a general maritime action. The district court denied the motion and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding that punitive damages differed materially from loss of society damages, and that, under the Jones Act, Evich remained good law: punitive damages are awardable to seamen for their own injuries in general maritime unseaworthiness actions.
That ruling, however, put the Ninth Circuit in direct conflict with a contrary ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on the same issue, and the Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to address whether punitive damages may be awarded to a Jones Act seaman in a personal-injury suit alleging a breach of the general maritime duty to provide a seaworthy vessel.
To the discuss the case, we have Daryl Joseffer, Senior Vice President and Chief Counsel for Appellate Litigation at the U.S. Chamber Litigation Center.]]>711court,law,maritime,punitive,scotus,supremecleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/washington-state-department-of-licensingCougar Den, Inc. is a wholesale fuel importer that is owned by a member of the Yakama Nation. Cougar Den imports fuel from Oregon via Washington public highways to the Yakama Reservation where it is sold to Yakama-owned gas stations within the reservation. In 2013, the Washington State Department of Licensing, because Cougar Den imports the gas by using Washington public highways, assessed the importer $3.6 million in taxes, penalties, and licensing fees. Cougar Den appealed to the Washington Superior Court, claiming that the 1855 Treaty between the United States and the Yakama Nation preempts this tax, since it reserves, among other things, the “right, in common with citizens of the United States, to travel upon all public highways.” The Washington Superior Court held that the tax was preempted by the Treaty, and the Washington Supreme Court affirmed that judgment on appeal.
Washington then petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari, arguing that the 1855 treaty does not forbid the State from imposing a state-wide tax on all fuel importers who transport fuel via ground transportation, including those members of the Yakama Nation. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the 1855 treaty preempts this importation tax on members of the Yakama Nation.
By a vote of 5-4, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington, but without a majority opinion. Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, concluded for a plurality that “the ‘right to travel’ provision of the 1855 Treaty between the United States and the Yakama Nation of Indians pre-empts the state’s fuel tax as applied to Cougar Den’s importation of fuel by public highway for sale within the reservation.” Justices Gorsuch and Ginsburg filed an opinion concurring in the judgment--thereby providing the necessary additional votes to affirm the lower court--but on a different rationale. Unchallenged factual findings as to the Yakamas’ understanding of the 1855 treaty terms, they reasoned, indicate that the treaty “does not permit encumbrances on the ability of tribal members to bring their goods to and from market.” Chief Justice Roberts dissented, joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, and Kavanaugh. Justice Kavanaugh also filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justice Thomas.
To discuss the case, we have Tom Gede, Principal at Morgan Lewis.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/17466374Thu, 28 Mar 2019 18:52:45 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 19, 2019, the Supreme Court decided Washington State Department of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc., a case involving the 1855 Treaty between the United States and the Yakama Nation of Indians, and whether the “right to travel”...Cougar Den, Inc. is a wholesale fuel importer that is owned by a member of the Yakama Nation. Cougar Den imports fuel from Oregon via Washington public highways to the Yakama Reservation where it is sold to Yakama-owned gas stations within the reservation. In 2013, the Washington State Department of Licensing, because Cougar Den imports the gas by using Washington public highways, assessed the importer $3.6 million in taxes, penalties, and licensing fees. Cougar Den appealed to the Washington Superior Court, claiming that the 1855 Treaty between the United States and the Yakama Nation preempts this tax, since it reserves, among other things, the “right, in common with citizens of the United States, to travel upon all public highways.” The Washington Superior Court held that the tax was preempted by the Treaty, and the Washington Supreme Court affirmed that judgment on appeal.
Washington then petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari, arguing that the 1855 treaty does not forbid the State from imposing a state-wide tax on all fuel importers who transport fuel via ground transportation, including those members of the Yakama Nation. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the 1855 treaty preempts this importation tax on members of the Yakama Nation.
By a vote of 5-4, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington, but without a majority opinion. Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, concluded for a plurality that “the ‘right to travel’ provision of the 1855 Treaty between the United States and the Yakama Nation of Indians pre-empts the state’s fuel tax as applied to Cougar Den’s importation of fuel by public highway for sale within the reservation.” Justices Gorsuch and Ginsburg filed an opinion concurring in the judgment--thereby providing the necessary additional votes to affirm the lower court--but on a different rationale. Unchallenged factual findings as to the Yakamas’ understanding of the 1855 treaty terms, they reasoned, indicate that the treaty “does not permit encumbrances on the ability of tribal members to bring their goods to and from market.” Chief Justice Roberts dissented, joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, and Kavanaugh. Justice Kavanaugh also filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justice Thomas.
To discuss the case, we have Tom Gede, Principal at Morgan Lewis.]]>756founding era & history,state courts,state governments,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/rimini-street-inc-v-oracle-usa-inc-post-Oracle sued Rimini Street for copyright infringement in federal district court and won a multimillion dollar jury award. After judgment, the District Court ordered Rimini Street to pay Oracle $12.8 million for litigation expenses such as expert witnesses, e-discovery, and jury consulting. On appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the NInth Circuit rejected Rimini’s challenge to this award of costs. Although some of the expenses did not fit within the categories of costs authorized by the general federal statute applicable to such awards--28 U. S. C. §§ 1821 and 1920--the Ninth Circuit relied on language in the Copyright Act at 17 U. S. C. § 505, which gives federal district courts discretion to award “full costs” to a party in copyright litigation.
The Supreme Court thereafter granted certiorari to resolve a split among the federal circuit courts of appeals on this issue: whether the term “full costs” in § 505 authorizes awards of expenses other than those costs identified in §§ 1821 and 1920.
In an unanimous decision, delivered by Justice Kavanaugh, the Court held that a federal district court’s discretion to award “full costs” to a party in copyright litigation pursuant to 17 U. S. C. §505 is limited to the six categories specified in the general costs statute codified at 28 U. S. C. §§1821 and 1920.
To discuss the case, we have James Heilpern, Law and Linguistics Fellow at BYU Law.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/17455727Wed, 27 Mar 2019 18:56:31 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 4, 2019, the Supreme Court decided Rimini Street Inc v. Oracle USA Inc., a case involving the scope of a federal district court’s ability to award “full costs” to a party in a copyright dispute according to 28 U. S. C....Oracle sued Rimini Street for copyright infringement in federal district court and won a multimillion dollar jury award. After judgment, the District Court ordered Rimini Street to pay Oracle $12.8 million for litigation expenses such as expert witnesses, e-discovery, and jury consulting. On appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the NInth Circuit rejected Rimini’s challenge to this award of costs. Although some of the expenses did not fit within the categories of costs authorized by the general federal statute applicable to such awards--28 U. S. C. §§ 1821 and 1920--the Ninth Circuit relied on language in the Copyright Act at 17 U. S. C. § 505, which gives federal district courts discretion to award “full costs” to a party in copyright litigation.
The Supreme Court thereafter granted certiorari to resolve a split among the federal circuit courts of appeals on this issue: whether the term “full costs” in § 505 authorizes awards of expenses other than those costs identified in §§ 1821 and 1920.
In an unanimous decision, delivered by Justice Kavanaugh, the Court held that a federal district court’s discretion to award “full costs” to a party in copyright litigation pursuant to 17 U. S. C. §505 is limited to the six categories specified in the general costs statute codified at 28 U. S. C. §§1821 and 1920.
To discuss the case, we have James Heilpern, Law and Linguistics Fellow at BYU Law.]]>906federal courts,intellectual property,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/fourth-estate-public-benefit-corp-v-wall_1Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. is an online news organization that licenses articles to different websites but retains the copyright to those articles. Wall-Street.com and Fourth Estate entered into a license agreement for a number of articles written by Fourth Estate. As part of the agreement, Wall-Street.com was required to remove all Fourth Estate content from its website before cancelling its account. Wall-Street cancelled its account but continued to display Fourth Estate articles, and Fourth Estate filed suit for copyright infringement against Wall-Street.com and its owner in federal district court. At the time Fourth Estate filed suit, it had submitted applications with the Registrar of Copyrights, but the Registrar had not yet acted upon them.
Wall-Street.com moved to dismiss, arguing that the Copyright Act permits an infringement suit only after the Registrar of Copyrights approves or denies an application to register the copyright at issue. The district court agreed with the defendants and dismissed Fourth Estate’s complaint without prejudice. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that judgment, but noted a split among the federal courts of appeals on the issue: whether the ability to file an infringement suit turns on application by the copyright owner (the “application” approach) or the making of a decision on the application by the Registrar of Copyrights (the “registration” approach).
Granting certiorari, the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit. In an opinion delivered by Justice Ginsburg, the Court held that “registration occurs, and a copyright claimant may commence an infringement suit, when the Copyright Office registers a copyright.”
To discuss the case, we have Brian Frye, Associate Professor of Law at University of Kentucky College of Law.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/17387416Wed, 20 Mar 2019 18:09:40 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 4, 2019, the Supreme Court decided Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, a case involving a split among the Courts of Appeals regarding when a copyright owner may initiate a suit for infringement in federal court. Fourth...Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. is an online news organization that licenses articles to different websites but retains the copyright to those articles. Wall-Street.com and Fourth Estate entered into a license agreement for a number of articles written by Fourth Estate. As part of the agreement, Wall-Street.com was required to remove all Fourth Estate content from its website before cancelling its account. Wall-Street cancelled its account but continued to display Fourth Estate articles, and Fourth Estate filed suit for copyright infringement against Wall-Street.com and its owner in federal district court. At the time Fourth Estate filed suit, it had submitted applications with the Registrar of Copyrights, but the Registrar had not yet acted upon them.
Wall-Street.com moved to dismiss, arguing that the Copyright Act permits an infringement suit only after the Registrar of Copyrights approves or denies an application to register the copyright at issue. The district court agreed with the defendants and dismissed Fourth Estate’s complaint without prejudice. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that judgment, but noted a split among the federal courts of appeals on the issue: whether the ability to file an infringement suit turns on application by the copyright owner (the “application” approach) or the making of a decision on the application by the Registrar of Copyrights (the “registration” approach).
Granting certiorari, the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit. In an opinion delivered by Justice Ginsburg, the Court held that “registration occurs, and a copyright claimant may commence an infringement suit, when the Copyright Office registers a copyright.”
To discuss the case, we have Brian Frye, Associate Professor of Law at University of Kentucky College of Law.]]>629federal courts,intellectual property,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/timbs-v-indiana-post-decision-scotuscastFollowing his arrest en route to a controlled drug purchase after having previously purchased about $400 worth of heroin from undercover police officers, Tyson Timbs pled guilty to felony counts of drug dealing and conspiracy to commit theft, and was sentenced to a year of home detention and several years of probation, plus roughly $1,200 in police costs and related fees. In addition, the State of Indiana sought forfeiture of Timbs’ Land Rover, which he had purchased using $42,000 of his late father’s life insurance proceeds. Indiana claimed that it could seize the car because it had been driven to buy and transport heroin, even though the car was worth more than four times the maximum fine permitted for Timbs’ drug conviction. The Supreme Court of Indiana upheld the forfeiture against an Eighth Amendment challenge on the grounds that the U.S. Supreme Court had never incorporated that amendment’s “excessive fines” clause against the states. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the issue.
By a vote of 9-0, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Supreme Court of Indiana and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Ginsburg, the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Eighth Amendment’s excessive fines clause against the States. Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.
To the discuss the case, we have Christopher Green, Associate Professor of Law and H.L.A. Hart Scholar in Law and Philosophy at University of Mississippi School of Law.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/17382883Wed, 20 Mar 2019 15:42:45 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn February 20, 2019, the Supreme Court decided Timbs v. Indiana, a case involving the incorporation of the Eighth Amendment’s excessive fines clause against the States. Following his arrest en route to a controlled drug purchase after having...Following his arrest en route to a controlled drug purchase after having previously purchased about $400 worth of heroin from undercover police officers, Tyson Timbs pled guilty to felony counts of drug dealing and conspiracy to commit theft, and was sentenced to a year of home detention and several years of probation, plus roughly $1,200 in police costs and related fees. In addition, the State of Indiana sought forfeiture of Timbs’ Land Rover, which he had purchased using $42,000 of his late father’s life insurance proceeds. Indiana claimed that it could seize the car because it had been driven to buy and transport heroin, even though the car was worth more than four times the maximum fine permitted for Timbs’ drug conviction. The Supreme Court of Indiana upheld the forfeiture against an Eighth Amendment challenge on the grounds that the U.S. Supreme Court had never incorporated that amendment’s “excessive fines” clause against the states. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the issue.
By a vote of 9-0, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Supreme Court of Indiana and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Ginsburg, the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Eighth Amendment’s excessive fines clause against the States. Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.
To the discuss the case, we have Christopher Green, Associate Professor of Law and H.L.A. Hart Scholar in Law and Philosophy at University of Mississippi School of Law.]]>839criminal law & procedure,federal courts,fourteenth amendment,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/franchise-tax-board-of-california-v-hyatIn the 1990s, Gilbert Hyatt moved from California to Nevada. Following an investigation and audit, however, the Franchise Tax Board of California (FTB) claimed that he had misstated the date of his move and therefore owed California millions in unpaid taxes, penalties and interest. Hyatt then brought a tort suit against FTB, which is a California state agency, in Nevada state court--and won a jury verdict of nearly $500 million. Although the Nevada Supreme Court set aside much of the award on appeal, it nevertheless affirmed an award of $1 million for fraud--even though a Nevada statute would have capped such damages in a similar suit against Nevada officials at $50,000. Nevada’s interest in providing adequate redress to its own citizens, the court concluded, superseded the application of any statutory cap for California’s benefit.
California sought review in the U.S. Supreme Court, urging it to overrule the 1979 decision Nevada v. Hall, which held that one state’s courts could adjudicate a private citizen’s lawsuit against another state without the second state’s consent. The Supreme Court granted certiorari but split 4-4 on the issue, which resulted in a technical affirmance of the Nevada Supreme Court’s exercise of jurisdiction. Reaching the merits, the Court held by a vote of 6-2 that the U.S. Constitution did not permit Nevada to apply a rule of Nevada law that awarded damages against California greater than it could award against Nevada in similar circumstances.
On remand, the Nevada Supreme Court reissued its vacated opinion except as to the damages portion and applied the statutory damages caps for FTB’s benefit. FTB again petitioned for certiorari, however, and the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to revisit the issue on which it had previously split 4-4: whether Nevada v. Hall, which permits a sovereign state to be haled into another state’s courts without its consent, should be overruled.
To discuss the case, we have Stephen Sachs, Professor of Law at Duke University.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/17321676Thu, 14 Mar 2019 16:30:14 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn January 9, 2019, the Supreme Court heard argument in Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt, a case considering whether one state may, without its consent, be sued by a private citizen in another state’s courts. In the 1990s, Gilbert...In the 1990s, Gilbert Hyatt moved from California to Nevada. Following an investigation and audit, however, the Franchise Tax Board of California (FTB) claimed that he had misstated the date of his move and therefore owed California millions in unpaid taxes, penalties and interest. Hyatt then brought a tort suit against FTB, which is a California state agency, in Nevada state court--and won a jury verdict of nearly $500 million. Although the Nevada Supreme Court set aside much of the award on appeal, it nevertheless affirmed an award of $1 million for fraud--even though a Nevada statute would have capped such damages in a similar suit against Nevada officials at $50,000. Nevada’s interest in providing adequate redress to its own citizens, the court concluded, superseded the application of any statutory cap for California’s benefit.
California sought review in the U.S. Supreme Court, urging it to overrule the 1979 decision Nevada v. Hall, which held that one state’s courts could adjudicate a private citizen’s lawsuit against another state without the second state’s consent. The Supreme Court granted certiorari but split 4-4 on the issue, which resulted in a technical affirmance of the Nevada Supreme Court’s exercise of jurisdiction. Reaching the merits, the Court held by a vote of 6-2 that the U.S. Constitution did not permit Nevada to apply a rule of Nevada law that awarded damages against California greater than it could award against Nevada in similar circumstances.
On remand, the Nevada Supreme Court reissued its vacated opinion except as to the damages portion and applied the statutory damages caps for FTB’s benefit. FTB again petitioned for certiorari, however, and the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to revisit the issue on which it had previously split 4-4: whether Nevada v. Hall, which permits a sovereign state to be haled into another state’s courts without its consent, should be overruled.
To discuss the case, we have Stephen Sachs, Professor of Law at Duke University.]]>964constitution,state courts,state governments,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/carpenter-v-murphy-post-argument-scotuscIn 1999, Patrick Murphy, a member of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation confessed to the killing of George Jacobs. The State of Oklahoma charged him with murder and he was convicted in state court, receiving the death penalty. In 2004, Murphy sought post-conviction relief in federal district court, arguing that the Oklahoma state courts had lacked jurisdiction because the federal Major Crimes Act requires that a member of an Indian Nation alleged to have committed murder in Indian territory be tried in federal court. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals rejected this argument, concluding Murphy had not shown that the site of the murder fell within Indian territory.
Murphy thereafter sought habeas relief in federal district court, again raising his jurisdictional challenge (among other claims). The district court rejected his argument, but granted a certificate of appealability on the issue. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled in Murphy’s favor. Noting the parties’ agreement that the murder occurred within the Creek Reservation if Congress had not disestablished it or diminished its borders, the Court--invoking the Supreme Court’s 1984 decision Solem v. Bartlett--concluded that Congress had not done so. As a result, the Oklahoma courts lacked jurisdiction to charge and try Murphy for murder. Chief Judge Tymkovich, concurring in the denial of Oklahoma’s motion for rehearing en banc, however, suggested the case would benefit from Supreme Court review. He noted, among other things, that “the boundaries of the Creek Reservation outlined by the panel opinion encompass a substantial non-Indian population, including much of the city of Tulsa; and Oklahoma claims the decision will have dramatic consequences for taxation, regulation, and law enforcement.”
The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to consider whether the 1866 territorial boundaries of the Creek Nation within the former Indian Territory of eastern Oklahoma constitute an “Indian reservation” today under 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a).
To discuss the case, we have Troy Eid, Shareholder at Greenberg Traurig.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/17292473Mon, 11 Mar 2019 21:43:19 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn November 27, 2018, the Supreme Court heard argument in Carpenter v. Murphy, a case considering the 1866 territorial boundaries of the Creek Nations and Indian country jurisdiction. In 1999, Patrick Murphy, a member of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation...In 1999, Patrick Murphy, a member of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation confessed to the killing of George Jacobs. The State of Oklahoma charged him with murder and he was convicted in state court, receiving the death penalty. In 2004, Murphy sought post-conviction relief in federal district court, arguing that the Oklahoma state courts had lacked jurisdiction because the federal Major Crimes Act requires that a member of an Indian Nation alleged to have committed murder in Indian territory be tried in federal court. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals rejected this argument, concluding Murphy had not shown that the site of the murder fell within Indian territory.
Murphy thereafter sought habeas relief in federal district court, again raising his jurisdictional challenge (among other claims). The district court rejected his argument, but granted a certificate of appealability on the issue. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled in Murphy’s favor. Noting the parties’ agreement that the murder occurred within the Creek Reservation if Congress had not disestablished it or diminished its borders, the Court--invoking the Supreme Court’s 1984 decision Solem v. Bartlett--concluded that Congress had not done so. As a result, the Oklahoma courts lacked jurisdiction to charge and try Murphy for murder. Chief Judge Tymkovich, concurring in the denial of Oklahoma’s motion for rehearing en banc, however, suggested the case would benefit from Supreme Court review. He noted, among other things, that “the boundaries of the Creek Reservation outlined by the panel opinion encompass a substantial non-Indian population, including much of the city of Tulsa; and Oklahoma claims the decision will have dramatic consequences for taxation, regulation, and law enforcement.”
The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to consider whether the 1866 territorial boundaries of the Creek Nation within the former Indian Territory of eastern Oklahoma constitute an “Indian reservation” today under 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a).
To discuss the case, we have Troy Eid, Shareholder at Greenberg Traurig.]]>2344criminal law & procedure,federal courts,state governments,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/thacker-v-tennessee-valley-authority-posIn 2013, Anthony Szozda and Gary and Venida Thacker were participating in a fishing tournament on the Tennessee River. The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) had a crew near the river, trying to raise a downed power line that had partially fallen into the river instead of crossing over it. The crew attempted to lift the conductor out of the water concurrent with Szozda and the Thackers passing through the river at a high rate of speed. The conductor struck both Thacker and Szozda, causing serious injury to Thacker and killing Szozda. The Thackers sued TVA for negligence. The district court dismissed the Thackers’ complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
On appeal, the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that judgment. Although the act creating the TVA waives sovereign immunity from tort suits, the Court held that the waiver does not apply where the TVA was engaged in governmental functions that were discretionary in nature. Applying a test derived from the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Court determined that the TVA’s challenged conduct fell within this “discretionary-function exception” here, and immunity therefore applied.
The Supreme Court granted the Thackers’ subsequent petition for certiorari to address whether the Eleventh Circuit erred in using a discretionary-function test derived from the Federal Tort Claims Act rather than the test set forth in Federal Housing Authority v. Burr, when testing the immunity of governmental “sue and be sued” entities (like the Tennessee Valley Authority) from the plaintiffs’ claims.
To discuss the case, we have Richard Peltz-Steele, Professor at University of Massachusetts School of Law.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/17222714Mon, 04 Mar 2019 21:28:25 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn January 14, 2019, the Supreme Court heard argument in Thacker v. Tennessee Valley Authority, a case involving a dispute over the “discretionary-function exception” to waivers of federal sovereign immunity. In 2013, Anthony Szozda and...In 2013, Anthony Szozda and Gary and Venida Thacker were participating in a fishing tournament on the Tennessee River. The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) had a crew near the river, trying to raise a downed power line that had partially fallen into the river instead of crossing over it. The crew attempted to lift the conductor out of the water concurrent with Szozda and the Thackers passing through the river at a high rate of speed. The conductor struck both Thacker and Szozda, causing serious injury to Thacker and killing Szozda. The Thackers sued TVA for negligence. The district court dismissed the Thackers’ complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
On appeal, the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that judgment. Although the act creating the TVA waives sovereign immunity from tort suits, the Court held that the waiver does not apply where the TVA was engaged in governmental functions that were discretionary in nature. Applying a test derived from the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Court determined that the TVA’s challenged conduct fell within this “discretionary-function exception” here, and immunity therefore applied.
The Supreme Court granted the Thackers’ subsequent petition for certiorari to address whether the Eleventh Circuit erred in using a discretionary-function test derived from the Federal Tort Claims Act rather than the test set forth in Federal Housing Authority v. Burr, when testing the immunity of governmental “sue and be sued” entities (like the Tennessee Valley Authority) from the plaintiffs’ claims.
To discuss the case, we have Richard Peltz-Steele, Professor at University of Massachusetts School of Law.]]>805federal courts,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/fourth-estate-public-benefit-corp-v-wallFourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. is an online news organization that licenses articles to different websites but retains the copyright to those articles. Wall-Street.com and Fourth Estate entered into a license agreement for a number of articles written by Fourth Estate. As part of the agreement, Wall-Street was required to remove all Fourth Estate content from its website before cancelling its account. When Wall-Street cancelled its account but continued to display Fourth Estate articles, Fourth Estate filed suit for copyright infringement against Wall-Street and its owner in federal district court.
The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the Copyright Act permits an infringement suit only after the Registrar of Copyrights approves or denies an application to register the copyright at issue. Here, Fourth Estate alleged that it had filed applications with the Registrar, but did not indicate whether any application had been acted upon. The district court agreed with the defendants and dismissed Fourth Estate’s complaint without prejudice. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that judgment. Noting a circuit split on whether the ability to file an infringement suit turns on application by the copyright owner (the “application” approach) or the making of a decision on the application by the Registrar of Copyrights (the “registration” approach), the Eleventh Circuit adhered to the registration approach.
The Supreme Court granted argument to address the circuit split regarding whether the “registration of [a] copyright claim has been made” within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) when the copyright holder delivers the required application, deposit, and fee to the Copyright Office, as the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have held, or only once the Copyright Office acts on that application, as the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Tenth and, in the decision below, the Eleventh Circuits have held.
To discuss the case, we have Brian Frye, Associate Professor of Law at University of Kentucky College of Law.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/17221324Mon, 04 Mar 2019 13:47:36 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn January 8, 2019, the Supreme Court heard argument in Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, a case considering whether a copyright owner may sue for infringement in federal court after merely applying for registration of the...Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. is an online news organization that licenses articles to different websites but retains the copyright to those articles. Wall-Street.com and Fourth Estate entered into a license agreement for a number of articles written by Fourth Estate. As part of the agreement, Wall-Street was required to remove all Fourth Estate content from its website before cancelling its account. When Wall-Street cancelled its account but continued to display Fourth Estate articles, Fourth Estate filed suit for copyright infringement against Wall-Street and its owner in federal district court.
The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the Copyright Act permits an infringement suit only after the Registrar of Copyrights approves or denies an application to register the copyright at issue. Here, Fourth Estate alleged that it had filed applications with the Registrar, but did not indicate whether any application had been acted upon. The district court agreed with the defendants and dismissed Fourth Estate’s complaint without prejudice. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that judgment. Noting a circuit split on whether the ability to file an infringement suit turns on application by the copyright owner (the “application” approach) or the making of a decision on the application by the Registrar of Copyrights (the “registration” approach), the Eleventh Circuit adhered to the registration approach.
The Supreme Court granted argument to address the circuit split regarding whether the “registration of [a] copyright claim has been made” within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) when the copyright holder delivers the required application, deposit, and fee to the Copyright Office, as the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have held, or only once the Copyright Office acts on that application, as the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Tenth and, in the decision below, the Eleventh Circuits have held.
To discuss the case, we have Brian Frye, Associate Professor of Law at University of Kentucky College of Law.]]>585intellectual propertycleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/united-states-v-stitt-and-united-states-ACCA imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum prison sentence on any federal firearms offender who has three or more convictions for a “violent” felony or serious drug offense. “Burglary” qualifies as a violent felony under ACCA, but the statute applies a “generic” understanding of burglary that may be narrower than some state burglary offenses. A prior state conviction does not qualify as burglary under ACCA if the elements of the state statute are broader than those of generic burglary, namely: an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.
Here, both defendants persuaded federal courts of appeals--the Sixth Circuit for Stitt and the Eighth Circuit for Sims--that their sentences were improperly enhanced because predicate burglary convictions under the laws of Tennessee and Arkansas, respectively, involved elements categorically broader than the generic burglary encompassed by ACCA. The Supreme Court consolidated the cases and granted certiorari to consider whether burglary of a nonpermanent or mobile structure that is adapted or used for overnight accommodation can qualify as “burglary” for purposes of ACCA.
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the judgment of the Sixth Circuit in Stitt and vacated the judgment of the Eighth Circuit in Sims, remanding that case for additional proceedings relating to the breadth of Arkansas’ burglary statute. In an opinion delivered by Justice Breyer, the Court held that the term “burglary” in ACCA includes burglary of a structure or vehicle that has been adapted or is customarily used for overnight accommodation.
To the discuss the case, we have Robert Leider, Associate Professor of Law at George Mason University Antonin Scalia Law School.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/17175313Wed, 27 Feb 2019 15:38:49 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn December 10, 2018, the Supreme Court decided the consolidated cases United States v. Stitt and United States v. Sims, both concerning the federal Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). ACCA imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum prison sentence on any...ACCA imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum prison sentence on any federal firearms offender who has three or more convictions for a “violent” felony or serious drug offense. “Burglary” qualifies as a violent felony under ACCA, but the statute applies a “generic” understanding of burglary that may be narrower than some state burglary offenses. A prior state conviction does not qualify as burglary under ACCA if the elements of the state statute are broader than those of generic burglary, namely: an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.
Here, both defendants persuaded federal courts of appeals--the Sixth Circuit for Stitt and the Eighth Circuit for Sims--that their sentences were improperly enhanced because predicate burglary convictions under the laws of Tennessee and Arkansas, respectively, involved elements categorically broader than the generic burglary encompassed by ACCA. The Supreme Court consolidated the cases and granted certiorari to consider whether burglary of a nonpermanent or mobile structure that is adapted or used for overnight accommodation can qualify as “burglary” for purposes of ACCA.
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the judgment of the Sixth Circuit in Stitt and vacated the judgment of the Eighth Circuit in Sims, remanding that case for additional proceedings relating to the breadth of Arkansas’ burglary statute. In an opinion delivered by Justice Breyer, the Court held that the term “burglary” in ACCA includes burglary of a structure or vehicle that has been adapted or is customarily used for overnight accommodation.
To the discuss the case, we have Robert Leider, Associate Professor of Law at George Mason University Antonin Scalia Law School.]]>881criminal law & procedurecleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/nieves-v-bartlett-post-argumentIn 2014, Russell Bartlett was arrested by two police officers, Sergeant Nieves and Trooper Weight, during an outdoor party that was part of the annual “Arctic Man” festival held in Alaska’s Hoodoo Mountains. Bartlett, who appeared intoxicated, approached Trooper Weight, who had been speaking to a minor regarding suspected underage drinking, and loudly demanded that Weight stop. When Trooper Weight pushed Bartlett back to create space between the two men, Nieves, who had observed the contact, ran over and a struggle ensued. The officers subdued and arrested Bartlett, who was later released from detention without injury. Although the state ultimately declined to prosecute Bartlett on charges of disorderly conduct and resisting arrest, the prosecutor indicated his belief in the existence of probable cause for that arrest.
Bartlett filed suit against the officers in federal district court, claiming false arrest, excessive force, malicious prosecution, and retaliatory arrest. The district court granted summary judgment to Sergeant Nieves and Trooper Weight on qualified immunity grounds, but the U.S. Court of Appeals reversed that judgment as to the retaliatory arrest claim and remanded the case. Under circuit precedent, the Court concluded, “an individual has a right to be free from retaliatory police action, even if probable cause existed for the action.” The Supreme Court granted the officers’ subsequent petition for certiorari, however, to address whether probable cause defeats a First Amendment retaliatory-arrest claim under the civil rights statute 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
To discuss the case, we have Lisa Soronen, Executive Director of the State and Local Legal Center.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/16976999Thu, 07 Feb 2019 17:02:30 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn November 26, 2018, the Supreme Court heard argument in Nieves v. Bartlett, a case considering the merit of retaliatory arrest claims in the presence of probable cause for arrest. In 2014, Russell Bartlett was arrested by two police officers,...In 2014, Russell Bartlett was arrested by two police officers, Sergeant Nieves and Trooper Weight, during an outdoor party that was part of the annual “Arctic Man” festival held in Alaska’s Hoodoo Mountains. Bartlett, who appeared intoxicated, approached Trooper Weight, who had been speaking to a minor regarding suspected underage drinking, and loudly demanded that Weight stop. When Trooper Weight pushed Bartlett back to create space between the two men, Nieves, who had observed the contact, ran over and a struggle ensued. The officers subdued and arrested Bartlett, who was later released from detention without injury. Although the state ultimately declined to prosecute Bartlett on charges of disorderly conduct and resisting arrest, the prosecutor indicated his belief in the existence of probable cause for that arrest.
Bartlett filed suit against the officers in federal district court, claiming false arrest, excessive force, malicious prosecution, and retaliatory arrest. The district court granted summary judgment to Sergeant Nieves and Trooper Weight on qualified immunity grounds, but the U.S. Court of Appeals reversed that judgment as to the retaliatory arrest claim and remanded the case. Under circuit precedent, the Court concluded, “an individual has a right to be free from retaliatory police action, even if probable cause existed for the action.” The Supreme Court granted the officers’ subsequent petition for certiorari, however, to address whether probable cause defeats a First Amendment retaliatory-arrest claim under the civil rights statute 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
To discuss the case, we have Lisa Soronen, Executive Director of the State and Local Legal Center.]]>912federal courts,first amendment,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/nutraceutical-corp-v-lambert-post-argumeTroy Lambert bought a dietary supplement that claimed to be an aphrodisiac containing sexual performance-enhancing herbs. He thereafter brought a class action in federal district court against the drug’s manufacturer, Nutraceutical Corp., alleging violations of U.S. Food and Drug Administration requirements and various California consumer protection statutes. The district court initially certified the class action, but following reassignment of the case to a new judge and discovery raising concerns about Lambert’s classwide damages model, Nutraceutical moved to decertify the class and the district court granted the motion on February 20, 2015.
On March 2, 10 days after the class had been decertified, Lambert informed the court that he intended to file a motion for reconsideration. The district court instructed him to file the motion within 10 days, which was 20 days in total from the original class desertification. Lambert moved for reconsideration on March 12 with further evidence to support his full refund damages model. The district court denied his motion in June. Fourteen days later, Lambert filed a petition under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) for permission to appeal the district court’s orders granting decertification and denying reconsideration to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit conditionally granted the petition but instructed the parties to address whether it was timely.
Under Rule 23(f), a petition for permission to appeal must be filed with the circuit clerk “within 14 days” after the order “granting or denying class-action certification” was entered. Although Lambert’s petition came within 14 days of denial of his motion for reconsideration, it was filed months after the actual order granting decertification. The Ninth Circuit held that Lambert’s petition was nevertheless timely. Rule 23(f) is not jurisdictional, the court determined, and its deadline should equitably tolled by a timely motion for reconsideration such as Lambert’s. Reaching the merits, the Ninth Circuit then reversed and remanded, holding that the district court had abused its discretion in decertifying the class.
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, granted certiorari to address whether the Ninth Circuit erred when it held that equitable exceptions apply to mandatory claim-processing rules—such as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f)—and can excuse a party’s failure to file timely within the 14-day deadline, in conflict with the decisions of 7 other Circuit Courts of Appeals.
To the discuss the case, we have Michael Morley, Assistant Professor of Law at Florida State University College of Law.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/16737853Thu, 17 Jan 2019 15:56:28 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn November 27, 2018, the Supreme Court heard argument in Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert, a case considering whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), which imposes a 14-day deadline for appealing from a grant or denial of class-action...Troy Lambert bought a dietary supplement that claimed to be an aphrodisiac containing sexual performance-enhancing herbs. He thereafter brought a class action in federal district court against the drug’s manufacturer, Nutraceutical Corp., alleging violations of U.S. Food and Drug Administration requirements and various California consumer protection statutes. The district court initially certified the class action, but following reassignment of the case to a new judge and discovery raising concerns about Lambert’s classwide damages model, Nutraceutical moved to decertify the class and the district court granted the motion on February 20, 2015.
On March 2, 10 days after the class had been decertified, Lambert informed the court that he intended to file a motion for reconsideration. The district court instructed him to file the motion within 10 days, which was 20 days in total from the original class desertification. Lambert moved for reconsideration on March 12 with further evidence to support his full refund damages model. The district court denied his motion in June. Fourteen days later, Lambert filed a petition under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) for permission to appeal the district court’s orders granting decertification and denying reconsideration to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit conditionally granted the petition but instructed the parties to address whether it was timely.
Under Rule 23(f), a petition for permission to appeal must be filed with the circuit clerk “within 14 days” after the order “granting or denying class-action certification” was entered. Although Lambert’s petition came within 14 days of denial of his motion for reconsideration, it was filed months after the actual order granting decertification. The Ninth Circuit held that Lambert’s petition was nevertheless timely. Rule 23(f) is not jurisdictional, the court determined, and its deadline should equitably tolled by a timely motion for reconsideration such as Lambert’s. Reaching the merits, the Ninth Circuit then reversed and remanded, holding that the district court had abused its discretion in decertifying the class.
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, granted certiorari to address whether the Ninth Circuit erred when it held that equitable exceptions apply to mandatory claim-processing rules—such as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f)—and can excuse a party’s failure to file timely within the 14-day deadline, in conflict with the decisions of 7 other Circuit Courts of Appeals.
To the discuss the case, we have Michael Morley, Assistant Professor of Law at Florida State University College of Law.]]>1002federal courts,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/helsinn-healthcare-s-a-v-teva-pharmaceutIn April 2001, Helsinn entered into two agreements with MGI Pharma. Although these agreements were announced in a press release, specific information about the products, like dosing formulations, were omitted. In 2003, Helsinn filed a provisional patent application covering the product. Three patents arose from this provisional patent application prior to the enactment of the AIA; however, one patent was subject to the new provisions of the AIA.
In 2011, Teva sought FDA approval to make a generic version of the patented product. Helsinn sued Teva for patent infringement based on this ANDA filing. Teva argued that the patent was invalid because Helsinn’s agreements with MGI put the product “on sale” before the relevant date. The district court rejected Teva’s argument, concluding that the AIA had changed the meaning of “on sale” to require the invention be made public by the sale. Because the dosing information was not provided in the press release regarding the agreements, the district court concluded the agreements did not make the invention public and there was no “on sale” bar.
The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that inventions are made available to the public whenever there is a commercial offer for sale and that the sale is public even when the details of the invention are not disclosed to the public by the sale. Thus, the “on sale” bar applied to Helsinn’s patent.
The U.S. Supreme Court then granted certiorari to address whether under the AIA, an inventor’s sale of an invention to a third party that is obligated to keep the invention confidential qualifies as prior art for purposes of determining the patentability of the invention.
To the discuss the case, we have Kristen Osenga, Professor of Law at University of Richmond School of Law.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/16479380Fri, 14 Dec 2018 23:34:33 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn December 4, 2018, the Supreme Court heard argument in Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. This case arose out of a dispute over the validity of a patent covering a product used to reduce the likelihood of chemotherapy-induced...In April 2001, Helsinn entered into two agreements with MGI Pharma. Although these agreements were announced in a press release, specific information about the products, like dosing formulations, were omitted. In 2003, Helsinn filed a provisional patent application covering the product. Three patents arose from this provisional patent application prior to the enactment of the AIA; however, one patent was subject to the new provisions of the AIA.
In 2011, Teva sought FDA approval to make a generic version of the patented product. Helsinn sued Teva for patent infringement based on this ANDA filing. Teva argued that the patent was invalid because Helsinn’s agreements with MGI put the product “on sale” before the relevant date. The district court rejected Teva’s argument, concluding that the AIA had changed the meaning of “on sale” to require the invention be made public by the sale. Because the dosing information was not provided in the press release regarding the agreements, the district court concluded the agreements did not make the invention public and there was no “on sale” bar.
The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that inventions are made available to the public whenever there is a commercial offer for sale and that the sale is public even when the details of the invention are not disclosed to the public by the sale. Thus, the “on sale” bar applied to Helsinn’s patent.
The U.S. Supreme Court then granted certiorari to address whether under the AIA, an inventor’s sale of an invention to a third party that is obligated to keep the invention confidential qualifies as prior art for purposes of determining the patentability of the invention.
To the discuss the case, we have Kristen Osenga, Professor of Law at University of Richmond School of Law.]]>935federal courts,intellectual property,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/timbs-v-indiana-post-argument-scotuscastIn May 2013, Tyson Timbs was apprehended en route to a controlled drug purchase, having previously purchased about $400 worth of heroin from undercover police officers. He ultimately pled guilty to felony counts of drug dealing and conspiracy to commit theft, and was sentenced to six years of imprisonment (with five suspended to probation). Timbs also had to pay roughly $1,200 in police costs and related fees. The State of Indiana then sought forfeiture of Timbs’ Land Rover, which he had used $42,000 of his late father’s life insurance proceeds to purchase, but had driven to buy and transport heroin. Lower courts ordered the vehicle released to Timbs, concluding that forfeiture of the Land Rover would impose an excessive fine in violation of the U.S. Constitution’s Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Court of Indiana, however, reinstated the forfeiture on the grounds that the U.S. Supreme Court had never incorporated the excessive fine clause against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment.
The U.S. Supreme Court thereafter granted certiorari to address that issue: whether the Eighth Amendment’s excessive fines clause is incorporated against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.
To the discuss the case, we have Christopher Green, Associate Professor of Law and H.L.A. Hart Scholar in Law and Philosophy at University of Mississippi School of Law.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/16455552Wed, 12 Dec 2018 21:57:14 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn November 28, 2018, the Supreme Court heard argument in Timbs v. Indiana, a case involving the Eighth Amendment’s excessive fines clause, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the concept of “incorporation” against the states. In May...In May 2013, Tyson Timbs was apprehended en route to a controlled drug purchase, having previously purchased about $400 worth of heroin from undercover police officers. He ultimately pled guilty to felony counts of drug dealing and conspiracy to commit theft, and was sentenced to six years of imprisonment (with five suspended to probation). Timbs also had to pay roughly $1,200 in police costs and related fees. The State of Indiana then sought forfeiture of Timbs’ Land Rover, which he had used $42,000 of his late father’s life insurance proceeds to purchase, but had driven to buy and transport heroin. Lower courts ordered the vehicle released to Timbs, concluding that forfeiture of the Land Rover would impose an excessive fine in violation of the U.S. Constitution’s Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Court of Indiana, however, reinstated the forfeiture on the grounds that the U.S. Supreme Court had never incorporated the excessive fine clause against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment.
The U.S. Supreme Court thereafter granted certiorari to address that issue: whether the Eighth Amendment’s excessive fines clause is incorporated against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.
To the discuss the case, we have Christopher Green, Associate Professor of Law and H.L.A. Hart Scholar in Law and Philosophy at University of Mississippi School of Law.]]>787criminal law & procedure,fourteenth amendment,property law,state courts,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/stokeling-v-united-states-united-states-ACCA imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum prison sentence on any federal firearms offender who has three or more convictions for a “violent” felony or serious drug offense. In determining whether any given predicate felony conviction qualifies as “violent,” federal courts apply a “categorical” approach that looks only to the elements of the predicate offense and not the underlying facts. If the elements include “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another,” the conviction qualifies as a violent felony.
In Stokeling v. United States, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that Stokeling’s Florida conviction for “robbery by sudden snatching” categorically qualified as a violent felony. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether that analysis holds when the state offense includes as an element the common law requirement of overcoming “victim resistance,” and state appellate courts have required only slight force to satisfy that element.
In United States v. Stitt, consolidated with United States v. Sims, both defendants persuaded federal courts of appeals--the Sixth Circuit for Stitt and the Eighth Circuit for Sims--that their sentences were improperly enhanced because predicate burglary convictions under the laws of Tennessee and Arkansas, respectively, involved elements categorically broader than the generic burglary encompassed by ACCA. ACCA deems burglary a violent felony, but takes a generic view of burglary that may be narrower than some state burglary laws. The Supreme Court consolidated the two cases and granted certiorari to consider whether burglary of a nonpermanent or mobile structure that is adapted or used for overnight accommodation can qualify as “burglary” for purposes of ACCA.
To the discuss the case, we have Luke Milligan, Professor of Law at the University of Louisville Brandeis School of Law.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/16397119Thu, 06 Dec 2018 00:01:59 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn October 9, 2018, the Supreme Court heard arguments in Stokeling v. United States and the consolidated cases United States v. Stitt and United States v. Sims, all disputes that involve the federal Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). ACCA imposes a...ACCA imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum prison sentence on any federal firearms offender who has three or more convictions for a “violent” felony or serious drug offense. In determining whether any given predicate felony conviction qualifies as “violent,” federal courts apply a “categorical” approach that looks only to the elements of the predicate offense and not the underlying facts. If the elements include “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another,” the conviction qualifies as a violent felony.
In Stokeling v. United States, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that Stokeling’s Florida conviction for “robbery by sudden snatching” categorically qualified as a violent felony. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether that analysis holds when the state offense includes as an element the common law requirement of overcoming “victim resistance,” and state appellate courts have required only slight force to satisfy that element.
In United States v. Stitt, consolidated with United States v. Sims, both defendants persuaded federal courts of appeals--the Sixth Circuit for Stitt and the Eighth Circuit for Sims--that their sentences were improperly enhanced because predicate burglary convictions under the laws of Tennessee and Arkansas, respectively, involved elements categorically broader than the generic burglary encompassed by ACCA. ACCA deems burglary a violent felony, but takes a generic view of burglary that may be narrower than some state burglary laws. The Supreme Court consolidated the two cases and granted certiorari to consider whether burglary of a nonpermanent or mobile structure that is adapted or used for overnight accommodation can qualify as “burglary” for purposes of ACCA.
To the discuss the case, we have Luke Milligan, Professor of Law at the University of Louisville Brandeis School of Law.]]>1082criminal law & procedure,federal courts,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/jam-v-international-finance-corporationThe International Finance Group (IFC) is an international organization which provides loans to projects in developing countries that do not have the necessary private capital for projects. Under the International Organizations Immunities Act (IOIA), the IFC is an organization designated to “enjoy the same immunity from suit … as is enjoyed by foreign governments, except to the extent that such organizations may expressly waive their immunity for the purpose of any proceedings or by the terms of any contract.” The IFC funded the construction of the Tata Mundra Power Plant in Gujarat, India, with a proviso that the plant had to follow an Environmental and Social Action Plan to protect the surrounding community; failure to follow the Plan would result in a loss of financial support. The power plant did not follow the Plan, but the IFC did not revoke funding. Members of the surrounding community sued the IFC in district court, claiming that the IFC is responsible for their injuries because it continued funding the project despite the plant’s clear failure to follow the Environmental and Social Action Plan. The district court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the IFC was immune from suit. The petitioners appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit, which agreed with the district court.
The US Supreme Court then granted certiorari to address whether the International Organizations Immunities Act—which affords international organizations the “same immunity” from suit that foreign governments have, 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b)—confers the same immunity on such organizations as foreign governments have under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11.
To the discuss the case, we have Mike Ramsey, Professor of Law at University of San Diego School of Law.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/16331530Wed, 28 Nov 2018 16:15:08 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn October 31, 2018, the Supreme Court heard argument in Jam v. International Finance Corporation, a case involving the scope of the International Organizations Immunities Act. The International Finance Group (IFC) is an international organization...The International Finance Group (IFC) is an international organization which provides loans to projects in developing countries that do not have the necessary private capital for projects. Under the International Organizations Immunities Act (IOIA), the IFC is an organization designated to “enjoy the same immunity from suit … as is enjoyed by foreign governments, except to the extent that such organizations may expressly waive their immunity for the purpose of any proceedings or by the terms of any contract.” The IFC funded the construction of the Tata Mundra Power Plant in Gujarat, India, with a proviso that the plant had to follow an Environmental and Social Action Plan to protect the surrounding community; failure to follow the Plan would result in a loss of financial support. The power plant did not follow the Plan, but the IFC did not revoke funding. Members of the surrounding community sued the IFC in district court, claiming that the IFC is responsible for their injuries because it continued funding the project despite the plant’s clear failure to follow the Environmental and Social Action Plan. The district court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the IFC was immune from suit. The petitioners appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit, which agreed with the district court.
The US Supreme Court then granted certiorari to address whether the International Organizations Immunities Act—which affords international organizations the “same immunity” from suit that foreign governments have, 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b)—confers the same immunity on such organizations as foreign governments have under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11.
To the discuss the case, we have Mike Ramsey, Professor of Law at University of San Diego School of Law.]]>546federal courts,international law & trade,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/nielsen-v-preap-post-argument-scotuscastAs codified, § 1226(c) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act (“INA”) provides for the mandatory detention of criminal aliens “when [they are] released” from criminal custody, and for the holding of these aliens without bond. The three plaintiffs in this case are lawful permanent residents who have committed crimes that could lead to their removal from the United States but after serving their criminal sentence were released and returned to their families and communities in the United States; however, years later, each was arrested by immigration authorities and detained without bond hearings under § 1226(c). The plaintiffs filed a class action petition for habeas relief in district court arguing that since they were not detained “when...released” from criminal custody, they are not subject to mandatory detention under § 1226(c). The district court granted their motion for class certification, issued a preliminary injunction requiring the government to provide all class members with bond hearings under § 1226(a), and concluded that under § 1226(c) aliens can be held without bound only if taken into immigration custody immediately upon release from criminal custody, not if there is a lengthy gap after their release. The government appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the statute “does not suggest that immigration officials lose authority if they delay.” The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s class certification order and preliminary injunction, and held that the mandatory detention provision of § 1226(c) applies only to those criminal aliens detained promptly after their release from criminal custody, not to those detained long after.
The US Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether a criminal alien becomes exempt from mandatory detention under § 1226(c) if, after the alien is released from criminal custody, the Department of Homeland Security does not take him into immigration custody immediately.
To the discuss the case, we have Kent Scheidegger, Legal Director & General Counsel, Criminal Justice Legal Foundation.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no position on particular legal or public policy issues. All opinions are those of the speaker.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/15984961Wed, 17 Oct 2018 14:48:11 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn October 10, 2018, the Supreme Court heard argument in Nielsen v. Preap, a case involving the exemption of a criminal alien from mandatory detention without bond due to a delay in arrest after release from criminal custody. As codified, §...As codified, § 1226(c) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act (“INA”) provides for the mandatory detention of criminal aliens “when [they are] released” from criminal custody, and for the holding of these aliens without bond. The three plaintiffs in this case are lawful permanent residents who have committed crimes that could lead to their removal from the United States but after serving their criminal sentence were released and returned to their families and communities in the United States; however, years later, each was arrested by immigration authorities and detained without bond hearings under § 1226(c). The plaintiffs filed a class action petition for habeas relief in district court arguing that since they were not detained “when...released” from criminal custody, they are not subject to mandatory detention under § 1226(c). The district court granted their motion for class certification, issued a preliminary injunction requiring the government to provide all class members with bond hearings under § 1226(a), and concluded that under § 1226(c) aliens can be held without bound only if taken into immigration custody immediately upon release from criminal custody, not if there is a lengthy gap after their release. The government appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the statute “does not suggest that immigration officials lose authority if they delay.” The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s class certification order and preliminary injunction, and held that the mandatory detention provision of § 1226(c) applies only to those criminal aliens detained promptly after their release from criminal custody, not to those detained long after.
The US Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether a criminal alien becomes exempt from mandatory detention under § 1226(c) if, after the alien is released from criminal custody, the Department of Homeland Security does not take him into immigration custody immediately.
To the discuss the case, we have Kent Scheidegger, Legal Director & General Counsel, Criminal Justice Legal Foundation.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no position on particular legal or public policy issues. All opinions are those of the speaker.]]>838criminal law & procedure,federal courts,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/janus-v-american-federation-of-state-couUnder Illinois law, public employees are permitted to unionize; and if a majority of employees in a particular bargaining union vote to unionize, then that union is designated as the exclusive representative of all the employees in collective bargaining, even those members who choose not to join the union. Non-members are required to pay an “agency fee,” which is a percentage of the full union dues and covers union expenses “germane” to the union’s collective bargaining activities, but cannot cover any political or ideological projects sponsored by the union. Mark Janus works at the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services. The employees in his unit are represented by American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31 (“the union”). Janus did not join the union because he opposes many of its positions, including those taken in collective bargaining, but was required to pay 78.06% of full union dues as an “agency fee”--a fee resulting in a payment of $44.58 per month, and about $535 per year.
Janus and two other state employees joined a lawsuit brought by the Governor of Illinois against the union in federal district court, seeking a declaration that the statutory imposition of agency fees was unconstitutional. The District Court dismissed the Governor for lack of standing, but proceeded to reject the claims of Janus and the other employees on the merits, finding their challenge foreclosed by the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, but the Supreme Court granted certiorari to reconsider whether public-sector agency-fee arrangements are constitutional.
By a vote of 5-4, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Seventh Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Alito, the Court overruled Abood and held that state extraction of agency fees from nonconsenting public-sector employees violates the First Amendment; thus states and public-sector unions may no longer extract agency fees from nonconsenting employees.
Justice Alito’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Gorsuch. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Kagan also filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor.
To discuss the case, we have Raymond LaJeunesse, Vice President & Legal Director, National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/15701464Wed, 12 Sep 2018 17:20:50 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 27, 2018, the Supreme Court decided Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, a case considering the forced subsidizing of unions by public employees, even if they choose not to join the union or...Under Illinois law, public employees are permitted to unionize; and if a majority of employees in a particular bargaining union vote to unionize, then that union is designated as the exclusive representative of all the employees in collective bargaining, even those members who choose not to join the union. Non-members are required to pay an “agency fee,” which is a percentage of the full union dues and covers union expenses “germane” to the union’s collective bargaining activities, but cannot cover any political or ideological projects sponsored by the union. Mark Janus works at the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services. The employees in his unit are represented by American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31 (“the union”). Janus did not join the union because he opposes many of its positions, including those taken in collective bargaining, but was required to pay 78.06% of full union dues as an “agency fee”--a fee resulting in a payment of $44.58 per month, and about $535 per year.
Janus and two other state employees joined a lawsuit brought by the Governor of Illinois against the union in federal district court, seeking a declaration that the statutory imposition of agency fees was unconstitutional. The District Court dismissed the Governor for lack of standing, but proceeded to reject the claims of Janus and the other employees on the merits, finding their challenge foreclosed by the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, but the Supreme Court granted certiorari to reconsider whether public-sector agency-fee arrangements are constitutional.
By a vote of 5-4, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Seventh Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Alito, the Court overruled Abood and held that state extraction of agency fees from nonconsenting public-sector employees violates the First Amendment; thus states and public-sector unions may no longer extract agency fees from nonconsenting employees.
Justice Alito’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Gorsuch. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Kagan also filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor.
To discuss the case, we have Raymond LaJeunesse, Vice President & Legal Director, National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation.]]>1380first amendment,labor & employment law,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/lozman-v-city-of-riviera-beach-fl-post-dFane Lozman moved to Riviera Beach, FL in 2006, where he lived on a floating home in the Riviera Beach Marina--a part of the city designated for redevelopment under the City’s new redevelopment plan that would use eminent domain to revitalize the waterfront. After hearing news of the plan, Lozman became an “outspoken critic,” and filed suit against the City in June 2006 after a special City Council emergency meeting to push through the redevelopment plan before the Governor of Florida signed a bill into law that would prohibit the use of eminent domain for private development.
Later at a public City Council meeting in November 2006, Lozman began to discuss the arrest of a former county official during the public comments portion of the meeting. He was interrupted by a member of the City Council, who, after exchanging words with Lozman, called a city police officer to dismiss Lozman from the podium. Lozman refused to leave the podium without finishing his comments, the police officer warned him that he would be arrested if he did not comply, and, upon the continuance of his comments, Lozman was arrested for disorderly conduct and resisting arrest without violence (charges later dismissed). In 2008, Lozman filed suit in federal district court against the City of Riviera Beach, claiming that his arrest had constituted unlawful retaliation by the City due to Lozman’s earlier opposition to the redevelopment plan. The jury found that the arrest had been supported by probable cause, which the District Court concluded must defeat Lozman’s First Amendment claim of retaliatory arrest. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that judgment, but the Supreme Court then granted certiorari to address whether the existence of probable cause defeats a First Amendment claim for retaliatory arrest.
By a vote of 8-1, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Kennedy, the Court held that the existence of probable cause for Lozman’s arrest for disrupting a city council meeting did not bar his First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim under the circumstances of this case.
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion.
To discuss the case, we have Lisa Soronen, Executive Director of the State & Local Legal Center.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/15533183Mon, 20 Aug 2018 18:59:36 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 18, 2018, the Supreme Court decided Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, FL, a case involving a claim of retaliatory arrest in violation of the First Amendment. Fane Lozman moved to Riviera Beach, FL in 2006, where he lived on a floating home in...Fane Lozman moved to Riviera Beach, FL in 2006, where he lived on a floating home in the Riviera Beach Marina--a part of the city designated for redevelopment under the City’s new redevelopment plan that would use eminent domain to revitalize the waterfront. After hearing news of the plan, Lozman became an “outspoken critic,” and filed suit against the City in June 2006 after a special City Council emergency meeting to push through the redevelopment plan before the Governor of Florida signed a bill into law that would prohibit the use of eminent domain for private development.
Later at a public City Council meeting in November 2006, Lozman began to discuss the arrest of a former county official during the public comments portion of the meeting. He was interrupted by a member of the City Council, who, after exchanging words with Lozman, called a city police officer to dismiss Lozman from the podium. Lozman refused to leave the podium without finishing his comments, the police officer warned him that he would be arrested if he did not comply, and, upon the continuance of his comments, Lozman was arrested for disorderly conduct and resisting arrest without violence (charges later dismissed). In 2008, Lozman filed suit in federal district court against the City of Riviera Beach, claiming that his arrest had constituted unlawful retaliation by the City due to Lozman’s earlier opposition to the redevelopment plan. The jury found that the arrest had been supported by probable cause, which the District Court concluded must defeat Lozman’s First Amendment claim of retaliatory arrest. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that judgment, but the Supreme Court then granted certiorari to address whether the existence of probable cause defeats a First Amendment claim for retaliatory arrest.
By a vote of 8-1, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Kennedy, the Court held that the existence of probable cause for Lozman’s arrest for disrupting a city council meeting did not bar his First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim under the circumstances of this case.
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion.
To discuss the case, we have Lisa Soronen, Executive Director of the State & Local Legal Center.]]>1046federal courts,first amendment,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/washington-v-united-states-post-decisionThe 1854-1855 Stevens Treaties were a series of treaties between several Native American Tribes and the State of Washington. As part of these treaties, the Tribes relinquished land, watersheds, and offshore waters adjacent to a particular area, “Case Area,” in exchange for guaranteed off-reservation fishing rights. In 2001, twenty-one tribes and the United States complained in federal district court that the State had been building and maintaining culverts that impeded the transit of mature and juvenile salmon between the sea and their spawning grounds. In 2007, the district court issued an injunction requiring the State to correct these culverts, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address (1) whether a treaty “right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations ... in common with all citizens” guaranteed “that the number of fish would always be sufficient to provide a ‘moderate living’ to the tribes”; (2) whether the district court erred in dismissing the state's equitable defenses against the federal government where the federal government signed these treaties in the 1850s, for decades told the state to design culverts a particular way, and then filed suit in 2001 claiming that the culvert design it provided violates the treaties it signed; and (3) whether the district court’s injunction violates federalism and comity principles by requiring Washington to replace hundreds of culverts, at a cost of several billion dollars, when many of the replacements will have no impact on salmon, and plaintiffs showed no clear connection between culvert replacement and tribal fisheries.
In a per curiam opinion, an equally divided Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit.
To discuss the case, we have Lance Sorenson, Olin-Darling Fellow in Constitutional Law at Stanford Law School.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/15383414Mon, 30 Jul 2018 19:32:20 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 11, 2018, the Supreme Court decided Washington v. United States, a case considering off-reservation fishing rights of multiple Native American Tribes in the State of Washington. The 1854-1855 Stevens Treaties were a series of treaties...The 1854-1855 Stevens Treaties were a series of treaties between several Native American Tribes and the State of Washington. As part of these treaties, the Tribes relinquished land, watersheds, and offshore waters adjacent to a particular area, “Case Area,” in exchange for guaranteed off-reservation fishing rights. In 2001, twenty-one tribes and the United States complained in federal district court that the State had been building and maintaining culverts that impeded the transit of mature and juvenile salmon between the sea and their spawning grounds. In 2007, the district court issued an injunction requiring the State to correct these culverts, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address (1) whether a treaty “right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations ... in common with all citizens” guaranteed “that the number of fish would always be sufficient to provide a ‘moderate living’ to the tribes”; (2) whether the district court erred in dismissing the state's equitable defenses against the federal government where the federal government signed these treaties in the 1850s, for decades told the state to design culverts a particular way, and then filed suit in 2001 claiming that the culvert design it provided violates the treaties it signed; and (3) whether the district court’s injunction violates federalism and comity principles by requiring Washington to replace hundreds of culverts, at a cost of several billion dollars, when many of the replacements will have no impact on salmon, and plaintiffs showed no clear connection between culvert replacement and tribal fisheries.
In a per curiam opinion, an equally divided Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit.
To discuss the case, we have Lance Sorenson, Olin-Darling Fellow in Constitutional Law at Stanford Law School.]]>640federal courts,state governments,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/gill-v-whitford-post-decision-scotuscastIn Wisconsin’s 2010 elections, Republicans won the governorship and acquired control of the state senate. In 2011, pursuant to the state constitution’s requirement that the legislature must redraw the boundaries of its districts following each census, the Wisconsin legislature adopted a redistricting plan, Act 43, for state legislative districts. With Act 43 in effect Republicans expanded their legislative control in subsequent elections, reportedly winning 60 of 99 seats in the State Assembly with 48.6% of the statewide two-party vote in 2012, and 63 of 99 seats with 52% of the statewide two-party vote in 2014. In 2015 twelve Wisconsin voters sued in federal court, alleging that Act 43 constituted a statewide partisan gerrymander in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Defendants’ motions to dismiss and for summary judgment were denied, and following trial a divided three-judge district court panel invalidated Act 43 statewide. Act 43, the majority concluded, impermissibly burdened the representational rights of Democratic voters by impeding their ability to translate their votes into legislative seats even when Republicans were in an electoral minority. The court enjoined further use of Act 43 and ordered that a remedial redistricting plan be enacted, but the United States Supreme Court stayed that judgment pending resolution of this appeal.
By a vote of 9-0, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded the case for a new trial. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court held that the plaintiffs--Wisconsin Democratic voters who rested their claim of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering on statewide injury--had failed to demonstrate Article III standing.
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the court, in which Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined. Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined except as to Part III. Justice Kagan filed a concurring opinion in which Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor joined. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, which was joined by Justice Gorsuch.
To discuss the case, we have David Casazza, Associate at Gibson Dunn.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/15289890Thu, 19 Jul 2018 19:40:51 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 18, 2018, the Supreme Court decided Gill v. Whitford, a case considering claims of partisan gerrymandering. In Wisconsin’s 2010 elections, Republicans won the governorship and acquired control of the state senate. In 2011, pursuant to...In Wisconsin’s 2010 elections, Republicans won the governorship and acquired control of the state senate. In 2011, pursuant to the state constitution’s requirement that the legislature must redraw the boundaries of its districts following each census, the Wisconsin legislature adopted a redistricting plan, Act 43, for state legislative districts. With Act 43 in effect Republicans expanded their legislative control in subsequent elections, reportedly winning 60 of 99 seats in the State Assembly with 48.6% of the statewide two-party vote in 2012, and 63 of 99 seats with 52% of the statewide two-party vote in 2014. In 2015 twelve Wisconsin voters sued in federal court, alleging that Act 43 constituted a statewide partisan gerrymander in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Defendants’ motions to dismiss and for summary judgment were denied, and following trial a divided three-judge district court panel invalidated Act 43 statewide. Act 43, the majority concluded, impermissibly burdened the representational rights of Democratic voters by impeding their ability to translate their votes into legislative seats even when Republicans were in an electoral minority. The court enjoined further use of Act 43 and ordered that a remedial redistricting plan be enacted, but the United States Supreme Court stayed that judgment pending resolution of this appeal.
By a vote of 9-0, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded the case for a new trial. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court held that the plaintiffs--Wisconsin Democratic voters who rested their claim of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering on statewide injury--had failed to demonstrate Article III standing.
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the court, in which Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined. Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined except as to Part III. Justice Kagan filed a concurring opinion in which Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor joined. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, which was joined by Justice Gorsuch.
To discuss the case, we have David Casazza, Associate at Gibson Dunn.]]>1137election law,first amendment,fourteenth amendment,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/mccoy-v-louisiana-post-decision-scotuscaIn 2008, Robert McCoy was indicted on three counts of first-degree murder for the deaths of the mother, stepfather, and son of his estranged wife. McCoy pleaded not guilty, maintaining that he was out of state at the time of the murder. In 2010, his relationship with the court-appointed public defender broke down, and in March 2010 Larry English became McCoy’s defense attorney. English concluded that the evidence against McCoy was overwhelming and told McCoy that he would concede McCoy’s guilt in an effort to avoid the death penalty; McCoy adamantly opposed English’s strategy. At trial, English nevertheless indicated repeatedly to the jury that McCoy had caused the victims’ deaths and pleaded for mercy. McCoy protested unsuccessfully to the trial judge and was permitted to testify to his innocence, but was ultimately convicted and sentenced to death. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that defense counsel had authority to concede guilt over McCoy’s objection as a strategy to avoid a death sentence. In light of a division of opinion among state courts of last resort on whether it is unconstitutional to allow defense counsel to concede guilt over the defendant’s intransigent and unambiguous objection, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.
By a vote of 6-3, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Louisiana Supreme Court and remanded the case for a new trial. In an opinion delivered by Justice Ginsburg, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to choose the fundamental objective of his defense and insist that counsel refrain from admitting guilt, even when counsel’s experience-based view is that confessing guilt offers the defendant the best chance to avoid the death penalty.
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court, which was joined by the Chief Justice, and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Thomas and Gorsuch.
To discuss the case, we have Jay Schweikert, Policy Analyst with the Cato Institute’s Project on Criminal Justice.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/15093465Wed, 20 Jun 2018 17:56:17 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn May 14, 2018, the Supreme Court decided McCoy v. Louisiana, a case considering whether defense counsel may--against the defendant’s express wishes--concede his client’s guilt in an effort to avoid the death penalty. In 2008, Robert...In 2008, Robert McCoy was indicted on three counts of first-degree murder for the deaths of the mother, stepfather, and son of his estranged wife. McCoy pleaded not guilty, maintaining that he was out of state at the time of the murder. In 2010, his relationship with the court-appointed public defender broke down, and in March 2010 Larry English became McCoy’s defense attorney. English concluded that the evidence against McCoy was overwhelming and told McCoy that he would concede McCoy’s guilt in an effort to avoid the death penalty; McCoy adamantly opposed English’s strategy. At trial, English nevertheless indicated repeatedly to the jury that McCoy had caused the victims’ deaths and pleaded for mercy. McCoy protested unsuccessfully to the trial judge and was permitted to testify to his innocence, but was ultimately convicted and sentenced to death. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that defense counsel had authority to concede guilt over McCoy’s objection as a strategy to avoid a death sentence. In light of a division of opinion among state courts of last resort on whether it is unconstitutional to allow defense counsel to concede guilt over the defendant’s intransigent and unambiguous objection, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.
By a vote of 6-3, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Louisiana Supreme Court and remanded the case for a new trial. In an opinion delivered by Justice Ginsburg, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to choose the fundamental objective of his defense and insist that counsel refrain from admitting guilt, even when counsel’s experience-based view is that confessing guilt offers the defendant the best chance to avoid the death penalty.
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court, which was joined by the Chief Justice, and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Thomas and Gorsuch.
To discuss the case, we have Jay Schweikert, Policy Analyst with the Cato Institute’s Project on Criminal Justice.]]>957criminal law & procedure,state courts,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/murphy-v-national-collegiate-athletic-asPASPA prohibits state-sanctioned gambling with respect to amateur and professional sporting events. Among other things, the statute allows sports leagues whose events are the subject of betting schemes to bring an action to enjoin any gambling. PASPA did except certain states from its prohibitions, including New Jersey--but only if New Jersey established its sports gambling scheme within one year of PASPA’s enactment. New Jersey did not do so, and in fact prohibited sports gambling until a 2011 referendum amended the state constitution to allow it.
Thereafter, New Jersey enacted the 2012 Sports Wagering Act, which created a government-regulated sports betting scheme. Invoking PASPA, five sports leagues sued to enjoin the 2012 law. New Jersey countered that PASPA was unconstitutional under the federal anti-commandeering doctrine. The District Court deemed PASPA constitutional and enjoined implementation of the wagering law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari.
In 2014, New Jersey enacted a new gambling law which repealed certain restrictions on “the placements and acceptance of wagers” on sporting events so long as those events did not involve New Jersey collegiate teams (or other in-state collegiate sporting events). New Jersey contended that this law was admissible under PASPA because it did not actively authorize sports-betting. Once again sports leagues sued to enjoin the law as a violation of PASPA, and prevailed in federal district court. The Third Circuit, sitting en banc, again affirmed, holding that PASPA did not commandeer New Jersey in a way that ran afoul of the federal Constitution. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether a federal statute that prohibits modification or repeal of state-law prohibitions on private conduct impermissibly commandeers the regulatory power of the states.
By a vote of 6-3, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Third Circuit. In an opinion delivered by Justice Alito, the Court held that the provisions of PAPSA that prohibit state authorization and licensing of sports gambling schemes violate the Constitution’s anticommandeering rule, and cannot be severed from the remainder of the statute, which collapses as a result.
Justice Alito’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Kagan, and Gorsuch. Justice Breyer joined to all except as to Part VI-B. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Breyer filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined, and in which Justice Breyer joined in part.
To discuss the case, we have Elbert Lin, Partner at Hunton & Williams, LLP.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/15039809Wed, 13 Jun 2018 12:14:10 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn May 14, 2018, the Supreme Court decided Murphy v. NCAA, a case involving a conflict between state-authorized sports gambling and a federal statute: the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992 (PASPA). PASPA prohibits...PASPA prohibits state-sanctioned gambling with respect to amateur and professional sporting events. Among other things, the statute allows sports leagues whose events are the subject of betting schemes to bring an action to enjoin any gambling. PASPA did except certain states from its prohibitions, including New Jersey--but only if New Jersey established its sports gambling scheme within one year of PASPA’s enactment. New Jersey did not do so, and in fact prohibited sports gambling until a 2011 referendum amended the state constitution to allow it.
Thereafter, New Jersey enacted the 2012 Sports Wagering Act, which created a government-regulated sports betting scheme. Invoking PASPA, five sports leagues sued to enjoin the 2012 law. New Jersey countered that PASPA was unconstitutional under the federal anti-commandeering doctrine. The District Court deemed PASPA constitutional and enjoined implementation of the wagering law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari.
In 2014, New Jersey enacted a new gambling law which repealed certain restrictions on “the placements and acceptance of wagers” on sporting events so long as those events did not involve New Jersey collegiate teams (or other in-state collegiate sporting events). New Jersey contended that this law was admissible under PASPA because it did not actively authorize sports-betting. Once again sports leagues sued to enjoin the law as a violation of PASPA, and prevailed in federal district court. The Third Circuit, sitting en banc, again affirmed, holding that PASPA did not commandeer New Jersey in a way that ran afoul of the federal Constitution. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether a federal statute that prohibits modification or repeal of state-law prohibitions on private conduct impermissibly commandeers the regulatory power of the states.
By a vote of 6-3, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Third Circuit. In an opinion delivered by Justice Alito, the Court held that the provisions of PAPSA that prohibit state authorization and licensing of sports gambling schemes violate the Constitution’s anticommandeering rule, and cannot be severed from the remainder of the statute, which collapses as a result.
Justice Alito’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Kagan, and Gorsuch. Justice Breyer joined to all except as to Part VI-B. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Breyer filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined, and in which Justice Breyer joined in part.
To discuss the case, we have Elbert Lin, Partner at Hunton & Williams, LLP.]]>1559federal courts,federalism,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/jesner-v-arab-bank-plc-post-decision-scoBetween 2004 and 2010, survivors of several terrorist attacks in the Middle East (or family members or estate representatives of the victims) filed lawsuits in federal district court in New York against Arab Bank, PLC, an international bank headquartered in Jordan. Plaintiffs alleged that Arab Bank had financed and facilitated the attacks in question, and they sought redress under, among other laws, the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). The district court ultimately dismissed those ATS claims based on the 2010 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (“Kiobel I”) which concluded that ATS claims could not be brought against corporations, because the law of nations did not recognize corporate liability. The U.S. Supreme Court later affirmed the judgment in Kiobel (“Kiobel II”) but on a different basis: the presumption against extraterritorial application of statutes.
In Jesner, the Second Circuit, invoking its precedent in Kiobel I--and finding nothing to the contrary in the Supreme Court’s Kiobel II decision--affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ ATS claims on the grounds that the ATS does not apply to alleged international law violations by a corporation. This sharpened a split among the circuit courts of appeals on the issue, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the dispute.
By a vote of 5-4, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Second Circuit. In an opinion delivered by Justice Kennedy, the Court held that foreign corporations may not be defendants in suits brought under the Alien Tort Statute.
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II-B-I, and II-C, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch--and an opinion with respect to Parts II-A, II-B-2, II-B-3, and III, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justices Alito and Gorsuch also filed opinions concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan.
To discuss the case, we have Eugene Kontorovich, Professor of Law at Northwestern School of Law.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/14968183Mon, 04 Jun 2018 18:46:29 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn April 24, 2018, the Supreme Court decided Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, a case considering whether corporations may be sued under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). Between 2004 and 2010, survivors of several terrorist attacks in the Middle East (or family...Between 2004 and 2010, survivors of several terrorist attacks in the Middle East (or family members or estate representatives of the victims) filed lawsuits in federal district court in New York against Arab Bank, PLC, an international bank headquartered in Jordan. Plaintiffs alleged that Arab Bank had financed and facilitated the attacks in question, and they sought redress under, among other laws, the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). The district court ultimately dismissed those ATS claims based on the 2010 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (“Kiobel I”) which concluded that ATS claims could not be brought against corporations, because the law of nations did not recognize corporate liability. The U.S. Supreme Court later affirmed the judgment in Kiobel (“Kiobel II”) but on a different basis: the presumption against extraterritorial application of statutes.
In Jesner, the Second Circuit, invoking its precedent in Kiobel I--and finding nothing to the contrary in the Supreme Court’s Kiobel II decision--affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ ATS claims on the grounds that the ATS does not apply to alleged international law violations by a corporation. This sharpened a split among the circuit courts of appeals on the issue, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the dispute.
By a vote of 5-4, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Second Circuit. In an opinion delivered by Justice Kennedy, the Court held that foreign corporations may not be defendants in suits brought under the Alien Tort Statute.
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II-B-I, and II-C, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch--and an opinion with respect to Parts II-A, II-B-2, II-B-3, and III, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justices Alito and Gorsuch also filed opinions concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan.
To discuss the case, we have Eugene Kontorovich, Professor of Law at Northwestern School of Law.]]>806federal courts,international law & trade,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/wilson-v-sellers-post-decision-scotuscas In 1996, Marion Wilson was convicted of murder and sentenced to death, and both his conviction and sentence were confirmed on direct appeal. Wilson then sought habeas relief in state superior court, claiming that his trial counsel offered ineffective assistance in investigating mitigation evidence for purposes of sentencing. The superior court denied habeas relief, concluding that any new evidence was cumulative of evidence presented at triall as well as inadmissible, and likely would not have changed the outcome. In a one-sentence order the Georgia Supreme Court summarily denied Wilson’s subsequent application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal. Wilson then filed a habeas petition in federal district court, which also denied relief. Even assuming Wilson’s counsel had been deficient, the court deferred to the state habeas court’s conclusion that these deficiencies did not ultimately cause prejudice to Wilson. On appeal a divided U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, held that--rather than “looking through” the Georgia Supreme Court’s summary denial to the reasoning of the lower state habeas court--the district court should have considered what reasons “could have supported” the state supreme court’s summary decision. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the resulting split among the circuit courts of appeals on whether federal habeas law employs a “look through” presumption.
By a vote of 6-3, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Breyer, the Court held that a federal habeas court reviewing an unexplained state-court decision on the merits should “look through” that decision to the last related state-court decision that provides a relevant rationale and presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning; the state may rebut the presumption by showing that the unexplained decision most likely relied on different grounds than the reasoned decision below.
Justice Breyer’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Thomas and Alito.
To discuss the case, we have Lee Rudofsky, Solicitor General for the State of Arkansas.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/14928112Wed, 30 May 2018 15:51:12 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn April 17, 2018, the Supreme Court decided Wilson v. Sellers, a case involving the standard federal courts should use to analyze a state appellate court’s summary denial of habeas relief when applying federal habeas law. In 1996, Marion... In 1996, Marion Wilson was convicted of murder and sentenced to death, and both his conviction and sentence were confirmed on direct appeal. Wilson then sought habeas relief in state superior court, claiming that his trial counsel offered ineffective assistance in investigating mitigation evidence for purposes of sentencing. The superior court denied habeas relief, concluding that any new evidence was cumulative of evidence presented at triall as well as inadmissible, and likely would not have changed the outcome. In a one-sentence order the Georgia Supreme Court summarily denied Wilson’s subsequent application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal. Wilson then filed a habeas petition in federal district court, which also denied relief. Even assuming Wilson’s counsel had been deficient, the court deferred to the state habeas court’s conclusion that these deficiencies did not ultimately cause prejudice to Wilson. On appeal a divided U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, held that--rather than “looking through” the Georgia Supreme Court’s summary denial to the reasoning of the lower state habeas court--the district court should have considered what reasons “could have supported” the state supreme court’s summary decision. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the resulting split among the circuit courts of appeals on whether federal habeas law employs a “look through” presumption.
By a vote of 6-3, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Breyer, the Court held that a federal habeas court reviewing an unexplained state-court decision on the merits should “look through” that decision to the last related state-court decision that provides a relevant rationale and presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning; the state may rebut the presumption by showing that the unexplained decision most likely relied on different grounds than the reasoned decision below.
Justice Breyer’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Thomas and Alito.
To discuss the case, we have Lee Rudofsky, Solicitor General for the State of Arkansas.]]>825criminal law & procedure,federal courts,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/u-s-bank-national-association-v-village- In 2011, the Village at Lakeridge (“Lakeridge”) filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, which seeks to facilitate a reorganization that allows the debtor to maintain viability while restructuring debts. At the time, Lakeridge owed millions of dollars to its owner MBP Equity Partners (“MBP”), as well as to U.S. Bank. Lakeridge’s proposed reorganization plan placed both creditors in separate classes and would have impaired their interests. U.S. Bank objected, which precluded a consensual plan, but under the Code MBP’s status as an “insider”--being the owner of Lakeridge--meant that MBP could not provide the requisite consent to force a “cramdown” of the plan over U.S. Bank’s objections. Lakeridge was therefore faced with liquidation unless MBP could transfer its claim against Lakeridge to a non-insider who would agree to the reorganization plan. Kathleen Bartlett, a member of MBP’s board, persuaded retired surgeon Robert Rabkin--with whom she was romantically involved--to purchase MBP’s multimillion-dollar claim for $5,000. Rabkin then consented to the reorganization plan. U.S. Bank again objected, arguing that the transaction was not truly at arm’s length due to the romantic relationship between Bartlett and Rabkin; Rabkin was essentially a “non-statutory” insider. The Bankruptcy Court rejected this argument, deeming Rabkin’s purchase a “speculative investment,” and noting that Rabkin and Bartlett lived separately and managed their own affairs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed that judgment, concluding that it could not reverse unless the lower court had committed a “clear error.” The Supreme Court then granted certiorari to address the proper standard of review.
By a vote of 9-0 the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit. In an opinion delivered by Justice Kagan, the Court held unanimously that the Ninth Circuit acted properly in reviewing the Bankruptcy Court’s determination of non-statutory insider status for clear error rather than undertaking de novo review.
Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion. Justice Sotomayor also filed a concurring opinion, which was joined by Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Gorsuch.
To discuss the case, we have Tom Plank, Professor of Law, at the University of Tennessee School of Law.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no position on particular legal or public policy issues; all expressions of opinion are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/14828534Fri, 18 May 2018 17:09:01 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 5, 2018, the Supreme Court decided U.S. Bank National Association v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC, a case involving how appellate courts should review a lower court’s determination that a person related in some way to a bankruptcy debtor... In 2011, the Village at Lakeridge (“Lakeridge”) filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, which seeks to facilitate a reorganization that allows the debtor to maintain viability while restructuring debts. At the time, Lakeridge owed millions of dollars to its owner MBP Equity Partners (“MBP”), as well as to U.S. Bank. Lakeridge’s proposed reorganization plan placed both creditors in separate classes and would have impaired their interests. U.S. Bank objected, which precluded a consensual plan, but under the Code MBP’s status as an “insider”--being the owner of Lakeridge--meant that MBP could not provide the requisite consent to force a “cramdown” of the plan over U.S. Bank’s objections. Lakeridge was therefore faced with liquidation unless MBP could transfer its claim against Lakeridge to a non-insider who would agree to the reorganization plan. Kathleen Bartlett, a member of MBP’s board, persuaded retired surgeon Robert Rabkin--with whom she was romantically involved--to purchase MBP’s multimillion-dollar claim for $5,000. Rabkin then consented to the reorganization plan. U.S. Bank again objected, arguing that the transaction was not truly at arm’s length due to the romantic relationship between Bartlett and Rabkin; Rabkin was essentially a “non-statutory” insider. The Bankruptcy Court rejected this argument, deeming Rabkin’s purchase a “speculative investment,” and noting that Rabkin and Bartlett lived separately and managed their own affairs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed that judgment, concluding that it could not reverse unless the lower court had committed a “clear error.” The Supreme Court then granted certiorari to address the proper standard of review.
By a vote of 9-0 the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit. In an opinion delivered by Justice Kagan, the Court held unanimously that the Ninth Circuit acted properly in reviewing the Bankruptcy Court’s determination of non-statutory insider status for clear error rather than undertaking de novo review.
Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion. Justice Sotomayor also filed a concurring opinion, which was joined by Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Gorsuch.
To discuss the case, we have Tom Plank, Professor of Law, at the University of Tennessee School of Law.
As always, the Federalist Society takes no position on particular legal or public policy issues; all expressions of opinion are those of the speakers.]]>875federal courts,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/jennings-v-rodriguez-post-decision-scotuAlejandro Rodriguez, a Mexican citizen and legal permanent resident of the United States, was convicted of a drug offense and vehicular theft, and ordered removed from the country. He was detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226, which generally requires detention of aliens convicted of certain criminal offenses until removal proceedings are resolved. In addition to challenging his removal order, however, Rodriguez also sought habeas relief in federal court in the form of a bond hearing to determine whether his continued detention was justified. His case was consolidated with a related case, and after a round of litigation in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, was certified as a class to address whether aliens in situations like Rodriguez, who had been detained longer than six months pursuant to an immigration detention statute, were entitled to a hearing to assess the justification for continued detention. They argued that the immigration statutes did not justify such detention in the absence of an individualized bond hearing at which the Government proves by clear and convincing evidence that the class member’s detention remains justified. The District Court granted the class injunctive relief along these lines and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, relying on the canon of constitutional avoidance. The Supreme Court thereafter granted the Government’s petition for certiorari.
This case was originally argued before the Supreme Court in November 2016, but the Court thereafter ordered supplemental briefing and the case was then reargued in October 2017. The supplemental briefing directed the parties to address whether the alleged bond hearing requirement extended to aliens detained while seeking admission to the United States, to criminal or terrorist aliens, and how the proposed standard of proof applied to the bond hearing.
By a vote of 5-3 the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion authored by Justice Alito, the Court held that the immigration provisions at issue--§§ 1225(b), 1226(a) and 1226(c) of Title 8--do not give detained aliens the right to periodic bond hearings during the course of their detention; the Ninth Circuit erred in applying the canon of constitutional avoidance to hold otherwise. That court should consider the aliens’ constitutional claims on remand, but should first reexamine whether they may continue litigating as a class.
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court except as to Part II. The Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy joined Justice Alito’s opinion in full, while Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined as to all but Part II, and Justice Sotomayor joined only as to Part III-C. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring the judgment, in which Justice Gorsuch joined except for footnote 6. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor joined. Justice Kagan was recused.
To discuss the case, we have Richard Samp, Chief Counsel of the Washington Legal Foundation.


As always, the Federalist Society takes no position on particular legal or public policy issues; all expressions of opinion are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/14734388Tue, 08 May 2018 14:32:26 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn February 27, 2018 the Supreme Court decided Jennings v. Rodriguez, a case involving a lawsuit by aliens challenging their continued detention under civil immigration statutes without the benefit of an individualized bond hearing as to the...Alejandro Rodriguez, a Mexican citizen and legal permanent resident of the United States, was convicted of a drug offense and vehicular theft, and ordered removed from the country. He was detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226, which generally requires detention of aliens convicted of certain criminal offenses until removal proceedings are resolved. In addition to challenging his removal order, however, Rodriguez also sought habeas relief in federal court in the form of a bond hearing to determine whether his continued detention was justified. His case was consolidated with a related case, and after a round of litigation in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, was certified as a class to address whether aliens in situations like Rodriguez, who had been detained longer than six months pursuant to an immigration detention statute, were entitled to a hearing to assess the justification for continued detention. They argued that the immigration statutes did not justify such detention in the absence of an individualized bond hearing at which the Government proves by clear and convincing evidence that the class member’s detention remains justified. The District Court granted the class injunctive relief along these lines and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, relying on the canon of constitutional avoidance. The Supreme Court thereafter granted the Government’s petition for certiorari.
This case was originally argued before the Supreme Court in November 2016, but the Court thereafter ordered supplemental briefing and the case was then reargued in October 2017. The supplemental briefing directed the parties to address whether the alleged bond hearing requirement extended to aliens detained while seeking admission to the United States, to criminal or terrorist aliens, and how the proposed standard of proof applied to the bond hearing.
By a vote of 5-3 the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion authored by Justice Alito, the Court held that the immigration provisions at issue--§§ 1225(b), 1226(a) and 1226(c) of Title 8--do not give detained aliens the right to periodic bond hearings during the course of their detention; the Ninth Circuit erred in applying the canon of constitutional avoidance to hold otherwise. That court should consider the aliens’ constitutional claims on remand, but should first reexamine whether they may continue litigating as a class.
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court except as to Part II. The Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy joined Justice Alito’s opinion in full, while Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined as to all but Part II, and Justice Sotomayor joined only as to Part III-C. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring the judgment, in which Justice Gorsuch joined except for footnote 6. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor joined. Justice Kagan was recused.
To discuss the case, we have Richard Samp, Chief Counsel of the Washington Legal Foundation.


As always, the Federalist Society takes no position on particular legal or public policy issues; all expressions of opinion are those of the speakers.]]>1099administrative law & regulatio,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/encino-motorcars-v-navarro-post-decisionCongress enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) in 1938 to “protect all covered workers from substandard wages and oppressive working hours,” and it requires overtime pay for employees covered under the Act who work more than 40 hours in a given week. The FLSA exempts from this requirement, however, “any salesman, partsman, or mechanic primarily engaged in selling or servicing automobiles, trucks, or farm implements, if he is employed by a nonmanufacturing establishment primarily engaged in the business of selling such vehicles or implements to ultimate purchasers….”
Hector Navarro and other service advisors filed suit against their employer Encino Motorcars, alleging that it violated the FLSA by failing to pay them overtime wages. Encino countered that as service advisors, Navarro and the other plaintiffs fell within the FLSA exemption. The district court ruled in favor of Encino, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, relying upon a 2011 regulation issued by the Department of Labor (DOL) and indicating that service advisors were not covered by the exemption. The Supreme Court, however, thereafter vacated the judgment of the Ninth Circuit, determining that the regulation at issue was procedurally defective and remanded the case for the Ninth Circuit to reconsider without “placing controlling weight” on the DOL regulation. On remand, the Ninth Circuit, using the distributive canon of statutory interpretation, held that the FLSA exemption did not encompass service advisors. The Supreme Court again granted certiorari.
By a vote of 5-4, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Thomas, the Court held that “service advisors are exempt from the overtime-pay requirement of the FLSA because they are ‘salesm[e]n...primarily engaged in...servicing automobiles.’ §213(b)(10)(A)." Justice Thomas’ majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Alito, and Gorsuch. Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan.
To discuss the case, we have Tammy McCutchen, Principal at Littler Mendelson, PC.

As always, the Federalist Society takes no position on particular legal or public policy issues; all expressions of opinion are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/14677199Tue, 01 May 2018 17:50:54 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn April 2, 2018, the Supreme Court decided Encino Motorcars v. Navarro, a case on its second trip to the high court regarding a dispute over the interpretation of the Fair Labor Standard Act’s overtime-pay requirements and whether it exempts...Congress enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) in 1938 to “protect all covered workers from substandard wages and oppressive working hours,” and it requires overtime pay for employees covered under the Act who work more than 40 hours in a given week. The FLSA exempts from this requirement, however, “any salesman, partsman, or mechanic primarily engaged in selling or servicing automobiles, trucks, or farm implements, if he is employed by a nonmanufacturing establishment primarily engaged in the business of selling such vehicles or implements to ultimate purchasers….”
Hector Navarro and other service advisors filed suit against their employer Encino Motorcars, alleging that it violated the FLSA by failing to pay them overtime wages. Encino countered that as service advisors, Navarro and the other plaintiffs fell within the FLSA exemption. The district court ruled in favor of Encino, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, relying upon a 2011 regulation issued by the Department of Labor (DOL) and indicating that service advisors were not covered by the exemption. The Supreme Court, however, thereafter vacated the judgment of the Ninth Circuit, determining that the regulation at issue was procedurally defective and remanded the case for the Ninth Circuit to reconsider without “placing controlling weight” on the DOL regulation. On remand, the Ninth Circuit, using the distributive canon of statutory interpretation, held that the FLSA exemption did not encompass service advisors. The Supreme Court again granted certiorari.
By a vote of 5-4, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Thomas, the Court held that “service advisors are exempt from the overtime-pay requirement of the FLSA because they are ‘salesm[e]n...primarily engaged in...servicing automobiles.’ §213(b)(10)(A)." Justice Thomas’ majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Alito, and Gorsuch. Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan.
To discuss the case, we have Tammy McCutchen, Principal at Littler Mendelson, PC.

As always, the Federalist Society takes no position on particular legal or public policy issues; all expressions of opinion are those of the speakers.]]>904federal courts,labor & employment law,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/westerngeco-llc-v-ion-geophysical-corporIn 2015, WesternGeco sued ION for patent infringement. The jury found in favor of WesternGeco, awarding it $93.4 million in lost profits and a reasonable royalty of $12.5 million. Because the jury also found that ION was “subjectively reckless” in its infringement, WesternGeco petitioned the court for additional damages available under applicable law for “willful” infringement, invoking the then-applicable two-part test set out in the Federal Circuit’s In re Seagate decision, which has both a subjective and an objective component. ION countered by arguing that neither component could be satisfied, and the district court agreed as to the objective component, concluding that ION’s positions had been reasonable and not objectively baseless--and therefore would not support a finding of willful infringement under Seagate.
On appeal the Federal Circuit reversed the award of lost profits, concluding that WesternGeco was not entitled to lost profits resulting from foreign uses of its patented invention. As to the issue of enhanced damages for willful infringement, however, the Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. WesternGeco then sought certiorari from the Supreme Court. After issuing its decision in Halo Electronics--which addressed the standard for enhanced damages--the Supreme Court granted the petition, vacated the Federal Circuit’s judgment, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the reasoning in Halo Electronics. The Federal Circuit in turn reinstated the part of its previous decision reversing the lost profits award, but otherwise remanded the case to the district court to consider whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to support the jury’s finding of subjective willfulness. If so, the Federal Circuit indicated, the district court must then exercise its discretion to determine whether enhanced damages were warranted.
In the meantime, WesternGeco successfully petitioned the Supreme Court to grant certiorari on whether the Federal Circuit erred in holding that lost profits arising from prohibited combinations occurring outside of the United States are categorically unavailable in cases in which patent infringement is proven under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f). That provision makes it an act of patent infringement to supply “components of a patented invention,” “from the United States,” knowing or intending that the components be combined “outside of the United States,” in a manner that “would infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the United States.”
To discuss the case, we have Stephen Yelderman, Professor of Law at Notre Dame Law School.

As always, the Federalist Society takes no position on particular legal or public policy issues; all expressions of opinion are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/14628627Wed, 25 Apr 2018 18:58:16 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn April 16, 2018, the Supreme Court heard argument in WesternGeco, LLC v. ION Geophysical Corporation, a case that the Court again took up after having remanded it to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit for reconsideration in light of...In 2015, WesternGeco sued ION for patent infringement. The jury found in favor of WesternGeco, awarding it $93.4 million in lost profits and a reasonable royalty of $12.5 million. Because the jury also found that ION was “subjectively reckless” in its infringement, WesternGeco petitioned the court for additional damages available under applicable law for “willful” infringement, invoking the then-applicable two-part test set out in the Federal Circuit’s In re Seagate decision, which has both a subjective and an objective component. ION countered by arguing that neither component could be satisfied, and the district court agreed as to the objective component, concluding that ION’s positions had been reasonable and not objectively baseless--and therefore would not support a finding of willful infringement under Seagate.
On appeal the Federal Circuit reversed the award of lost profits, concluding that WesternGeco was not entitled to lost profits resulting from foreign uses of its patented invention. As to the issue of enhanced damages for willful infringement, however, the Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. WesternGeco then sought certiorari from the Supreme Court. After issuing its decision in Halo Electronics--which addressed the standard for enhanced damages--the Supreme Court granted the petition, vacated the Federal Circuit’s judgment, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the reasoning in Halo Electronics. The Federal Circuit in turn reinstated the part of its previous decision reversing the lost profits award, but otherwise remanded the case to the district court to consider whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to support the jury’s finding of subjective willfulness. If so, the Federal Circuit indicated, the district court must then exercise its discretion to determine whether enhanced damages were warranted.
In the meantime, WesternGeco successfully petitioned the Supreme Court to grant certiorari on whether the Federal Circuit erred in holding that lost profits arising from prohibited combinations occurring outside of the United States are categorically unavailable in cases in which patent infringement is proven under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f). That provision makes it an act of patent infringement to supply “components of a patented invention,” “from the United States,” knowing or intending that the components be combined “outside of the United States,” in a manner that “would infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the United States.”
To discuss the case, we have Stephen Yelderman, Professor of Law at Notre Dame Law School.

As always, the Federalist Society takes no position on particular legal or public policy issues; all expressions of opinion are those of the speakers.]]>784federal courts,intellectual property,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/upper-skagit-indian-tribe-v-lundgrenThe Lundgren family owns land in Skagit County, Washington. A barbed wire fence with a gate runs across the southern portion of an adjacent lot, near--but not up against--the edge of the Lundgrens’ lot. Since 1947, however, the Lundgrens have treated that fence as the actual boundary line of their property, maintaining both the fence and the property along the southern side of the fence. In 2013, the Upper Skagit Indian Tribe (“Tribe”) bought the adjacent lot from the previous owner, though the Tribe only became aware of the fence when surveying the property following its purchase. In 2014, the Tribe notified the Lundgrens that the fence did not actually represent the boundary line between the two lots, and asserted ownership rights to the entire property, including any lying beyond the fence.
In 2015 the Lundgrens filed an action in state court to quiet title to the disputed strip of property along the fence, arguing that they had acquired title by adverse possession or mutual recognition and acquiescence well before the Tribe made its purchase. The Tribe countered by asserting that its sovereign immunity required dismissal of the Lundgrens’ action, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court ultimately rejected the Tribe’s argument and ruled in favor of the Lundgrens. Although the Tribe had refused joinder to the lawsuit, the court reasoned, ownership of the land could be determined without the Tribe’s participation because the court was proceeding in rem and asserting jurisdiction solely over the property, not the landowner. On direct review, a divided Supreme Court of Washington agreed and affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The United States Supreme Court, however, granted the Tribe’s subsequent petition for certiorari, to address whether a court's exercise of in rem jurisdiction overcomes the jurisdictional bar of tribal sovereign immunity when the tribe has not waived immunity and Congress has not unequivocally abrogated it.
To discuss the case, we have Tom Gede, principal in Morgan Lewis Consulting LLC and of counsel to Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP.

As always, the Federalist Society takes no position on particular legal or public policy issues; all expressions of opinion are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/14589829Fri, 20 Apr 2018 20:22:20 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 21, 2018, the Supreme Court heard argument in Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren, a case that considers whether a state court’s exercise of in rem jurisdiction can be blocked by a tribal assertion of sovereign immunity. The...The Lundgren family owns land in Skagit County, Washington. A barbed wire fence with a gate runs across the southern portion of an adjacent lot, near--but not up against--the edge of the Lundgrens’ lot. Since 1947, however, the Lundgrens have treated that fence as the actual boundary line of their property, maintaining both the fence and the property along the southern side of the fence. In 2013, the Upper Skagit Indian Tribe (“Tribe”) bought the adjacent lot from the previous owner, though the Tribe only became aware of the fence when surveying the property following its purchase. In 2014, the Tribe notified the Lundgrens that the fence did not actually represent the boundary line between the two lots, and asserted ownership rights to the entire property, including any lying beyond the fence.
In 2015 the Lundgrens filed an action in state court to quiet title to the disputed strip of property along the fence, arguing that they had acquired title by adverse possession or mutual recognition and acquiescence well before the Tribe made its purchase. The Tribe countered by asserting that its sovereign immunity required dismissal of the Lundgrens’ action, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court ultimately rejected the Tribe’s argument and ruled in favor of the Lundgrens. Although the Tribe had refused joinder to the lawsuit, the court reasoned, ownership of the land could be determined without the Tribe’s participation because the court was proceeding in rem and asserting jurisdiction solely over the property, not the landowner. On direct review, a divided Supreme Court of Washington agreed and affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The United States Supreme Court, however, granted the Tribe’s subsequent petition for certiorari, to address whether a court's exercise of in rem jurisdiction overcomes the jurisdictional bar of tribal sovereign immunity when the tribe has not waived immunity and Congress has not unequivocally abrogated it.
To discuss the case, we have Tom Gede, principal in Morgan Lewis Consulting LLC and of counsel to Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP.

As always, the Federalist Society takes no position on particular legal or public policy issues; all expressions of opinion are those of the speakers.]]>604property law,state courts,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/kisela-v-hughes-post-decision-scotuscastHughes sued Kisela in federal district court, alleging the use of excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Kisela, but the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the record, viewed in the light most favorable to Hughes, was sufficient to show that Kisela violated the Fourth Amendment. The excessive force violation, the Ninth Circuit held, was obvious--and the law was in its view clearly established under analogous circuit precedent. Kisela’s petition for rehearing en banc was denied over a seven-judge dissent, but the United States Supreme Court thereafter granted certiorari.
By a vote of 7-2, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case. In light of all the circumstances, the Court indicated in a per curiam opinion, it was “far from [] obvious” that a competent officer would have known that shooting Hughes to protect Chadwick would violate the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, the Court added, the Ninth Circuit erred in concluding that its own precedent “clearly established” that Kisela’s use of force was excessive. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justice Ginsburg.
To discuss the case, we have Robert Leider, Associate at Arnold & Porter.

As always, the Federalist Society takes no position on particular legal or public policy issues; all expressions of opinion are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/14589826Fri, 20 Apr 2018 20:21:20 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn April 2, 2018, the Supreme Court decided Kisela v. Hughes. In 2010, Andrew Kisela, a police officer in Tucson, Arizona, responded to a report of a woman hacking a tree with a kitchen knife before returning into her home. Two other police officers...Hughes sued Kisela in federal district court, alleging the use of excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Kisela, but the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the record, viewed in the light most favorable to Hughes, was sufficient to show that Kisela violated the Fourth Amendment. The excessive force violation, the Ninth Circuit held, was obvious--and the law was in its view clearly established under analogous circuit precedent. Kisela’s petition for rehearing en banc was denied over a seven-judge dissent, but the United States Supreme Court thereafter granted certiorari.
By a vote of 7-2, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case. In light of all the circumstances, the Court indicated in a per curiam opinion, it was “far from [] obvious” that a competent officer would have known that shooting Hughes to protect Chadwick would violate the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, the Court added, the Ninth Circuit erred in concluding that its own precedent “clearly established” that Kisela’s use of force was excessive. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justice Ginsburg.
To discuss the case, we have Robert Leider, Associate at Arnold & Porter.

As always, the Federalist Society takes no position on particular legal or public policy issues; all expressions of opinion are those of the speakers.]]>884federal courts,fourth amendment,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/artis-v-district-of-columbia-post-decisi In 2011, Stephanie Artis filed suit against DC in federal district court alleging unlawful termination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, along with various other claims arising under DC statutes and the common law. The district court granted DC judgment on the pleadings and dismissed Artis’s sole federal claim under Title VII in 2014. Fifty-nine days later, Artis refiled those claims in DC Superior Court. DC responded with a motion for dismissal on the grounds that the claims were time-barred based on the relevant statutes of limitations plus 1367(d). The Superior Court agreed and the DC Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment, concluding that § 1367(d) does not “stop the clock” on state statutes of limitations from the time of an unsuccessful federal filing until 30 days after dismissal, but rather merely creates a 30-day “grace period” for a claimant to refile his or her claims elsewhere.
The U.S. Supreme Court thereafter granted Artis’s petition for certiorari to resolve a split among state supreme courts regarding the proper interpretation of § 1367(d). By a vote of 5-4 the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the DC Court of Appeals and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Ginsburg, the Court rejected the “grace period” reading and held that §1367(d)’s instruction to “toll” a state limitations period means to hold it in abeyance, i.e., to stop the clock.
Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito.
To discuss the case, we have Misha Tseytlin, Solicitor General of Wisconsin.

As always, the Federalist Society takes no position on particular legal or public policy issues; all expressions of opinion are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/14514900Wed, 11 Apr 2018 17:10:42 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn January 22, 2018, the Supreme Court decided Artis v. District of Columbia, a case concerning the scope of the tolling language contained in the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d). When a federal court dismisses the... In 2011, Stephanie Artis filed suit against DC in federal district court alleging unlawful termination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, along with various other claims arising under DC statutes and the common law. The district court granted DC judgment on the pleadings and dismissed Artis’s sole federal claim under Title VII in 2014. Fifty-nine days later, Artis refiled those claims in DC Superior Court. DC responded with a motion for dismissal on the grounds that the claims were time-barred based on the relevant statutes of limitations plus 1367(d). The Superior Court agreed and the DC Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment, concluding that § 1367(d) does not “stop the clock” on state statutes of limitations from the time of an unsuccessful federal filing until 30 days after dismissal, but rather merely creates a 30-day “grace period” for a claimant to refile his or her claims elsewhere.
The U.S. Supreme Court thereafter granted Artis’s petition for certiorari to resolve a split among state supreme courts regarding the proper interpretation of § 1367(d). By a vote of 5-4 the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the DC Court of Appeals and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Ginsburg, the Court rejected the “grace period” reading and held that §1367(d)’s instruction to “toll” a state limitations period means to hold it in abeyance, i.e., to stop the clock.
Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito.
To discuss the case, we have Misha Tseytlin, Solicitor General of Wisconsin.

As always, the Federalist Society takes no position on particular legal or public policy issues; all expressions of opinion are those of the speakers.]]>669civil rights,federal courts,labor & employment law,state courts,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/minnesota-voters-alliance-v-mansky-post-Minnesota Statute § 211B.11 prohibits voters from wearing a “political badge, political button, or other political insignia… at or about the polling place on primary or election day.” State election officials indicated that “political” apparel included “issue oriented material designed to influence or impact voting” or “material promoting a group with recognizable political views.” If a person arrived at a polling place wearing a political item, the election judges were instructed to ask the individual to remove or cover the item. If the individual refused to comply he or she would still be allowed to vote, but the person’s name and address would be recorded for a potential misdemeanor prosecution.
An association of various Minnesota political groups known as Election Integrity Watch (EIW) sued the Secretary of State and county election officials in federal district court, alleging that the statute was invalid--both facially and as-applied--under the First Amendment, and violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause due to selective enforcement. Although the district court initially dismissed all claims, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed that judgment with respect to EIW’s as-applied First Amendment claim, and remanded the case. On remand, the district court again ruled against EIW, granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants. On a second appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment--but the United States Supreme Court thereafter granted certiorari to determine whether Minnesota Statute Section 211B.11 is facially overbroad under the First Amendment.
To discuss the case, we have Timothy Sandefur, Vice President for Litigation at the Goldwater Institute.

As always, the Federalist Society takes no position on particular legal or public policy issues; all expressions of opinion are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/14398765Tue, 27 Mar 2018 21:21:58 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn February 28, 2018, the Supreme Court heard argument in Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky, a case involving a Minnesota statute that broadly bans all political apparel at the polling place. Minnesota Statute § 211B.11 prohibits voters from...Minnesota Statute § 211B.11 prohibits voters from wearing a “political badge, political button, or other political insignia… at or about the polling place on primary or election day.” State election officials indicated that “political” apparel included “issue oriented material designed to influence or impact voting” or “material promoting a group with recognizable political views.” If a person arrived at a polling place wearing a political item, the election judges were instructed to ask the individual to remove or cover the item. If the individual refused to comply he or she would still be allowed to vote, but the person’s name and address would be recorded for a potential misdemeanor prosecution.
An association of various Minnesota political groups known as Election Integrity Watch (EIW) sued the Secretary of State and county election officials in federal district court, alleging that the statute was invalid--both facially and as-applied--under the First Amendment, and violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause due to selective enforcement. Although the district court initially dismissed all claims, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed that judgment with respect to EIW’s as-applied First Amendment claim, and remanded the case. On remand, the district court again ruled against EIW, granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants. On a second appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment--but the United States Supreme Court thereafter granted certiorari to determine whether Minnesota Statute Section 211B.11 is facially overbroad under the First Amendment.
To discuss the case, we have Timothy Sandefur, Vice President for Litigation at the Goldwater Institute.

As always, the Federalist Society takes no position on particular legal or public policy issues; all expressions of opinion are those of the speakers.]]>726federal courts,first amendment,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/sveen-v-melin-post-argument-scotuscastIn 2002, Minnesota amended its probate code to incorporate life insurance beneficiary designations into its revocation-upon-divorce statute. Mark Sveen purchased a life insurance policy in 1997, months before marrying Kaye Melin, who Sveen designated as the primary beneficiary on the policy. His two adult children, Ashley and Antone Sveen, were listed as contingent beneficiaries. Melin and Sveen divorced in 2007, but Sveen never removed Melin as the primary beneficiary of his life insurance policy.
Both Melin and Sveen’s adult children sought to claim the insurance proceeds. In light of Minnesota’s extension of the revocation-upon-divorce statute to life insurance policies, Sveen’s insurance company sought clarification in federal district court regarding whether Melin should still be considered the primary beneficiary. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Sveens, applying the revocation-upon-divorce statute retroactively to remove Melin as a beneficiary.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit reversed that judgment, however, reasoning that retroactive application of the statute in these circumstances would violate the Contracts clause. The Supreme Court thereafter granted certiorari to consider that core issue: whether the application of a revocation-upon-divorce statute to a contract signed before the statute’s enactment violates the contracts clause.
To discuss the case, we have Prof. James Ely, Professor of Law Emeritus at Vanderbilt University Law School.

As always, the Federalist Society takes no position on particular legal or public policy issues; all expressions of opinion are those of the speakers.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/14358063Thu, 22 Mar 2018 14:37:40 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 19, 2018, the Supreme Court heard argument in Sveen v. Melin, a case involving the relationship between Minnesota’s revocation-upon-divorce statute and the U.S. Constitution’s “Contracts clause,” which declares that no...In 2002, Minnesota amended its probate code to incorporate life insurance beneficiary designations into its revocation-upon-divorce statute. Mark Sveen purchased a life insurance policy in 1997, months before marrying Kaye Melin, who Sveen designated as the primary beneficiary on the policy. His two adult children, Ashley and Antone Sveen, were listed as contingent beneficiaries. Melin and Sveen divorced in 2007, but Sveen never removed Melin as the primary beneficiary of his life insurance policy.
Both Melin and Sveen’s adult children sought to claim the insurance proceeds. In light of Minnesota’s extension of the revocation-upon-divorce statute to life insurance policies, Sveen’s insurance company sought clarification in federal district court regarding whether Melin should still be considered the primary beneficiary. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Sveens, applying the revocation-upon-divorce statute retroactively to remove Melin as a beneficiary.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit reversed that judgment, however, reasoning that retroactive application of the statute in these circumstances would violate the Contracts clause. The Supreme Court thereafter granted certiorari to consider that core issue: whether the application of a revocation-upon-divorce statute to a contract signed before the statute’s enactment violates the contracts clause.
To discuss the case, we have Prof. James Ely, Professor of Law Emeritus at Vanderbilt University Law School.

As always, the Federalist Society takes no position on particular legal or public policy issues; all expressions of opinion are those of the speakers.]]>602constitution,federal courts,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/lozman-v-city-of-riviera-beach-florida-pFane Lozman moved to Riviera Beach, Florida in 2006, where he lived on a floating home in the Riviera Beach Marina. Shorty after moving to Riviera Beach, Lozman learned of the City’s new redevelopment plan for the Marina, which, by using eminent domain, sought to revitalize the waterfront. Lozman, who opposed this plan, became known as an “outspoken critic.” During the finalization of the redevelopment plan, the state legislature passed a bill prohibiting the use of eminent domain for private development; however, in order to push through the plan, the Riviera Beach City Council held a special emergency meeting the day before the Governor signed the bill into law. In response, Lozman filed suit against the City in June 2006.
At a City Council regular public session in November 2006, Lozman was granted permission to speak during the “non-agenda” public comments portion of the meeting. Lozman’s comments were interrupted by a member of the City Council, who, after a quick interchange with Lozman, called a city police officer to dismiss Lozman from the podium. Lozman refused to be seated without finishing his comments, and the police officer warned him that he would be arrested if he did not comply. Lozman continued his comments, was arrested, and was charged with disorderly conduct and resisting arrest without violence. These charges were later dismissed.
In 2008, Lozman filed suit in district court against the City of Riviera Beach, arguing that his arrest had constituted unlawful retaliation by the City because of Lozman’s earlier opposition to the redevelopment plan. A jury found in favor of the City, however, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that judgment. The jury’s determination that the arrest had been supported by probable cause, the court concluded, defeated Lozman’s First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim as a matter of law. The federal circuit courts of appeals have divided on that issue, however, and the Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to address whether the existence of probable cause defeats a First Amendment retaliatory-arrest claim as a matter of law.
To discuss the case, we have Lisa Soronen, Executive Director of the State & Local Legal Center.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/14339525Tue, 20 Mar 2018 14:10:09 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn February 27, 2018, the Supreme Court heard argument in Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Florida, a case involving a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim. Fane Lozman moved to Riviera Beach, Florida in 2006, where he lived on a floating home...Fane Lozman moved to Riviera Beach, Florida in 2006, where he lived on a floating home in the Riviera Beach Marina. Shorty after moving to Riviera Beach, Lozman learned of the City’s new redevelopment plan for the Marina, which, by using eminent domain, sought to revitalize the waterfront. Lozman, who opposed this plan, became known as an “outspoken critic.” During the finalization of the redevelopment plan, the state legislature passed a bill prohibiting the use of eminent domain for private development; however, in order to push through the plan, the Riviera Beach City Council held a special emergency meeting the day before the Governor signed the bill into law. In response, Lozman filed suit against the City in June 2006.
At a City Council regular public session in November 2006, Lozman was granted permission to speak during the “non-agenda” public comments portion of the meeting. Lozman’s comments were interrupted by a member of the City Council, who, after a quick interchange with Lozman, called a city police officer to dismiss Lozman from the podium. Lozman refused to be seated without finishing his comments, and the police officer warned him that he would be arrested if he did not comply. Lozman continued his comments, was arrested, and was charged with disorderly conduct and resisting arrest without violence. These charges were later dismissed.
In 2008, Lozman filed suit in district court against the City of Riviera Beach, arguing that his arrest had constituted unlawful retaliation by the City because of Lozman’s earlier opposition to the redevelopment plan. A jury found in favor of the City, however, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that judgment. The jury’s determination that the arrest had been supported by probable cause, the court concluded, defeated Lozman’s First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim as a matter of law. The federal circuit courts of appeals have divided on that issue, however, and the Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to address whether the existence of probable cause defeats a First Amendment retaliatory-arrest claim as a matter of law.
To discuss the case, we have Lisa Soronen, Executive Director of the State & Local Legal Center.]]>642federal courts,first amendment,state governments,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/digital-realty-trust-v-somers-post-decisIn 2014, then-Vice President of Digital Realty Trust, Inc. Paul Somers reported to his senior management that he suspected securities-law violations by the company. He was subsequently terminated. Prior to his termination, Somers had expressed his concerns internally only and not to the Securities and Exchange Commission. He sued Digital Realty Trust in federal district court, alleging unlawful whistleblower retaliation under Dodd-Frank. Digital Realty moved to dismiss the case, arguing that Somers did not qualify as a whistleblower because he had not reported his suspicions to the Commission. The district court rejected that argument and a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding that whistleblower protection can extend to persons who have not actually reported suspected violations to the Commission. This decision aggravated a split in the federal circuit courts of appeals on the issue, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.
By a vote of 9-0 the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Ginsburg, the Court held that Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation whistleblower protection does not extend to an individual who has not reported a violation of securities laws to the Securities and Exchange Commission. Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, which was joined by Justice Breyer. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, which was joined by Justices Alito and Gorsuch.
To discuss the case, we have Todd Braunstein, Global Head of Legal Investigations at Willis Towers Watson.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/14202766Mon, 05 Mar 2018 14:48:43 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn February 21, 2018, the Supreme Court decided Digital Realty Trust v. Somers. Among other things, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) endeavors to protect “whistleblowers,” who are...In 2014, then-Vice President of Digital Realty Trust, Inc. Paul Somers reported to his senior management that he suspected securities-law violations by the company. He was subsequently terminated. Prior to his termination, Somers had expressed his concerns internally only and not to the Securities and Exchange Commission. He sued Digital Realty Trust in federal district court, alleging unlawful whistleblower retaliation under Dodd-Frank. Digital Realty moved to dismiss the case, arguing that Somers did not qualify as a whistleblower because he had not reported his suspicions to the Commission. The district court rejected that argument and a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding that whistleblower protection can extend to persons who have not actually reported suspected violations to the Commission. This decision aggravated a split in the federal circuit courts of appeals on the issue, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.
By a vote of 9-0 the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Ginsburg, the Court held that Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation whistleblower protection does not extend to an individual who has not reported a violation of securities laws to the Securities and Exchange Commission. Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, which was joined by Justice Breyer. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, which was joined by Justices Alito and Gorsuch.
To discuss the case, we have Todd Braunstein, Global Head of Legal Investigations at Willis Towers Watson.]]>749federal courts,financial services,labor & employment law,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/husted-v-a-philip-randolph-institute-posThe National Voters Regulation Act of 1993 (NVRA) and the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) require that States maintain their lists of registered voters in such a way as to ensure proper removal of individuals no longer eligible to vote for certain reasons, such as a felony conviction. In addition, the State of Ohio has undertaken steps to ensure inactive registrants are still living at the address at which they are registered to vote. The principal way Ohio does this is by comparing names and addresses contained in its own voter registration database to the National Change of Address (NCOA) database generated from U.S. Postal Service data. Ohio’s Secretary of State then provides each county’s Board of Elections (BOE) with a list of registered voters who appear to have moved. The BOE thereafter sends each of these voters a postage-prepaid forwardable notice on which the voter must indicate whether he or she still lives at the address of registration. Recipients of this notice are subsequently removed from the voter registration list if they (1) do not respond to the confirmation notice or update their registration, and, (2) do not subsequently vote during a period of four consecutive years that includes two federal elections.
Ohio has also implemented a “Supplemental Process,” however. Under this process each BOE compiles a list of voters who have not engaged in “voter activity” for the past two years (meaning filing a change of address form with a state agency, casting an absentee ballot, voting in person on election day, or casting a provisional ballot). The BOE sends these registrants a confirmation notice similar to the one used in the NCOA process. Voters sent a confirmation notice are removed from the rolls if they subsequently fail to vote for four years and fail either to respond to the confirmation notice or re-register.
The A. Philip Randolph Institute and other affiliates sued Ohio Secretary of State Jon Husted in federal district court, alleging that Ohio’s Supplemental Process violated the NVRA and HAVA, and seeking an injunction reinstating voters removed from the state registry under the Supplemental Process. Although the Secretary amended the confirmation notice format during the course of the litigation, neither the original version nor the revised version attempts to inform recipients who have moved how properly to register to vote in their new district. The district court denied relief and gave judgment in favor of the Secretary. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, however, reversed that judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Supreme Court then granted certiorari to address whether Ohio’s Supplemental Process runs afoul of NVRA and HAVA.
To discuss the case, we have Michael Morley, Assistant Professor of Law at Barry University School of Law.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/14128494Fri, 23 Feb 2018 19:07:42 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn January 10, 2018, the Supreme Court heard argument in Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute, a case involving a dispute over the process for removing inactive voters from voter registration lists in the State of Ohio. The National Voters...The National Voters Regulation Act of 1993 (NVRA) and the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) require that States maintain their lists of registered voters in such a way as to ensure proper removal of individuals no longer eligible to vote for certain reasons, such as a felony conviction. In addition, the State of Ohio has undertaken steps to ensure inactive registrants are still living at the address at which they are registered to vote. The principal way Ohio does this is by comparing names and addresses contained in its own voter registration database to the National Change of Address (NCOA) database generated from U.S. Postal Service data. Ohio’s Secretary of State then provides each county’s Board of Elections (BOE) with a list of registered voters who appear to have moved. The BOE thereafter sends each of these voters a postage-prepaid forwardable notice on which the voter must indicate whether he or she still lives at the address of registration. Recipients of this notice are subsequently removed from the voter registration list if they (1) do not respond to the confirmation notice or update their registration, and, (2) do not subsequently vote during a period of four consecutive years that includes two federal elections.
Ohio has also implemented a “Supplemental Process,” however. Under this process each BOE compiles a list of voters who have not engaged in “voter activity” for the past two years (meaning filing a change of address form with a state agency, casting an absentee ballot, voting in person on election day, or casting a provisional ballot). The BOE sends these registrants a confirmation notice similar to the one used in the NCOA process. Voters sent a confirmation notice are removed from the rolls if they subsequently fail to vote for four years and fail either to respond to the confirmation notice or re-register.
The A. Philip Randolph Institute and other affiliates sued Ohio Secretary of State Jon Husted in federal district court, alleging that Ohio’s Supplemental Process violated the NVRA and HAVA, and seeking an injunction reinstating voters removed from the state registry under the Supplemental Process. Although the Secretary amended the confirmation notice format during the course of the litigation, neither the original version nor the revised version attempts to inform recipients who have moved how properly to register to vote in their new district. The district court denied relief and gave judgment in favor of the Secretary. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, however, reversed that judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Supreme Court then granted certiorari to address whether Ohio’s Supplemental Process runs afoul of NVRA and HAVA.
To discuss the case, we have Michael Morley, Assistant Professor of Law at Barry University School of Law.]]>1179election law,federal courts,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/encino-motorcars-v-navarro-post-argumentCongress enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) in 1938 to “protect all covered workers from substandard wages and oppressive working hours,” and it requires overtime pay for employees covered under the Act who work more than 40 hours in a given week. The FLSA exempts from this requirement, however, “any salesman, partsman, or mechanic primarily engaged in selling or servicing automobiles, trucks, or farm implements, if he is employed by a nonmanufacturing establishment primarily engaged in the business of selling such vehicles or implements to ultimate purchasers….”
Hector Navarro and other service advisors filed suit against their employer Encino Motorcars, alleging that it violated the FLSA by failing to pay them overtime wages. Encino countered that as service advisors, Navarro and the other plaintiffs fell within the FLSA exemption. The district court ruled in favor of Encino, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, relying upon a 2011 regulation issued by the Department of Labor (DOL) and indicating that service advisors were not covered by the exemption. The Supreme Court, however, thereafter vacated the judgment of the Ninth Circuit. Determining that the regulation at issue was procedurally defective, the Court remanded the case for the Ninth Circuit to construe the FLSA exemption without “placing controlling weight” on the DOL regulation.
On remand, the Ninth Circuit, assuming without deciding that the DOL regulation was entitled to no weight, held that the FLSA exemption, on its own terms, did not encompass service advisors. As a result, the court indicated, plaintiffs could proceed against Encino on their claims for overtime. Encino petitioned for certiorari, however, and the Supreme Court agreed to take up the case a second time to consider again whether service advisors at car dealerships are exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act's overtime-pay requirements.
To discuss the case, we have Tammy McCutchen, Principal at Littler Mendelson, PC.
This podcast is cosponsored with the Labor & Employment Law Practice Group.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/14109698Wed, 21 Feb 2018 15:08:57 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn January 17, 2018, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Encino Motorcars v. Navarro, a case on its second trip to the high court regarding a dispute over the application of the Fair Labor Standard Act’s overtime-pay requirements for...Congress enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) in 1938 to “protect all covered workers from substandard wages and oppressive working hours,” and it requires overtime pay for employees covered under the Act who work more than 40 hours in a given week. The FLSA exempts from this requirement, however, “any salesman, partsman, or mechanic primarily engaged in selling or servicing automobiles, trucks, or farm implements, if he is employed by a nonmanufacturing establishment primarily engaged in the business of selling such vehicles or implements to ultimate purchasers….”
Hector Navarro and other service advisors filed suit against their employer Encino Motorcars, alleging that it violated the FLSA by failing to pay them overtime wages. Encino countered that as service advisors, Navarro and the other plaintiffs fell within the FLSA exemption. The district court ruled in favor of Encino, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, relying upon a 2011 regulation issued by the Department of Labor (DOL) and indicating that service advisors were not covered by the exemption. The Supreme Court, however, thereafter vacated the judgment of the Ninth Circuit. Determining that the regulation at issue was procedurally defective, the Court remanded the case for the Ninth Circuit to construe the FLSA exemption without “placing controlling weight” on the DOL regulation.
On remand, the Ninth Circuit, assuming without deciding that the DOL regulation was entitled to no weight, held that the FLSA exemption, on its own terms, did not encompass service advisors. As a result, the court indicated, plaintiffs could proceed against Encino on their claims for overtime. Encino petitioned for certiorari, however, and the Supreme Court agreed to take up the case a second time to consider again whether service advisors at car dealerships are exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act's overtime-pay requirements.
To discuss the case, we have Tammy McCutchen, Principal at Littler Mendelson, PC.
This podcast is cosponsored with the Labor & Employment Law Practice Group.]]>1081federal courts,labor & employment law,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/cyan-inc-v-beaver-county-employees-retirIn 1995, Congress enacted the Private Securities and Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) to address various abuses then taking place with respect to securities litigation. When plaintiffs then proceeded to file securities actions in state rather than federal courts in an effort to avoid PSLRA restrictions, Congress enacted the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA), to “prevent certain State private securities class action lawsuits alleging fraud from being used to frustrate the objectives of the [PSLRA].” Among other things, SLUSA amended the concurrent jurisdiction of federal and state courts over enforcement suits under the 1933 Securities Act to except “covered class actions,” which were otherwise provided for in Section 77p(c) of the Act. That section precludes covered class actions alleging state-law securities claims and permits precluded actions to be removed to and dismissed in federal court.
In 2014, Beaver County Employees Retirement Fund brought a “covered class action” against Cyan, Inc. in California Superior Court, alleging violations of the 1933 Securities Act’s disclosure requirements. The Fund alleged no state law claims, only the federal Securities Act violations. Arguing that the state courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the federal claims in the wake of SLUSA, Cyan sought judgment on the pleadings. The Superior Court denied relief, following precedent from the California Court of Appeal (Second District) indicating that “concurrent jurisdiction of a covered class action alleging only claims under the 1933 Act ‘survived the amendments’ that SLUSA had made to that statute.” The California Court of Appeal (First District) affirmed the Superior Court, and the Supreme Court of California denied further review.
The U.S. Supreme Court then granted certiorari to resolve whether state courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over “covered class actions” that allege only claims under the Securities Act of 1933.
To discuss the case, we have Thaya Brook Knight, Associate Director of Financial Regulation Studies at the Cato Institute.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/13897843Fri, 26 Jan 2018 23:17:05 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn November 28, 2017, the Supreme Court heard argument in Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver County Employees Retirement Fund, a case involving a dispute over the concurrent jurisdiction of federal and state courts regarding class-action lawsuits that allege...In 1995, Congress enacted the Private Securities and Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) to address various abuses then taking place with respect to securities litigation. When plaintiffs then proceeded to file securities actions in state rather than federal courts in an effort to avoid PSLRA restrictions, Congress enacted the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA), to “prevent certain State private securities class action lawsuits alleging fraud from being used to frustrate the objectives of the [PSLRA].” Among other things, SLUSA amended the concurrent jurisdiction of federal and state courts over enforcement suits under the 1933 Securities Act to except “covered class actions,” which were otherwise provided for in Section 77p(c) of the Act. That section precludes covered class actions alleging state-law securities claims and permits precluded actions to be removed to and dismissed in federal court.
In 2014, Beaver County Employees Retirement Fund brought a “covered class action” against Cyan, Inc. in California Superior Court, alleging violations of the 1933 Securities Act’s disclosure requirements. The Fund alleged no state law claims, only the federal Securities Act violations. Arguing that the state courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the federal claims in the wake of SLUSA, Cyan sought judgment on the pleadings. The Superior Court denied relief, following precedent from the California Court of Appeal (Second District) indicating that “concurrent jurisdiction of a covered class action alleging only claims under the 1933 Act ‘survived the amendments’ that SLUSA had made to that statute.” The California Court of Appeal (First District) affirmed the Superior Court, and the Supreme Court of California denied further review.
The U.S. Supreme Court then granted certiorari to resolve whether state courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over “covered class actions” that allege only claims under the Securities Act of 1933.
To discuss the case, we have Thaya Brook Knight, Associate Director of Financial Regulation Studies at the Cato Institute.]]>1052corporations,federal courts,securities & antitrust,state courts,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/kernan-v-cuero-and-dunn-v-madison-post-dUp first is Kernan v. Cuero. Michael Cuero pled guilty to two felony charges, on the understanding that the maximum prison time he faced was 14 years and 4 months. In the course of making his plea Cuero admitted to a previous conviction for residential burglary, which qualified as a predicate offense or “strike” under California’s “three strikes” law. After the plea but before sentencing, however, the prosecution realized that another of Cuero’s previous convictions counted as a second such strike. Over Cuero’s objection, the trial court granted the prosecution’s motion to amend its criminal complaint to add the additional strike--but also permitted Cuero to withdraw his guilty plea in light of the change. He ultimately entered a new guilty plea to the amended complaint, and the presence of the second strike exposed him to an enhanced sentence of a minimum of 25 years and a maximum of life imprisonment. Cuero was then sentenced to 25 years to life, the conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, and his state habeas petition was denied by the California Supreme Court.
Cuero then sought habeas relief in federal district court, which denied his petition. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however, reversed that judgment and held that the state trial court had “acted contrary to clearly established Supreme Court law” by refusing to enforce the original plea agreement with its 14-years-and-4 months maximum sentence.
On November 9 the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the Ninth Circuit had erred when it held that “federal law” as interpreted by the Supreme Court “clearly” established that specific performance of the original plea agreement was constitutionally required.
Our next case is Dunn v. Madison. In 2016, Vernon Madison petitioned an Alabama trial court to stay his death sentence after a series of recent strokes which, he argued, left him incompetent to be executed. Madison has been awaiting his death sentence since the 1980s, when he was convicted of capital murder. In Ford v. Wainwright and Panetti v. Quarterman the Supreme Court indicated that a person is entitled to relief if it could be proven that he “suffers from a mental illness which deprives [him] of the mental capacity to rationally understand that he is being executed as a punishment for a crime.” The trial court held a hearing to consider the testimony of two psychologists: one court-appointed and the other hired by Madison’s counsel. Although they acknowledged that Madison’s mental awareness and memory of past events may have declined post-stroke, both psychologists indicated that he could understand that Alabama was seeking retribution against him for his criminal act. The trial court denied Madison’s petition.
Madison then sought habeas relief in federal district court, claiming that the state court had incorrectly applied Ford and Panetti and that its judgment was “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented.” The District Court denied relief but a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit granted a certificate of appealability and reversed. As Madison no longer remembers committing his capital offense, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned, he cannot rationally understand the connection between his crime and his execution.
The U.S. Supreme Court thereafter reversed the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit, explaining in a per curiam opinion that neither Panetti nor Ford “clearly established” that a prisoner is incompetent to be executed because of a failure to remember his commission of the crime, as distinct from a failure to rationally comprehend the concepts of crime and punishment as applied in his case. The state court, the Supreme Court held, did not apply Panetti or Ford unreasonably, nor rely upon an unreasonable assessment of the evidence before it. Madison therefore was not entitled to federal habeas relief.
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Breyer and Sotomayor, issued a concurring opinion. Justice Breyer also issued a concurring opinion.
To discuss these cases, we have Kent Scheidegger, Legal Director of the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/13644578Thu, 21 Dec 2017 15:59:58 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn November 6, 2017, the Supreme Court issued per curiam decisions in Kernan v. Cuero and Dunn v. Madison, both cases involving habeas petitions filed by state prisoners. In this episode, we will be discussing both decisions. Up first is Kernan v....Up first is Kernan v. Cuero. Michael Cuero pled guilty to two felony charges, on the understanding that the maximum prison time he faced was 14 years and 4 months. In the course of making his plea Cuero admitted to a previous conviction for residential burglary, which qualified as a predicate offense or “strike” under California’s “three strikes” law. After the plea but before sentencing, however, the prosecution realized that another of Cuero’s previous convictions counted as a second such strike. Over Cuero’s objection, the trial court granted the prosecution’s motion to amend its criminal complaint to add the additional strike--but also permitted Cuero to withdraw his guilty plea in light of the change. He ultimately entered a new guilty plea to the amended complaint, and the presence of the second strike exposed him to an enhanced sentence of a minimum of 25 years and a maximum of life imprisonment. Cuero was then sentenced to 25 years to life, the conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, and his state habeas petition was denied by the California Supreme Court.
Cuero then sought habeas relief in federal district court, which denied his petition. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however, reversed that judgment and held that the state trial court had “acted contrary to clearly established Supreme Court law” by refusing to enforce the original plea agreement with its 14-years-and-4 months maximum sentence.
On November 9 the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the Ninth Circuit had erred when it held that “federal law” as interpreted by the Supreme Court “clearly” established that specific performance of the original plea agreement was constitutionally required.
Our next case is Dunn v. Madison. In 2016, Vernon Madison petitioned an Alabama trial court to stay his death sentence after a series of recent strokes which, he argued, left him incompetent to be executed. Madison has been awaiting his death sentence since the 1980s, when he was convicted of capital murder. In Ford v. Wainwright and Panetti v. Quarterman the Supreme Court indicated that a person is entitled to relief if it could be proven that he “suffers from a mental illness which deprives [him] of the mental capacity to rationally understand that he is being executed as a punishment for a crime.” The trial court held a hearing to consider the testimony of two psychologists: one court-appointed and the other hired by Madison’s counsel. Although they acknowledged that Madison’s mental awareness and memory of past events may have declined post-stroke, both psychologists indicated that he could understand that Alabama was seeking retribution against him for his criminal act. The trial court denied Madison’s petition.
Madison then sought habeas relief in federal district court, claiming that the state court had incorrectly applied Ford and Panetti and that its judgment was “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented.” The District Court denied relief but a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit granted a certificate of appealability and reversed. As Madison no longer remembers committing his capital offense, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned, he cannot rationally understand the connection between his crime and his execution.
The U.S. Supreme Court thereafter reversed the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit, explaining in a per curiam opinion that neither Panetti nor Ford “clearly...]]>844criminal law & procedure,federal courts,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/ayestas-v-davis-post-argument-scotuscastManuel Ayestas was sentenced to death for murder, and his conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in 1998. Ayestas then sought state habeas relief, claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel because his attorney had failed to bring Honduras-based family members to Texas in order to testify to Ayestas’s good character and lack of criminal record in Honduras. The Texas state district court found that Ayestas’s trial counsel, though ultimately unsuccessful, had acted with reasonable diligence, and therefore denied habeas relief. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed in 2008.
In 2009 Ayestas sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, claiming that his trial counsel had acted ineffectively by failing to properly investigate all potentially mitigating evidence. An effective investigation, Ayestas argued, would have uncovered his lack of a criminal record in Honduras, his schizophrenia, and his addiction to drugs and alcohol. The district court determined that Ayestas had procedurally defaulted this claim by failing to raise it in state habeas proceedings, and found no cause to excuse that default. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability.
In 2012, however, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Martinez v. Ryan that the ineffectiveness of state habeas counsel in failing to claim ineffective assistance of trial counsel may provide cause to excuse a procedural default. Although the Fifth Circuit denied Ayestas’s motion for a rehearing based on the Martinez ruling, the Supreme Court vacated that judgment and remanded Ayestas’s case for further consideration in light of the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Trevino v. Thaler, which made clear that Martinez applied in the context of Texas state procedures. The Fifth Circuit in turn remanded Ayestas’s case to the district court to reconsider his procedurally defaulted ineffective assistance claim in the first instance.
On remand Ayestas filed a motion for investigative assistance under 18 U.S.C. § 3599(f), requesting a mitigation specialist in order to develop his broader ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. In 2014 the district court denied habeas relief, concluding that neither Ayestas’s trial nor state habeas counsel had been constitutionally ineffective, and that a mitigation specialist was therefore not “reasonably necessary.” Ayestas thereafter moved to amend his federal habeas petition to add claims relating to a recently discovered prosecution memorandum suggesting that the push for capital punishment in Ayestas’s case was improperly motivated by his national origin. He also sought a stay in federal court until he exhausted these new claims in state court. The district court denied all relief and denied a certificate of appealability. The Fifth Circuit affirmed in all respects.
The Supreme Court granted Ayestas’s subsequent certiorari petition to address whether the Fifth Circuit erred in concluding that 18 U.S.C. § 3599(f) withholds “reasonably necessary” resources to investigate and develop an ineffective assistance of counsel claim that state habeas counsel forfeited, where the claimant's existing evidence does not meet the ultimate burden of proof at the time the Section 3599(f) motion is made.
To discuss the case, we have Dominic Draye, Solicitor General of the State of Arizona.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/13485358Fri, 01 Dec 2017 21:34:45 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn November 7, 2017, the Supreme Court heard argument in Ayestas v. Davis, a case involving the extent to which 18 U.S.C. § 3599, which allows indigent defendants to obtain “reasonably necessary” investigative services in connection...Manuel Ayestas was sentenced to death for murder, and his conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in 1998. Ayestas then sought state habeas relief, claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel because his attorney had failed to bring Honduras-based family members to Texas in order to testify to Ayestas’s good character and lack of criminal record in Honduras. The Texas state district court found that Ayestas’s trial counsel, though ultimately unsuccessful, had acted with reasonable diligence, and therefore denied habeas relief. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed in 2008.
In 2009 Ayestas sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, claiming that his trial counsel had acted ineffectively by failing to properly investigate all potentially mitigating evidence. An effective investigation, Ayestas argued, would have uncovered his lack of a criminal record in Honduras, his schizophrenia, and his addiction to drugs and alcohol. The district court determined that Ayestas had procedurally defaulted this claim by failing to raise it in state habeas proceedings, and found no cause to excuse that default. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability.
In 2012, however, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Martinez v. Ryan that the ineffectiveness of state habeas counsel in failing to claim ineffective assistance of trial counsel may provide cause to excuse a procedural default. Although the Fifth Circuit denied Ayestas’s motion for a rehearing based on the Martinez ruling, the Supreme Court vacated that judgment and remanded Ayestas’s case for further consideration in light of the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Trevino v. Thaler, which made clear that Martinez applied in the context of Texas state procedures. The Fifth Circuit in turn remanded Ayestas’s case to the district court to reconsider his procedurally defaulted ineffective assistance claim in the first instance.
On remand Ayestas filed a motion for investigative assistance under 18 U.S.C. § 3599(f), requesting a mitigation specialist in order to develop his broader ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. In 2014 the district court denied habeas relief, concluding that neither Ayestas’s trial nor state habeas counsel had been constitutionally ineffective, and that a mitigation specialist was therefore not “reasonably necessary.” Ayestas thereafter moved to amend his federal habeas petition to add claims relating to a recently discovered prosecution memorandum suggesting that the push for capital punishment in Ayestas’s case was improperly motivated by his national origin. He also sought a stay in federal court until he exhausted these new claims in state court. The district court denied all relief and denied a certificate of appealability. The Fifth Circuit affirmed in all respects.
The Supreme Court granted Ayestas’s subsequent certiorari petition to address whether the Fifth Circuit erred in concluding that 18 U.S.C. § 3599(f) withholds “reasonably necessary” resources to investigate and develop an ineffective assistance of counsel claim that state habeas counsel forfeited, where the claimant's existing evidence does not meet the ultimate burden of proof at the time the Section 3599(f) motion is made.
To discuss the case, we have Dominic Draye, Solicitor General of the State of Arizona.]]>1161criminal law & procedure,federal courts,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/patchak-v-zinke-post-argument-scotuscastIn 2012, the Supreme Court held in the case Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak that David Patchak had prudential standing to bring a lawsuit under the Administrative Procedure Act against the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI), to challenge DOI’s taking title under the Indian Reorganization Act to a certain tract of land that was then put into trust for use by the Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians, also known as the Gun Lake Band or Gun Lake Tribe. Congress responded by passing the Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act (the Gun Lake Act), reaffirming DOI’s taking of land into trust for the Gun Lake Tribe, removing jurisdiction from the federal courts over any actions relating to the land in question, and indicating that any such actions “shall be promptly dismissed.” The district court in which Patchak had filed his suit determined that its jurisdiction to resolve the suit had been stripped by the Gun Lake Act and that the act was not unconstitutional. It therefore dismissed Patchak’s case. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment on appeal.
The Supreme Court then granted certiorari to address whether a statute directing the federal courts to “promptly dismiss” a pending lawsuit following substantive determinations by the courts (including the Supreme Court’s determination that the “suit may proceed”) – without amending the underlying substantive or procedural laws – violates the Constitution's separation of powers principles.
To discuss the case, we have Erik Zimmerman, Attorney at Robinson Bradshaw.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/13466404Wed, 29 Nov 2017 20:12:42 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn November 7, 2017, the Supreme Court heard argument in Patchak v. Zinke, a case involving separation of powers concerns that may arise when Congress passes a statute directing federal courts to “promptly dismiss” a pending lawsuit...In 2012, the Supreme Court held in the case Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak that David Patchak had prudential standing to bring a lawsuit under the Administrative Procedure Act against the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI), to challenge DOI’s taking title under the Indian Reorganization Act to a certain tract of land that was then put into trust for use by the Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians, also known as the Gun Lake Band or Gun Lake Tribe. Congress responded by passing the Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act (the Gun Lake Act), reaffirming DOI’s taking of land into trust for the Gun Lake Tribe, removing jurisdiction from the federal courts over any actions relating to the land in question, and indicating that any such actions “shall be promptly dismissed.” The district court in which Patchak had filed his suit determined that its jurisdiction to resolve the suit had been stripped by the Gun Lake Act and that the act was not unconstitutional. It therefore dismissed Patchak’s case. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment on appeal.
The Supreme Court then granted certiorari to address whether a statute directing the federal courts to “promptly dismiss” a pending lawsuit following substantive determinations by the courts (including the Supreme Court’s determination that the “suit may proceed”) – without amending the underlying substantive or procedural laws – violates the Constitution's separation of powers principles.
To discuss the case, we have Erik Zimmerman, Attorney at Robinson Bradshaw.]]>813federal courts,property law,separation of powers,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/artis-v-dc-post-argument-scotuscastIn April 2009, Stephanie Artis, a temporary employee for DC’s Department of Health (DOH), filed a claim with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging discrimination by her supervisor, Gerard Brown. Artis followed the charge with a series of grievances challenging notices of proposed infractions against her and alleging other violations of employee rights by Brown. The DOH terminated her employment in November 2010, and she lodged a final grievance in January 2011, alleging the termination was unlawful retaliation.
Artis filed suit against DC in federal district court in December 2011. She asserted a federal claim of unlawful termination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, along with various other claims arising under DC statutes and the common law. In June 2014, the district court granted DC judgment on the pleadings and dismissed Artis’ sole federal claim under Title VII. Given the facial deficiency of that claim, the district court found no basis for exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Artis’ remaining non-federal claims. Fifty-nine days later Artis refiled those remaining claims in DC Superior Court. DC responded with a motion for dismissal on the grounds that the claims were time-barred based on the relevant statutes of limitations plus 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) of the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute. The Superior Court agreed, concluding that § 1367(d) does not suspend state statutes of limitations at the time of an unsuccessful federal filing, but rather creates a thirty-day period for a claimant to file actions over which the U.S. District Court lacked jurisdiction.
The language of 1367(d) provides that statutes of limitations “shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.” On appeal to the DC Court of Appeals, Artis argued that there were nearly two years remaining on the statute of limitations when she filed her suit in the federal district court, and under the language of 1367(d) she had that period (plus thirty days) to file her claims in the Superior Court after her case was dismissed. DC countered that “tolled” should merely mean that a thirty-day “grace period” applies if the limitations period for the non-federal claims expires (as it would have in Artis’ case) while the federal claim is pending in federal court. The DC Court of Appeals found DC’s “grace period” reading more persuasive. As Artis had failed to refile her remaining claims within that grace period following dismissal, the Court of Appeals deemed them time-barred and affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the dueling interpretations of § 1367(d): whether that provision suspends the limitations period for a non-federal claim while the claim is pending and for 30 days after the claim is dismissed, or whether the tolling provision does not suspend the limitations period but merely provides 30 days beyond the dismissal for the plaintiff to refile.
To discuss the case, we have Misha Tseytlin, Solicitor General of Wisconsin.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/13441432Mon, 27 Nov 2017 16:38:16 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn November 1, 2017, the Supreme Court heard argument in Artis v. District of Columbia, a case involving a dispute over the meaning of tolling as the term is used in the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d). In April...In April 2009, Stephanie Artis, a temporary employee for DC’s Department of Health (DOH), filed a claim with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging discrimination by her supervisor, Gerard Brown. Artis followed the charge with a series of grievances challenging notices of proposed infractions against her and alleging other violations of employee rights by Brown. The DOH terminated her employment in November 2010, and she lodged a final grievance in January 2011, alleging the termination was unlawful retaliation.
Artis filed suit against DC in federal district court in December 2011. She asserted a federal claim of unlawful termination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, along with various other claims arising under DC statutes and the common law. In June 2014, the district court granted DC judgment on the pleadings and dismissed Artis’ sole federal claim under Title VII. Given the facial deficiency of that claim, the district court found no basis for exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Artis’ remaining non-federal claims. Fifty-nine days later Artis refiled those remaining claims in DC Superior Court. DC responded with a motion for dismissal on the grounds that the claims were time-barred based on the relevant statutes of limitations plus 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) of the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute. The Superior Court agreed, concluding that § 1367(d) does not suspend state statutes of limitations at the time of an unsuccessful federal filing, but rather creates a thirty-day period for a claimant to file actions over which the U.S. District Court lacked jurisdiction.
The language of 1367(d) provides that statutes of limitations “shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.” On appeal to the DC Court of Appeals, Artis argued that there were nearly two years remaining on the statute of limitations when she filed her suit in the federal district court, and under the language of 1367(d) she had that period (plus thirty days) to file her claims in the Superior Court after her case was dismissed. DC countered that “tolled” should merely mean that a thirty-day “grace period” applies if the limitations period for the non-federal claims expires (as it would have in Artis’ case) while the federal claim is pending in federal court. The DC Court of Appeals found DC’s “grace period” reading more persuasive. As Artis had failed to refile her remaining claims within that grace period following dismissal, the Court of Appeals deemed them time-barred and affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the dueling interpretations of § 1367(d): whether that provision suspends the limitations period for a non-federal claim while the claim is pending and for 30 days after the claim is dismissed, or whether the tolling provision does not suspend the limitations period but merely provides 30 days beyond the dismissal for the plaintiff to refile.
To discuss the case, we have Misha Tseytlin, Solicitor General of Wisconsin.]]>709civil rights,federal courts,labor & employment law,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/wilson-v-sellers-post-argument-scotuscas_2In 1996, Marion Wilson, Jr. was sentenced to death after being found guilty of a series of violent crimes culminating in the murder of Donovan Parks. At sentencing Wilson’s counsel argued that Wilson was not the triggerman and offered evidence of his troubled childhood; in response the state prosecutor highlighted Wilson’s criminal history and gang activity. Wilson’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. Wilson sought habeas relief in state superior court, claiming that his trial counsel offered ineffective assistance in his investigation of mitigation evidence during the trial phase of the murder trial. He offered lay testimony about his childhood and expert testimony regarding his judgment skills. The superior court denied habeas relief, concluding that the lay testimony was cumulative of other evidence offered at trial as well as inadmissible, and that the expert testimony would not have changed the outcome of the trial. In a one-sentence order, the Georgia Supreme Court summarily denied Wilson’s subsequent application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal.
Wilson then sought habeas relief in federal district court. The district court denied relief, but granted a certificate of appealability on the issue of the effectiveness of Wilson’s trial counsel at sentencing. A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief. Treating the Georgia Supreme Court’s summary refusal to grant a certificate of probable cause to appeal as the final state court decision on the merits, the Eleventh Circuit applied the test outlined by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 2011 case Harrington v. Richter, asking whether there was any reasonable basis for the Georgia Supreme Court to deny relief. The panel answered that question in the affirmative. Wilson obtained rehearing en banc before the full Eleventh Circuit, however, arguing that under the 1991 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Ylst v. Nunnemaker, the panel should instead have looked “through” the Georgia Supreme Court’s ruling back to “the last reasoned decision” by the state courts. By a vote of 6-5 the Eleventh Circuit disagreed, holding that federal courts need not “look through” a summary decision on the merits to review the reasoning of the lower state court.
The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to address whether its decision in Harrington v. Richter abrogates the presumption set forth in Ylst v. Nunnemaker that a federal court sitting in habeas proceedings should “look through” a summary state court ruling to review the last reasoned decision.
To discuss the case, we have Lee Rudofsky, Solicitor General of Arkansas.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/13387550Tue, 21 Nov 2017 22:29:39 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn October 30, 2017, the Supreme Court heard argument in Wilson v. Sellers, a case regarding the standard of review federal courts should apply to a final state court denial of habeas relief. In 1996, Marion Wilson, Jr. was sentenced to death after...In 1996, Marion Wilson, Jr. was sentenced to death after being found guilty of a series of violent crimes culminating in the murder of Donovan Parks. At sentencing Wilson’s counsel argued that Wilson was not the triggerman and offered evidence of his troubled childhood; in response the state prosecutor highlighted Wilson’s criminal history and gang activity. Wilson’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. Wilson sought habeas relief in state superior court, claiming that his trial counsel offered ineffective assistance in his investigation of mitigation evidence during the trial phase of the murder trial. He offered lay testimony about his childhood and expert testimony regarding his judgment skills. The superior court denied habeas relief, concluding that the lay testimony was cumulative of other evidence offered at trial as well as inadmissible, and that the expert testimony would not have changed the outcome of the trial. In a one-sentence order, the Georgia Supreme Court summarily denied Wilson’s subsequent application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal.
Wilson then sought habeas relief in federal district court. The district court denied relief, but granted a certificate of appealability on the issue of the effectiveness of Wilson’s trial counsel at sentencing. A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief. Treating the Georgia Supreme Court’s summary refusal to grant a certificate of probable cause to appeal as the final state court decision on the merits, the Eleventh Circuit applied the test outlined by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 2011 case Harrington v. Richter, asking whether there was any reasonable basis for the Georgia Supreme Court to deny relief. The panel answered that question in the affirmative. Wilson obtained rehearing en banc before the full Eleventh Circuit, however, arguing that under the 1991 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Ylst v. Nunnemaker, the panel should instead have looked “through” the Georgia Supreme Court’s ruling back to “the last reasoned decision” by the state courts. By a vote of 6-5 the Eleventh Circuit disagreed, holding that federal courts need not “look through” a summary decision on the merits to review the reasoning of the lower state court.
The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to address whether its decision in Harrington v. Richter abrogates the presumption set forth in Ylst v. Nunnemaker that a federal court sitting in habeas proceedings should “look through” a summary state court ruling to review the last reasoned decision.
To discuss the case, we have Lee Rudofsky, Solicitor General of Arkansas.]]>1404criminal law & procedure,federal courts,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/jesner-v-arab-bank-plc-post-argument-scoBetween 2004 and 2010, survivors of several terrorist attacks in the Middle East (or family members or estate representatives of the victims) filed lawsuits in federal district court in New York against Arab Bank, PLC, an international bank headquartered in Jordan. Plaintiffs alleged that Arab Bank had financed and facilitated the attacks in question, and they sought redress under, among other laws, the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). The district court ultimately dismissed those ATS claims based on the 2010 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., (“Kiobel I”), which concluded that ATS claims could not be brought against corporations, because the law of nations did not recognize corporate liability.
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s judgment in Kiobel (“Kiobel II”) but for a different reason: the failure to rebut a presumption against extraterritorial application of the ATS to actions that took place in the territory of a sovereign other than the United States. The district court in Jesner acknowledged this, but concluded that nothing in the Supreme Court’s decision actually contravened the Second Circuit’s original rationale regarding corporate liability, which therefore remained the law applicable to district courts within the Second Circuit. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court, agreeing that Kiobel II did not overrule Kiobel I on the issue of corporate liability under the ATS.
Other federal circuit courts of appeals, however, have read Kiobel II differently with respect to the possibility of corporate liability, creating a split with the Second Circuit--and the Supreme Court has now granted certiorari to address whether the Alien Tort Statute categorically forecloses corporate liability.
To discuss the case, we have Eugene Kontorovich, Professor of Law at Northwestern School of Law.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/13221280Wed, 01 Nov 2017 21:30:12 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn October 11, 2017, the Supreme Court heard argument in Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, a case regarding the validity of suits against corporate entities under the Alien Tort Statute. Between 2004 and 2010, survivors of several terrorist attacks in the...Between 2004 and 2010, survivors of several terrorist attacks in the Middle East (or family members or estate representatives of the victims) filed lawsuits in federal district court in New York against Arab Bank, PLC, an international bank headquartered in Jordan. Plaintiffs alleged that Arab Bank had financed and facilitated the attacks in question, and they sought redress under, among other laws, the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). The district court ultimately dismissed those ATS claims based on the 2010 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., (“Kiobel I”), which concluded that ATS claims could not be brought against corporations, because the law of nations did not recognize corporate liability.
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s judgment in Kiobel (“Kiobel II”) but for a different reason: the failure to rebut a presumption against extraterritorial application of the ATS to actions that took place in the territory of a sovereign other than the United States. The district court in Jesner acknowledged this, but concluded that nothing in the Supreme Court’s decision actually contravened the Second Circuit’s original rationale regarding corporate liability, which therefore remained the law applicable to district courts within the Second Circuit. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court, agreeing that Kiobel II did not overrule Kiobel I on the issue of corporate liability under the ATS.
Other federal circuit courts of appeals, however, have read Kiobel II differently with respect to the possibility of corporate liability, creating a split with the Second Circuit--and the Supreme Court has now granted certiorari to address whether the Alien Tort Statute categorically forecloses corporate liability.
To discuss the case, we have Eugene Kontorovich, Professor of Law at Northwestern School of Law.]]>718federal courts,international law & trade,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/national-association-of-manufacturers-v-In 2015, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and U.S. Environmental Agency (the “Agencies”) issued a final rule intended to clarify the definition of “waters of the United States” as used in the Clean Water Act (the “Clean Water Rule”). Petitioner associations and companies filed suit in various federal district and appellate courts to challenge the Clean Water Rule, claiming that the definitional changes improperly expanded the Agencies’ regulatory jurisdiction and dramatically altered the existing balance of federal-state collaboration on water resource concerns. Many of the suits were eventually consolidated before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The Clean Water Rule, Petitioners contended, is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent and was improperly adopted without satisfying the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. Petitioner National Association of Manufacturers (“NAM”), which had brought its challenge in federal district court, then intervened in the Sixth Circuit litigation and moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that judicial review must first take place in district court and that this case did not fall within the judicial review provisions of the Clean Water Act. The Sixth Circuit ultimately rejected this argument and concluded that it could exercise jurisdiction over requests for review of the Clean Water Rule under 33 U.S.C. Sec. 1369(b)(1)(F). That provision provides for exclusive jurisdiction in the federal circuit courts of appeals to review an action “issuing or denying any permit under section 1342, [the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System]....”
The question presently before the U.S. Supreme Court is whether the Sixth Circuit erred in holding that it had jurisdiction under 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(F) to assess a Clean Water Rule that did not actually “issu[e] or den[y] any permit,” but rather defined the waters that fall within the scope of the Clean Water Act.
To discuss the case, we have Jonathan Adler, Director of the Center for Business Law & Regulation at Case Western Reserve University School of Law.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/13174637Mon, 30 Oct 2017 18:38:34 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn October 11, 2017, the Supreme Court heard argument in National Association of Manufacturers v. Department of Defense, a case regarding the proper jurisdiction of federal circuit courts of appeals with respect to rules issued under the Clean Water...In 2015, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and U.S. Environmental Agency (the “Agencies”) issued a final rule intended to clarify the definition of “waters of the United States” as used in the Clean Water Act (the “Clean Water Rule”). Petitioner associations and companies filed suit in various federal district and appellate courts to challenge the Clean Water Rule, claiming that the definitional changes improperly expanded the Agencies’ regulatory jurisdiction and dramatically altered the existing balance of federal-state collaboration on water resource concerns. Many of the suits were eventually consolidated before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The Clean Water Rule, Petitioners contended, is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent and was improperly adopted without satisfying the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. Petitioner National Association of Manufacturers (“NAM”), which had brought its challenge in federal district court, then intervened in the Sixth Circuit litigation and moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that judicial review must first take place in district court and that this case did not fall within the judicial review provisions of the Clean Water Act. The Sixth Circuit ultimately rejected this argument and concluded that it could exercise jurisdiction over requests for review of the Clean Water Rule under 33 U.S.C. Sec. 1369(b)(1)(F). That provision provides for exclusive jurisdiction in the federal circuit courts of appeals to review an action “issuing or denying any permit under section 1342, [the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System]....”
The question presently before the U.S. Supreme Court is whether the Sixth Circuit erred in holding that it had jurisdiction under 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(F) to assess a Clean Water Rule that did not actually “issu[e] or den[y] any permit,” but rather defined the waters that fall within the scope of the Clean Water Act.
To discuss the case, we have Jonathan Adler, Director of the Center for Business Law & Regulation at Case Western Reserve University School of Law.]]>918administrative law & regulatio,environmental & energy law,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/gill-v-whitford-post-argument-scotuscastThe questions before the Supreme Court are as follows: (1) Whether the district court, in holding that it had the authority to entertain a statewide challenge to Wisconsin's redistricting plan instead of requiring a district-by-district analysis, ran afoul of the Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Vieth v. Jubelirer; (2) whether the district court violated Vieth when it held that Wisconsin's redistricting plan was an impermissible partisan gerrymander, even though it was undisputed that the plan complies with traditional redistricting principles; (3) whether the district court violated Vieth by adopting a watered-down version of the partisan-gerrymandering test employed by the plurality in the Supreme Court’s 1986 decision in Davis v. Bandemer; (4) whether the defendants are entitled to present additional evidence showing that they would have prevailed under the district court's test, which the court announced only after the record had closed; and (5) whether partisan-gerrymandering claims are justiciable.
To the discuss the case, we have David Casazza, Associate at Gibson Dunn & Crutcher.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/13086650Fri, 20 Oct 2017 15:50:33 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn October 3, 2017, the Supreme Court heard argument in Gill v. Whitford, a case involving claims of partisan gerrymandering. In Wisconsin’s 2010 elections, Republicans won the governorship and acquired control of the state senate. In 2011,...The questions before the Supreme Court are as follows: (1) Whether the district court, in holding that it had the authority to entertain a statewide challenge to Wisconsin's redistricting plan instead of requiring a district-by-district analysis, ran afoul of the Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Vieth v. Jubelirer; (2) whether the district court violated Vieth when it held that Wisconsin's redistricting plan was an impermissible partisan gerrymander, even though it was undisputed that the plan complies with traditional redistricting principles; (3) whether the district court violated Vieth by adopting a watered-down version of the partisan-gerrymandering test employed by the plurality in the Supreme Court’s 1986 decision in Davis v. Bandemer; (4) whether the defendants are entitled to present additional evidence showing that they would have prevailed under the district court's test, which the court announced only after the record had closed; and (5) whether partisan-gerrymandering claims are justiciable.
To the discuss the case, we have David Casazza, Associate at Gibson Dunn & Crutcher.]]>861election law,first amendment,fourteenth amendment,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/jennings-v-rodriguez-post-argument-scotuAlthough the Supreme Court heard argument on the case last term, it then requested supplemental briefing on the following questions and set the case for reargument this October: (1) Whether aliens seeking admission to the United States who are subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) must be afforded bond hearings, with the possibility of release into the United States, if detention lasts six months; (2) whether criminal or terrorist aliens who are subject to mandatory detention under Section 1226(c) must be afforded bond hearings, with the possibility of release, if detention lasts six months; and (3) whether, in bond hearings for aliens detained for six months under Sections 1225(b), 1226(c), or 1226(a), the alien is entitled to release unless the government demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the alien is a flight risk or a danger to the community, whether the length of the alien’s detention must be weighed in favor of release, and whether new bond hearings must be afforded automatically every six months.
To discuss the case, we have Richard Samp, Chief Counsel of the Washington Legal Foundation.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/13071798Wed, 18 Oct 2017 21:12:15 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn October 3, 2017, the Supreme Court heard reargument in Jennings v. Rodriguez, a class-action lawsuit by aliens challenging their continued detention under civil immigration statutes without the benefit of an individualized bond hearing or...Although the Supreme Court heard argument on the case last term, it then requested supplemental briefing on the following questions and set the case for reargument this October: (1) Whether aliens seeking admission to the United States who are subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) must be afforded bond hearings, with the possibility of release into the United States, if detention lasts six months; (2) whether criminal or terrorist aliens who are subject to mandatory detention under Section 1226(c) must be afforded bond hearings, with the possibility of release, if detention lasts six months; and (3) whether, in bond hearings for aliens detained for six months under Sections 1225(b), 1226(c), or 1226(a), the alien is entitled to release unless the government demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the alien is a flight risk or a danger to the community, whether the length of the alien’s detention must be weighed in favor of release, and whether new bond hearings must be afforded automatically every six months.
To discuss the case, we have Richard Samp, Chief Counsel of the Washington Legal Foundation.]]>896administrative law & regulatio,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/endrew-f-v-douglas-county-school-distric
Endrew F. is a student with autism who received annual IEPs from the Douglas County School District from preschool through the fourth grade. At that point, however, his parents felt his progress to be stagnating, and when the school district proposed a similar IEP for the fifth grade, Endrew’s parents moved him to a specialized private school where he made significant progress. School district officials thereafter presented Endrew’s parents with a revised IEP, but the parents considered it little better than the previous version. The parents sought reimbursement of private school tuition costs by filing an IDEA complaint with the Colorado Department of Education. Their claim was denied, however, and the denial was affirmed by both a federal district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The Tenth Circuit concluded that under Rowley, the FAPE requirement was satisfied so long as the IEP conferred more than a minimal educational benefit.

By a vote of 8-0, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Tenth Circuit and remanded the case. Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Roberts indicated that to meet its substantive obligation under the IDEA, a school must offer an IEP “reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances,” a more demanding standard than the Tenth Circuit’s de minimis one. The Court then remanded the case for further proceedings under the corrected standard.

To discuss the case, we have Daniel Woodring, principal at Woodring Law Firm.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/12946407Tue, 03 Oct 2017 13:55:18 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 22, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District, a dispute involving the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), which in exchange for federal funding requires that states provide a “free...
Endrew F. is a student with autism who received annual IEPs from the Douglas County School District from preschool through the fourth grade. At that point, however, his parents felt his progress to be stagnating, and when the school district proposed a similar IEP for the fifth grade, Endrew’s parents moved him to a specialized private school where he made significant progress. School district officials thereafter presented Endrew’s parents with a revised IEP, but the parents considered it little better than the previous version. The parents sought reimbursement of private school tuition costs by filing an IDEA complaint with the Colorado Department of Education. Their claim was denied, however, and the denial was affirmed by both a federal district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The Tenth Circuit concluded that under Rowley, the FAPE requirement was satisfied so long as the IEP conferred more than a minimal educational benefit.

By a vote of 8-0, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Tenth Circuit and remanded the case. Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Roberts indicated that to meet its substantive obligation under the IDEA, a school must offer an IEP “reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances,” a more demanding standard than the Tenth Circuit’s de minimis one. The Court then remanded the case for further proceedings under the corrected standard.

To discuss the case, we have Daniel Woodring, principal at Woodring Law Firm.]]>782civil rights,education policy,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/moore-v-texas-post-decision-scotuscast
Bobby James Moore was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death for fatally shooting a sales clerk during a failed robbery attempt. Finding Moore to be intellectually disabled under current medical diagnostic standards set forth in the latest editions of the American Association of Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD) manual and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, and invoking Atkins, a state court recommended granting Moore habeas relief in the form of life imprisonment or a new trial. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, however, rejected that recommendation based on its 2004 decision in Ex Parte Briseno, which relied on standards set forth in a predecessor manual to the AAIDD and a series of evidentiary factors. The Court of Criminal Appeals ultimately determined that Moore had failed to establish significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, and denied relief.

By a vote of 5-3, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remanded the case. In an opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg, the Supreme Court held that the Court of Criminal Appeals had failed to comply with the requirements of the Eighth Amendment and Supreme Court precedents. By rejecting the habeas court’s application of contemporary medical guidance and clinging to the outdated and nonclinical factors set forth in Briseno, the Supreme Court indicated, the Court of Criminal Appeals had failed adequately to inform itself of the medical community’s diagnostic framework as required by the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Hall v. Florida. Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion was joined by Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. The Chief Justice dissented, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito.

To discuss the case, we have Joanmarie Davoli.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/12946299Tue, 03 Oct 2017 13:43:10 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 28, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Moore v. Texas, a habeas corpus dispute regarding the scope of the Supreme Court’s 2002 decision in Atkins v. Virginia that the execution of a mentally disabled person would violate the Eighth...
Bobby James Moore was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death for fatally shooting a sales clerk during a failed robbery attempt. Finding Moore to be intellectually disabled under current medical diagnostic standards set forth in the latest editions of the American Association of Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD) manual and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, and invoking Atkins, a state court recommended granting Moore habeas relief in the form of life imprisonment or a new trial. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, however, rejected that recommendation based on its 2004 decision in Ex Parte Briseno, which relied on standards set forth in a predecessor manual to the AAIDD and a series of evidentiary factors. The Court of Criminal Appeals ultimately determined that Moore had failed to establish significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, and denied relief.

By a vote of 5-3, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remanded the case. In an opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg, the Supreme Court held that the Court of Criminal Appeals had failed to comply with the requirements of the Eighth Amendment and Supreme Court precedents. By rejecting the habeas court’s application of contemporary medical guidance and clinging to the outdated and nonclinical factors set forth in Briseno, the Supreme Court indicated, the Court of Criminal Appeals had failed adequately to inform itself of the medical community’s diagnostic framework as required by the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Hall v. Florida. Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion was joined by Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. The Chief Justice dissented, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito.

To discuss the case, we have Joanmarie Davoli.]]>1259criminal law & procedure,federal courts,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/coventry-health-care-of-missouri-inc-v-n
By a vote of 8-0, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Missouri Supreme Court and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Ginsburg, the Supreme Court held that Missouri’s prohibitions on contractual subrogation and reimbursement “relate to … payments with respect to benefits,” and are therefore preempted by FEHBA. The Court further held that FEHBA’s preemption regime comports with the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, because the statute itself and not the OPM contract triggers federal preemption. All other justices joined Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court except Justice Gorsuch, who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion.


To discuss the case, we have George Horvath, a Post-Doctoral Fellow and Lecturer at Berkeley Law.]]>https://api.spreaker.com/episode/12946262Tue, 03 Oct 2017 13:36:20 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn April 18, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Coventry Health Care of Missouri, Inc., v. Nevils. Under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959 (FEHBA), the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) may contract with private carriers to provide...
By a vote of 8-0, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Missouri Supreme Court and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Ginsburg, the Supreme Court held that Missouri’s prohibitions on contractual subrogation and reimbursement “relate to … payments with respect to benefits,” and are therefore preempted by FEHBA. The Court further held that FEHBA’s preemption regime comports with the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, because the statute itself and not the OPM contract triggers federal preemption. All other justices joined Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court except Justice Gorsuch, who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion.


To discuss the case, we have George Horvath, a Post-Doctoral Fellow and Lecturer at Berkeley Law.]]>1042federal courts,healthcare,supreme courtcleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/fry-v-napoleon-community-schools-post-de_2https://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170914_FryvNapoleonCommunitySchools91417.mp3Fri, 15 Sep 2017 16:17:19 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn February 22, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools, a dispute involving the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), which in exchange for federal funding requires that states provide a “free appropriate...816cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/white-v-pauly-post-decision-scotuscasthttps://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170912_WhitevPauly.mp3Tue, 12 Sep 2017 22:44:49 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn January 9, 2017, the Supreme Court decided White v. Pauly, a petition involving a denial of qualified immunity to law enforcement officers in a civil rights dispute. In October 2011, officers Kevin Truesdale and Michael Mariscal went to the home of...725cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/jenkins-v-hutton-virginia-v-leblanc-posthttps://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170901_JenkinsvHuttonANDVirginiavLeBlanc9117.mp3Fri, 01 Sep 2017 17:21:25 +0000The Federalist SocietyIn June, the Supreme Court issued per curiam opinions in two habeas cases: Jenkins v. Hutton and Virginia v. LeBlanc. In today’s episode, we will be discussing the opinions in both cases. -- Jenkins v. Hutton -- More than thirty years ago, an Ohio...953cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/mclane-co-v-eeoc-post-decision-scotuscashttps://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170831_McLanev.EEOC83017.mp3Thu, 31 Aug 2017 17:19:50 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn April 3, 2017, the Supreme Court decided McLane Co., Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. In 2008, Damiana Ochoa filed a sex discrimination charge under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against her former employer McLane Co.,...682cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/davila-v-davis-mcwilliams-v-dunn-post-dehttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170821_Davilav.DavisandMcWilliamsv.Dunn.mp3Mon, 21 Aug 2017 16:38:46 +0000The Federalist SocietyIn June 2017, the Supreme Court decided two cases involving habeas corpus petitions filed by state prisoners challenging the validity of their convictions and/or sentences: Davila v. Davis and McWilliams v. Dunn. -- The petition in Davila v. Davis...966cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/kokesh-v-securities-and-exchange-commisshttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170818_Kokeshv.SecuritiesandExchangeCommission81817.mp3Fri, 18 Aug 2017 14:45:14 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 5, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Kokesh v. Securities and Exchange Commission. In 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) alleged that Charles Kokesh had violated various securities laws by concealing the misappropriation of...722cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/tc-heartland-llc-v-kraft-foods-group-brahttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170811_TCHeartlandLLCv.KraftFoodsGroupBrandsLLCPostDecisison81117.mp3Fri, 11 Aug 2017 15:02:44 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn May 22, 2017, the Supreme Court decided TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC, a dispute over the proper venue for a patent infringement suit. Section 1400(b) of the patent venue statute states in relevant part that a civil action for...834cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/sandoz-inc-v-amgen-inc-post-decision-scohttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170811_SandozIncv.AmgenInc81117.mp3Fri, 11 Aug 2017 15:00:07 +0000The Federalist SocietyThe Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 (BPCIA) provides an abbreviated pathway for obtaining Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval of a drug that is biosimilar to an already licensed biological product. Among other things,...892cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/california-public-employees-retirement-shttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170809_CaliforniaPublicEmployeesRetirementSystemv.ANZSecuritiesPostDecision8917.mp3Wed, 09 Aug 2017 14:58:38 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 26, 2017, the Supreme Court decided California Public Employees’ Retirement System v. ANZ Securities. Between 2007 and 2008, Lehman Brothers Holdings raised capital through a number of public securities offerings. California Public Employees’...965cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/sessions-v-morales-santana-post-decisionhttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170807_SessionsvMoralesSantana61217.mp3Mon, 07 Aug 2017 16:09:43 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 12, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Sessions v. Morales-Santana, formerly known as Lynch v. Morales-Santana. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides for derivative acquisition of U.S. citizenship from birth, by a child born abroad,...1162cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/maslenjak-v-united-states-post-decision-http://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170726_Maslenjakv.UnitedStates72617.mp3Wed, 26 Jul 2017 16:37:30 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 22, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Maslenjak v. United States. At the close of the Bosnian civil war, Divna Maslenjak sought refugee status for herself and her family in the U.S. due to fear of persecution regarding their Serbian identity in...1025cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/ziglar-v-abbasi-post-decision-scotuscasthttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170725_Ziglarv.Abbasi72517.mp3Tue, 25 Jul 2017 15:28:09 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 19, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Ziglar v. Abbasi, which was consolidated with the cases Ashcroft v. Abbasi , and Hasty v. Abbasi. Ziglar v. Abbasi was part of a series of lawsuits brought by Muslim, South Asian, and Arab noncitizens who...648cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/hernandez-v-mesa-post-decision-scotuscashttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170724_Hernandezv.Mesa72417.mp3Mon, 24 Jul 2017 15:26:20 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 26, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Hernandez v. Mesa. In 2010, Sergio Adrian Hernandez Guereca, a fifteen-year-old Mexican national, died after being shot near the border between El Paso, Texas and Juarez, Mexico by Jesus Mesa, Jr., a U.S....1040cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/cooper-v-harris-post-decision-scotuscasthttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170720_Cooperv.Harris72017.mp3Thu, 20 Jul 2017 15:51:36 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn May 22, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Cooper v. Harris, formerly known as McCrory v. Harris. In this case, the Court considered a redistricting plan introduced in North Carolina after the 2010 census. Plaintiffs argued that North Carolina used...1299cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/trinity-lutheran-church-of-columbia-v-cohttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170718_TrinityLutheranChurchofColumbiav.Comer71817.mp3Tue, 18 Jul 2017 21:36:23 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 26, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer. The Learning Center is a licensed preschool and daycare that is operated by Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc (Trinity Lutheran). Though it incorporates...1235cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/esquivel-quintana-v-sessions-post-decisihttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170718_EsquivelQuintanav.Sessions71817.mp3Tue, 18 Jul 2017 21:34:47 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn May 30, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions. In 2009, Juan Esquivel-Quintana, who was then 21, pleaded no-contest to a California statutory rape offense after engaging in consensual sex with a 17-year old. California...810cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/murr-v-wisconsin-post-decision-scotuscashttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170720_Murrv.Wisconsin72017.mp3Tue, 18 Jul 2017 15:50:18 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 23, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Murr v. Wisconsin. In the 1960s the Murrs purchased two adjacent lots (Lots F and E), each over an acre in size, in St. Croix County, Wisconsin. In 1994 and 1995, the parents transferred the parcels to their...1357cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/bravo-fernandez-v-united-states-post-dechttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170714_BravoFernandezv.UnitedStates71417.mp3Fri, 14 Jul 2017 21:33:30 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn November 29, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Bravo-Fernandez v. United States. A jury convicted petitioners Juan Bravo-Fernandez and Hector Martínez-Maldonado of bribery in violation of 18 U. S. C. §666 but acquitted them of conspiring to violate...1174cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/impression-products-inc-v-lexmark-intern_1http://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170714_ImpressionProductsInc.v.LexmarkInternationalInc.71417.mp3Fri, 14 Jul 2017 21:31:52 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn May 30, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc. Lexmark International, Inc. (Lexmark), which owns many patents for its printer toner cartridges, allows customers to buy its cartridges through a...866cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/microsoft-corp-v-baker-post-decision-scohttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170714_MicrosoftCorp.v.Baker71417.mp3Fri, 14 Jul 2017 21:29:17 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 12, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Microsoft Corp. v. Baker. Plaintiffs brought a class action lawsuit against Microsoft Corporation (Microsoft) alleging that, during gameplay on the Xbox 360 video game console, discs would come loose and get...872cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/advocate-health-care-network-v-stapletonhttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170711_AdvocateHealthCareNetworkv.Stapleton71117.mp3Tue, 11 Jul 2017 21:26:53 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 5, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, which is consolidated with Saint Peter’s Healthcare System v. Kaplan, and Dignity Health v. Rollins. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)...1047cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/matal-v-tam-post-decision-scotuscasthttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170629_Matalv.Tam62917.mp3Thu, 29 Jun 2017 18:07:37 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 19, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Matal v. Tam. Simon Tam of The Slants, an Asian American rock band, applied to register the band’s name with the U.S. Trademark Office, but the application was denied. The Office claimed that the name would...900cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/packingham-v-north-carolina-post-decisiohttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170629_Packinghamv.NorthCarolina62917.mp3Thu, 29 Jun 2017 18:05:31 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 19, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Packingham v. North Carolina. Lester Packingham was convicted in 2002 of taking “indecent liberties” with a minor in violation of North Carolina law, and sentenced to prison time followed by supervised...668cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/czyzewski-v-jevic-holding-corporation-pohttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170602_Czyzewskiv.JevicHoldingCorporation6217.mp3Fri, 02 Jun 2017 21:39:40 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 22, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corporation. Jevic Transportation, Inc., a trucking company headquartered in New Jersey, was purchased by a subsidiary of Sun Capital Partners in 2006. In 2008 Jevic filed for...809cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/bank-of-america-corp-v-city-of-miami-poshttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170602_BankofAmericanCorp.v.CityofMiami6217.mp3Fri, 02 Jun 2017 21:38:06 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn May 1, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami, which was consolidated with Wells Fargo & Co. v. City of Miami. In this case, the city of Miami sued Bank of America Corporation and similar defendants under the Fair...751cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/weaver-v-massachusetts-post-argument-scohttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170522_Weaverv.Massachusetts52217.mp3Mon, 22 May 2017 15:16:43 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn April 19, 2017, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Weaver v. Massachusetts. Kentel Myrone Weaver was convicted of first degree murder for the 2003 shooting of Germaine Rucker. In 2011, Weaver filed a motion for a new trial, claiming that he...1010cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/turner-v-united-states-post-argument-scohttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170517_Turnerv.UnitedStates51717.mp3Wed, 17 May 2017 21:27:13 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 29, 2017, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Turner v. United States, which was consolidated with Overton v. United States. In 1984, the body of Catherine Fuller was discovered in an alley after she had been beaten and raped. Sufficient...932cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/california-public-employees-retirement-s_1http://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170517_CaliforniaPublicEmployeesRetirementSystemv.ANZSecurities51717.mp3Wed, 17 May 2017 21:19:40 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn April 17, 2017, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in California Public Employees’ Retirement System v. ANZ Securities. Between July 2007 and January 2008, Lehman Brothers raised over $31 billion through debt offerings. California Public...1143cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/national-labor-relations-board-v-sw-genehttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170516_NationalLaborRelationsBoardv.SWGeneralInc.51617.mp3Tue, 16 May 2017 21:18:14 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 21, 2017, the Supreme Court decided National Labor Relations Board v. SW General, Inc. SW General, Inc. provides ambulance services to hospitals in Arizona. A union had negotiated longevity pay for SW General’s emergency medical technicians,...1050cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/lewis-v-clarke-post-decision-scotuscasthttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170515_Lewisv.Clarke51517.mp3Mon, 15 May 2017 21:16:48 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn April 25, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Lewis v. Clarke. Petitioners Brian and Michelle Lewis were driving on a Connecticut interstate when they were struck from behind by a vehicle driven by respondent William Clarke, a Mohegan Tribal Gaming...729cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/bethune-hill-v-virginia-state-board-of-eTo discuss the case, we have Jack Park, who is Of Counsel at Strickland Brockington Lewis LLP.]]>http://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170515_BethuneHillv.VirginiaStateBoardofElections51517.mp3Mon, 15 May 2017 21:14:27 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 1, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Board of Elections. Plaintiffs in Bethune-Hill each resided in one of twelve newly proposed majority-minority districts for the Virginia Legislature, created to satisfy Section...To discuss the case, we have Jack Park, who is Of Counsel at Strickland Brockington Lewis LLP.]]>690cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/nelson-v-colorado-post-decision-scotuscahttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170511_Nelsonv.Colorado51117.mp3Thu, 11 May 2017 21:07:09 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn April 19, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Nelson v. Colorado, along with Madden v. Colorado. In both cases, petitioners had collectively paid several thousand dollars to the state of Colorado in costs, fees, and restitution payments following their...1055cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/beckles-v-united-states-post-decision-schttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170505_Becklesv.UnitedStates5517.mp3Mon, 08 May 2017 21:05:34 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 6, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Beckles v. United States. Travis Beckles, who had various felony convictions, was subsequently found guilty of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. As a result he was subject to an enhanced...977cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/star-athletica-llc-v-varsity-brands-inc-http://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170505_StarAthleticaLLCv.VarsityBrandsInc.5417.mp3Mon, 08 May 2017 21:02:27 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 22, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc. Varsity Brands, Inc. designs and manufactures clothing and accessories for use in various athletic activities, including cheerleading. Design concepts for the...494cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/trinity-lutheran-church-of-columbia-v-co_1http://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170428_TrinityLutheranChurchofColumbiav.Comer42817.mp3Fri, 28 Apr 2017 16:26:38 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn April 19, 2017, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer. The Learning Center is a licensed preschool and daycare that is operated by Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc (Trinity). Though it...901cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/advocate-health-care-network-v-stapleton_1http://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170406_AdvocateHealthCareNetworkv.Stapleton4617.mp3Thu, 06 Apr 2017 15:42:14 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 27, 2017, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, which is consolidated with Saint Peter’s Healthcare System v. Kaplan and Dignity Health v. Rollins. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of...1207cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/tc-heartland-llc-v-kraft-foods-group-bra_1http://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170406_TCHeartlandLLCv.KraftFoodsGroupBrandsLLC4617.mp3Thu, 06 Apr 2017 15:40:22 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 27, 2017, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC. TC Heartland LLC (Heartland) is organized under Indiana law and headquartered in Indiana. Kraft Food Brands LLC (Kraft) is organized under...1313cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/microsoft-corp-v-baker-post-argument-scohttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170406_MicrosoftCorp.v.Baker4617.mp3Thu, 06 Apr 2017 15:38:56 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 21, 2017, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Microsoft Corp. v. Baker. Plaintiffs brought a class action lawsuit against Microsoft Corporation (Microsoft) alleging that, during gameplay on the Xbox 360 video game console, discs would...918cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/impression-products-inc-v-lexmark-internhttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170406_ImpressionProductsInc.v.LexmarkInternationalInc.4617.mp3Thu, 06 Apr 2017 15:37:27 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 21, 2017, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc. Lexmark International, Inc. (Lexmark), which owns many patents for its printer toner cartridges, allows customers to buy its...904cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/murr-v-wisconsin-post-argument-scotuscashttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170406_Murrv.Wisconsin4617.mp3Thu, 06 Apr 2017 15:35:59 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 20, 2017, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Murr v. Wisconsin. In 1960 and 1963, the Murrs purchased two adjacent lots (Lots F and E), each over an acre in size, in St. Croix County, Wisconsin. In 1994 and 1995, the parents transferred...902cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/pena-rodriguez-v-colorado-post-decision-_1http://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170406_PenaRodriguezv.Colorado4617.mp3Thu, 06 Apr 2017 15:34:16 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 6, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado. Miguel Angel Pena-Rodriguez was convicted of unlawful sexual conduct and harassment in state trial court. Two jurors later informed Pena-Rodriguez’s counsel that another juror...1329cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/packingham-v-north-carolina-post-argumenhttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170330_Packinghamv.NorthCarolina33017.mp3Thu, 30 Mar 2017 16:51:16 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn February 27, 2017, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Packingham v. North Carolina. Lester Packingham was convicted in 2002 of taking “indecent liberties” with a minor in violation of North Carolina law, and sentenced to prison time followed...995cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/mclane-co-v-eeoc-post-argument-scotuscashttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170330_McLanev.EEOC33017.mp3Thu, 30 Mar 2017 16:49:55 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn February 21, 2017, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in McLane Co. v. EEOC. Damiana Ochoa worked for McLane Company, a supply chain company. After returning from maternity leave, Ochoa was required to take a “physical abilities” test, which she...1037cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/hernandez-v-mesa-post-argument-scotuscashttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170330_Hernandezv.Mesa33017.mp3Thu, 30 Mar 2017 16:48:02 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn February 21, 2017, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Hernandez v. Mesa. In 2010, Sergio Adrian Hernandez Guereca, a fifteen-year-old Mexican national, died after being shot near the border between El Paso, Texas and Juarez, Mexico by Jesus...1066cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/life-technologies-corp-v-promega-corp-pohttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170321_LifeTechnologiesCorp.v.PromegaCorp.32117.mp3Tue, 21 Mar 2017 16:13:58 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn February 22, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Life Technologies Corp. v. Promega Corp. Promega Corporation owned four patents for technology used in kits that can conduct genetic testing and was the exclusive licensee of a fifth patent. In 2010,...639cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/bank-of-america-corp-v-city-of-miami-pos_1http://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170215_BankofAmericanCorp.v.CityofMiami21517.mp3Wed, 15 Mar 2017 15:23:54 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn November 8, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami, which was consolidated with Wells Fargo & Co. v. City of Miami. In this case, the city of Miami sued Bank of America Corporation and similar...773cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/ziglar-v-abbasi-post-argument-scotuscasthttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170210_Ziglarv.Abbasi21017.mp3Fri, 10 Feb 2017 15:56:21 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn January 18, 2017, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Ziglar v. Abbasi, which was consolidated with the cases Ashcroft v. Abbasi and Hasty v. Abbasi. Ziglar v. Abbasi was part of a series of lawsuits brought by Muslim, South Asian, and Arab...902cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/lee-v-tam-post-argument-scotuscasthttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170210_Leev.Tam21017.mp3Fri, 10 Feb 2017 15:54:38 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn January 18, 2017, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Lee v. Tam. Simon Tam of The Slants, an Asian American rock band, applied to register the band’s name with the U.S. Trademark Office, but the application was denied. The Office claimed...442cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/state-farm-fire-and-casualty-co-v-u-s-ex_1http://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170209_StateFarmFireandCasualtyCo.v.U.S.exrel.Rigsby2917.mp3Thu, 09 Feb 2017 15:52:47 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn December 6, 2016, the Supreme Court decided State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. U.S. ex rel. Rigsby. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. (State Farm) administered separate wind and flood damage policies in the Gulf Coast area at the time of Hurricane...1575cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/samsung-electronics-co-v-apple-post-decihttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170209_SamsungElectronicsCo.v.Apple2917.mp3Thu, 09 Feb 2017 15:50:45 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn December 6, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Samsung Electronics Co. v. Apple. In April 2011, Apple sued Samsung Electronics, alleging that Samsung’s smartphones infringed on Apple’s trade dress as well as various design patents for the iPhone. A...1178cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/moore-v-texas-post-argument-scotuscasthttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170113_Moorev.Texas11317.mp3Fri, 13 Jan 2017 15:02:14 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn November 29, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Moore v. Texas. In 1980, Bobby James Moore was convicted of capital murder for the shooting of James McCarble, a seventy-year-old store clerk, in Houston, Texas. Moore was convicted and...664cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/czyzewski-v-jevic-holding-corporation-po_1http://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170111_Czyzewskiv.JevicHoldingCorporation11116.mp3Wed, 11 Jan 2017 15:00:44 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn December 7, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corporation. Jevic Transportation, Inc., a trucking company headquartered in New Jersey, was purchased by a subsidiary of Sun Capital Partners in 2006. In 2008...781cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/venezuela-v-helmerich-payne-internationahttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20170104_Venezuelav.HelmerichandPayneInternational1416.mp3Wed, 04 Jan 2017 18:05:08 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn November 2, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne International. Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Company owns a subsidiary that, in 2007, contracted to provide Venezuela's state-owned oil corporation...541cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/mccrory-v-harris-and-bethune-hill-v-virghttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20161220_McCroryv.HarrisandBethuneHillv.VirginiaStateBoardofElections121916.mp3Wed, 21 Dec 2016 15:37:50 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn December 5, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in McCrory v. Harris and Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Board of Elections. In these related cases, the Court considered redistricting plans introduced in North Carolina and Virginia after the...1401cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/beckles-v-united-states-post-argument-schttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20161220_Becklesv.UnitedStates121616.mp3Wed, 21 Dec 2016 15:35:32 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn November 28, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Beckles v. United States. Travis Beckles, who had previous felony convictions (mostly for drug possession and sales), was an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act...1114cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/salman-v-united-states-post-decision-scohttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20161220_Salmanv.UnitedStates121916.mp3Wed, 21 Dec 2016 15:33:39 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn December 6, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Salman v. United States. Bassam Yacoub Salman was convicted in a jury trial of conspiracy to commit securities fraud, as well as several counts of actual securities fraud. The government’s theory was that...1068cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/star-athletica-llc-v-varsity-brands-inc-_1http://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20161201_StarAthleticaLLCv.VarsityBrandsInc.12116.mp3Thu, 01 Dec 2016 16:34:32 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn October 31, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc. Varsity Brands, Inc. designs and manufactures clothing and accessories for use in various athletic activities, including cheerleading. Design...466cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/bosse-v-oklahoma-post-decision-scotuscashttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20161116_Bossev.Oklahoma111616.mp3Wed, 16 Nov 2016 15:18:11 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn October 11, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Bosse v. Oklahoma. In 1987, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Booth v. Maryland that the Eighth Amendment prohibits a sentencing jury in a death penalty case from considering victim impact evidence that does...776cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/national-labor-relations-board-v-sw-gene_1http://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20161115_NationalLaborRelationsBoardv.SWGeneralInc.111516.mp3Tue, 15 Nov 2016 15:16:46 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn November 7, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in National Labor Relations Board v. SW General, Inc. SW General, Inc. provides ambulance services to hospitals in Arizona. A union had negotiated “longevity pay” for SW General’s emergency...939cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/lynch-v-morales-santana-post-argument-schttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20161115_Lynchv.MoralesSantana111516.mp3Tue, 15 Nov 2016 15:14:55 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn November 9, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Lynch v. Morales-Santana. Morales-Santana’s father was born in Puerto Rico but acquired U.S. citizenship in 1917 under the Jones Act of Puerto Rico. Morales-Santana was born in 1962 in the...969cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/state-farm-fire-and-casualty-co-v-u-s-ex_2http://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20161107_StateFarmFireandCasualtyCo.v.U.S.exrel.Rigsby11716.mp3Tue, 08 Nov 2016 16:21:20 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn November 1, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. U.S. ex rel. Rigsby. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. (State Farm) administered separate wind and flood damage policies in the Gulf Coast area at the...831cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/pena-rodriguez-v-colorado-post-argument-http://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20161107_PenaRodriguezv.Colorado11716.mp3Tue, 08 Nov 2016 16:19:58 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn October 11, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado. Miguel Angel Pena-Rodriguez was convicted of unlawful sexual conduct and harassment in state trial court. Two jurors later informed Pena-Rodriguez’s counsel that...1051cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/samsung-electronics-co-v-apple-post-arguhttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20161107_SamsungElectronicsCo.v.Apple11716.mp3Tue, 08 Nov 2016 16:18:22 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn October 5, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Samsung Electronics Co. v. Apple. In April 2011, Apple sued Samsung Electronics, alleging that Samsung’s smartphones infringed on Apple’s trade dress as well as various design patents for...860cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/salman-v-united-states-post-argument-scohttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20161103_Salmanv.UnitedStates11216.mp3Thu, 03 Nov 2016 15:51:43 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn October 5, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Salman v. United States. Bassam Yacoub Salman was convicted in a jury trial of conspiracy to commit securities fraud, as well as several counts of actual securities fraud. The government’s...1253cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/supreme-court-preview-what-is-in-store-f_2http://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160928_2016SCOTUSPreview9272016.mp3Wed, 28 Sep 2016 15:49:02 +0000The Federalist SocietyOctober 4th will mark the first day of oral arguments for the 2016 Supreme Court term. The Court's docket already includes major cases involving insider trading, the Fourth Amendment, the Sixth Amendment, the Eighth Amendment, criminal law, IP and...5535cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/harris-v-arizona-independent-redistrictihttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160822_Harrisv.ArizonaIndependentRedistrictingCommission82216.mp3Mon, 22 Aug 2016 15:18:32 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn April 20, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Harris v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission. In 2012, the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission redrew the map for the state legislative districts based on the results of the 2010 census....825cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/mathis-v-united-states-post-decision-scohttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160818_Mathisv.UnitedStates81816.mp3Thu, 18 Aug 2016 21:34:15 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 23, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Mathis v. United States. The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence on a defendant convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm who also has three prior state...657cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/dollar-general-corporation-v-mississippihttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160818_DollarGeneralCorporationv.MississippiBandofChoctawIndians81816.mp3Thu, 18 Aug 2016 21:32:59 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 23, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Dollar General Corporation v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians. This case concerns a dispute over tribal court jurisdiction relating to allegations that the non-Indian manager of a Dollar General store on...817cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/voisine-v-united-states-post-decision-schttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160818_Voisinev.UnitedStates81816.mp3Thu, 18 Aug 2016 21:31:40 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 27, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Voisine v. United States. Stephen Voisine was convicted in 2003 of assaulting a woman with whom he was in a domestic relationship--a misdemeanor violation of a Maine statute. In 2009 Voisine turned a rifle...766cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/puerto-rico-v-sanchez-valle-post-decisiohttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160818_PuertoRicov.SanchezValle81716.mp3Thu, 18 Aug 2016 21:29:41 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 9, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle. Sanchez Valle was charged by Puerto Rico prosecutors with the illegal sale of weapons and ammunition without a license in violation of Puerto Rico law. While that charge was...618cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/ross-v-blake-post-decision-scotuscasthttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160728_Rossv.Blake72816.mp3Thu, 28 Jul 2016 18:22:27 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 6, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Ross v. Blake. While being moved to a prison’s segregation unit, Maryland inmate Shaidon Blake was assaulted by James Madigan, one of two guards moving him. Blake subsequently sued Madigan and fellow guard...533cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/kirtsaeng-v-john-wiley-sons-post-decisiohttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160728_Kirtsaengv.JohnWileyandSons72816.mp3Thu, 28 Jul 2016 18:20:21 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 16, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons. Academic textbook publisher John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (Wiley) owns the American copyright for textbooks and often assigns its rights to its foreign subsidiaries to publish,...551cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/utah-v-strieff-post-decision-scotuscasthttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160719_Utahv.Strieff71916.mp3Tue, 19 Jul 2016 15:14:49 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 20, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Utah v. Strieff. A police officer detained Edward Strieff after seeing him leave a residence that the officer believed, based on an anonymous tip and his own surveillance, was a base for drug dealing. A...849cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/lynch-v-arizona-post-decision-scotuscasthttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160714_Lynchv.Arizona71416.mp3Thu, 14 Jul 2016 16:11:24 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn May 31, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Lynch v. Arizona without oral argument. A jury convicted Shawn Patrick Lynch of first-degree murder, kidnapping, armed robbery, and burglary for the 2001 killing of James Panzarella. The State of Arizona...704cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/cuozzo-speed-technologies-llc-v-lee-posthttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160714_CuozzoSpeedTechnologiesLLCv.Lee71416.mp3Thu, 14 Jul 2016 16:09:51 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 20, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee. In 2011, the America Invents Act created an expedited procedure, known as inter partes review, to provide a cost-effective alternative to litigation for resolving...937cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/puerto-rico-v-franklin-california-tax-frhttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160712_PuertoRicov.FranklinCaliforniaTaxFreeTrust71216.mp3Tue, 12 Jul 2016 23:29:13 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 13, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust (consolidated with its companion case, Acosta-Febo v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust). Concerned that its public utilities were on the verge of...558cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/united-states-army-corps-of-engineers-v-http://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160712_U.S.ArmyCorpsofEngineersv.HawkesCo.71216.mp3Tue, 12 Jul 2016 23:24:57 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn May 31, 2016, the Supreme Court decided United States Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co., Inc. Hawkes Co. (Hawkes) applied to the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) for a Clean Water Act permit to begin extracting peat from wetlands in northern...1121cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/dietz-v-bouldin-post-decision-scotuscasthttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160712_Dietzv.Bouldin71216.mp3Tue, 12 Jul 2016 23:23:05 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 9, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Dietz v. Bouldin. Petitioner Rocky Dietz sued respondent Hillary Bouldin for negligence for injuries suffered in an automobile accident. Bouldin removed the case to Federal District Court. At trial, Bouldin...695cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/united-states-v-bryant-post-decision-scohttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160712_UnitedStatesv.Bryant71216.mp3Tue, 12 Jul 2016 23:18:50 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 13, 2016, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Bryant. Michael Bryant, Jr., has multiple tribal-court convictions for domestic assault. For most of those convictions he was sentenced to terms of imprisonment, none of them exceeding one...557cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/universal-health-services-v-u-s-ex-rel-ehttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160712_UniversalHealthServicesv.U.S.exrel.Escobar71216.mp3Tue, 12 Jul 2016 23:15:30 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 16, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Universal Health Services v. United States ex rel. Escobar. This case involves the federal False Claims Act, which allows a private party to bring a “qui tam” action alleging that the defendant defrauded the...909cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/united-states-v-texas-post-decision-scothttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160712_UnitedStatesv.Texas71216.mp3Tue, 12 Jul 2016 23:12:29 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 23, 2016, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Texas. This case relates back to the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) 2012 Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, which set forth special criteria to direct how DHS...485cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/whole-womans-health-v-hellerstedt-post-dhttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160712_WholeWomansHealthv.Hellerstedt71216.mp3Tue, 12 Jul 2016 23:10:51 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 27, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt. Whole Woman’s Health and other Texas abortion providers sued Texas officials seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against a state law requiring that physicians who...1339cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/mcdonnell-v-united-states-post-decision-http://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160712_McDonnellv.UnitedStates71216.mp3Tue, 12 Jul 2016 23:06:03 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 27, 2016, the Supreme Court decided McDonnell v. United States. Robert F. McDonnell, former Governor of Virginia, was convicted in a jury trial of eleven counts of corruption. During the trial prosecutors sought to prove that McDonnell and his...1011cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/fisher-v-univ-of-texas-at-austin-post-dehttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160712_Fisherv.UniversityofTexasatAustin71216.mp3Tue, 12 Jul 2016 21:42:22 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 23, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin. This is the second time the case has come before the high court. Abigail Fisher, a white female, applied for admission to the University of Texas at Austin (the...655cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/rjr-nabisco-inc-v-the-european-communityhttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160712_RJRNabiscoInc.v.TheEuropeanCommunity71216.mp3Tue, 12 Jul 2016 21:39:48 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 20, 2016, the Supreme Court decided RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. The European Community. The European Community and 26 of its member states sued RJR Nabisco (RJR) in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, alleging that RJR...762cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/gobeille-v-liberty-mutual-insurance-comphttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160712_Gobeillev.LibertyMutualInsuranceCompany71216.mp3Tue, 12 Jul 2016 21:37:53 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 1, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Gobeille v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company. -- Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty Mutual) operates a self-insured employee health plan through a third-party administrator. Vermont state law...969cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/halo-electronics-v-pulse-electronics-poshttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160712_HaloElectronicsv.PulseElectronics62726.mp3Tue, 12 Jul 2016 21:36:05 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 13, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Halo Electronics v. Pulse Electronics, which was consolidated with Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer. Both of these cases involved claims of patent infringement relating to the sale or marketing of various inventions....701cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/bernard-v-minnesota-post-argument-scotushttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160616_Bernardv.Minnesota61616.mp3Thu, 16 Jun 2016 16:35:40 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn April 20, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Bernard v. Minnesota, which was consolidated with Birchfield v. North Dakota and Beylund v. Levi. -- In Bernard, William Robert Bernard, Jr., admitted he had been drinking, but he denied...867cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/crst-van-expedited-inc-v-eeoc-post-decishttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160616_CRSTVanExpeditedInc.v.EEOC61616.mp3Thu, 16 Jun 2016 16:34:13 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn May 19, 2016, the Supreme Court decided CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. EEOC. In 2007, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed a sexual harassment suit against CRST Van Expedited (CRST) on behalf of approximately 270 female employees....512cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/simmons-v-himmelreich-post-decision-scothttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160614_Simmonsv.Himmelreich61416.mp3Wed, 15 Jun 2016 16:40:01 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 6, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Simmons v. Himmelreich. This case arose out of lawsuits filed by federal prisoner Walter Himmelreich after he was assaulted by a fellow prisoner. Himmelreich’s initial lawsuit, filed against the United...464cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/williams-v-pennsylvania-post-decision-schttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160614_Williamsv.Pennsylvania61416.mp3Wed, 15 Jun 2016 16:38:28 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn June 9, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Williams v. Pennsylvania. Terrance Williams was convicted and sentenced to death for the robbery and murder of Amos Norwood. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed Williams’ conviction and sentence, and...826cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/wittman-v-personhuballah-post-decision-shttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160614_Wittmanv.Personhuballah61416.mp3Wed, 15 Jun 2016 16:25:44 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn May 23, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Wittman v. Personhuballah. In 2012, the Virginia State Legislature adopted a redistricting plan that altered the composition of the Third Congressional District by increasing the percentage of...440cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/sturgeon-v-frost-post-decision-scotuscashttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160602_Sturgeonv.Frost6216.mp3Thu, 02 Jun 2016 19:04:39 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 22, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Sturgeon v. Frost. Sturgeon challenged a National Park Service (NPS) ban on the operation of hovercraft on the National River, part of which falls within the Yukon-Charley River National Preserve. The State...858cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/husky-international-electronics-inc-v-rihttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160602_HuskyInternationalElectronicsInc.v.Ritz6216.mp3Thu, 02 Jun 2016 19:02:53 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn May 16, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz. Between 2003 and 2007 Husky International Electronics sold and delivered electronic device components worth more than $160,000 to Chrysalis Manufacturing Corp....636cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/sheriff-v-gillie-post-decision-scotuscashttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160602_Sheriffv.Gillie6116.mp3Wed, 01 Jun 2016 19:00:54 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn May 16, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Sheriff v. Gillie. This case involves litigation between debtors to Ohio institutions and special counsel who sought to collect money owed to the institutions. Two questions were before the Supreme Court: (1)...1153cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/woods-v-etherton-post-decision-scotuscashttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160531_Woodsv.Etherton52716.mp3Tue, 31 May 2016 19:45:43 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn April 4, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Woods v. Etherton without oral argument. -- Timothy Etherton was convicted in Michigan state court of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, and the conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. His...527cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/zubik-v-burwell-post-decision-scotuscast
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) requires that group health plans and health insurance issuers provide coverage for women’s “preventative care,” or face financial penalties. Although the ACA does not define preventative care, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), relying on the Institute of Medicine, determined that the term encompassed, among other things, all FDA-approved contraceptive methods, including drugs and devices that could induce an abortion. Federal regulations require petitioners to cover these contraceptives as part of their health plans, unless petitioners submit a form either to their insurer or to the Federal Government, stating that they object on religious grounds to providing contraceptive coverage. Petitioners resisted, asserting that submitting the notice substantially burdened the exercise of their religion, in violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. The ensuing litigation yielded different outcomes in different U.S. Courts of Appeals, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Following oral argument, the Court requested supplemental briefing from the parties addressing “whether contraceptive coverage could be provided to petitioners’ employees, through petitioners’ insurance companies, without any such notice from petitioners.” -- After receiving the supplemental briefs the Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the Courts of Appeals by a vote of 8-0 and remanded the cases to the Third, Fifth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits, respectively. The Court’s per curiam opinion explained that “‘the parties on remand should be afforded an opportunity to arrive at an approach going forward that accommodates petitioners’ religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women covered by petitioners’ health plans ‘receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage.’” Furthermore, the Court indicated it was expressing no view on the merits of the cases and stated that “nothing in this opinion, or in the opinions or orders of the courts below, is to affect the ability of the Government to ensure that women covered by petitioners’ health plans ‘obtain, without cost, the full range of FDA-approved contraceptives.’" At the same time, the Court noted, throughout this litigation, petitioners had made the Government aware of their view that they meet “the requirements for exemption from the contraceptive coverage requirement on religious grounds” and nothing in the Court’s opinion, or in the opinions or orders of the courts below, “precludes the Government from relying on this notice, to the extent it considers it necessary, to facilitate the provision of full contraceptive coverage going forward.” And because the Government may rely on this notice, the Court indicated, “the Government may not impose taxes or penalties on petitioners for failure to provide the relevant notice.” -- Justice Sotomayor issued a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Ginsburg. -- To discuss the case, we have Roger Severino, who is Director, DeVos Center for Religion and Civil Society, The Heritage Foundation.]]>http://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160523_Zubikv.Burwell52316.mp3Mon, 23 May 2016 19:44:03 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn May 16, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Zubik v. Burwell, the lead case in a consolidated series, with the other petitioners including Priests for Life, Southern Nazarene University, Geneva College, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Washington, East...
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) requires that group health plans and health insurance issuers provide coverage for women’s “preventative care,” or face financial penalties. Although the ACA does not define preventative care, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), relying on the Institute of Medicine, determined that the term encompassed, among other things, all FDA-approved contraceptive methods, including drugs and devices that could induce an abortion. Federal regulations require petitioners to cover these contraceptives as part of their health plans, unless petitioners submit a form either to their insurer or to the Federal Government, stating that they object on religious grounds to providing contraceptive coverage. Petitioners resisted, asserting that submitting the notice substantially burdened the exercise of their religion, in violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. The ensuing litigation yielded different outcomes in different U.S. Courts of Appeals, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Following oral argument, the Court requested supplemental briefing from the parties addressing “whether contraceptive coverage could be provided to petitioners’ employees, through petitioners’ insurance companies, without any such notice from petitioners.” -- After receiving the supplemental briefs the Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the Courts of Appeals by a vote of 8-0 and remanded the cases to the Third, Fifth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits, respectively. The Court’s per curiam opinion explained that “‘the parties on remand should be afforded an opportunity to arrive at an approach going forward that accommodates petitioners’ religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women covered by petitioners’ health plans ‘receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage.’” Furthermore, the Court indicated it was expressing no view on the merits of the cases and stated that “nothing in this opinion, or in the opinions or orders of the courts below, is to affect the ability of the Government to ensure that women covered by petitioners’ health plans ‘obtain, without cost, the full range of FDA-approved contraceptives.’" At the same time, the Court noted, throughout this litigation, petitioners had made the Government aware of their view that they meet “the requirements for exemption from the contraceptive coverage requirement on religious grounds” and nothing in the Court’s opinion, or in the opinions or orders of the courts below, “precludes the Government from relying on this notice, to the extent it considers it necessary, to facilitate the provision of full contraceptive coverage going forward.” And because the Government may rely on this notice, the Court indicated, “the Government may not impose taxes or penalties on petitioners for failure to provide the relevant notice.” -- Justice Sotomayor issued a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Ginsburg. -- To discuss the case, we have Roger Severino, who is Director, DeVos Center for Religion and Civil Society, The Heritage Foundation.]]>1217cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/heffernan-v-city-of-paterson-post-decisihttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160517_Heffernanv.CityofPaterson51716.mp3Tue, 17 May 2016 21:19:01 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn April 26, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Heffernan v. City of Paterson. Jeffrey Heffernan was a police officer for the City of Paterson, New Jersey. A fellow police officer observed Heffernan picking up a campaign sign for the mayoral candidate...322cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/hughes-v-talen-energy-marketing-post-dechttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160516_Hughesv.TalenEnergyMarketing51616.mp3Mon, 16 May 2016 16:24:22 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn April 19, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing and several consolidated companion cases. The Court considered whether Maryland encroached on the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC) rate-setting power when...546cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/bank-markazi-v-peterson-post-decision-schttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160516_BankMarkaziv.Peterson51616.mp3Mon, 16 May 2016 16:22:46 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn April 20, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Bank Markazi v. Peterson. The Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 makes a designated set of assets available to satisfy the judgments gained in separate actions by victims of terrorist...992cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/ocasio-v-united-states-post-decision-scohttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160516_Ocasiov.UnitedStates51616.mp3Mon, 16 May 2016 16:21:30 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn May 2, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Ocasio v. United States. Former police officer Samuel Ocasio challenged his conviction under the Hobbs Act for conspiracy to commit extortion, which arose from an alleged kickback scheme under which police...959cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/evenwel-v-abbott-post-decision-scotuscashttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160516_Evenwelv.Abbott51616.mp3Mon, 16 May 2016 16:20:04 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn April 4, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Evenwel v. Abbott. As required by the Texas Constitution, the Texas legislature reapportioned its senate districts after the publication of the 2010 census, formally adopting an interim plan that had been...1305cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/mcdonnell-v-united-states-post-argument-http://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160513_McDonnellv.UnitedStates51316.mp3Fri, 13 May 2016 16:18:32 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn April 27, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in McDonnell v. United States. Robert F. McDonnell, former Governor of Virginia, was convicted in a jury trial of eleven counts of corruption. During the trial, prosecutors sought to prove that...1044cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/united-states-v-texas-post-argument-scothttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160512_UnitedStatesv.Texas51216.mp3Thu, 12 May 2016 19:30:57 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn April 18, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in United States v. Texas. This case relates back to the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) 2012 Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, which set forth special criteria to...778cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/cuozzo-speed-technologies-llc-v-lee-post_1http://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160512_CuozzoSpeedTechnologiesLLCv.Lee51216.mp3Thu, 12 May 2016 19:28:16 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn April 25, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee. In 2011 the America Invents Act created an expedited procedure, known as inter partes review, to provide a cost-effective alternative to litigation for...731cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/kirtsaeng-v-john-wiley-sons-post-argumenhttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160512_Kirtsaengv.JohnWileyandSons51216.mp3Thu, 12 May 2016 19:25:44 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn April 25, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons. Academic textbook publisher John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (Wiley) owns the American copyright for textbooks and often assigns its rights to its foreign subsidiaries...563cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/bruce-v-samuels-post-decision-scotuscasthttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160510_Brucev.Samuels51016.mp3Tue, 10 May 2016 20:10:35 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn January 12, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Bruce v. Samuels. The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 provides that those prisoners qualified to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) must nonetheless pay an initial partial filing fee, set as “20 percent...980cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/lockhart-v-united-states-post-decision-shttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160509_Lockhartv.UnitedStates5616.mp3Mon, 09 May 2016 17:21:03 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 1, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Lockhart v. United States. Petitioner Avondale Lockhart pleaded guilty to possessing child pornography. Because Lockhart had a prior state-court conviction for first-degree sexual abuse involving his adult...656cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/williams-v-pennsylvania-post-argument-schttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160420_Williamsv.Pennsylvania42016.mp3Wed, 20 Apr 2016 18:28:30 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn February 29, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Williams v. Pennsylvania. Terrance Williams was convicted and sentenced to death for the robbery and murder of Amos Norwood. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed Williams’...806cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/welch-v-united-states-post-decision-scothttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160420_Welchv.UnitedStates42016.mp3Wed, 20 Apr 2016 18:26:53 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn April 18, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Welch v. United States. Gregory Welch pleaded guilty to the charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of federal law. Because Welch had three prior felony convictions, the district...687cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/kansas-v-carr-post-decision-scotuscasthttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160420_Kansasv.Carr42016.mp3Wed, 20 Apr 2016 18:24:49 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn January 20, 2016, the Supreme Court decided three consolidated death penalty cases: Kansas v. Carr, a second Kansas v. Carr, and Kansas v. Gleason. -- A Kansas jury sentenced Sidney Gleason to death for killing a co-conspirator and her boyfriend...882cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/united-states-army-corps-of-engineers-v-_1http://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160420_UnitedStatesArmyCorpsofEngineersv.HawkesCo.Inc.42016.mp3Wed, 20 Apr 2016 18:23:18 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 30, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in United States Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co., Inc. Hawkes Co. (Hawkes) applied to the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) for a Clean Water Act permit to begin extracting peat from...1364cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/zubik-v-burwell-post-argument-scotuscasthttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160420_Zubikv.Burwell42016.mp3Wed, 20 Apr 2016 18:21:25 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 23, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Zubik v. Burwell, the lead case in a consolidated series, with the other petitioners including Priests for Life, Southern Nazarene University, Geneva College, Roman Catholic Archbishop of...1421cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/caetano-v-massachusetts-post-decision-schttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160420_Caetanov.Massachusetts42016.mp3Wed, 20 Apr 2016 18:19:32 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 21, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Caetano v. Massachusetts without oral argument. -- Jamie Caetano was convicted of violating a Massachusetts law prohibiting possession of stun guns. On appeal, she claimed this law violated the Second...437cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/rjr-nabisco-inc-v-the-european-community_1http://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160420_RJRNabiscoInc.v.TheEuropeanCommunity42016.mp3Wed, 20 Apr 2016 18:16:44 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 21, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. The European Community. The European Community and 26 of its member states sued RJR Nabisco (RJR) in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York,...1345cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/friedrichs-v-california-teachers-associahttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160420_Friedrichsv.CaliforniaTeachersAssociation42016.mp3Wed, 20 Apr 2016 18:16:44 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 29, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association. A group of public school employees sued the California Teachers Association and various other entities, arguing that the agency shop arrangement itself--as...966cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/betterman-v-montana-post-argument-scotushttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160413_Bettermanv.Montana41316.mp3Thu, 14 Apr 2016 00:09:31 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 28, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Betterman v. Montana. Brandon Thomas Betterman pled to and was sentenced for the offense of bail-jumping. He argued on appeal that a 14-month delay between the entry of his guilty plea and...833cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/nichols-v-united-states-post-decision-schttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160407_Nicholsv.UnitedStates4716.mp3Thu, 07 Apr 2016 17:06:05 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn April 4, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Nichols v. United States. Petitioner Nichols, a registered sex offender who moved from Kansas to the Philippines without updating his registration, was arrested, escorted to the United States, and charged...669cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/luis-v-u-s-post-decision-scotuscasthttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160406_Luisv.U.S.4616.mp3Wed, 06 Apr 2016 17:04:38 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 30, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Luis v. U.S. In 2012, a grand jury indicted Luis for a variety of crimes relating to health care fraud. The government contended that she had fraudulently obtained some $45 million, and had spent all except...737cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/crst-van-expedited-inc-v-eeoc-post-argumhttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160405_CRSTVanExpeditedInc.v.EEOC4516.mp3Tue, 05 Apr 2016 16:57:54 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn February 22, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. EEOC. In 2007, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed a sexual harassment suit against CRST Van Expedited (CRST) on behalf of approximately...835cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/v-l-v-e-l-post-decision-scotuscasthttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160330_V.L.v.E.L.33016.mp3Thu, 31 Mar 2016 14:25:54 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 7, 2016, the Supreme Court decided V.L. v. E.L., a case involving an interstate dispute over custody of a child raised by a same-sex couple. A Georgia court entered a final judgment of adoption making petitioner V. L. a legal parent of the...823cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/kingdomware-technologies-v-united-stateshttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160330_KingdomwareTechnologiesv.UnitedStates33016.mp3Thu, 31 Mar 2016 14:23:19 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn February 22, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Kingdomware Technologies v. United States. Kingdomware Technologies is a certified, service-disabled veteran owned small business, or SDVOSB--a special type of veteran-owned small...974cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/wittman-v-personhuballah-post-argument-shttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160330_Wittmanv.Personhuballah33016.mp3Wed, 30 Mar 2016 14:19:58 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 21, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Wittman v. Personhuballah. In 2012, the Virginia State Legislature adopted a redistricting plan that altered the composition of the Third Congressional District by increasing the percentage...822cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/simmons-v-himmelreich-post-argument-scothttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160325_Simmonsv.Himmelreich32516.mp3Tue, 29 Mar 2016 15:52:28 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 22, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Simmons v. Himmelreich. This case arises from a lawsuit filed by federal prisoner Walter Himmelreich as the result of an assault by a fellow prisoner. Although several of Himmelreich’s...781cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/puerto-rico-v-franklin-california-tax-fr_1http://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160325_PuertoRicov.FranklinCaliforniaTaxFreeTrust32516.mp3Mon, 28 Mar 2016 15:50:35 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 22, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust (consolidated with its companion case, Acosta-Febo v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust). -- Concerned that its public utilities were on...940cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/voisine-v-united-states-post-argument-schttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160325_Voisinev.UnitedStates32516.mp3Mon, 28 Mar 2016 15:49:00 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn February 29, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Voisine v. United States. Stephen Voisine was convicted in 2003 of assaulting a woman with whom he was in a domestic relationship--a misdemeanor violation of a Maine statute. In 2009...1100cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/montanile-v-board-of-trustees-of-the-nathttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160322_Montanilev.BoardofTrusteesoftheNationalElevatorIndustryHealthBenefitPlan32216.mp3Wed, 23 Mar 2016 15:47:43 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn January 20, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Montanile v. Board of Trustees of the National Elevator Industry Health Benefit Plan. Petitioner Montanile was injured by a drunk driver and his benefits plan paid more than $120,000 in medical expenses....809cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/halo-electronics-v-pulse-electronics-pos_1http://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160314_HaloElectronicsv.PulseElectronics31416.mp3Mon, 14 Mar 2016 15:44:45 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn February 23, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Halo Electronics v. Pulse Electronics, which was consolidated with Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer. Both of these cases involved claims of patent infringement relating to the sale or marketing of...598cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/americold-realty-trust-v-conagra-foods-phttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160311_AmericoldRealtyTrustv.ConAgraFoods31116.mp3Fri, 11 Mar 2016 14:40:02 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 7, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Americold Realty Trust v. ConAgra Foods, a case giving rise to a dispute over the scope of federal courts’ diversity jurisdiction. A group of corporations whose food perished in a warehouse fire sued the...932cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/campbell-ewald-company-v-gomez-post-decihttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160311_CampbellEwaldCompanyv.Gomez31116.mp3Fri, 11 Mar 2016 14:38:43 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn January 20, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Campbell-Ewald Company v. Gomez. This case concerns a complaint by Jose Gomez that Campbell-Ewald Company, a marketing consultant for the U.S. Navy, allowed a third-party vendor to send him unsolicited...861cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/whole-womans-health-v-hellerstedt-post-ahttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160309_WholeWomansHealthv.Hellerstedt3916.mp3Wed, 09 Mar 2016 16:01:02 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 2, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt. Whole Woman’s Health and other Texas abortion providers sued Texas officials seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against a state law requiring that...1491cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/husky-international-electronics-inc-v-ri_1http://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160307_HuskyInternationalElectronicsInc.v.Ritz3716.mp3Mon, 07 Mar 2016 15:59:41 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 1, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz. Between 2003 and 2007 Husky International Electronics sold and delivered electronic device components worth more than $160,000 to Chrysalis...763cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/hughes-v-talen-energy-marketing-post-arghttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160307_Hughesv.TalenEnergyMarketing3716.mp3Mon, 07 Mar 2016 15:58:05 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn February 24, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in the consolidated cases Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing and CPV Maryland, LLC v. Talen Energy Marketing. -- In this case, the Supreme Court considers whether Maryland encroached on the...450cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/welch-v-united-states-post-argument-scothttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160405_Welchv.UnitedStates4516.mp3Sat, 05 Mar 2016 16:56:09 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn March 30, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Welch v. United States. Police entered Gregory Welch’s apartment believing that a robbery suspect was on the premises, and after he consented to search they located a gun and ammunition that...590cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/amgen-inc-v-harris-post-decision-scotuschttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160224_AmgenInc.v.Harris22416.mp3Thu, 25 Feb 2016 15:33:00 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn January 25, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Amgen Inc v. Harris without oral argument. Former employees of an Amgen subsidiary had participated in a benefit plan that offered ownership of Amgen stock. When the value of Amgen stock fell in 2007,...797cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/montgomery-v-louisiana-post-decision-scohttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160222_Montgomeryv.Louisiana22226.mp3Mon, 22 Feb 2016 19:50:32 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn January 25, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Montgomery v. Louisiana. Petitioner Montgomery was 17 years old in 1963, when he killed a deputy sheriff in Louisiana and received a mandatory sentence of life without parole. In 2012 the U.S. Supreme...750cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/musacchio-v-united-states-post-decision-http://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160217_Musacchiov.UnitedStates21716.mp3Wed, 17 Feb 2016 23:43:43 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn January 25, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Musacchio v. United States. Petitioner Musacchio was convicted in a jury trial on two counts of violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. At trial, the district court had incorrectly instructed the jury...831cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/federal-energy-regulatory-commission-v-ehttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160217_FederalEnergyRegulatoryCommissionv.ElectricPowerSupplyAssociation21716.mp3Wed, 17 Feb 2016 23:41:58 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn January 25, 2016, the Supreme Court decided several energy cases consolidated under the heading Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Electric Power Supply Association. These cases concern a practice called “demand re­sponse,” in which operators...696cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/sturgeon-v-frost-post-argument-scotuscashttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160217_Sturgeonv.Frost21716.mp3Wed, 17 Feb 2016 21:23:00 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn January 20, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Sturgeon v. Frost. Sturgeon challenged a National Park Service (NPS) ban on the operation of hovercraft on the National River, part of which falls within the Yukon-Charley River National...1147cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/puerto-rico-v-sanchez-valle-post-argumenhttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160212_PuertoRicov.SanchezValle21216.mp3Fri, 12 Feb 2016 22:37:34 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn January 13, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle. Sanchez Valle was charged by Puerto Rico prosecutors with the illegal sale of weapons and ammunition without a license in violation of Puerto Rico law. While...347cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/hurst-v-florida-post-decision-scotuscasthttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160211_Hurstv.Florida21116.mp3Thu, 11 Feb 2016 14:37:32 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn January 12, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Hurst v. Florida. The question before the Court was whether Florida’s death sentencing scheme--which Hurst contends does not require unanimity in the jury death recommendation or in the finding of...595cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/harris-v-arizona-independent-redistricti_1http://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160211_Harrisv.ArizonaIndependentRedistrictingCommission21116.mp3Thu, 11 Feb 2016 14:36:18 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn December 8, 2015, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Harris v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission. In 2012, the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission redrew the map for the state legislative districts based on the results of...1548cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/fisher-v-university-of-texas-at-austin-phttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160211_Fisherv.UniversityofTexasatAustin21116.mp3Thu, 11 Feb 2016 14:34:33 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn December 9, 2015, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin. This is the second time the case has come before the high court. -- Abigail Fisher, a white female, applied for admission to the University of...1194cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/evenwel-v-abbott-post-argument-scotuscashttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160211_Evenwelv.Abbott21116.mp3Thu, 11 Feb 2016 14:33:00 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn December 8, 2015, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Evenwel v. Abbott. As required by the Texas Constitution, the Texas legislature reapportioned its senate districts after the publication of the 2010 census, formally adopting an interim...1456cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/tyson-foods-v-bouaphakeo-post-argument-shttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160211_TysonFoodsv.Bouaphakeo21116.mp3Thu, 11 Feb 2016 14:30:49 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn November 10, 2015, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Tyson Foods v. Bouaphakeo. Peg Bouaphakeo and the rest of the plaintiffs in this class action are current and former employees of Tyson Foods. They claim that Tyson violated the Fair Labor...702cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/heffernan-v-city-of-paterson-post-argumehttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160210_Heffernanv.CityofPaterson21016.mp3Wed, 10 Feb 2016 22:34:56 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn January 19, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Heffernan v. City of Paterson. Jeffrey Heffernan was a police officer for the City of Paterson, New Jersey. A fellow police officer observed Heffernan picking up a campaign sign for the...839cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/friedrichs-v-california-teachers-associa_1http://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20160113_Friedrichsv.CaliforniaTeachersAssociation11316.mp3Wed, 13 Jan 2016 21:21:13 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn January 11, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association. Under California law and existing Supreme Court precedent, unions can become the exclusive bargaining representative for the public school...906cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/directv-v-imburgia-post-decision-scotuschttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20151217_DIRECTVv.Imburgia121715.mp3Fri, 18 Dec 2015 02:48:35 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn December 14, 2015, the Supreme Court decided DIRECTV v. Imburgia. This case involves a class action lawsuit against DIRECTV by various California customers. Among other things, the agreement between DIRECTV and its customers contained a waiver of...638cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/dollar-general-corporation-v-mississippi_1http://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20151215_DollarGeneralCorporationv.MississippiBandofChoctawIndians121515.mp3Wed, 16 Dec 2015 03:55:08 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn December 7, 2015, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Dollar General Corporation v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians. This case concerns a dispute over tribal court jurisdiction relating to allegations that the non-Indian manager of a...1163cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/shapiro-v-mcmanus-post-decision-scotuscahttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20151214_Shapirov.McManus121415.mp3Mon, 14 Dec 2015 17:07:16 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn December 8, 2015, the Supreme Court decided Shapiro v. McManus. In this case several Maryland citizens sued state election officials claiming that a 2011 redistricting plan violated their rights to political association and equal representation...561cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/spokeo-inc-v-robins-post-argument-scotushttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20151209_SpokeoInc.v.Robins.mp3Wed, 09 Dec 2015 23:12:43 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn November 2, 2015, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins. Robins sued website operator Spokeo, Inc. under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, complaining that Spokeo had published inaccurate personal information about Robins....814cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/gobeille-v-liberty-mutual-insurance-comp_1http://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20151209_Gobeillev.LibertyMutualInsuranceCompany12915.mp3Wed, 09 Dec 2015 23:11:12 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn December 2, 2015, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Gobeille v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty Mutual) operates a self-insured employee health plan through a third-party administrator. Vermont...736cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/luis-v-u-s-post-argument-scotuscasthttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20151208_Luisv.U.S.12815.mp3Wed, 09 Dec 2015 04:59:33 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn November 10, 2015, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Luis v. U.S. Luis was indicated for Medicare fraud involving alleged kickbacks to patients who enrolled with Luis’ home healthcare companies. The government then brought a civil action to...669cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/obb-personenverkehr-ag-v-sachs-post-decihttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20151207_OBBPersonenverkehrAGv.Sachs12715.mp3Tue, 08 Dec 2015 03:21:36 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn December 1, 2015, the Supreme Court decided OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs. This case concerns the scope of the commercial activity exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). Under this exception, sovereign immunity does not bar a...1161cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/shapiro-v-mcmanus-post-argument-scotuscahttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20151124_Shapirov.McManus112415.mp3Tue, 24 Nov 2015 15:00:24 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn November 4, 2015, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Shapiro v. McManus. In this case several Maryland citizens sued state election officials claiming that a 2011 redistricting plan violated their rights to political association and equal...993cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/obb-personenverkehr-ag-v-sachs-post-arguhttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20151118_OBBPersonenverkehrAGv.Sachs111815.mp3Wed, 18 Nov 2015 22:23:49 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn October 5, 2015, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs. This case involves a dispute regarding whether federal courts have jurisdiction over a lawsuit brought by Carol Sachs against OBB Personenverkher--the...1507cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/mullenix-v-luna-post-decision-scotuscasthttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20151117_Mullenixv.Luna.mp3Tue, 17 Nov 2015 23:06:49 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn November 9, 2015, the Supreme Court decided Mullenix v. Luna without oral argument. The question in this case was whether a police officer who shot at the car of a fleeing and purportedly armed suspect, killing him in the process, was entitled to...906cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/campbell-ewald-company-v-gomez-post-arguhttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20151111_CampbellEwaldCompanyv.Gomez.mp3Wed, 11 Nov 2015 21:39:53 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn October 14, 2015, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Campbell-Ewald Company v. Gomez. -- This case concerns a complaint by Jose Gomez that Campbell-Ewald Company, a marketing consultant for the U.S. Navy, allowed a third-party vendor to...710cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/federal-energy-regulatory-commission-v-e_1http://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20151107_FederalEnergyRegulatoryCommissionv.ElectricPowerSupplyAssociationandEnerNOCv.ElectricPowerSupplyAssociation11615.mp3Sat, 07 Nov 2015 15:12:31 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn October 14, 2015, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Electric Power Supply Association and EnerNOC v. Electric Power Supply Association. -- These consolidated cases involve the efforts of the Federal...682cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/hurst-v-florida-post-argument-scotuscasthttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20151107_Hurstv.Florida11615.mp3Sat, 07 Nov 2015 15:10:52 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn October 13, 2015, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Hurst v. Florida. Timothy Lee Hurst was convicted of murdering his co-worker and sentenced to death after a jury recommended that penalty by a vote of 7-5. The question before the Court...682cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/ocasio-v-u-s-post-argument-scotuscasthttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20151107_Ocasiov.U.S.11615.mp3Sat, 07 Nov 2015 15:09:07 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn October 6, 2015, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Ocasio v. U.S. Ocasio challenges his conviction under the Hobbs Act for conspiracy to commit extortion, which arose from an alleged kickback scheme under which police officers funneled...679cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/directv-v-imburgia-post-argument-scotuschttp://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20151106_DIRECTVv.Imburgia11615.mp3Fri, 06 Nov 2015 15:05:42 +0000The Federalist SocietyOn October 6, 2015, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in DIRECTV v. Imburgia. This case involves a class action lawsuit which argues that DIRECTV improperly charged early termination fees to its customers. The question is whether the California...730cleanfullhttps://www.spreaker.com/user/fedsoc/supreme-court-preview-what-is-in-store-f_3http://www.fed-soc.org/library/audiolib/20150930_2015SupremeCourtPreview9302015.mp3Thu, 01 Oct 2015 16:38:00 +0000The Federalist SocietyOctober 5th will mark the first day of the 2015 Supreme Court term. Thus far, the Court's docket includes major cases involving the death penalty, affirmative action, unions, civil asset forfeiture, and more. -- Notable cases include Campbell-Ewald...4840cleanfull